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Abstract 
 
Legal positivism insists upon a distinction between the inside and outside of 
law. The common law and statutory rules of interpretation assist in maintaining 
this distinction, establishing the myth that legal decision-making is a purely 
objective and rational process, giving rise to internal truths. While critical 
theorists have illustrated the ways in which the lines between the inside and 
outside are always blurred, there remains a perceived distinction, in law, 
between the interpretation of concepts that occurs in the law and that which 
occurs outside the law. Only the former have legal legitimacy. The idea of the 
legal family is a case in point, where the law defines family according to its own 
prescriptions irrespective of how family is constituted by non-legal 
communities. In this thesis, I consider the meanings of family in different 
spheres to show how the lines between the social, the political and the legal 
consistently overlap. I then develop a mechanism by which the law can 
acknowledge and affirm that which is ‘outside’. This requires, firstly, a 
conception of law as communication and of legal interpretation as a 
constructive process. Secondly, the task demands that jurists engage with the 
semiotic processes of the everyday and that legal concepts, at least those that 
exist independently of the law (family for example) be framed with an open 
indexicality. This might enable such concepts to be interpreted according to a 
range of contexts, other than (or in addition to) the legal one. Finally, using the 
family as an example, I illustrate how a semiotic approach can assist legal 
interpretation, reform and analysis. vi 
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Introduction 
 
I'll make my report as if I told a story, for I was taught as a child on my homeworld 
that Truth is a matter of the imagination. The soundest fact may fail or prevail in 
the style of its telling: like that singular organic jewel of our seas, which grows 
brighter as one woman wears it and, worn by another, dulls and goes to dust. Facts 
are no more solid, coherent, round, and real than pearls are. But both are sensitive. 
 
The story is not all mine, nor told by me alone. Indeed I am not sure whose story it 
is; you can judge better. But it is all one, and if at moments the facts seem to alter 
with an altered voice, why then you can choose the fact you like best; yet none of 
them are false, as it is all one story (Le Guin 1990:9). 
 
Positivist legal discourses on the separation between the legal (the inside) and the 
non-legal (the outside), establish a specific legal sphere of interpretation, allowing 
law to privilege certain truths. As Davies argues, this distinction is not only 
“absolutely fundamental to law … law is this distinction” (2002:13, emphasis in 
original). 1 Enabling and assisting the separation are specific rules for judicial 
decision-making, in particular those pertaining to statutory construction and to the 
doctrine of stare decisis. These rules disguise legal interpretation as an act of truth 
finding, rather than truth construction. This legal truth can then be marked out 
from other, non-legal truths. 
 
This thesis is, firstly, a challenge to the positivist account of the legal domain and 
its interpretative practices. It then attempts to form a bridge between the so-called 
‘outside’ of the law and that which is ‘inside’ of the law, without subsuming the 
outside into the limits of the law. I suggest a semiotic approach to legal 
interpretation in cases involving social categories and concepts, as a means of 
accommodating the truths of those outside the law. I illustrate this method by 
reference to family law. 
 
This semiotic approach to reading law is central to the thesis, because it would 
create a systematic link between the inside and the outside. However, before 
explaining the approach and illustrating its use, it is necessary to set the scene. The 
approach I develop is a response to my perception of a problem for law. Hence, the 
discussion of my method comes after I establish that there is such a problem, using 
family as the example. I then provide an explanation of the relationship between 
law (the inside) and society (the outside), overview the conceptual conditions that 
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establish this boundary and explicate the ‘problem’ by reference to three spheres of 
meaning; the social, the legal and, as intermediate between the two, the political. 
 
Some readers may criticise my efforts as assuming an ontological distinction 
between inside-law and outside-law. I am clear that the domains of ‘internal’ and 
‘external’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are merely conceptual spaces, adopted by the law 
for a particular, practical purpose. When I speak of this distinction throughout the 
thesis I am not subscribing to the idea that there is an absolute separation. But I am, 
after all, talking about the practices of law and it is to these practices that I address 
my attempt to form a bridge between the two artificially distinct spaces.2 In doing 
so, I move from a critique of law as a positive, internal domain, to a pragmatic 
approach, working within this domain. 
 
The question I am trying to answer is: How can the law respect a multiplicity of 
non-legal truths whilst at the same time validating them as legal truths, without 
perpetrating a violence against these ‘others’? This is a problem with the law’s 
dealings with many facets of social life. For example, Australian Indigenous 
peoples’ relationship to land is arguably different from the legal category assigned 
to that relationship, native title, and from common law doctrines on property. 
Similarly, the criminalisation of sex workers by the law’s and the legislature’s 
construction of workers as deviants at worst, victims at best, defies and denies an 
age-old social practice. There is even a gulf between the law’s definition and the 
material of intellectual property when the law is dealing with traditional 
customary and cultural matters. In this thesis, I could use any of a wide range of 
matters, to demonstrate my argument. I have, however, chosen family as the site of 
analysis because it at once exemplifies the gulf between the legal and the social 
whilst also exposing the social dimensions of law and the law’s myths of 
determinacy and objectivity. By reference to family law, I aim to illustrate that the 
law is always social and cultural and that its truth is only one truth for a particular 
moment in time. This being so, it is justifiable to argue that the law should or could 
abandon attempts to find an objective reality and concede to non-legal truths. 
 
The law’s dealings (including its decision to deal or not to deal) with social practice 
have real and lasting consequences. In the case of the family, the way in which the 
law defines family, through statute, through the concept’s judicial history, and the 
process of legal interpretation, determines whether individuals have access to a 
particular method and set of rules for determining family-centred disputes. It also 
signals a hierarchy of legitimacy of familial forms. 
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Every person has her or his own story to tell of family and of what and who 
constitutes that family. In Anglo-Australian society, however, one model, the 
nuclear model, is privileged as an ideal, despite its diminishing numbers. This 
privileging is reflected in all facets of Australian life, including Australian family 
law. Nevertheless, the lived experiences of Australian family are multifarious. 
Families are formed through biological and/or social connection. Non-married 
couples; non-cohabiting couples, with or without children; lifelong, cohabiting 
friends; distant relatives in mutually caring relationships; heterosexual or same-sex 
unions; extended family; group households: each of these is a family, if the parties 
consider it so. There are many truths for any storyteller, depending upon the 
purpose and the audience of that story. 
 
The law is one such storyteller. It tells a particular story of family, based upon the 
intersection between the common law, statute, the facts before the court,3 the jurists 
(lawyers and judiciary) and, of course, the area of law. My focus is on that area of 
law known as family law. In this domain (as well as in others) a preferred family is 
imagined, judged as a legitimate story through a process of legal reasoning and 
cast out upon the world as the fact of family. 
 
The social implication of the law’s definition of a matter is greatest when it pertains 
to a concept that exists outside the law, such as family, as distinct from matters 
such as intellectual property, which derive meaning through the law.4 Legal 
interpretation privileges the meaning derived from this process and in court, these 
meanings will be validated, over and above the non-legal meanings held by the 
parties before the court. 
 
Witteveen, for example, distinguishes between two types of legislation, and 
develops a metaphor for a third type of legislation. Witteveen’s law types are: 
“significant laws”, “symbolic laws” and “symphonic laws”. “Significant laws” are 
largely reflective of a command model of law in which legislators clearly express 
the content of the law, closing interpretation to those skilled in legal interpretation 
(1999:32). We can also apply this model to caselaw if we consider the law as a 
direction for reading the legal principle. “Symbolic laws” include normative 
concepts and indicate a need for the jurist to refer beyond the law to formulate the 
law’s content. Witteveen notes the motherhood statements that are included in 
constitutions, such as “good faith” and “due process”, which refer to ethical 
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4 I acknowledge that our contemporary notion of family cannot exist outside of how the law 
constructs it. However, notions of kin and familial obligation have histories well beyond Westminster 
law. Introduction | 4 
attitudes and rely upon shared norms for semiotic content (1999:35-36). The third 
type of law invokes the metaphor of the symphony in which the performer (the 
jurist) and the audience (those in the everyday) are each involved in the 
interpretation of the musical score (the legal rule) (1999:47-49). I discuss 
Witteveen’s ideas further in relation to models of communication and the task of 
interpretation in part 4. Here, I draw upon these ideas to argue for the need to 
rethink the legal/non-legal divide, particularly in relation to a concept like family. 
 
I think Witteveen’s schema, with some modification, is useful for distinguishing 
between those laws which apply to matters that are an invention of the law and 
those that pre-exist the law; for instance, legal matters that have a life of their own 
outside of the law. We might see “significant laws” as those that are the invention 
of the legislature or the courts. They have form and content by virtue of the 
definition provided by the law. For example, intellectual property is a concept 
known firstly through the law. Once the abstract concept, that is, the intellectual or 
creative material, is given legal form, it may then have non-legal normative content 
by virtue of the concept’s use outside of the law. Yet the law can claim the 
category, ‘intellectual property’, as its own. It exists in the first instance because 
law has created it, even though law may then lose control of its non-legal 
normative content. However, family exists notwithstanding the definition 
provided for it in family law or any other law. It is known firstly outside the law. 
Its non-legal normative content pre-exists its legal normative content. Yet, 
generally, Australian governments have legislated on family by expressing the 
law’s content; that is by stating, directly or indirectly, the definition of family. 
Witteveen’s second model falls short of my concerns because, although it indicates 
the need for the jurist to go outside the law to determine meaning, interpretation 
remains the privilege of the jurist. The important issue for laws that relate to 
matters that are not merely legal fictions, is how to de-emphasise the role of the 
jurist and more openly engage with the social. 
 
From Witteveen’s schema I conclude that concepts derived from “significant law” 
only exist because they are inventions of the law (the proprietary status attached to 
intellectual material only exists because of the law) and so it may be proper that the 
law’s voice dominates. However, in the case of “symbolic law”, such as family, 
which exists independently of the law, the law’s version rides roughshod over 
other meanings. This is partly because the law prefers to rest on a legal normativity 
alone, failing to acknowledge the possibility that legal terms retain socially 
normative content.5 Though there are many truths to family outside of the space 
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defined as law, law only recognises those families which it deems family. Law is 
thus attempting to legislate cultural practice, an impossibility in so far as culture 
continues to duck and weave according to local specificities. 
 
In Australia, there is a specialised federal and uniform system for the resolution of 
family matters, administered by the Family Court and its mediation and 
counselling services, and enabled by the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (the FLA). As a 
Commonwealth statute, its scope is limited by the ‘marriage’ and ‘divorce and 
matrimonial causes’ powers of the Australian Constitution. The federal Parliament 
can thus only legislate on family matters to the extent conferred by the 
Constitution. A narrow reading of these powers by the High Court has meant that 
the FLA has come to apply, at least in all matters other than those pertaining to 
children, to the parties of legally sanctioned marriage, thereby excluding the 
parties of non-legally sanctioned family.6 The family of the FLA is generally a 
nuclear family, headed by a married couple. This leaves other families, including 
those headed by the parties of de facto marriages, friends who have organised their 
living arrangements so that they operate as family, siblings who cohabit and share 
household and financial arrangements like a nuclear family would, or non-
cohabiting partners (with or without children) at the mercy of the civil system. 
 
The existing approach establishes a hierarchy of legitimacy. The peak of this 
legitimacy is the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) which, in the actual naming of the 
statute, denotes family. The Act’s jurisdiction in relation to property matters is 
heteronormativity par excellence. The Commonwealth is limited by the s51 
constitutional heads of power of ‘marriage’ (placitum xxi) and ‘divorce and 
matrimonial causes’ (placitum xxii). Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P&D 
130, per Sir James Wilde, provides the authoritative definition of the legal 
institution of marriage as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, 
to the exclusion of all others”. This definition has been accepted as the terms of the 
marriage powers in Australia (per Mason and Brennan JJ in Calverley v Green 
(1984)155 CLR 242, 259-60 and Brennan J in The Queen v L (1991) 174 CLR 379, 392). 
The language of Hyde is reflected in both the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) and the FLA. 
Section 46 of the Marriage Act provides that a marriage ceremony must include the 
Hyde definition. Further, section 43(a) of the FLA provides that any exercise of the 
Act’s jurisdiction shall have regard to the “need to preserve and protect the 
institution of marriage as the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all 
                                                                                                                                          
heavily on the concept of normativity, in explaining the field of law as a closed domain. I appeal for a 
legal normativity which accommodates non-legal norms. 
6 The exception relating to children exists because of a transfer of powers by all states other than 
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others voluntarily entered into for life”. This, it would seem, is Australian family, 
firmly entrenched for almost thirty years. 
 
As a result of the jurisdictional inadequacy of the FLA, the states and territories 
have slowly introduced their own statutory measures to resolve the property 
disputes arising from those domestic relationships not defined by marriage (see De 
Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA), De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT), Domestic 
Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), Family Court Act 1975 (WA), Property Law Act 1958 
(Vic.) Property (Relationships) Act 1999 (NSW) and Relationships Act 2003 (Tas)). 
There has been a chronology in the recognition of families alternative to the FLA 
criteria. Generally, the states and territories first recognised heterosexual de facto 
relationships, then same-sex de facto relationships, and it is only recently (except in 
the case of the Australian Capital Territory) that non-couple relationships have 
been recognised as being familial in nature. In fact, Western Australia only 
recognised heterosexual de facto relationships in 2002. Until these state and 
territory statutes, any family not recognised under the FLA lacked familial status in 
the law, and its property-related disputes were relegated to the common law for 
resolution. 
 
In 2002, the state and territory Attorneys-General agreed to refer their powers to 
the Commonwealth to legislate on alternative families, and have started to do so 
(see for example, Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 (NSW)). 
However, the Commonwealth will only accept the transfer of powers in relation to 
heterosexual de facto relationships. The terms under which the Commonwealth 
will legislate for these relationships are unclear. However, it appears that 
heterosexual de facto relationships are being elevated in their status to something 
like family whilst other relationships remain in second place in terms of legal 
acceptance. The exception is WA, where heterosexual and same-sex de facto 
relationships have recently become subject to the Family Court Act 1975 (WA) in the 
same way as families which are constructed through marriage. 
 
Some readers may question why I would write a thesis drawing on the example of 
the exclusion of certain family types from the federal jurisdiction, when the states 
and territories have addressed, or are increasingly attempting to address, the 
regulatory needs of these other families. The law’s treatment of family is typical of 
the law’s difficulty in dealing with multiplicity in meaning, the meanings that 
abound outside the law. In this thesis, I will focus on the category of law known as 
family law as an explication of the ‘problem’ and the possible solutions. This is part 
of a ‘meta-problem’: that of the positivist distinction between the inside and the 
outside of law. For family, specifically, the problem is as follows. 
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Firstly, except for Western Australia, state law does not have as comprehensive a 
system of family law as exists federally. Further, a one-stop shop for dealing with 
both children and property matters is not available for families recognised by the 
states. Secondly, the traditional approach to legislating on family ensures that the 
law will always lag significantly behind the demand for such a law; that is, social 
practice. New family models develop but the courts are not statutorily equipped to 
deal with them and must await a positive act of the Parliament. However, 
recognising alternative family models is only the first step; it is then necessary to 
deal with the implications of such recognition, though this is not the subject of this 
thesis. A follow up task would be to determine the rights that would flow from the 
recognition. Thirdly, if we consider that law has some constitutive potential then it 
has a role in determining family models outside of law. People may gravitate 
towards the traditional nuclear model because it is a protected category. Finally, 
the family which the federal jurisdiction recognises is centralised and legitimised, 
while ‘other’ families are marked as such, in descending order of value. 
 
For Derrida, the creation of a centre and the marking of ‘other’ is a significatory 
violence, which the law perpetrates (1992). This violence can never be eliminated 
from the law. After all, the law’s job is to be determinative. But its power is built 
upon a myth of reason and it is here that its greatest injustice perhaps lies. In 
adhering to the fiction that law’s decisions are based upon a system of logic and 
reasoning, which is socially and culturally remote, the law effectively denies 
alternative truths. According to Cornell (1991), this has material consequences. For 
Lyotard, the creation of a situation which disables the ability of these ‘others’ to 
speak in the dominant language of family is a similar injustice (1984, 1998). 
 
In part 1 of this thesis (chapter 2), I expand on these issues. I briefly describe 
Australian family law, before drawing on the work of Derrida, Cornell and 
Lyotard to analyse the effect of the law’s inclusion/exclusion on the family. 
However, before I turn to what are essentially the motives of the thesis, I discuss, 
in chapter 1, the assumptions upon which my own reasoning rests. These include 
an idea that society, culture and law are mutually constituted, challenging the 
positivist separation between the inside and outside of law. Meanings circulate and 
are contested within and beyond these spheres. I explain that struggles over truth 
claims are made visible by a Foucauldian conception of power in which power 
relations are negotiated rather than asserted. This shows the limits of the law’s 
violence; it can not be eternal and total. However, the point is that a sign’s meaning 
is not completely closed to alternative possibilities. 
 
In part 2, I focus on legal discourse, in particular, legal theory and the rules of legal 
interpretation. The relationship between the social and the legal, between the Introduction | 8 
inside and the outside of law, is not a new jurisprudential query. Chapter 3 is an 
overview of how thinkers over the last two millennia have conceptualised the 
relationship between law and society. For natural law proponents and for 
positivists, the question has been: what is the proper place of positive law vis-à-vis 
the social? Or, where is the dividing line between the legal and the social and what 
is its effect? For others, such as ‘law in context’ thinkers, the issue has been the 
relationship between the legal and the social, or what occurs in the shared space of 
the law. Although I provide a general overview, I focus, mostly, on positivist 
theorists who have most effectively asserted the spatial distinction between the 
inside and outside of law. In fact, the foundations of the common law approach to 
legal interpretation lie in positivist theory. This provides insights to the next 
chapter (chapter 4), which is an outline of the statutory and common law rules of 
interpretation. 
 
The rules of interpretation seek to ensure determinations are made according to the 
rule of law, closing the legal domain of interpretation from the social domain. They 
consist of the doctrine of stare decisis or of legal precedent, and the statutory and 
common law rules of statutory construction. The common law doctrine of stare 
decisis was developed in the nineteenth century and was supported by an 
improved system of legal reporting. Its central principle is that a court is bound by 
an earlier case from a court of equal or higher status in the same court hierarchy. 
Its objective is to increase the degree of consistency and predictability of judicial 
decision making and, therefore, of the law in general. There are also principles 
dictating the processes for interpreting a statute. Historically, the courts have 
developed these through caselaw, but in more recent times, statutes have clarified 
them. In Australia, there are Interpretation Acts, under various nomenclatures, for 
each of the states (pertaining to state law) as well as for Commonwealth law. I 
discuss the common law rules of statutory construction before providing an outline 
of the Commonwealth Acts Interpretation Act 1901 and the subsequent decisions on 
the relationship between the two. 
 
Having presented these rules, in chapter 5 I challenge the claim that they give rise 
to a determinacy of legal meaning, by reference to what might be known as 
postmodern and post-structuralist legal, social and literary theorists. It is here that I 
introduce semiotic themes, referring to Barthes’ Mythologies with his conception of 
myth as providing a history to meaning, and Jackson’s idea of “semiotic groups” 
with their respective roles in the interpretation of the law. ‘Interpretation’ is thus a 
constructive and productive practice – constructive in terms of how a legal term 
comes to mean as well as in its relation to society practice – rather than a process of 
finding an original legal meaning demarcated from social meaning. After all, 
authorship is associated with reading practice as much as with an original setting Introduction | 9 
down of legal text. Further, although legal writing practices seek to remove the 
(original) author from the text, the subject is brought to the text in the practice of 
interpretation. I argue that the meanings associated with any text are always social. 
 
Part 3 is a consideration of the meanings of family in different spheres. It aims to 
show the contradictions within, and mobility between, the inside and outside 
spheres. My approach here is threefold. Firstly, in chapter 6, I trace the trends of 
Australian family life since federation, as an illustration of how the meaning of 
family fluctuates, to show that ‘family’ is not a category that can be legally defined. 
I refer to this sphere as the outside of law. In chapter 7, I outline Australian family 
statutory law, including the relevant provisions of the Australian Constitution, and 
examine the parliamentary debates leading to the passing of key Commonwealth 
family law statutes. This investigation is pertinent to the law because one of the 
rules of statutory interpretation is that, where there is uncertainty, the statute is to 
be interpreted by reference to the Parliament’s intent; that is, by reference to the 
‘original’ author’s meaning. The debates, however, indicate that in a political 
forum family comes to mean many things. There is much more to be found on the 
meaning of family than its definition. We can only understand the meaning of 
family for each statute – if it is to be determined by the Parliament’s intention – 
through the discourse which created it. ‘Meaning’ is a more slippery concept than 
the rules of interpretation would have us believe. I refer to this sphere as ‘before’ 
the law because, for some positivists (see Austin, for example), the parliamentary 
debates precede the law. These meanings come before the law, as an intermediate 
between the outside and the inside of law. Finally, in chapter 8, I trace the courts’ 
determinations of the meaning of family. We find here that, despite the fixity of a 
provision, family comes to represent different things in different judicial eras and 
that the judicial determination of family relies upon cultural as well as legal 
imperatives (social as well as legal norms). 
 
The relationship between these three spheres of meaning-making indicates that an 
attempt to find an original meaning is futile. Were we to depend upon something 
like the initiator’s intentions, the law would come into disrepute, insisting on the 
family forms and values of a by-gone era. This being the case, it is illogical to 
continue to rest on the myth of a determinate method of legal reasoning. It would 
be far better to concede to the social, to acknowledge that the legal cannot be 
strictly legal and that it would be superior law if it permitted a reference to the 
actual lived experience of family rather than a legacy. 
 
By exposing, theoretically and empirically, the myth of law’s reason it is possible to 
destabilise the law’s stranglehold on truth. If there is no singular truth of family, 
then law can embrace alternative and multiple versions as is socially desirable. The Introduction | 10 
next section, part 4, is the central part of the thesis. My solution to the meta-
problem described above is to devise an alternative approach to legislating on and 
interpreting social concepts, permitting an open space of meaning construction and 
allowing social practice rather than legal prescription to fill this space. 
 
Part 4 opens with a suggestion that we consider law as a form of communication 
rather than as phenomena (chapter 9). An instrumentalist view of law depicts law 
as something that is made by a Parliament, then interpreted and applied by the 
jurist, and which, finally affects society. There is a direct line from the law’s 
creation to its social effect. The law’s meaning and intent is transmitted from A to B 
and so on. Drawing on communication models and relying on semiotics and 
legislation theorists, van Schooten and Witteveen, I argue that law is constructive 
and transactional rather than transmissional in nature. That is, at each step of 
engagement, the law is constructed, and, as noted already, every reader of the law 
is its author, notwithstanding that there are different reading parameters for 
different interpretative communities. Teubner’s “autopoiesis” leads me to an 
alternative to the instrumentalist and literalist view of law (Teubner 1988:3). This 
theory posits law as a domain in which its meanings are self-generated in light of 
external (such as social) factors. 
 
Saussure first challenged philology’s focus on the original meaning of texts in the 
early twentieth century. He attributed a word’s signification to its place within a 
structure rather than to its semantic history. He coined the term ‘semiology’ to 
refer to a science of meaning which, whilst having its origins in language, could be 
translated to any sign system. Another early proponent of semiotics was the North 
American, Peirce, whose approach to the study of meaning was more behaviourist 
in fashion, focusing, to a much greater degree than Saussure, on the social 
construction of meaning. In chapter 10, I consider the explanations, strengths and 
weaknesses of these traditions by, inter alia, Silverman, Hodge, McHoul and 
Malloy and I attempt to develop my own set of “cautionary prescriptions” (to use 
Foucault’s terminology) as guides for the interpretation of legal signs as we live 
them. These might be seen as part of an approach to the legal interpretation of 
signs such as family which pre-exist, and co-exist with, their legal use. In short, I 
argue that, in such circumstances, the proper approach for the law, given the 
questions of ethics and justice raised earlier, is to undertake an investigation, 
cursory though that may be, of the semiotic practices of specific interpretative 
communities engaged with that sign. The family, then, could be validated if the 
parties before the courts have lived as family, irrespective of whether that 
particular form of family has been imagined and incorporated into the law by 
statute or common law. This is an approach which permits the practices of the 
outside of law, the a-legal (to be distinguished from il-legal), to be incorporated Introduction | 11 
inside the law. In this respect, my thesis on semiotics in law differs from the work 
of those scholars who are interested in a semiotics of law. 
 
This approach, of course, has implications not only for judicial decision making but 
also for the framing of legislation. Referring again to Witteveen’s characterisation 
of legislation types, in chapter 11, I suggest that the appropriate approach to 
legislating on family is to recognise its normative content and frame legislation in a 
way which permits the courts to defer to social practice. I refer to Witteveen’s third 
category of legislation, “symphonic law”, which is a metaphorical reference to the 
reflexivity between symphony and audience. He is suggesting that there is an 
interplay between text and reader – that the reader is productive of the text – 
conceiving of a similar possibility for some laws. 
 
Family, I argue, is not determined by form, but by practice. This is indicated in the 
socio-legal literature on family. Family means not in terms of what it looks like but 
of how people live it. By comparing the various state and Commonwealth 
approaches to family and domestic matters, I illustrate that the states and 
territories, led by the Australian Capital Territory’s (ACT) Domestic Relationships 
Act 1994 (ACT), are moving towards such a model. They are focusing upon the 
content of relationships, that is, on whether the parties have an emotional, social 
and economic inter-dependence. This replaces an approach which concentrates on 
form or content; on whether the parties are married, the nature of the connection to 
children (biological or social) and so on. In the final chapter of Part 4, chapter 12, I 
illustrate the semiotic approach to interpretation outlined in the earlier chapter. 
Firstly, I show how such an approach would assist a reading of the social family 
(the outside family) for legal purposes. I take the issue of access to the ACT 
legislation on the part of same-sex couples to show the wide ambit of the 
legislation, permitting an inquiry into the norms of particular communities. I 
suggest that one of the possibilities of such legislation is that these new, legally 
sanctioned, families may choose not to use the law. Their relationship to law is as 
related to their communities’ cultural practice as to their construction of family. 
Hence, it might be the practice of some communities not to rely upon the law to 
resolve family disputes. This is an indication of the complexity of cultural practice 
as well as the problematic of instrumentalist notions of legislation, which assume a 
predictable cause-effect relationship between law and society. I also indicate how a 
semiotic approach can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of law. The final part of 
chapter 12 involves a semiotic analysis of a legal decision relating to a same-sex 
family, providing insights into the cultural limits of legal interpretation. 
 
I find Witteveen’s three models of law useful in describing different types of laws, 
by reference to their semiotic openness. However, this does not mean that I Introduction | 12 
subscribe to the idea that laws can be categorically defined as “significant”, 
“symbolic” or “symphonic.” I have already hinted that intellectual property, 
though arguably significant in character, begins to have a social content as it 
becomes part of a non-legal discourse. Essentially, then, all law is actually 
symphonic and all legal concepts are vehicles for non-legal content. The law might 
create its fictions, ‘things’ like property, but these concepts circulate outside the 
law, become part of everyday discourse and derive a broader semiotic content than 
that which the law seeks to permit. This qualification notwithstanding, concepts 
like family are quite clearly not-legal in conception and as such it is proper that the 
law respect this not-legality. My approach would at least permit an honest 
reference to the outside of law. Law’s violence to family will always exist, but it 
might be a lesser violence. And, I hope my approach would create an alternative 
mindset for those considering law reform. As to whether a semiotic method would 
be appropriate to other areas of law is a matter for greater examination, by 
reference to particular areas of law. 
 
There are, variations in tone and approach in each of the parts of the thesis. I have 
generally adopted the idioms of two different discourses. In parts 1 and 2, I use 
language with which scholars of post-structural and postmodern theory will be 
familiar. However, part 3 adopts conventions common in legal commentary, 
drawing on statistical and historical data and undertaking discussion of legislative 
and legal history in a manner which suggests an allegiance to legal interpretative 
processes. The information is presented in a less critical and more naturalistic 
fashion than the reader might anticipate, given the substance of the earlier chapter. 
I have my reasons. Statistical and historical (legal and social) data has authority in 
discourses such as history, science and law and are the type of information drawn 
on by lawyers to espouse ‘truth’ or ‘the facts’. This is particularly the case when 
reading legal texts, because law has its own conventions for distilling the facts of 
legal knowledge (legal interpretation). Derrida and other postmodern theorists 
suggest that we engage openly with such discourses, rather than ignore them. I 
must be able to find the ‘facts’ and ‘truths’ of the law in order to critique them and 
to move beyond the discourse. Throughout part 3, I alert to some of the 
contradictions between the positivist legal positions and the truths that arise from 
using law’s and science’s own methods before moving, in the subsequent part (part 
4), to an approach which will embrace postmodern and post-structural concerns as 
part of law’s method. 
 
Before proceeding with the body of this thesis, I will clarify, in chapter 1, several 
concepts that are central to my understanding of the relationship between law and 
society; the inside and the outside of law. They are: law as constitutive of society, 
law as a regulatory mechanism, a theory of power, and a definition of culture vis-à-Introduction | 13 
vis the social. As becomes apparent in the discussion, these concepts are 
interrelated. Part 1:  From Force to Feeling: the Power of Meaning 
 
Chapter 1  The Disciplinary Power of the Law 
 
 
Introduction 
 
A traditional view of law is that law is a set of commands or orders issued by a 
sovereign, that give rise to an obligation under threat of sanction (Austin 1970).1 
According to such a view, a legal message is transmitted from the legal sphere to 
the social sphere and, through this transmission, has social effect. 
 
In this chapter, I present a range of contemporary views on law’s role in social 
regulation. These challenge the Austinian view that law’s ‘commands’ are 
singularly discernible. Secondly, they provide a more complex explanation of law’s 
power. Rather than commands, laws are ‘signals’ that affect the construction of 
social (disciplined) subjects. This is a different type of power from that suggested 
by legal positivists. Drawing on Foucault’s ideas, I argue that law does not simply 
assert power. Rather, power is a relation and law’s subjects actively negotiate the 
law. Law, then, is not a set of rules or sanctions, but a set of messages that are open 
to multiple interpretations. I claim that the social effect of law depends upon 
cultural issues: the transmission, communication and alteration of meanings. Law’s 
purpose relies on the circulation of meaning. Having problematised the 
relationship between law and society, I argue against an instrumental view of law. 
This is the idea that the law can be used to effect policy outcomes. Like traditional 
explanations of the law as a command, instrumentalism assumes that, through the 
transmission of legal meaning, there is social change. In the final part of this 
chapter, I clarify my use of the term ‘culture’ and by extension ‘cultural’, 
distinguishing them from my use of the term ‘social’. 
 
 
Regulating the Social: Disciplining the Subject 
 
Some socio-legal commentators suggest that law is constitutive of social practice 
(for example Calavita 2001) or, further, that law and society are mutually 
constituted (Brigham 1996). Arguably, the law has a greater degree of social control 
where it specifically proscribes particular conduct; something like speeding 
restrictions. But law’s influence is perhaps lower in areas where regulation sits 
alongside social practices which are not necessarily dependent on the law for their 
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formation, such as family life2 In such instances, how does the law become part of 
the everyday and therefore part of the social? Is engagement necessary for it to 
have social effect? We know that the law has effect when someone is brought 
before it and some sanction is applied. However, the power of the law as a 
mechanism of social ordering lies in its mere presence. We who live in the 
everyday have a commonsense knowledge of the law and, largely, abide by it, 
except perhaps for transgressions, which may or may not be part of a calculation of 
risk. But why? Is it because of a culture of civil obedience or a fear of retribution? Is 
it formed on the basis of a general community consensus with the statements of the 
law; that is, law reflects dominant community values? Understanding why there is 
general consensus concerning the need to abide by the law might afford some 
insight into how we make sense of it. 
 
Parkinson suggests that law’s effect is based on a culture of “positive obligation”: 
 
the law commands a high level of respect in western societies which is independent 
of popular acceptance either of the merits of particular laws or of the level of 
respect shown to the law makers…[I]t derives authority and respect from a deep 
sense within the community that the law ought to be obeyed, not merely for fear of 
sanction, but from a feeling of positive obligation (Parkinson 2001:24). 
 
Parkinson indicates that the law has legal and social effect even if it reflects values 
which are contrary or antithetical to those of particular communities. This must be 
true, at least to some degree. For example, if law is based on masculine values to 
the detriment of women’s interests, as has been persuasively argued in relation to a 
range of areas of law (see Scutt 1990, Graycar and Morgan 1990) how is it that it 
continues to resonate for women? Similarly, how is it that those who are 
disempowered by a classical liberal commitment to individualism, which arguably 
underpins the Australian legal system, not only abide by the law but perpetuate 
and reinforce it (see for example, Hunt (1986) on the Critical Legal Studies 
movement)? Parkinson’s thesis is that such obedience comes from a sense of 
obligation to the law, generally, as a system, rather than to particular rules per se. 
 
Parkinson’s idea of “positive obligation” might explain why the law ‘works’ 
despite a degree of public dissatisfaction with it. On the other hand, he could be 
wrong in his assessment of the community’s attitude to law. Instead of a regard for 
the authoritative nature of law some communities, even so-called ‘respected’ 
communities, may engage through resistance, either lawful or unlawful. This 
suggests that to know the effect of law on communities, the nexus between law and 
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the social, requires a suspension of generalised accounts of the relationship 
between the two. The constitutive nature of law is not a simple cause-effect 
relationship. 
 
I wish, for the moment, to unproblematically posit Parkinson’s description as the 
explanation for why there is general acceptance for the determinative nature of the 
law in terms of social practice. Yet the question remains: how does the law relate to 
the minutiae of everyday activities, such as the organisation of family life which, 
while perhaps ultimately subject to the law, are not necessarily carried out with a 
consciousness of the law and the possible legal ramifications. Perhaps the nexus 
between the social and law can best be explained, if at all, in terms of 
governmentality or social ordering; perhaps Parkinson’s claim of positive 
obligation alludes to this. Maybe the law does not only operate as something 
outside, which one obeys out of a sense of positive obligation. The real power of 
the law may be something seamlessly embedded in the practices of the everyday, 
in the doing of the social, perhaps even in the culture of a society. 
 
There is a parallel between Parkinson’s account of the power of law and that of 
Goodrich, a legal post-structuralist. For Goodrich, the power of law arises not just 
through its invocation in the courtroom, but also as a recognisable “system of 
authority or control which the individual subject is to obey without necessarily 
understanding” (Goodrich 1986:22). However, Goodrich takes the issue of positive 
obedience one step further, suggesting that the relationship between subject and 
law is more systemic than positive. The law acts as an “authoritative resource[s] for 
administration, control and the ‘accounting’ of social relationships generally” 
(Goodrich 1986:22). By such accounts, the law’s meaning is of little consequence, 
because it only ‘means’ as a signal of appropriate behaviour. There is no necessary 
relation between the effects of law and whether or not it reflects social norms, 
whether it means socially what the subject would want it to mean or whether the 
social subject understands the content of the law as it is meant to be understood, at 
least by lawmakers. That the individual does not know the genre constraints on the 
understanding of legal concepts does not prevent her or him from understanding, 
generally, the difference between obedience and disobedience, submission and 
resistance, illegitimacy or legitimacy (whichever the case may be). For Goodrich: 
 
what is important is not so much the content of the system or its rules but rather 
the simple recognition on the part of those subject to them that the texts do indeed 
form a system or that there is a rule to be obeyed (1986:22). 
 
This is consistent with Parkinson’s proposition. It is, perhaps, an explanation of 
why it is at once the content and not the content of law that matters. It is the law as Chapter 1 | 17 
it operates as a signal not its legal purity (if we believe a positivist take on 
interpretation) that matters. 
 
Let me explain further. If the issue is one of system rather than content and 
meaning, how can the law, which is all about meaning, play a part in the social 
ordering enshrined and manifested in everyday activities; that is, in the life of 
families? I argue that, notwithstanding these arguments about system, there are (at 
least) two ways in which the content of the law might still matter. Let us accept 
that law provides messages of acceptable and unacceptable social conduct, of what 
must and must not be done to be obedient. The first and simplest account of how 
the law works in everyday life is that positive obedience might, in some way at 
least, require a submission of sorts to, if not agreement with, the types of values 
enshrined by such standards of behaviour. The second pertains to a process of 
subjectification upon which, according to Foucault, the art of governance is 
contingent, subsequent to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Foucault 1991a, 
1991b). Mechanisms of contemporary governance, law being one of them, in part 
rely upon techniques for creating subjects invested with particular knowledges.3 
Foucault, in describing the human soul, explains the subjectification process: 
 
it [the human soul] is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain 
type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by 
which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and 
knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power (1991b:29). 
 
The investment of particular knowledges arises through the: 
 
functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished – and, in a more general 
way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home 
and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised 
for the rest of their lives (1991b:29). 
 
Foucault’s ideas challenge the enlightenment concept of the pre-social individual, 
the “neutral agent” (Nietzsche 1956:178) or “free subject” (Nietzsche 1956:180). For, 
as Nietzsche describes, “there is no ‘being’ behind the doing, acting, becoming; the 
‘doer’ has simply been added to the deed by the imagination – the doing is 
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everything” (1956:178-179). All moral capacities (conscience, responsibility, free 
will) have a history, a genealogy and are a product of a specific historical labour of 
discipline and culture (Nietzsche 1956:158-188). 
 
Foucault notes that this process of subjectification is important to an eighteenth 
century (and beyond) art of governance, which turns upon the theme of 
population, replacing those of sovereignty (of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century) and state (eighteenth century) (Foucault 1991a:101). However, for 
Foucault, law has little, if any, role to play in this creation of the subject, that is, in 
the control of the population through multifaceted, decentralised disciplinary 
apparatuses (1991a:101). In the eighteenth century the law might have had a role in 
providing a foundation for state sovereignty and for defining and characterising an 
art of governance (Foucault 1991a:101). However, Foucault suggests that there is an 
incompatibility between disciplinary power and juridical power in the subsequent 
period. This because is the juridical system: 
 
is utterly incongruous with the new methods of power whose operation is not 
ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by 
punishment but by control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms 
that go beyond the state and its apparatus (Foucault 1993:89). 
 
Foucault distinguishes, in Western society, discipline from the apparatuses of the 
state, including the law, as a mechanism of governance, albeit that the “exercise of 
power has [since the Middle Ages] been formulated in terms of law” (Foucault 
1993:87). However, he does not dismiss the role of law totally. His theory of power 
provides that power is based on what is largely a juridical model “centred on 
nothing more than the statement of the law and the operation of taboos” (Foucault 
1993:85). But in his treatment of law, Foucault subscribes to the command model of 
law, which is clearly incongruous with the new methods of power. If, instead, we 
view law as something other than the dictates of a sovereign, then it operates as 
one of the mechanisms of governance outlined by Foucault. Law is part of the 
process of subjection and forms an element of the relations of power. Wherever the 
law seeks to regulate public and private activities, the stuff of the everyday, it 
contributes to the normalisation of particular beliefs, values and social practices. It 
formulates the subject to whom that regulation directly or indirectly applies. As 
Foucault claims, and Goodrich reiterates, the “turning of real lives into writing 
[that is, the law] … functions as a procedure of objectification and subjectification” 
(Foucault 1991b:192, Goodrich 1986:22).4 Doing the everyday, that is, doing family, 
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is a learned behaviour (Miller & McHoul 1998:9), though not a behaviour which 
can necessarily be predicted, given the multiplicity of contingencies intersecting 
with that subjectivity. Nevertheless, as Miller and McHoul remind us (citing Heller 
1998:9), if “individuals are to reproduce society, they must reproduce themselves 
as individuals”. The law is just one of the public statements of social acceptability, 
providing a backdrop to the training of the individual. It is just one of the means by 
which modes of power are “reduced to an effect of obedience” (Foucault 1993:89). 
It is critical to a theorising of law that it involves a recognition that the officers of 
the law are themselves both social and legal subjects. They are similarly produced, 
like non-legal subjects, according to rigours of their own disciplines and 
communities. There is henceforth a recurrent loop (but not a circle) where the law 
gets iterated and reiterated according to both the legal and social subjectivities of 
the officials applying it. 
 
Foucault illustrates the role of law in the construction of social subjects through 
what he calls “signalization” (1991b:166). The subject need only come to know the 
signal. She or he need not understand “the injunction”, only how to recognise the 
signal and react accordingly. Arguably then, law exists as one of these signals. It 
gives codes of appropriate behaviour and sanctions for non-compliance, whether 
those sanctions are of a positive nature (for example the provision of a 
punishment) or of a negative nature (the failure to support the action, such as 
refusing to enforce a contract). When one witnesses a sanction, with the constant 
aid of public accounts of aberrations provided by media and the body politic, one 
is being signalled. A person might not understand the precision of the deviance 
and how, exactly, the sanction is matched to the disobedience, but she or he 
understands, in essence, the signal and what is expected, in a generalised fashion, 
in order to act appropriately. A correct reaction, then, would be what concurs, at 
least in a general manner, with the statements of the law, the signals. This is where 
content is pertinent and how law, whilst perhaps existing on a premise of positive 
obedience, is potentially normative. It informs, instructs and constructs the ways of 
‘doing’ and therefore social norms. What the law means, or what it is seen to mean, 
matters in everyday life because it creates, or at least contributes to, the 
establishment and perpetuation of an order for doing things in a way that is 
socially functional. Hence, the law is one of the training manuals. 
 
The social nature of individual conduct is noted by Sacks, by reference to Weber. 
The regulation of individual conduct is mobilised around private interests in 
‘correct’ behaviour, but only by fitting those practices into public concerns rather 
than by top-down command. Sacks paraphrases Weber’s idea as follows: 
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The big problem for any society is that there are some more or less generalized 
organizational techniques which it sets up, and which people need to be mobilized 
to behave in the interests of … And so some kind of techniques are found whereby 
private interests are fitted into “public requirements”. And [this is] a theme that 
occurs again and again in Weber, for example in his incredible paper “Politics as a 
Vocation”, there he locates the political boss as that sort of person who is able to 
monitor the range of private interests and use them and interest in them to engage 
in some sorts of public action. He makes a case for the ethical disinterest of the 
political boss and thereby assimilates him to the priest who is engaged in the same 
sort of task; of monitoring the relationship between an ethic and anybody’s ethics 
(1970:46-47). 
 
Santos confirms this link between Foucault’s (and Weber’s) conception of 
discipline and the law when he suggests a formal similarity between law (juridical 
power) and science (which he parallels to disciplinary power): 
 
Such isomorphism and the circulation of meaning it allows give rise to social 
processes that function as symbolic melting pots, configurations of meaning in 
which elements of both science [disciplinary power] and law are present in 
complex combinations (1995:4). 
 
It is not just the combination that is complex. The “configurations of meaning” are 
such that the relationship between law and discipline, and therefore the use and 
effect of law in and on the everyday and social ordering, cannot be predicted. The 
law is a complex character on the “human stage” (Kevelson 1992:2). It is a 
“composite, complicated, continually evolving idea … [It] is a system of signs … a 
standard-bearer of social value” (Kevelson 1992:2). 
 
It may, therefore, be said that the law signals, and in doing so, disciplines, creating 
norms which are effective in the everyday. It does this through its presence as 
much as through its use. This presence and use assists in the constitution of the 
social being, of what it means to be family, and the transgressions of ‘proper’ 
behaviour and lifestyle. Thus, the meaning that is made of law matters in the doing 
of everyday things. However, we can only know such effectivity by reading law 
within particular significatory frameworks. For example, the limits of those 
permitted to marry in Australia may signal to the community the legitimacy (or 
illegitimacy) of the relationships the law does not validate. But obedience to the 
law requires that communities understand law in the way law intends us to 
understand it, and organise relationships in a manner that reflects these legitimised 
models. This is where localised semiosic practices are important, for there are 
communities that might resist such subjectivity. Chapter 1 | 21 
Law, Power and the Subject 
 
Foucault’s notion of the construction of subjects is contingent upon a reworking of 
the concept of power. He distinguishes Power, associated with a supreme or 
dominant authority which controls or represses (such as law or a monarch), from 
power, which is always present and producing as a multiplicity of relational forces 
(1993:92-93). In explaining his theory of power, Foucault offers a series of 
propositions (1993:94-96). To paraphrase: 
 
•  it is not concrete, with a single locus, but is mobile with multiple sources; 
•  it is imbedded in social relations, acting in and upon them, not exterior to them; 
•  it is not top-down and hierarchical but permeates social institutions coming 
into play (producing, distributing, aligning) through their machinations; 
•  its operation is not individual and intentional, but works through the formation 
of systems, the aims and logic of which are clear but not individually created; 
and 
•  the power network is comprised both of moments of acceptance and resistance. 
 
Foucault’s point is that modern relations of power, while they might exist as part 
of a structure, are effective by virtue of the production of knowledges and of 
particular social subjects so that power operates on the self, from within systems 
and structures. 
 
This is why Foucault eschews the privileging of law in the workings of power; 
because to invest law with authority is to subscribe to theories of Power rather than 
power; a hierarchical, top-down exercise of power, rather than a dynamic, 
reciprocal relation. We should, according to Foucault, free ourselves of: 
 
the theoretical privilege of law … if we wish to analyze power within the concrete 
and historical framework of its operation. We must construct an analysis of power 
that no longer takes law as a model and a code (Foucault 1993:90). 
 
As I have suggested above, Foucault’s conception of law is based on a command 
model. My view of law is something more akin to Foucault’s idea of power, even 
though the law imagines itself to operate on a command model. Nevertheless, 
Foucault does claim that strategies of power relations are embedded “in the 
formulation of law” and in “various social hegemonies” (1993:126-127). And so, 
there is a role for the consideration of law as a fragment of social relations and 
hence in the play of power. My concern is that law has been either ignored or 
considered unproblematically (as in universalised claims about the effect of the 
law) as one of the influences on everyday activities and hence, in this respect, on Chapter 1 | 22 
social ordering and reciprocally legal reasoning. What I aim to do is not to elevate 
or prioritise law, not to centre or elevate it as an exercise of power, but merely to 
place it in the picture. 
 
Legal semiotician, Malloy, provides a characterisation of the law which is a useful 
reminder of the significance of law in the play of power. Malloy's quest is to 
reframe the common view on law and economics, which tends to see law as doing 
the work of economics, that is, legal discourse in economics is framed in terms of 
economic discourse. However, as he points out, there is a fundamental difference 
between the two. Whereas economics is concerned simply with the processing of 
facts, law is a “discourse … of persuasion and of mediation between conflicting 
interpretive viewpoints and value frameworks” (2000:9). It: 
 
directs its attention to influencing the normative ground upon which social 
organization rests [so] that [it] must influence beliefs about underlying 
relationships in the meaning and value-formation process of social interaction and 
exchange (Malloy 2000:9, emphasis in original). 
 
Further, “[i]n order to persuade and to mediate between competing claims, the law 
must influence opinions, beliefs, and values”. In its interface with the market place 
the law “must be concerned with the meanings of economic assumptions and 
predictions” (Malloy 2000:10, emphasis in original). Similarly, in its interface with 
society, generally, the law must be concerned with the meanings of the 
assumptions and predictions contained therein. In short, law has a special place in 
the mediation of meaning: 
 
The lawyer must act pragmatically to solve problems as they arise and to mediate 
the tension between real people situated in conflicting interpretive communities 
(Malloy 2000:10). 
 
And in doing so, as I have already suggested, the lawyer, whether acting as 
advocate or arbitrator, is seated in an interpretive community, one which mediates 
between legal and non-legal discourse. 
 
What should be apparent is that the law is not a monolith which floats in the 
background of everyday activities, only called upon to resolve conflicts or whip its 
subjects into submission. Instead, it is backgrounded, middlegrounded and 
foregrounded in the events of the everyday, called upon (or not) in different ways 
for different communities, but there nonetheless, embedded in the play of power 
relations and operating along unforeseeable tangents. 
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What I have done, so far, is to suggest that law regulates most if not all aspects of 
modern society. It is drawn upon to resolve disputes through recourse to its 
systems and processes, or by mere reference (the idea of negotiating in the law’s 
shadow), it constitutes the social subject and provides a statement of (particular) 
social values. Law is a mechanism for social ordering, at both micro and macro 
levels, overtly and covertly. Law resonates when individuals act with a view to 
formal regulation, as well as in seemingly non-legal performances. I have chosen 
the family, as the space for understanding the relationship between the law and the 
social, and for my attempt to conceive of a means of incorporating the social 
explicitly into the law. This is contingent upon the act of interpretation – the sense 
that people make of the law and the sense that law makes of the people before it, in 
its special function of interpretative mediator. 
 
 
Law as the Instrumentalist’s Tool 
 
My discussion thus far indicates a view that the relationship between the social 
and the law is complex and rooted in the cultural. This is a far cry from the 
instrumentalist view of law which, van Schooten claims, is widespread in the 
modern welfare state, coming to dominance in the twentieth century (van Schooten 
1999:185-186). Until the 1970s, law seemed to be effective as a policy instrument in 
the transformation of social structures; but a proliferation in legislation from the 
1960s, with its cost implications and a perception of a marked degree in 
effectiveness, brought challenges to such an approach (1999:186). Van Schooten’s 
metaphor of “government steering” is a pertinent one. The instrumentalist view of 
law is as “a simple picture in which the commander orders to shift the helm with 
the consequence that the ship will change course as ordered” (1999:186). This linear 
explanation of the law parallels positivist descriptions of the law as command. Van 
Schooten continues, “[t]oday’s complex society defies this metaphor: the ship has 
its own momentum. The results of steering manoeuvres become unpredictable” 
(1999:186). In a similar vein, Ewick and Silbey argue that the “conventional view of 
law as a tool or instrument … fails to fully capture the interactive and social 
aspects of legality” (Ewick and Silbey 1998:134). Through an investigation of 
commonplace or everyday views of law, they find that “legality” exists in these 
spaces (the outside) as both a means and an end: that it constitutes rather than 
simply causes; and that there is a contingency which defies a linear causal 
relationship. Further, an instrumentalist view assumes a rationality of action 
(Ewick and Silbey present what appears to be a Benthamite utilitarian conception) 
when rather, it plays a variety of roles in the conduct of social relationships 
(1998:132-135). As a response to the limits of the instrumentalist vision, van 
Schooten provides an overview of a number of theorists (Teubner, Podgórecki and Chapter 1 | 24 
Moore) whose works emphasise the “self-regulative capacity of society” (van 
Schooten 1999:186). These are consistent with some of the insights provided by 
Foucault, as outlined above, and I will draw on these themes, particularly 
Teubner’s concept of autopoiesis, in conceiving an alternative method of legislative 
framing, in chapter 11. 
 
Understanding the processes for making meaning is important to an 
understanding of how law operates on the social. The twist, though one which is 
logical given my adherence to a Foucauldian theory of power, is that the meanings 
that are made of law might not be those which are intended by the institutions that 
created it. Despite the rhetoric of legal institutions and the discourses that support 
them, the greatest effect of law is not in its ability to control and coerce (in the 
capital ‘P’ sense of Power), but in its effect as part of a systemic operation of power. 
 
 
Exploring the Cultural 
 
I claim above that the relationship between the social and the law is complex and 
rooted in the cultural. I wish to clarify what I mean by this distinction. The Fontana 
Dictionary of Modern Thought (Andrevski in Bullock & Trombley 1999:809) defines 
the ‘social’ as that which pertains to both the attributes of a society, including its 
structures and the changes within, and interpersonal relations, including 
individual activities or attributes which could affect others. For my purposes, I will 
use the term ‘society’ as a spatial designation with the ‘social’ being the practices 
that occur within. Because law regulates individual activities, as well as society‘s 
structures and the scope for movement within and between those structures, it is 
clear that law constitutes a part of the social. This defies the inside/outside binary 
of positivism. 
 
Williams warns that the word ‘culture’ is one of the most complicated in the 
English language and sets out a convoluted history (1988:87-93). I do not want to 
focus on this history, merely to clarify my use of the word. Miller and McHoul 
(1998:5-6) distil two contemporary common uses of ‘culture’: the first pertains to 
artistic output, defined by aesthetic criteria; the second is an all embracing term 
concerned with “how we live our lives, the senses of place and person that make us 
human”. Clearly it is the latter sense of culture that is relevant to this thesis. 
Wickham says that cultural studies defines culture as: 
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the way of life of a group (including, possibly, a society), including the meanings, 
the transmission, communication and alteration of those meanings, and the circuits 
of power by which meanings are valorised or derogated (Wickham 2000:256).5 
 
For Friedman, culture seems to be totally immaterial, “an enormous interplay of 
interpretations of a given social reality” (1997:9). Leonard claims that ‘culture’ (in 
cultural studies) “is anywhere ‘the real’ is constructed and made sense of” (note, he 
is referring to ‘culture’ and not ‘a culture’ – either way it is a spatial concept, 
1995:3) and, for Blankenburg, this might include the “legacy of ideas and values 
which form collective identities” (1999:12). 
 
We have, in these few examples, a range in the concept from ‘high art’, to 
communication practice. It will become apparent that, in my view, communication 
is both constituted by its material conditions and it is materially effective. 
However, I distinguish this materiality from the materiality of the cultural artefact. 
And so, forced to be definitive in my own usage of the term, I lean towards a 
synthesis of these explanations; that culture is concerned with ways of life, 
questions of identity and subjectivity, processes for sense-making and for 
constructing ‘reality’, and the “circuits of power”, which inform and permit these 
things. Further, societies are culturally formed, and so, when I speak of ‘society’ or 
the ‘social’ at different points in the thesis, I am denoting something which is 
culturally formed. I discuss this conflation later in the thesis, when I use the term 
‘communities’ to describe culturally formed social groupings as an explanation of 
my semiotic method. 
 
There is a burgeoning body of work on the ‘culture of law’ (for example, Arnaud 
1989, Kahn 1999, Nelken 1997). Of particular interest here is Friedman’s idea that 
legal culture is not something internal to law. Instead, it is characterised by the 
attitudes of wider communities towards the law (1997:34). This suggests that law 
lives and breathes outside of legal discourse, in everyday engagements. And, if 
lawyers (practitioners and the judiciary alike) ‘live’ outside of the law, which of 
course they do, it is inevitable that they bring this outside into the law. Hence, not 
only is there a culture of law outside of the law, but the culture of law inside the 
law reflects and incorporates this external culture. The reflexivity is perpetual, not 
just in terms of the effects of the social on the law, but also of the law on the social. 
 
It is reasonable to claim that “the way of life of a group (including, possibly, a 
society)”, namely ‘culture’, may be a part of a society’s structures and the 
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interpersonal relations within it, namely the ‘social’. Maintaining a distinction 
between the terms is at times impossible. Such a conflation is indicated by Miller’s 
and McHoul’s suggestion of a possible relationship between the two definitions of 
‘culture’. This gives rise to the concept as a mechanism for affecting individual 
ethical and aesthetic self-improvement, for “produc[ing] and manag[ing] … a 
specific type of human being” (Miller and McHoul, 1996:6). This suggests a means 
of writing the social subject. Culture becomes one of the means by which 
individuals are constructed as social beings, beings capable of functioning 
appropriately in the social world, according to the structures and expectations of 
interpersonal relations. Throughout the thesis I refer to the social and the cultural, 
sometimes interchangeably. What should be apparent from the above is that the 
‘social’ is inherently ‘cultural’. A society is constituted by a writing of its subjects, 
by the circulation of meaning and the relations of power. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have provided a conceptual spacing for the arguments of this 
thesis. I claim that law and society, and the meanings of law within each sphere, 
are mutually constitutive. Rather than a set of commands flowing from a 
sovereign, the law is just one of the techniques of modern governance for creating 
subjects that are invested with particular knowledges. This relationship between 
the law and its subjects challenges the positivist separation between the inside and 
outside of law. For these subjects are not passive receivers of legal instruction; 
rather, they actively engage with law’s meanings, conducting their affairs with a 
view to law but through their own cultural prisms. This view requires a rethinking 
of the concept of power and, in particular, the law’s power, not only over the 
individual, but also as a means of effecting social policy. A Foucauldian conception 
of power, in which power relations are negotiated rather than asserted, permits the 
law to acknowledge the struggles over truth claims. Part of the relationship 
between law and society, then, is a contest over the ways of doing things and of 
meanings; a cultural relationship. Hence, in the last part of the chapter, I clarified 
my idea of culture, vis-à-vis the concept of the social. 
 
In the next chapter, I give the practical and ethical justifications for opening law to 
non-legal meanings, by reference to family law. I argue that there are practical 
disadvantages for non-heteronormative families who are denied resort to 
specialised family law systems. There are also political implications of the law’s 
non-recognition of alternative family models. However, the exclusion of certain 
family models from law’s centre is symptomatic of a core problem. I draw on 
Lyotard’s concept of the différend and Derrida’s ideas on the significatory force of Chapter 1 | 27 
law, to show that law’s exclusion of the ‘other’ gives rise to a fundamental 
injustice. Chapter 2  Why Law on Family Matters 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Howard blinded by his morals: lesbian mother 
A lesbian mother-of-two yesterday said [Prime Minister] John Howard had shown 
an “appalling lack of understanding of what the real issues are”. 
Jennifer Morgan, fighting a legal battle to establish lesbian access to fertility 
treatment said: “He’s misreading it as purely a moral struggle between traditional 
families and however he conceives of alternative families”. 
Ms Morgan said it was, in fact, an issue of health and human freedom. “I’m 
disappointed that he’s unable to separate his own personal desires and beliefs from 
those of the very real responsibilities of his office” (Newman The Australian 2000:1). 
 
I think we often make the mistake of confusing toleration and endorsement … I 
think … sexual preference is something very private and something that should go 
unremarked and not discriminated against. But equally there are certain 
institutions in our community that provide it with bulwarks and stability and 
marriage is one of them ... [A]ttempts to give the same legal status to homosexual 
relations as to marriage are not things I would support (John Howard reported in 
The Australian 24 January 1996, as reproduced in Johnson 2003 (subeditor not 
provided)). 
 
These two extracts typify the opposite sides of the debate on non-heteronormative 
families, as represented by same-sex headed families. The first newspaper report, 
specifically, is concerned with a controversy over whether single or lesbian women 
should have access to assisted reproduction. It is not about ‘family law’. It is, 
however, about ‘family’ and ‘law’ and can stand in for general debates about the 
‘proper’ constitution of family (for the political dimensions of such debates, see 
Johnson 2003). It is pertinent because the same issue is embedded in family law – 
the question of what relationships might properly be deemed family, in law. The 
debates indicate that there is a struggle, as Jennifer Morgan points out, between 
universal human rights and the morality of those at the centre. 
 
Our families are no longer (if they ever were) only nuclear families. I discuss family 
and household trends later in the thesis. Suffice to say here, in the year to June 1998 
all household types except the traditional nuclear family increased in number (Salt 
2003:109. The traditional nuclear family, on the other hand, shrank as a proportion 
of households and Salt calculates that, at the current rates, the nuclear family will 
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headed by a same-sex couple, they may include children from prior relationships, 
they may include aunties, uncles and grandparents having a role in the decision 
making and financial make up of the family, and so on through a constellation of 
permutations and possibilities. Does our law match these varieties of family? 
 
Australian family law is progressive in many respects. It provides no-fault divorce. 
It permits the court to consider direct and indirect, financial and non-financial 
contributions to property acquisition in the family, thereby permitting recognition 
of the contribution that the primary carer (usually women, so this has gender 
implications) makes in looking after children and extended family, maintaining the 
home, and freeing up the primary income earner to build family wealth. It enables 
the court to consider the primary carer’s lost years of career building, and the time 
and cost of making up such ground, in the calculation of spousal maintenance and 
the division of family wealth. It provides a one-stop shop for the resolution of 
family disputes, incorporating counselling, mediation and legal services. 
 
Only some family types have the benefit of this system in relation to property 
disputes, while others are excluded from the national system. As Dewar argues, 
“in defining kinship, or its conceptions of relationship, Australian family law 
reflects its Anglo-European heritage … [and] changes to the Family Law Act … 
have, if anything, served further to entrench this nuclear model of law” (1997:219). 
Increasingly, the states are passing legislation which captures some of these ‘other’ 
family types. Although, generally, these other jurisdictions do not provide as 
comprehensive an approach as the federal system, they nevertheless establish a 
specialist system for resolving property disputes, so that parties are not relegated 
to the more generic civil jurisdiction. Why should we therefore be concerned about 
the exclusion of certain family types from the federal jurisdiction? 
 
The law’s approach to family alludes to a fundamental problem with the law as 
such, and with positivist accounts of jurisprudence that underscore Australian law, 
and probably any jurisdiction which is marked by a rule of law. This problem is the 
law’s inability to engage with concepts that live outside of the law according to 
their own set of dynamics, irrespective of the law’s pronouncement. 
 
In this chapter, I argue that the injustice of non-inclusion does not only lie in the 
law’s failure to provide remedies and services for alternative families. Drawing on 
Lyotard, Derrida and Cornell, I explain that family law, in Australia, reflects a 
hierarchy of legitimacy of different family forms. I suggest this is a significatory 
violence, which silences those families that do no occupy the position of centre, 
and which has material effects. 
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Inclusion and Justice 
 
It might be that justice is an effect of the processes and practices of the law – related 
to issues of access to the law, the nature of the substantive provisions of the law, 
and the decisions that flow therefrom. But the delivery (or otherwise) of justice that 
can be an effect of law is not limited to the types of redress the law provides. 
Justice is equally implicated in the significatory effect of law – how law orders the 
world as well as what it speaks of to the subjects of law. I use Lyotard’s idea of the 
différend and Derrida’s discussion of the violence of law to make this point. 
 
The injustice of signification does not occur in abstract terms only. For as Cornell 
notes, in commenting upon the injustice of which Lyotard speaks (below), 
“[i]njustice is … material, in that harm happens. But it becomes known as injustice 
in the naming” (1991:19-20). She gives the example of harms experienced by 
women, such as date rape, which (at the time of writing, and presumably in 
Cornell’s jurisdiction) are not recognised as such by the legal system, and which 
therefore do not “exist” (Cornell 1991:20). Making these harms known to and by 
the law obtains justice by giving the harm a legal reality.1 The same may be said of 
families. If only a traditionally constructed family is known as family, those other 
relationships – non-cohabitating couples, non-couples, extended family and non-
Anglo-Australian modelled families – are not families, despite sharing the 
characteristics that mark ‘private’ relationships from ‘public’ relationships, a 
shared sense of responsibility, the very thing that marks family as family and not 
some other form of social organisation. The denial of a legal reality means that 
economic exploitation is permitted in some domestic relationships. It means that 
these relationships are without officially recognised value. And, if the law is a 
signal, it says to society that certain domestic models are families whilst others are 
not, or are secondary models. Further, the limits to family law that exist within 
property regimes and the connotations that derive from this ordering, are likely to 
imbue the decision-making in the non-property aspects of family law. 
 
 
Lyotard, the Double Bind and the Différend 
 
The différend is the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which 
must be able to be put in phrases cannot yet be … This state is signaled by what 
one commonly calls a feeling. “One cannot find the words,” etc. A lot of searching 
must be done to fine [sic] new rules for forming and linking phrases that are able to 
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Marital rape is an example which, until being named as such, was considered a private (nameless) 
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express the différend disclosed by the feeling, unless one wants this différend to be 
smothered right away in a litigation and the alarm sounded by the feeling to have 
been useless. What is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps, 
is to bear witness to différends by finding new idioms for them (Lyotard 1984:7). 
 
Lyotard explains that injustice occurs where there is both an injury (the French tort) 
and an inability to prove that injury (1984:5). This inability can come about in a 
number of ways, all relevant to the law. It can be because of a deprivation of life or 
liberty, a denial of a right of speech, the denial of a right to testify to the injury or 
“even more simply if the phrasing of the testimony is itself deprived of authority” 
(1984:5). The result of these is that there are no means by which a second party, 
such as a tribunal, can come to have knowledge of the injury. There is an injustice, 
in Lyotard’s terms, in the inability of the parties of certain families to resolve their 
matters through a specialised family regime. But I am mostly concerned, here, with 
the issue of testimony because denial of access to the court does not come about via 
a specific exclusion, and therefore a naming, of families of type x, y or z. The 
implication of the denial is that such social groups x, y or z do not exist, at least not 
as family. They do not fall into a domain attracting a specialised body of law and 
adjudication calculated around the special concerns of the ‘private’ sphere. Instead 
they sit generically alongside other civil legal matters, those of the ‘public’ realm. 
The family, of family law, has been conflated with the private sphere whilst other 
models have been conflated with the public sphere. Let me explain this further, by 
reference to Lyotard’s discussion of the logical “double bind” (1984:5). 
 
The family/non-family, private/public set of dichotomies is an historic one which, 
it might be argued, finds its origins in Aristotlian theorising of state and the 
demarcation between the conduct (and therefore the property arrangements) of the 
private sphere (family) and that of the public sphere (civic).2 The logic is as follows. 
If your family model matches that of Hyde v Hyde you are family. If it does not you 
are not. If you are family, your activities are other than public (that is, private) in 
nature. If you are not, they are of a public nature. That your activities match those 
deemed to be of a private nature is irrelevant; they are already marked as not 
family, and therefore not of the public sphere. You cannot be doing ‘family’, that is, 
doing ‘private’ unless you replicated the model recognised by Hyde v Hyde-like 
formulations and so the specially constructed body of law marked for family does 
not apply. Lyotard refers to this as the “double bind”, an ancient dilemma: 
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(1995:2-15). The distinction has been widely criticised, and in discussing it here, I do not mean to 
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The mechanism consists in applying to two contradictory propositions p and not-p 
[“x is family” and “x is not-family”] two logical operators, exclusions: either or, and 
implications: if then (1984:5, emphasis in original). 
 
The traditional reasoning in Australian family law is that if your model of 
relationship looks like Hyde, then family, if not, not family. If family, private, if not 
family, public. Law has been framed accordingly. Whilst there have been degrees 
of change to the constitution of family from the Hyde formulation, such that same-
sex relationships, and de facto marriages are recognised by some jurisdictions, the 
heteronormativity of Hyde persists; that is, that ‘different’ families may be 
acknowledged as family, and therefore private, only if they reflect the values of 
Hyde, and look like its conception of marriage – cohabitation, monogamous, 
couple. The logic today is: heteronormative family equals private sphere and is 
legislated as a special category; non-heteronormative family equals public sphere 
and is relegated to the civil jurisdiction. This is the organisational foundation of 
family law, flawed as the logic may be.
 
 
The effect is that certain families do not exist as families, despite their character 
being analogous to traditional family models. Let us call them ‘non-families’. In not 
being subject to family law, they become aligned to other relationships of the 
public sphere. The characteristics of mutual responsibility and social obligation 
which are shared by families and non-families alike are rendered invisible in the 
case of non-families. The legal disputes of these non-families are not represented as 
family disputes, but as more generic civil disputes. They fall outside the data on 
family and do not have a legal reality as family, only as litigants. 
 
For Lyotard, the silence that befalls ‘non-families’ is the indicator of the différend 
(1984:14): “injustice is the crime combined with the perpetuation of silence that 
erases it” (Lyotard cited in Cornell 1991:19). He is speaking of the wrongs that 
cannot be signified and which are therefore erased as injustices. Alternative 
families, signified only as ‘non-families’, are not able to be represented in the legal 
domain as families. The injustice cannot therefore be represented, for any legal 
engagement with these families characterises them as something ‘other’ than 
family. Under the current model of family law relating to property, alternative 
models cannot be named. 
 
My criticism of the law is that it tries, through an unproblematic understanding of 
the work of language, to bring into its own idiom that which is outside of it. For the 
jurist, the application of what is outside the law to the inside of law is simply a 
question of matching categories; that category defined as family, by the law, with 
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However, this is a case of the différend. A différend arises “when the ‘regulation’ of 
the conflict … is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the injustice suffered 
by the other is not signified in that idiom” (1984:5). The idiom of family in law is 
one linked to marital relationships, or relationships that look like an idealised 
notion of marital relationship (cohabiting, coupled economic and social lives, with 
a view to procreation). We could imagine a dialogue between the law and someone 
from the non-family family; let’s say someone like Jennifer Morgan in the opening 
extract : 
 
The Law: you are not family – you do not live in a heterosexual relationship, you 
do not live with your partner, you retain an independent lifestyle … you cannot be 
family. Out to the public sphere with you! 
Someone from an alternative family: But I feel like I am in a family with these 
people. We look after each other. We retain our independence, but our financial 
arrangements and our personal exchanges are not entered into a ledger book. Our 
relationship is not like those of the public sphere! 
 
There is something about family going on in the exchange. But the likenesses are 
incommensurable because the referent is designated by the law. The exchange, if 
the alternative family members is to be heard, must occur in the idiom of the law. 
And until it does, the law excludes her version of family. 
 
Lyotard claims that the différend is signalled through feeling (1984:7). As Lucy, a 
literary theorist, explains: 
 
according to Lyotard, historical signs are “felt” by “the common person”, who 
knows that there is always something more to be said about any historical event 
than it is possible to say in words: that is, the common person’s “feeling” is closer 
than theoretical discourse can ever hope to get to the truth (or the singularity) of 
historico-political events (Lucy 1997:176-177). 
 
While, in law, family is explained by reference to a generalised conception and 
then translated through a rule for interpretation, in practice, the ‘common person’s’ 
experience, is to simply feel a certain way about certain people which comes to be 
understood within that experience, as family. Jennifer Morgan feels the duty and 
connection associated with family, even if that connection cannot be named within 
the law. 
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Lyotard indicates a way of resolving the problem: 
 
To give the différend its due is to institute new addressees, new addressers, new 
significations, and new referents in order that the injustice find an expression and 
that the plaintiff cease to be a victim. This requires new rules for the formation and 
linking of phrases … Every injustice must be able to be phrased. It is necessary to 
find a new competence (1984:7). 
 
But as the exchange suggests, this is not simply a question of playing with 
language. Accommodating alternative families requires being able to translate that 
which doesn’t necessarily have a word until the word has been allocated to it, a 
“feeling” to quote Lyotard, into the idiom of language. Otherwise we continue 
along the path of only acknowledging relationships once the law names them as 
family (de facto, same-sex etc.). Yet they may exist as family even if they do not 
have the official language of family at their disposal. This suggests that we need to 
think of language as “something other than the communication of a bit of 
information” and find an idiom to express that thing (Lyotard 1984:7). We could 
conceive of the language of family as something one does, how one lives, rather that 
what one is. This would permit the law to acknowledge that people know and feel 
they are family without necessarily being able to know what it is about their 
relationships which makes it so, irrespective of the language used by the law or by 
the parties in the family to describe it. As I illustrate later, by reference to 
sociological comment on family, this is consistent with how people, outside the 
law, do being family. 
 
 
Derrida, the Force of Law and its Hierarchy of Legitimacy 
 
In a vein similar to Lyotard’s différend, Derrida draws attention to the violence 
which arises from applying the language of one group to another that does not 
share that idiom. He argues that: 
 
It is unjust to judge someone who does not understand the language in which the 
law is inscribed or the judgement pronounced, etc. We could give multiple 
dramatic examples of violent situations in which a person or group of persons is 
judged in an idiom they do not understand very well or at all. And however slight 
or subtle the difference of competence in the mastery of the idiom is here, the 
violence of injustice has begun when all the members of a community do not share 
the same idiom throughout. Since in all rigour this ideal situation is never possible, 
we can perhaps already draw some inferences about …“the possibility of justice”. 
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the idiom in which one claims, as one says in French, that justice est faite, (“justice is 
done”, “made”) is not just any violence, any injustice. This injustice supposes that 
the other, the victim of the language’s injustice, is capable of a language in general, 
is man as a speaking animal, in the sense that we, men, give to this word language 
(Derrida 1992:18). 
 
Whereas, for Lyotard, the injustice is in the silence that occurs when a matter 
cannot be spoken of, for Derrida it occurs when one (the other) is forced to use a 
language not her or his own. For Derrida, language belongs to someone and has a 
context. Cornell, drawing on Derrida, provides the example of a woman who is 
forced to translate her experience into terms recognisable by the system, a system 
which is gendered male; such as analogising pregnancy to hernia for the purposes 
of claiming on an insurance policy (1991:195). An injustice arises from the 
requirement for alternative families to translate their lived experiences into the 
language of family law. They are being forced to liken relationships, that are 
perhaps built upon a different set of values, parameters and assumptions, to the 
heteronormative relationship represented in family law. The injustice derives from 
the need to translate the experiences of the everyday into the language of the law. 
Under the dominant model of family law, the only way for alternative families to 
gain recognition is for them to argue their likeness to heteronormative 
relationships; to mark sameness and to deny or disguise difference. However, for 
some advocates for reform (see for example Colker 1993, Card in Bolte 1998, 
Millbank 2000)3 this price is too high because the insistence on likeness is to adopt 
the idiom of those at the centre, at the expense of transformation. 
 
Derrida’s work is useful here because he highlights the injustice that might be done 
by and through the law. I wish to raise two related concerns, in addition to that 
noted above. These are: the marking of centre vis-à-vis the marking of difference 
and the irreconcilability of the generalisations of law and the specificity of unique 
singular situations. 
 
Law, like language, functions as a series of signs and part of this functioning is 
through a system of oppositions – “no element can function as a sign without 
referring to another element which itself is not simply present” (Derrida 2002:26, 
cited in Davies 1994:256). Signification is as much a reference to “the trace within 
[the sign] of the other elements of the chain or system” (Derrida 2002:26 cited in 
Davies 1994:256) as it is to that which is within. That the sign is jointly constituted 
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by what is overt and that which is given over as mere trace does not suggest a 
happy relationship between centre and ‘other’. As Derrida points out: 
 
we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-à-vis, but rather with a 
violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other … or has the upper hand 
(2002:41). 
 
Hence, for Derrida, every act of communication is an act of force, of violence. This 
idea is coupled with Derrida’s “critique of dualism” (Binder and Weisberg 
2000:382). As Binder and Weisberg explain: 
 
Derrida sees dualistic analysis as a particularly prevalent technique of closing the 
circle of meaning … [S]uch oppositions will be hierarchically arranged, with one 
“privileged” or “essential” term producing, regulating, or controlling its inessential 
opposite (2000:382). 
 
These ideas are specifically extended by Derrida, in the Force of Law: the Mystical 
Foundation of Authority, to law (1992). The force that comes from the establishment 
of binaries and their hierarchical arrangement is patent in the tradition of family 
law in Australia. 
 
In Australian family law, we have a hierarchy of family, in the following 
chronology and historical prevalence of legal recognition: 
 
1.  First, there is ‘family’ defined in terms of marriage, heterosexuality, 
monogamy and life-long commitment (the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)). The 
recent amendments to Western Australia’s Family Court Act 1975 (WA) 
extend the nomenclature to heterosexual and same-sex de facto 
relationships. 
2.  ‘De facto Relationships’ were the next family type recognised, defined in 
terms of heterosexuality and a period of cohabitation. The first statute 
passed was the De Facto Relationships Act 1984 (NSW) (see also Property Law 
Act 1958 (Vic), Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), De Facto Relationships Act 1991 
(NT), De Facto Relationships Act 1996 (SA), and De Facto Relationships Act 1999 
(Tas)). It was not until 2002 that the Western Australian government passed 
legislation for these (and same-sex de facto relationships) (Family Court Act 
1975 (WA)). In this state, these relationships have the same provisions apply 
to them as for families derived through marriage. 
3.  ‘De facto Relationships’, defined in terms of a period of cohabitation 
irrespective of sexual preference, were subsequently recognised. In 1999, the 
NSW Parliament amended its legislation to include same-sex de facto Chapter 2 | 37 
 
relationships, also changing the relevant legislation’s name to the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1999. As noted, Victoria and Queensland have similarly 
amended their statutes. Western Australia passed amendments in 2002. 
4.  Finally, a broader definition of ‘Domestic Relationships’ (Domestic 
Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), passed in 1994) is increasingly being 
recognised. The additional nomenclatures of ‘close personal relationships’ 
(NSW, passed in 1999), ‘caring relationships’ and ‘significant relationships’ 
(Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), passed in 2003) have been adopted. These 
relationship types are defined in terms of the characteristics of relationship, 
irrespective of cohabitation, sexual relationship, sexuality or any of the other 
indicators of a marriage-like union, used in the other statutes. The ACT 
legislation was ahead of its time; other states and territories have only 
recently followed suit. These statutes may include those relationships, such 
as people in shared housing, extended family, friends who share lifestyles 
and extended kinship arrangements, that are not acknowledged in family 
property law regimes. The issue then becomes one of the jurist’s exercise of 
discretion in recognising these other relationships as familial; that is, as 
private-sphere property negotiation. 
 
This hierarchy is indicated by the language used to signify relationships. Until 
2002, with the amendments to the Family Court Act 1975 (WA), only family formed 
through marriage was entitled to the term ‘family’. This chronology of recognition 
is likely to be replicated in the decision of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-
General to refer powers to the Commonwealth to legislate on de facto 
relationships, and the Commonwealth’s decision only to accept referrals in relation 
to heterosexual de facto relationships (Harland 2004). 
 
Each downward step in the hierarchy communicates a devaluing of the 
relationship. Rather than undermined by the introduction of new models, the 
centre is bolstered by their being marked as different. The hierarchy, rather than 
being a celebration of difference, is the consolation for a lack of sameness. One 
comes to know the (legitimate and legitimated) family through the trace of the 
model of domestic relationship which either is not included or included only as a 
peripheral category. 
 
The state places marriage and heteronormativity at the centre, as the norm, with a 
more rigorous heteronormativity coming second; that is, as a second rate family 
model.4 In fact, this family is so marked as second that it is no longer privileged by 
                                                 
4 The increasing rigour arises from a need, in some of the state and territory acts, to ‘prove’ marriage-
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the terminology of family. Assuming that law assists in the institution of 
boundaries of human subjectivity there is a flow-on from legal non-recognition to 
social non-recognition of these alternative family forms. 
 
Law, like language is, by its nature, violent. It seeks to fix or at least limit the 
possibilities of signification by marking out oppositions. Family law as constructed 
by the federal Parliament (the FLA) defines family as much through what it 
excludes, that is, same-sex and heterosexual de facto relationships, shared housing 
relationships, and commercial relationships, inter alia, as through its direct 
reference to marriage. In doing so, the Parliament has closed signification in 
relation to the legal family at least, possibly also to the social family as understood 
by the body dominant. This is a violent imposition on meaning. 
 
I speak here of the oppositional manifestations of family law in Australia. These 
are: 
 
Family Not  family 
In (legal)  Out (non-legal) 
Centre Other 
Private Public 
 
Law has been locked into these oppositions because of the assumptions about the 
marking of the private and public spheres and their conflation with family/not 
family. Progressive law reformists have argued for the inclusion of certain families, 
those historically marked as outside of family and as part of the public sphere (for 
example, Western Australia 2001). It is on this basis that late inclusion of 
heterosexual and same-sex de facto marriages has been the object of legislation in 
the states and territories. But this approach retains an ordering based upon the 
same oppositions. With only a few exceptions, there is little real transformation in 
relation to the law’s, or for that matter society’s, understanding of how family is 
constituted. With these incremental changes, the issue of what constitutes ‘in’ (and 
a closer to centre status) is based upon the same conflated binaries of family/not 
family, private/public.5 
 
This difference in the nature of regulation between the public and private sphere 
underpins the existence of a different regime for family. But while it is the 
                                                 
5 There is a further injustice, a further retrogression of the politics of the public sphere. This is that 
there are those within the public sphere, for example, in the commercial world, who operate like the 
private, in that they embrace a mantel of trust, of mutual responsibility and rights, of long term 
alliances. I am not concerned with these here, but they remind us of the impropriety of the 
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characteristics of relationship that mark the difference, the ideology of family has 
disguised the fact that these characteristics are not unique to traditional family 
models. This centre, this ‘understanding’ which has been neutralised through 
history, has fixed the structure of family law; in doing so, it has limited the “play” 
available within that structure.6 
 
The legal text is more than a set of rules removed from ‘the real’. The text and 
reality are part and parcel of the same thing but capable of being understood only 
through the “determined textual system” (Derrida 1998:158) that is the law. The 
reality that it gives rise to, however, is neither fixed, nor natural. Cornell’s claim 
regarding the politics of structure is even more critical for law. As she says: 
 
Establishment is associated with force and with politics. The shutting in of context, 
the denial of new possibilities yet to be imagined, is exposed as political, not as 
inevitable, and more importantly, as unethical and, ultimately unjust (1991:109). 
 
There are two morals to this story. The first is a reminder, through Derrida’s 
exposure of the textual confines of the signified or referent (this terminology is 
discussed in chapter 10), that the law’s meanings are not intransigent. They can be 
liberated. The second is a reminder of the force and power of the law, in its 
attempts to limit the significatory play of its texts. Law’s closure of semiosis, 
through the denial of alternative contexts, contributes to law’s violence. For, by 
closing semiosis, by limiting the possible legal manifestations of family, the law is 
effectively negating alternative operations of the same text. As Colebrook and 
McHoul claim, in general terms: “To accept any specific or particular purposive 
context as exhaustive is to exclude other possibilities of understanding” (1996:438). 
The understanding of family that comes from law is a determination, a 
“distribution of force” (Colebrook & McHoul 1996:436, citing Derrida). In 
Australian family law, a decision is made to invoke one interpretation of the 
everyday (that which concurs with, or approximates, the law’s own) in neglect 
and/or rejection of another. In doing so, the law cuts (‘decide’ is from the latin 
decidere: to cut), relegating something to the outside. The decision is at once an act 
of validation and invalidation, legitimation and delegitimation. There is a power or 
force in signification which is borne out on those whose relationships do not satisfy 
the formal requirements of the law. For Derrida, the centre is determined by this 
exclusion, through the cut. Hence, when legal positivism makes a decision about 
what is law and what is not law, it confirms the inside by excluding the outside. 
Similarly, the law’s decisions about family places some families in the margins as a 
correlation to the centre, to what is in the text. 
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Lest it be thought that this is a discussion of purely intellectual relevance (as if that 
in itself is not enough) let me refer to the Report of the Parliamentary Joint Select 
Committee on Certain Aspects of the Operation and Interpretation of the Family Law Act 
(Australia 1992) on, firstly, the nexus between legal language and its constitutive 
nature and practical implications and, secondly, on the chasm between legal 
definitions and the meanings that circulate beyond the law, as such. Under the 
heading “Connotations of the terminology” the Committee reports that the Family 
Law Council, a statutory body created under the FLA, raised “the issues of values 
and assumptions in language” (1992:106). The Council recommended an 
examination of the language of family law, namely that pertaining to parenting 
arrangements, as a step towards understanding the difficulties of the parties. It 
noted that the words of the statute, “despite their legal definitions, do not 
necessarily reflect the practice of the relationship between parents and children” 
and, in fact, contribute to a perception of parenting negotiations as being 
concerned with child “ownership” and of “notions of winning and losing” 
(1992:106-107). The Council recommended a change in the relevant language. 
 
Similar arguments were put by, inter alia, the National Catholic Association of 
Family Agencies, the Family Law Reform Association of Queensland, the ACT 
Legal Aid Office, Justice Elizabeth Evatt (a one-time judge of the Family Court of 
Australia), the Australian Council of Marriage Counselling Organisations Inc. and 
the Australian Institute of Family Studies, a research and policy body established 
under the FLA. Of particular interest is the Committee’s response to such 
arguments, that “the meaning [of the relevant terms] … is misunderstood” 
(1992:107) indicating a view that the legal meaning is the correct one, and 
dismissing alternative meanings. This is an example of the force of law in its 
validation of the meanings of its own establishment, and the closure of 
signification. 
 
The final lesson I take from Derrida relates to the nature of the legal decision and 
the contradiction that it presents. It is what he calls an “aporia”, a “non-road”. He 
says that “from this point of view, justice would be the experience that we are not 
able to experience” (1992:16). The first aporia is the common position that justice 
can only be exercised by a free will (1992:22). However, if a decision is to be just, it 
must follow some rule or law: 
 
for a decision to be just and responsible, it must, in its proper moment if there is 
one, be both regulated and without regulation: it must conserve the law and also 
destroy it or suspend it enough to have to reinvent it in each case, rejustify it, at 
least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new and free confirmation of its Chapter 2 | 41 
 
principle. Each case is other, each decision is different and requires an absolutely 
unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee 
absolutely (1992:23). 
 
This is most certainly the jurist’s task. She or he must abide by what has gone 
before, the decision or the rule, but must exercise a freedom in the application of 
this rule to the set of facts, the circumstances, before her or him. In this case there 
can be both restraint and freedom. This is what, after all, distinguishes a judge 
from a mere technician. Her or his work is more than simply applying a rule, 
despite the arguments of positivists to the contrary. She or he is required to make a 
decision suited to the moment. She or he must decide which rule should apply to 
the current situation, with a view to the social context and the justice or injustice of 
the matter, and then apply it. Justice is, therefore singular, but because the debate 
is centred in law, it is always also general (Cornell 1991:113); the generality of the 
statute or the ratio. Further, the jurist is faced with the undecidable; that is, they 
inhabit the area between that which is incalculable and that which must be 
calculated. Yet she or he is forced to make a decision across this heterogeneity 
(Derrida 1992:24). Cornell notes that the aporia can never be overcome, “it must be 
lived and lived as a response to justice” (1991:113, emphasis added). 
 
Derrida notes that there is never pure justice, only legality: 
 
Once the ordeal of the undecidable is past (if that is possible), the decision has 
again followed a rule or given itself a rule, invented it or reinvented, reaffirmed it, 
it is no longer presently just, fully just. There is apparently no moment in which a 
decision can be called presently and fully just: either it has not yet been made 
according to a rule, and nothing allows us to call it just, or it has already followed a 
rule – whether received, confirmed, conserved or reinvented – which in its turn is 
not absolutely guaranteed by anything; and, moreover, if it were guaranteed, the 
decision would be reduced to calculation and we couldn’t call it just (1992:24, 
emphasis in original). 
 
Does this mean that we should just concede to the impossibility? Where does this 
lead us in our striving for justice? We can glean that, for Derrida, a situation in 
which the application of the law is a mere application of a rule – a calculation as 
Derrida would call it – is less of a justice than the struggle with the undecidable. 
Yet, “justice requires us to calculate” (Derrida 1992:28). We cannot escape the 
moment of calculation, but we should try to negotiate the space between the 
calculable and the incalculable, and this should, if necessary, include reference 
beyond the field of law (Derrida 1992:28).  
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In the area of family law, the matter of jurisdiction has traditionally been mere 
calculation – does the family before the court constitute family in the precise terms 
of the statute? Are the parties married (the FLA), or are they a cohabiting 
heterosexual couple (the South Australian legislation, for example)? The relevant 
court does not have discretion on this question, even if it is patent that the parties 
have lived as family, and that they feel like family. It can exercise discretion only if 
the substantive provisions permit it. Would it be more, if not actually, just if there 
were greater scope for calculation at the moment of the decision? I entertain this 
possibility in chapter 11. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Derrida and Lyotard provide a reminder that the injustice of the law does not only 
occur by force of direct action – the decision of a court one way or another. It can 
also occur through the denial of a category as well as the denial of a voice and a 
reality to a victim. It can occur through its representations of ‘centre’ vis-à-vis 
‘other’, establishing a hierarchy of legitimacy. It exists when the judgment7 is a 
mere calculation, a blunt application of the rules without a struggle over the 
undecidability of the decision. Injustice can occur when the assumptions that 
underlie the ordering of a system deny any possibility for transformation. For me, 
these constitute the most fundamental of injustices for they imprison these others 
in a gaol of non-existence. 
 
It should be noted, as Cornell does that: 
 
For both Derrida and Lyotard, even the projection of redefinition and evolution 
would reinstate notions of adequation to pregiven standards. The importance of 
Lyotard and Derrida, particularly when read in conjunction with the 
deconstruction of the rigid divide between the real and the literal, emphasizes not 
only that justice demands its own transformation as prior victims insist on the 
recognition of the damage and harm they have suffered, but that justice itself 
remain as unrepresentable as a full description of principle, either as system or 
theory (1991:109). 
 
It is not enough that the Australian, state and territory Parliaments continue along 
a path of incrementally including those others, thinking each time that the job has 
been done. Justice is never done. It is “an experience of the impossible” (Derrida 
                                                 
7 In keeping with the Oxford Guide to Style I use ‘judgment’ to refer to legal decisions, and 
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1992:16). There are always those that fall outside the literalness of the legal text; 
especially if the text is, on the one hand, narrowly defined, and on the other, set 
within a legally self-determined context of interpretation. As Derrida tells us, the 
trace of the other always remains, reminding us of our injustice. Is there a way out? 
The answer of course is an indefinite maybe because in Derridean terms, justice is 
always yet to come. However, if the law is framed in a manner which permits a 
specific engagement with the family before it, the bringing of the other into the 
law, rather than the application of the law to the other, and the potential for the 
jurist to engage with the lived-in experience of the parties before it, the 
determination of family can remain open. This would point the way to justice, 
permitting the jurist to decide, as a judge rather than a mere technician, on the facts 
before her or him. And the cut would be an exclusion only for this moment, a cut 
that is particular to the situation at hand, rather than one that establishes a walled-
up centre . 
 
In the next part, I undertake what Kahn calls a “genealogy” of law (1999: 36), 
illustrating its conceptual foundations. I introduce positivist theories stemming 
from the seventeenth and eighteenth century scholars and provide an outline of the 
common law and statutory rules for interpretation. Finally, I challenge the myths 
of legal certainty and objectivity, by reference to the eighteenth century lawyer, 
Matthew Hale, and contemporary legal and literary thinkers. Part 2:  Law as Interpretation 
 
 
Preface 
 
The rule of law is a social practice: it is a way of being in the world. To live under 
the rule of law is to maintain a set of beliefs about the self and community, time 
and space, authority and representations. It is to understand the actions of others 
and the possible actions of the self as expressions of these beliefs … [It] maintains 
the philosophical ambition of coherence, unity, and system (Kahn 1999:36). 
 
Kahn argues for an investigation of the social and legal conditions which permit 
Western society’s commitment to the “rule of law”. The principles relating to legal 
interpretation are part of this concept. They are each part of a belief that law is a 
coherent, unified, system of interrelated rules and norms. 
 
In this part of the thesis, I will undertake what Kahn calls a “genealogy” (1999:41), 
“exposing the conceptual conditions of the practice [of law]” (1999:36). As Kahn 
explains, a genealogy shows that modern understandings of law have a history 
and that this history has an effect on the meanings of the present (1999:41). These 
conceptual conditions give rise to a legal and reified version of family. By outlining 
the conceptual underpinnings to the doctrines of interpretation, I hope to create a 
path to reconceptualising the system of family law, in the latter parts of the thesis. 
This will, hopefully, enable, within the law, an appreciation of the contradictions in 
its construction of family. 
 
The issue of what constitutes family in law (as with any other legal category) 
hinges on rules of statutory construction, the doctrine of stare decisis and upon 
tenets of legal interpretation. These tenets were conceived as part of a positivist 
version of law. It is assumed, at least by some who subscribe to a positivist outlook, 
that by applying the rules of interpretation, a legal truth can be uncovered. At the Preface | 45 
very least, these rules provide the illusion that the jurist can ‘objectively’ approach 
the law and the problem before the court, effectively leaving the jurist’s subject 
position outside the court. 
 
In chapter 3, I provide a brief theoretical history to our common law doctrines of 
interpretation. This shows that thinkers over the last 2000 years have been 
concerned with the distinction between the inside and outside of law. Positivists 
have sought to resolve this spatial distinction by identifying a clear realm of law. 
They describe law’s methods of meaning making as a logical and formulaic 
application of rules. They argue that the legal process of interpretation is 
essentially an internal one, devoid of social and cultural input. I follow this, in 
chapter 4, with an outline of the statutory and common law rules of interpretation 
in Australia. Under these rules, the jurist’s task is to identify the Parliament’s 
original intention or to ‘find’ the meaning in law. In the final chapter of this part, 
chapter 5, I continue in the tradition of many ‘postmodern’ and post-structuralist 
legal commentators who challenge the idea that there is determinacy in law. I 
argue that there are a number of flaws with the positivists’ presumptions: first, that 
there is no original source of meaning in law; second, that meaning is not able to be 
represented authoritatively; and third, that it is not possible for an author to have 
control over meaning. This has implications for law’s meaning. Chapter 3  Building Walls – Positivist Legal Jurisprudence 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Like all walls it was ambiguous, two-faced. What was inside and what was 
outside it depended upon which side of it you were on. (Le Guin in Davies 
1994:10). 
 
Saunders’ commentary on Aristotle’s Politics links the Aristotlian theory of 
state to a general controversy in the fifth to fourth centuries BC about the 
relative status and merits of nomos (law, convention), and phusis (nature) 
(1995:60). This distinction persists as a fundamental question for legal 
theorists. For Derrida, questioning the distinction is a matter of justice. 
“[D]estabilizing or complicating the opposition between nomos and physis … 
that is to say, the opposition between law, convention, the institution on the 
one hand, and nature on the other, with all the oppositions that they 
condition” is a deconstructive gesture (1992:8) and deconstruction is justice 
(1992:15, emphasis added). 
 
For more than two millennia, a central concern for those involved in the quest 
to explain law has been the relationship between that which is internal to the 
law and that which is external; however that externality has been framed. As 
Douzinas et al. assert: 
 
Jurisprudence sets itself the task of determining what is proper to law and of 
keeping outside law’s empire the non-legal, the extraneous, law's others … 
For jurisprudence the corpus of law is literally a body: it must either digest 
and transform the non-legal into legality, or it must reject it, keep it out as 
excess and contamination (1991:25). 
 
This has not been so much a questioning of the boundary, but a question that 
goes to how and where the boundary is to be drawn. The former has been at 
the core of some of Davies’ work: 
 
My aim is to consider the limits of legal thought – both the limits which are the 
content of legal thought (laws as limits) and the limits which define jurisprudence 
and ‘law’ as a distinct terrain of thought (Davies 1996:17). 
 
She considers the work of legal positivists such as Kelsen and Austin on the 
nature of law, and concludes that “the body of knowledge which is legal Chapter 3 | 47 
science is formed by a positive exclusion from consideration of everything 
which is other or ‘foreign’ to law” (1996:19). Positivism is not, however, the 
only realm of legal scholarship that marks out the terrain of law, although it is 
most overt in its attempts to do so.1 As Douzinas et al. remind us, much legal 
thought is premised upon an assumed distinction between the legal and non-
legal terrains, even on the part of those who might be critical of the 
distinction, if they reflected on it. In short, the questions posed by legal 
commentary revolve around the following ideas: 
 
1.  The characterisation of law (the internal) versus the characterisation of other 
(the external) and the question of where to draw a line. This is a central issue 
for positivists (such as Hart 1961 and Kelsen 1934), but others, such as 
natural law theorists have been similarly concerned with distinguishing 
man-made law from other law, such as that deriving from ‘God’ (for 
example, Aquinas, Aristotle, Cicero). 
2.  The nature of the relation between these two and a theorisation of the shared 
space between the two, where the two binary spheres come together. The 
external is largely considered something which may be attached to law, to 
account for, or evaluate it (for example, sociological theories of law, where 
the ‘other’ remains just that, and outside of the law2) or as a means of 
understanding law (such as theories of adjudication, which in some 
instances attempt to explain the law’s incorporation of the other as its own3). 
‘Law and society’4 or ‘socio-legal’5 analyses consider the shared space . 
3.  A complete challenge to and/or rejection of the concept of a separation 
between the internal and the external; that is, of positivist theories on the 
discipline of law. This position might be either a challenge to the discursive 
limits of law or of the possibility of knowing where the distinction falls. It 
can give rise to a critical theorising of the distinction that could include a 
return (theoretically, not chronologically) in a more problematic fashion to 
the first question. Typical scholars are Davies, Cornell, Goodrich and 
Douzinas who generally work from what some have called a postmodern 
theoretical framework. 
 
                                                 
1 Insights into the nature of law are contained in theoretical, analytic and comparative works, although 
in this chapter I am drawing mostly on theoretical material. 
2 Note Freeman’s introduction to a chapter on ‘Sociological Jurisprudence and the Sociology of Law’ 
where he says that: ‘Legal thought has tended to reflect the trends to be found in sociology’ 
(2001:659) 
3 See, for example, the work of Ronald Dworkin, which incorporates political morality. 
4 See, for example, Law and Society Review, the journal of the Law and Society Association. 
5 This type of analysis and its proponents (such as Sarat and Silbey, Nelken and Cotterrell) is 
discussed in Freeman (2001:685). Chapter 3 | 48 
In this chapter, I consider positivist theories of law, that is, those operating 
within the first set of ideas. I commence with the role of positivism in 
governance. The adherence to a set domain of law is a mechanism for the public 
accountability of the law and of the state. This is an important “conceptual 
condition” (to return to Kahn) of the law, generally, and of legal interpretation, 
generally. I will then draw on Bentham, Austin and Kelsen as examples of 
positivism’s theoretical claims on the inside of law. Finally, I illustrate how the 
outside continues to creep into the inside despite the attempts by great legal 
minds to build a conceptual wall. I refer specifically to the twentieth century 
work of Kelsen, Hart and Dworkin. These theories provide a backdrop to the 
rules of interpretation, which are outlined in the subsequent chapter. 
 
 
Positivist Law as the Commands of the State 
 
In common law countries, such as Australia, which are based upon a political 
democracy coupled with the rule of law, the debate on the nature of law, like 
that of the classical era, is often linked to issues of governance. As Freeman 
explains, a decisive part of the growth of the nation state, “constituting both a 
self-sufficient unit and an independent legal entity”, was the state’s almost 
unlimited ability to make new law (1994:205). The proponents of legal 
sovereignty favoured the idea of positive law over natural law, because the 
former, as the law of the state, is “ascertainable and valid” (1994:206). 
 
Positivist law is comprised of the rules or commands of the sovereign. Bentham, 
an eighteenth/nineteenth century jurist, known for his codification of the law 
and his social utilitarianism, says that the law is the “will of the sovereign in a 
state” (1970:18, emphasis in original). For Austin, writing in the nineteenth 
century, “laws or rules properly so, are a species of commands” (1970:5, 
emphasis in original) which are “set by political superiors to political inferiors” 
(1970:1). 
 
Hence, for the fathers of legal positivism, the idea of a determinate and 
comprehensible body of laws is linked to the issues of state power. One of these 
issues is the idea of the rule of law.6 This is, in essence, that law should dictate a 
government’s actions, which should not be arbitrary (Parkinson 2001:96). The 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of the tensions in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, between the power of the 
state and the limits set by the common law see Holdsworth and, in particular, his discussion of Coke’s 
resolution of this (Coke was a seventeenth century lawyer, writer and English attorney-general) 
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law enables and limits the power of government. For example, Bentham notes 
that: 
 
A law may be defined as an assemblage of signs declarative of a volition 
conceived or adopted by the sovereign in a state, concerning the conduct to be 
observed in a certain case by a certain person or class of persons, who in the case 
in question are or are supposed to be subject to his power (1970:1, emphasis in 
original). 
 
Positivist accounts of the nature of law are firmly implicated in positivist ideas 
of the source of law and the primacy of the state in governance. In a 
constitutional democracy such as Australia, law owes its power, as command 
and sanction, to having been passed according to the law (these are secondary 
rules, according to Hart). Because jurists are not elected members, they should 
limit themselves to ‘interpreting’ the law and should not ‘make’ law.7 
 
 
Positivism as an Internal System of Rules/Norms 
 
Jackson outlines three “major tenets of [legal] positivism”. These are: 
 
that there exists a specifically legal form of interpretation, one which belongs to 
an autonomous legal universe; … that there exists an intimate connection 
between decision-making and interpretation, and that normally interpretation 
of the law is determinative of its application to facts; third, that ‘the law’ exists 
as a single unified system, and that only one such system exists within any state 
(1990:85). 
 
To illustrate these “tenets” I will refer to key positivist scholars of the past two 
centuries: Bentham and Austin. I will also include Kelsen, Hart and Dworkin 
who later responded to the limits of positivism. I consider them as positivists 
because they each retain the traces of an autonomous legal structure in 
incorporating non-law standards into their theories (political standards, for 
Dworkin; a hierarchy of norms for Kelsen, and the norms of the legal system, 
for Hart). Each adheres to the idea that some form of legal truth is possible, 
although they refer to something other than the words of the law. 
 
                                                 
7 This assumes that interpretation is not a constructive process. I question this assumption in later 
chapters. For an historical account of these ideas, see Holdsworth (1945:vol. V, 419-444). Chapter 3 | 50 
For positivists, the dividing line between the internal and external would 
appear to be distinct. For Bentham, the law is enshrined in statute or caselaw, 
nothing more, nothing less. He wanted to fix the meaning of law, interpretable 
through a particular method (Hart 1954:41), as part of his attempt to codify the 
law and build a clear structure for reform (Freeman 1994:211). Austin explains 
the law positively, as commands by a sovereign that give rise to a duty or 
obligation and which are backed by a sanction or some enforcement of 
obedience (1970:1-15). However, he also defines positive law by reference to 
what it is not, such as the laws of God (“Divine Laws and Religious Precepts”) 
and morality (that is, laws not set by political superiors) (1970:1-3, 26). He 
argues that the boundaries of law begin with the law (statute and caselaw) and 
end with the process of judicial determination. This disallows the process of 
lawmaking, other than as determined by procedural rules, as well as questions 
of the moral content or effects of law. These are questions that can only have a 
place outside the law. 
 
Kelsen, a twentieth century legal scholar, attempts to develop a science of law to 
parallel the natural sciences (though his is conceptually differentiated). The 
external resides outside the single unified system. Legal interpretation is unique 
to this system. Kelsen explains that law “is concerned solely with that part of 
knowledge which deals with law, excluding from such knowledge everything 
which does not strictly belong to the subject-matter law” (1934:477). The 
discipline of law is distinct from “all foreign elements” (1934:477). 
 
These positivists acknowledge that law has an external relation. There may well 
be social effects, there may be ethical or moral considerations, and questions of 
the psychology of adjudication may be relevant, but these are beyond the scope 
of legal theorising (see, for example, Kelsen 1934:477-485). Further, moral 
considerations are not part of law. For, as Kelsen explains of his theory of 
positive law: “The Pure Theory Of Law … endeavours to answer the question, 
What is the law? (1934:477, emphasis added). It is not concerned with the 
question “What ought it to be?” (Kelsen 1934:477, emphasis added). As Hart 
concludes: 
 
Bentham and Austin insisted on the distinction between what law is and what it 
ought to be … partly because they thought that unless men kept these separate 
they might, without counting the cost to society, make hasty judgments that 
laws were invalid and ought not to be obeyed (1961:207). 
 
Despite the apparent criticism, Hart still favours the law-morality distinction 
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As we see, positivism attempts to map out a discipline of law that is distinct 
from other fields; delineating an internal sphere. This is determined by the 
“Science of the Jurisprudence of Law” according to Austin (1970:26) or the 
“Pure Theory of Law” for Kelsen (1934:477). However, such theories seriously 
restrict our capacity to understand, evaluate and criticise law. They limit our 
ability to analyse the non-rule aspects of the law, such as the context and 
conditions of law-making and interpretation, which can affect legal meaning. A 
science of law as outlined means that there will be many questions that cannot 
be answered jurisprudentially. But there is a more fundamental flaw in such 
theories. This is that, despite the best attempts to keep the outside at bay, it 
cannot help but creep in, in anything other than a simplistic theory of the law. I 
will turn, then to more sophisticated positivist accounts to illustrate this. 
 
 
The Hole in the Wall 
 
Bentham was attempting to counter the capricious nature of legal decision 
making at the time; hence his attempt to delineate the role of the jurist by 
outlining a proper domain of positivist law. Austin was attempting to clarify, 
from a positivist perspective, the “legal and logical implications of sovereignty” 
(Freeman 1994:205-214). But, as Hart indicates, Austin’s characterisation of law 
is “a simple account of the matter” (1961:18,25; he also makes the same claim 
about some of Bentham’s ideas, 1961:206). Later positivists, such as Kelsen, Hart 
and, I would argue, Dworkin were dealing with a different set of circumstances 
and with the benefit of the categorisations provided by their predecessors. Hart 
responds directly to Austin’s theory of law (1961) and Dworkin seeks to counter 
positivist claims that rules alone provide the content of law (Patterson 1993:7). 
 
For Kelsen, law is a hierarchy of norms, with the Grundnorm as the base. The 
Grundnorm defies explanation in strictly legal terms. He defines his hierarchy of 
norms in terms of meaning content, although the concept of meaning is not 
problematised. The norms are not to be considered as natural realities or facts in 
consciousness but as meaning-content. This is a call to the study of the content 
of the norm, in legal terms, as opposed to its effects or causes. The latter would 
constitute something other than a jurisprudential study, perhaps a sociological 
inquiry. The goal of his “Pure Theory of Law” is to “discover the specific 
principles of a sphere of meaning” (Kelsen 1934 in Freeman 1994:292-3). The 
application of law is a tracing back through the various norms, each of which 
gives the legal activity its authority, until it arrives at the Grundnorm, or higher 
norm (Kelsen 1945:ch X). Whereas each of the norms is dependent for its 
validity on its creation in a legal way, according to the preceding basic norms, Chapter 3 | 52 
the Grundnorm is valid only because it is presupposed to be such. The marker of 
this presupposition is efficacy, which is whether, in practice, the norm is 
actually obeyed and applied. The Grundnorm might be replaced ostensibly by, 
for example, military coup, but it is not replaced effectively and practically 
unless there is obedience to this change, unless it is efficacious. So Kelsen's 
internalised theory of law takes a radical turn. Ultimately, the law is law, not 
because it has been passed according to the rule of law but because of its 
efficacy. For me, the question remains: why do people obey any system of law? 
It is an issue of normativity and therefore clearly outside the realm of a strict 
science of law, except insofar as that science includes normative concerns and 
outcomes. The outside (something not positively designated in law) suddenly 
becomes part of the inside for Kelsen, although he does not state it as such. 
Kelsen’s “science” relies upon a culture of acceptance, which, in turn, gives rise 
to legal efficacy. It may be that there is a distinctive culture of law, but it is 
never distinct. It draws from something other than the rules and prescriptions 
that are the tools of the law. 
 
Remnants of the outside and the problematic of culture and interpretation can 
similarly be found in Hart's attempts to characterise law. As noted above, he 
viewed Austin’s command model of law as a simple one. It represents an 
external point of view, that is, as viewed by the ordinary person, but fails to 
account for the ways in which legal officials use and live rules (Fitzpatrick 
1992:186). Hart notes the institutional context of any special system of meaning: 
 
[T]he language involved in the enunciation and the application of rules 
constitutes a special segment of human discourse with special features which 
lead to confusion if neglected … [O]f this type of discourse the law is one very 
complex example (1954:41). 
 
He explains that two types of rules form the foundation of a sophisticated 
system of law (Hart draws a distinction between ‘sophisticated’ and ‘primitive’ 
systems): primary rules (substantive rules) and secondary rules (procedural and 
enabling rules) (Hart 1961:ch V). 
 
Secondary rules include: rules of change, that is, rules which permit change to 
existing substantive rules; rules of adjudication, that is, rules which authorise 
processes and personnel for determining disputes; and the rule of recognition, 
the basic source of legal authority in any system. These secondary rules are all 
internal in nature. Rules of change and of adjudication are rules of law because 
they are constructed through the normal process of law making. The rule of 
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internal because it represents the “internal point of view” (1961:99), a particular, 
legal way of doing things. It is a presupposition which gives the law its validity 
and is found in actual practice (1961:105-106). Hart clarifies this by arguing that 
the rule of recognition is: 
 
seldom expressly formulated as a rule; … but its existence is shown in the way in 
which particular rules are identified, either by courts or other officials or private 
persons or their advisers (emphasis in original) (Hart 1961:98). 
 
Similarly, the secondary rules, as a whole, are effective as part of the legal 
sphere because they are accepted as the common standard of its officials 
(1961:113). Hence, for Hart, legal meaning is derived from an interconnected 
lexicon of rules, one which invokes norms. This lexicon can only be elucidated 
by legal experts (Hart 1954). 
 
Like Kelsen, Hart invokes normativity as part of the law. The rule of recognition 
is essentially external to that which is traditionally conceived of as law, even by 
Hart's analysis. It becomes law only because Hart incorporates it into his 
concept of law. Hart's concept of law relies upon an institutionally accepted set 
of practices rather than a formal set of rules, something that is categorically 
outside of a strict legal formalism.  
 
Similar arguments, in relation to both Hart and Kelsen, are presented by van 
Hoecke in his book, Law as Communication. He claims that the: 
 
‘rule of recognition’ … is not part of the legal system, but a condition for its 
acceptance in society. It is not an internal, but an external element. Moreover, it 
is not a ‘rule’. It is a belief, an acceptance, an ideological position … By 
definition, such ‘rule(s) of recognition’, cannot be part of the institutionalisation 
of the law. It belongs to the societal breeding ground of the legal system, not to 
the legal system itself (2002:23). 
 
He adds that this is, “just like Kelsen’s basic norm” (2002:23). While seeming to 
acknowledge that law is something other than rules, essentially Hart continues 
to characterise this ‘outside’ law as a rule, the rule of recognition. Hence, rather 
than culture (norms) determining legal practice, “Hart’s image of law is that of a 
system in which rules govern power-holders; in which rules, rather that people 
govern” (Cotterrell 1989:99). If Hart’s “Concept of Law” holds any promise for 
an inclusion of the outside, it is put to rest by the clear hierarchy of power; of 
rules over practice. Fitzpatrick concludes that this is a “resort to essential 
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Dworkin’s rights thesis is a response to the positivist view that law can be 
explained as a system of rules (Patterson 1993:7). Dworkin argues that 
positivism provides a distorted picture of law because it overlooks non-rule 
standards (1977:ch 1 & 2), these being policies and principles (translated into 
rights) (1977:82). The law of a particular community includes the principles of 
political morality (moral standards), which are part of the law in legal systems 
such as Britain (and presumably, Australia). These are implicit in the tradition 
and culture of political democracies (1986:195- 215). It is by reference to these 
principles that the Herculean judge (his superhuman judge) comes to the 
correct decision. Hence, the law is not only a system of rules; it is also 
constituted by a (certain) political context. By invoking these background 
standards, the judge is not making law (as against the rules that are in place). 
She or he is “simply declaring the pre-existing rights and obligations of the 
parties before the court” (Berns 1993:41). Hence, these background standards are 
part of the law, if not part of the rules in the Hartian sense. 
 
Does Dworkin’s thesis allow for an opening of the category of law? Do 
Dworkin’s ideas dissolve the line marking the inside from the outside? In one 
sense they do, because Dworkin includes political morality as part of the law, as 
one of the considerations of the judge. This is legal, given the political context 
(Harris 1997:189), in a way that differs from Hart who would require that the 
policies be part of the rule of recognition, one of his secondary rules. Berns, 
however, claims that Dworkin simply narrows the Hartian “internal point of 
view” (1993:1): 
 
Dworkin argues that to understand the nature of law and the role of the judge it 
is essential to view legal argument itself as a social practice and examine it from 
the point of view of a participant in that practice. Only through our 
participation in legal argument can we understand what the interpretation of 
law, as a discrete social practice, really requires (1993:2). 
 
So, while Dworkin appeals to that which, for positivists, is outside of law, there 
is effectively a requirement that one be part of the structure of law to interpret 
that outside. This outside is then brought to the inside, and becomes, through a 
careful filtering by the insider, part of the discipline of law. Rather than marked, 
within the law, as both inside and outside, any political morality is interpreted 
by a judge who is assumed to be completely lacking in subjectivity and capable 
of defining a singular political morality of a singular community. Is this any 
different from Hart’s “internal point of view”? Moreover, is the stance more 
worthy of criticism because it pretends to incorporate the external in an 
unproblematic fashion? Chapter 3 | 55 
 
Bentham seeks to fix the meaning of law and Hart theorises law as a set of 
interconnected norms. For Kelsen, legal norms are not natural realities but 
“meaning-contents” and for Dworkin, legal interpretation is “constructive 
interpretation”, that is, the Herculean judge’s interpretation, by reference to a 
clear political morality. In so far as Hart and Kelsen trace the origins of the legal 
system to a proposition, rather than a fact, they illustrate Derrida’s argument 
that law’s authority rests on its self; that is, on a “mystical foundation” 
(1992:14). Therefore, the law is a “violence without ground” (1992:14). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have outlined the conceptual foundations of law. The legal 
system is a unified, coherent and closed field. Its rules are capable of clear 
definition and elucidation through a particular, internal, method of 
interpretation. Though there may be ‘non-legal’ aspects of the law these are, 
nevertheless, inherently legal because they are institutionally determined and 
characteristic. 
 
Despite these foundational ‘truths’, for seminal positivists such as Hart and 
Kelsen, as well as for Dworkin, the system of law, the internality of law, is 
fundamentally derived from something outside of the law. A theory of 
normativity is a theory of performance rather than of rules (I discuss the ideas 
of ‘ceremony’ and ‘game’ in chapter 9). The goal, particularly for early 
positivists, such as Bentham, of attempting to define the law, was to mark an 
exclusive analytic realm separable from moral and other non-legal content, as a 
counter to the imposition of individual values in decision-making. However, 
the goal is unachievable, as there is no total separation, only theoretically-
derived degrees of separation. Hart, Kelsen and Dworkin each make a 
concession to law’s inability to be segmented from the cultural. However, rather 
than concede to the necessarily social and cultural nature of law, they identify a 
particular aspect of the non-legal that infringes on the law (Kelsen’s Grundnorm, 
Hart’s rule of recognition and Dworkin’s political morality) and then attempt to 
absorb this into the law. This enables them to define law as a distinct field, like 
their predecessors. These modern positivists, whilst perhaps flawed in their 
attempt to build a wall around the law, still provide a ground for a continuing 
investigation of culture as something that can be part and parcel of the law. 
 
In this thesis, I build on this earlier work. I aim to incorporate the outside (the 
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legal construction and interpretation) through an altered version of legal 
interpretation. Is this a Hartian or Kelsian endeavour? Am I, as a legal scholar, 
subscribing to the myth of positivism? At the beginning of this chapter, I quoted 
Douzinas et al. on the relation between law and its outside: the law “must either 
digest and transform the non-legal into legality, or it must reject it”. Early 
positivists, such as Bentham and Austin, attempted to reject the outside. 
Twentieth century positivists, Kelsen, Hart and Dworkin, attempted to digest 
the outside by taking an aspect of it and making it part of the law. What I aim 
for in the latter parts of the thesis is to encourage the law to ingest the outside. 
Ingestion is neither a rejection nor an incorporation by the law of the outside 
into itself, as itself. It is simply to take the outside in and, as much as possible, to 
permit the outside to retain its integrity, knowing that its integrity cannot, in 
fact, be maintained. 
 
Legal positivism has been widely criticised by legal and non-legal scholars. A 
particular war on the myths of objectivity offered by legal positivism was 
waged by the proponents of the ‘Critical Legal Studies’ movement in the 1960s 
and 1970s (see Hunt 1986). More recently, poststructural theory has been used 
by legal theorists to question the claims of positivism (for example, Davies 2002, 
Derrida 1992, Douzinas et al. 1991, Goodrich, 1983). In chapter 5, I move to a 
discussion of these criticisms of legal positivism and of the approach to 
interpretation that arises.  
 
Before coming to this criticism, however, I provide, in the next chapter, an 
outline of the common law doctrine of stare decisis and the statutory rules of 
interpretation in Australia. These are a product of the positivist endeavour. 
They are to be relied upon by the jurist to assist her or him to find a true(r) 
meaning of the law, by reference to the law’s original texts: statutes and the 
common law. 
 
 Chapter 4   The Meta-Law of the Law (the Rules of Interpretation) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Mutability is so inescapable that it even holds true for artificial languages. Whoever 
creates a language controls it only so long as it is not in circulation; from the 
moment when it fulfills its mission and becomes the property of everyone, control 
is lost … A man proposing a fixed language that posterity would have to accept for 
what it is would be like a hen hatching a duck’s egg: the language created by him 
would be borne along, willy-nilly, by the current that engulfs all languages 
(Saussure 1974:76). 
 
In the preceding chapter, I illustrated law’s conceptual history, to show that the 
law is a product of a particular political and social structure. Its history is 
embedded in the methods for interpreting law in a common law system. Two of 
the major sources of law are statute and caselaw (the common law). Finding 
meaning in law requires that the jurist be able to interpret these sources. 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the history of the common law system, before proceeding 
to a discussion of the methods for interpreting statutes and caselaw in Australia. 
This is the official story of legal interpretation. The meanings derived from these 
methods of interpretation stand as the authentic statement of law, including those 
concepts, such as family, which the law brings into its domain. An appreciation of 
the official process is necessary before I move, in the latter parts of the thesis, to 
discuss an alternative means of legislating and for reading law. 
 
 
The History of the Law (Caselaw and Statutes) 
 
In the seventeenth century, Matthew Hale outlined the distinctions between the 
law of the courts (caselaw) and the law of the state (statutes or acts). He is writing 
before the doctrine of stare decisis or precedent became set in stone (discussed 
below), and before the advent of official court reporting, which was to occur for the 
first time in 1865 (Parkinson 2001:71). Nevertheless he gives an indication of the 
origins of the common law traditions that Australia inherited from the English 
legal system. 
 
Hale divides law into two parts, the leges scriptae or acts of Parliament passed 
within memory, and the leges non scriptae, or customary laws, whose origins are 
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underscores the point that although the lex non scripta may, in fact, be recorded, its 
force is obtained by virtue of usage or custom: 
 
And when I call those parts of our laws leges non scriptae, I do not mean as if all 
those laws were only oral, or communicated from the former ages to the later, 
merely by word; for all those laws have their several monuments in writing, 
whereby they are transferred from one age to another, and without which they 
would soon lose all kind of certainty (1794:vol 1, 27) … [B]ut … they are grown into 
use, and have acquired their binding power and the force of laws BY A LONG 
AND IMMEMORIAL USAGE, and by the strength of custom and reception in this 
kingdom … [T]he formal and obliging force and power of them grows by long 
custom and use (1794:vol 1, 28, emphasis as in original). 
 
Although custom formed the basis of caselaw, caselaw was not necessarily ad hoc, 
prior to a formal system of precedent. As Parkinson explains: 
 
The traditional nature of the law, and the belief that the common law had existed 
from time immemorial, ensured that a reference for the past and a commitment to 
precedent was inherent in the nature of common law reasoning (2001:70). 
 
Edward Coke, a seventeenth century lawyer, writer and Attorney-General, 
attempted to explain the law by reference to its medieval origins. His view was 
that the earliest sources of law would provide the purist account of the law. Thus, 
through logic, the pure essence of the earliest sources could be extracted. 
Holdsworth says that, for Coke, the resulting readings were mere explanations of 
“the truth to be concealed in the oldest authorities” (Holdsworth 1945:vol V, 473). 
 
The role of the jurist was to refer to the past, to find the law. This is the 
“declaratory theory of law”, the idea common between the sixteenth and 
eighteenth centuries, that the role of the judge is not to make law but to simply 
declare it (Davies 1994:26, Davies 1996:47-8, Parkinson 2001:182).1 Davies 
characterises this as: 
 
a version of correspondence theory which related the truth of legal statements to 
some external referent … [that] was not something which inheres in nature, but 
rather the “law” idealised and abstracted from legal tradition, custom and wisdom 
(1996:47). 
                                                 
1 Compare this to the belief in the fifteenth century that the king had the role of declaring the law of 
nature, from which statute and civil law, custom and the law of the king was derived; and which was 
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Hart claims that some theorists hold the view that “it is still meaningful to speak of 
a decision as the uniquely correct decision in any case and of the duty of the judge 
to discover it” (1967 in Freeman 1994:1307). It is arguable that Dworkin holds a 
similar, though adapted, position in his theory of “constructive interpretation”, a 
process by which judges uncover the proper decision with reference to the political 
institutions of which she or he is a part (Dworkin 1986, Patterson 1993). Similarly, 
Parkinson claims that underlying the science of law is an assumption that a single, 
correct answer can always be found to any problem, if the jurist 
correctly analyses the law (2001:181). Hence, the idea that law pre-exists the 
moment of decision is prominent in legal theorising. If the statute has been passed 
according to due process, and the foundations of the common law have been laid, 
the law’s application to a particular scenario can be ‘discovered’. Thus, the law is 
capable of coming to the truth of the matter. This does not mean that, in law, the 
meaning is fixed temporally. For example, whilst the concept of family was defined 
for the purposes of the common law in the nineteenth century by Hyde v Hyde and 
Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P&D 1302, this concept of family is not fixed for all time. It 
can be reinterpreted through new ‘discoveries’. However, for the time that the law 
attaches a particular meaning to the concept of family, this applies across space to 
any family-like models or enterprises, which might be relevant to the particular 
law. The correct decision, in so far as it represents a certain truth, is a truth of a 
spatial rather than a temporal nature. 
 
A system which gives precedent to tradition will, by its nature, have reverence for 
the discoveries and declarations of the past. In 1612, John Davies indicated this 
regard for law developed over time, in his explanation of the common law: 
 
For a Custome taketh beginning and groweth to perfection in this manner: When a 
reasonable act once done is found to be good and beneficiall to the people, and 
agreeable to their nature and disposition, then do they use it and practice it again 
and again, and so by often iteration and multiplication of the act it becometh a 
Custome; and being continues without interruption time out of mind, it obtaineth 
the force of a Law (in Davies, 1994:31, emphasis in original). 
 
The early common law had its detractors. For example, Bentham criticised the 
capacity within the common law for Law Lords to make capricious decisions 
(1962:45, n2) and developed a comprehensive theory of law, which promoted the 
codification of the common law. As Davies explains: 
                                                 
2 I will only provide the case’s full title and citation the first time I refer to it in a chapter, thereafter 
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Bentham saw nothing good about the common law – far from being rational or 
based on an immemorial wisdom, he saw it as an incoherent conglomeration of 
technical rules, a “shapeless heap of odds and ends” or “prodigious mass of 
rubbish”, made in an arbitrary fashion by judges according to whatever moral or 
political whim they felt like applying (2002:61). 
 
Bentham argued that a principle of social utilitarianism, that is, an objective of the 
greatest pleasure for the greatest number, should replace natural law and 
subjective values as the mainstay of governance (Bentham 1962:40, Freeman 
1994:207). The introduction of the doctrine of precedent, alone, did not reduce the 
arbitrariness of judicial decision-making (Davies, 1994:50-51, Parkinson 2001:180). 
It seems that the courts were involved with something other than mere 
‘declaration’ of the law and that, therefore, at least according to Bentham, the 
common law needed to be codified. This would place law-making more squarely 
in the hands of the political process, and therefore under the authority of the 
people in common law, democratic countries. 
 
I turn now to the relationship between statute and caselaw. An act of Parliament 
may always override a judgment of the court. However, a statute may be also 
supplemented by judgments on particular aspects of its application, such as the 
interpretation of specific provisions, the constitutionality of an act or parts of it and 
a resolution in the case of conflicting statutory provisions. The role of the court to 
act on statute is mediated by a theory of democracy (Freeman 1994:1299), a 
commitment to individual freedoms and rights (eg. Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 
CLR 427, 437) and the concept of the ‘separation of powers’. It is, theoretically, the 
role of Parliament to make law, and the role of the judiciary to interpret and apply 
it (Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1980-1981] 
146 CLR 297, 319, per Mason & Wilson JJ; 310, per Stephens J). As McHugh J noted 
in both Newcastle City Council v GIO General Ltd (1997) 191 CLR 85 and in Kingstone 
v Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 404, 423, “the function of the court remains one 
of construction and not legislation”. 
 
Interpretation is critical in law, perhaps more than any other discipline. The 
interpretation of, say, literature is an important aspect of the fibre and texture of a 
society. In the field of medicine, the interpretation of what it means to have an 
ailment may impact upon a diagnosis or a remedy. But interpretation in these 
fields need not have the effect of excluding, except in the sense of a Foucauldian 
discursive sense, one from that field. In law, however the interpretation of a word 
or a concept actually establishes that interpretation as the only interpretation that 
matters, despite perhaps the existence of equally valid alternative interpretations. 
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The law has particular protocols for interpreting law, influenced by the doctrine of 
the separation of powers as well as by the need for legal efficiency. These protocols 
for interpretation exist in the form of rules and doctrines. Perhaps ironically, but 
not surprisingly since law is always in a state of flux, these are also open to 
interpretation. The outline I am about to provide is a simplification of these rules 
and doctrines. 
 
The rules for interpretation are of two types: those pertaining to statutory 
construction and those stemming from the doctrine of stare decisis or precedent. 
The two are related in that outcomes of statutory construction may be binding on 
subsequent courts under the doctrine of precedent, and the principles derived from 
judicial decisions can be over-ridden by subsequent statute. The statutes concerned 
with statutory interpretation are a case in point, overriding, as they do, the 
common law. 
 
 
Caselaw: the Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
 
There are ultimately two inter-connected elements concerning the interpretation of 
caselaw. The first is the doctrine of stare decisis (from the Latin, it literally means “it 
stands decided”) or the doctrine of precedent, that establishes a hierarchy of 
decisions, which are binding upon subsequent courts. The second is that only the 
ratio decidendi of a case (the reason for the decision, deduced from the facts) is 
binding. 
 
Freeman provides an outline of what he considers the features of the common-law 
system of precedent. It is constituted by: 
 
i)  “a particular emphasis on judicial decisions as the core of the legal system”; 
ii)  “a very subordinate role conceded to juristic writings, as against decisions of 
the courts, in the exposition of the law”; 
iii)  “the treatment of certain judicial decisions as binding on other judges”; and 
iv)  “the form of judicial judgments and the mode of reporting these” (1994:1261). 
 
The doctrine emerged in the English common law around the late seventeenth 
century, though it did not reach its current form, as a rule of law, until the 
nineteenth (Parkinson 2001:85, Goodrich 1986:70). Goodrich notes that, in its 
current form, it constitutes one of the “most extreme systems of precedent in the 
history of western legal systems” (1986:71). Its development was aided by an 
increase in the reliability of legal reporting in the early 1800s (Goodrich 1986:70) 
and the introduction of official court reporting in 1865 (Parkinson 2001:71). In 1833, Chapter 4 | 62 
the principle was laid out in Mirehouse v Rennell (1833) 1 Cl & F 527, 546; 6 ER 
1015,1023, and firmly established in 1861 in Beamish v Beamish (1861) 11 ER 735 at 
760. Here, the House of Lords considered itself bound by an earlier case, even 
though it also considered the earlier reasoning to be flawed. According to Lord 
Campbell only an act of Parliament could overturn the earlier decision. The view 
was restated in London Street Tramways Co. Ltd v London County Council [1898] AC 
375, 280. 
 
The effect of the doctrine is that the ratio of a case subsequently applies to lower 
courts in the hierarchy. Historically, English courts were bound to their own earlier 
decisions (London Street Tramways) until a House of Lords Practice Direction in 
1966 which declared that, in limited circumstances, the House need not be bound 
by its own decisions (Parkinson 2001:72, Goodrich 1986:71). In Australia, both the 
High Court and intermediate appellate courts maintain an adherence to previous 
decisions. However, the latter may deviate if it is of the view that the earlier 
decision was incorrect in law. Further, the former has maintained a view that the 
doctrine of precedent has less weight in the case of constitutional matters 
(Parkinson 2001:183). 
 
In any decision, only the ratio decidendi is authoritative. Parts of the reasoning that 
are ancillary to the question before the court, the obiter dicta, may be persuasive but 
are not binding. This may seem like a simple proposition but the distinction 
between the ratio and the obiter is at times controversial and goes to the heart of 
legal debate. For example, in a decision comprised of a number of justices, in which 
each has provided a judgment, the individual reasoning might vary. It is then for 
legal commentators and subsequent arbitrators to debate the consistencies and 
differences in the reasoning, to ascertain an agreed reasoning – the ratio. As 
Goodrich notes, “it is impossible to devise formulae for determining the ratio 
decidendi of a case” (Goodrich 1986:73, citing Cross). Given that the reasoning of 
cases is often unclear, especially where there are dissenting judgments, there is a 
degree of interpretative mobility for subsequent arbitrators. Even when the ratio of 
a case is clear, there remains an exercise in interpretation in the question of what 
law (ratio) applies to what cases, just how persuasive the obiter will be, and how 
other considerations such as international relations, justice, equity and so on will 
come to play. 
 
 
Statutory Interpretation 
 
As with caselaw, there are debates about the subjectivity of statutory 
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guided than caselaw. The fundamental principles revolve around the approach to 
be adopted and the degree and nature of extrinsic material permitted in 
interpretation. I will focus on the interpretation of Commonwealth legislation, 
which has been largely replicated by the state legislatures. 
 
Historically, statutory interpretation has involved three principles of 
interpretation, known as the literal, golden and mischief (or purpose) rules. Justices 
Mason and Wilson of the High Court note, however, that these are rules of 
common sense and not rules of law (Cooper Brookes (Wollongong) Pty Ltd v Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation [1980-1981] 146 CLR 297, 320). 
 
The traditional manifestations of the ‘rules’ are as follow. The literal rule provides 
that the ordinary and plain meaning of the words in context prevail (Amalgamated 
Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129, 161-162). The 
golden rule in its earlier manifestations applies to remedy the situation when the 
word understood literally gives rise to an “absurdity and inconsistency” (Grey v 
Pearson (1857) 6 HLC 61, 106) in relation to the statute as a whole. It permits an 
adjustment to avoid this absurdity but no more. The literal and golden rules apply 
where the language of the statute is unambiguous. The third rule, the mischief or 
purpose rule, applies only where the words of the statute are ambiguous. The court 
may then look to the “mischief and defect” (Heydon’s Case (1585) 3 Co Rep 7a, 7b, 
76 ER 637) in the common law, which the Parliament has attempted to address in 
passing the statute. To cite Lord Simon of Glaisdale: 
 
The final task of construction is still, as always, to ascertain the meaning of what 
the draftsman has said, rather than to ascertain what the draftsman meant to say. 
But if the draftsmanship is correct these should coincide. So if the words are 
capable of more than one meaning it is a perfectly legitimate intermediate step in 
construction to choose between potential meanings by various tests (statutory, 
objective, anomaly, etc.) which throw light on what the draftsman meant to say 
(Heydon’s Case 1585, 7a). 
 
These combine to represent the rule in modern Anglo-Australian law (Mills v 
Meeking [1989-1990] 169 CLR 214, 223, per Mason CJ & Toohey J). The literal or 
grammatical meaning of a statute shall be given unless the language is ambiguous 
or uncertain. The literal or grammatical meaning should be determined “by 
reference to the language of the instrument viewed as a whole” (Cooper Brookes, 320 
per Mason & Wilson JJ; Project Blue Sky v ABA [1998] 194 CLR 355, 381 per 
McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). By literal or grammatical meaning, the 
court means the “natural and ordinary sense of the language read in its context” 
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literal or grammatical construction of the provision is that of the separation of 
powers. As Gibbs, Stephen, Mason, Wilson and Aickin JJ remind us, in separate 
judgments, the aim of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intention 
by reference to the statute as a whole (Cooper Brookes; see also the majority and 
dissenting judgments in Project Blue Sky, 374-5 and 384). In other words, the 
Parliament’s intention is paramount. As Lord Blackburn stated in River Wear 
Commissioners v Adamson [1877] 2 AC 743, 763: 
 
it is to be borne in mind that the office of the Judge is not to legislate but to declare 
the expressed intention of the legislature even if that expressed intention appeared 
to the court to be injudicious. 
 
It is not, however, the court’s role to assess the Parliament’s actions, so that even if 
it concludes that the legislature’s actions are unreasonable the literal rule still 
applies: 
 
Of course we must go by the words of the Act and if they are only capable of one 
meaning then we must take that meaning however irrational the result (Cramas 
Properties Ltd v Connaught Fur Trimmings Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 892, 898; 2 All ER 382, 
385 per Lord Reid, cited by Stephen J in Cooper Brookes 310). 
 
The judge may, however adopt an alternative reading if an “inconvenience or 
improbability of result” would arise from the literal reading (CIC Insurance Ltd v 
Bankstown Football Club Ltd [1995-1997] 187 CLR 384, 408 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, 
Toohey and Gummow JJ, referring to Cooper Brookes, 320-321). Wilson and Mason JJ 
clarify the idea in the judgment to which CIC was referring. They say that “mere 
inconvenience of result itself is not a ground for departing from the natural and 
ordinary sense of the language read in its context”. However, it may be that such 
circumstances will assist the court in coming to the conclusion that the literal 
interpretation is outside of the intentions of the legislature, and therefore to prefer 
an alternative interpretation (Cooper Brookes, 319-321). 
 
It is only in reconstructing the Parliament’s intention that the court should have 
resort to extrinsic material, as provided in Australia under the various 
interpretation acts. Reference may be made to extrinsic material at the first stage of 
interpretation to assist the court in determining the full context of the language, 
including the mischief the legislation was intended to remedy (CIC Insurance Ltd, 
408, per curiam). 
 
The courts generally speak of the natural and ordinary applications of language 
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signified) (in the Saussurian schema), is a natural connection. I will come to this 
issue in part 4. However, it is pertinent, if only as a brief note here, that there is 
significant discussion of the distinction between the legal and the technical, on the 
one hand, and the ordinary and natural, on the other, in the case of Collector of 
Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd  [1995-1996] 186 CLR 389, 396-398. The Full Court 
concludes that a court should prefer a construction which gives the language the 
“most natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances” 
(398, quoting Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373, 391 per Lord Simon of Glaisdale). 
Language should be construed with a view to the semantic register of which the 
language forms a part. 
 
The High Court makes the point that rules of construction based upon caselaw 
may be “supplemented, modified or reversed by legislative provision” (Bropho v 
Western Australia (1990) 171 CLR 1, ¶9 per Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, 
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). Hence, they must be read in combination with 
interpretation acts of the states, territories, and Commonwealth. I will outline here 
only the Commonwealth provisions; that is, the 1981 amendments to the Acts 
Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), namely s15AA and s15AB. The legislation of the states 
and territories broadly reflects these provisions (see, for example, Acts Interpretation 
Act 1931 (Tas), Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld)). 
 
Section 15AA provides that: 
 
In the interpretation of a provision of an Act a construction which would promote 
the purpose or object underlying the Act … shall be preferred to a construction that 
would not promote that purpose or object. 
 
The provision enshrines the purpose or mischief rule as the primary principal of 
statutory interpretation under the Act. In promoting the legislation’s purpose or 
object, the provision supports the Parliament’s intention, thereby reflecting the 
primacy of the Parliament’s law making function over that of the court. 
 
Ironically, in supporting a search for a meaning that is ‘truer’ to the Parliament’s 
intentions than is implicit in the text, the provision potentially increases the 
interpretative scope of the court, that is, the role of the court in constructing 
meaning. This point is noted by the majority of the High Court in Bropho. The 
Court comments that provisions such as this have “added an element of 
anachronism to a judicial confinement of the permissible basis for discerning a 
legislative intent that the Crown be bound to what is ‘manifest from the very terms 
of the statute’” (Bropho ¶16, citing Cross). It is perhaps for this reason that the 
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literal construction of the text. Of course, this in itself is a judicial overlay – a 
meaning attached to the text by the judiciary and not implicit in the text of the 
statute. 
 
In Bropho the High Court refers to the judgment of McHugh J in Kingston v Kaprose 
Pty Ltd as “the contemporary approach to statutory construction” (Bropho, ¶16). 
This is that the court should not as a rule deviate from the wording of the text if it 
is capable of only a single grammatical construct, unless the statutory context of 
the provision, the provision’s purpose or the general purpose of the Act discloses 
an alternative parliamentary intention. This applies even if an injustice or anomaly 
would arise, although such situations might go to an argument that the literal 
reading goes against the Parliament’s intention. Ultimately, however, the 
grammatical meaning “must give way to the construction which will promote the 
purpose or object of the Act” (Kingston, 423). Kirby J has described the approach 
encapsulated by s15AA as a “chang[e] in the focus of the camera through which a 
court views the words of the enactment” from a narrow textual field to a broader 
contextual field and includes the policy of the Parliament (Bate v Priestly (1990) 
FLC 92-102, ¶77 663). 
 
Both at common law and under statute, the court may refer to extrinsic material to 
assist in the determination of legislative intention; that is to determine the mischief 
that the Parliament was intending to cure in making the enactment. The majority 
judgment in CIC Insurance  Ltd enunciated the common law position: 
 
the modern approach to statutory interpretation (a) insists that the context be 
considered in the first instance, not merely at some later stage when ambiguity 
might be thought to arise, and (b) uses “context” in its widest sense to include such 
things as the existing state of law and the mischief which, by legitimate means 
[such as reference to extrinsic material], one may discern the statute was intended 
to remedy (408). 
 
Section 15AB is to similar effect. Subsection (1) provides that the court may refer to 
extrinsic material under the following conditions (subject to subsection (3)): 
 
(a)   to confirm the meaning is the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the 
provision taking into account its context in the Act and the purpose or 
object underlying the Act; or 
(b)  to determine the meaning of the provision when: 
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(ii)  the ordinary meaning conveyed by the text of the provision taking into 
account its context in the Act and the purpose or object underlying the Act 
leads to a result that is manifestly absurd or is unreasonable. 
 
The extrinsic material available to the court includes, in summary: 
 
(a)  all matters not forming part of the act that are set out in the document 
containing the text of the act; 
(b)  relevant reports of Law Reform Commissions or a committee of inquiry or 
similar body laid before Parliament before the enactment; 
(c)  any relevant Parliamentary Committee report made before the enactment; 
(d)  any treaty or international agreement referred to in the act; 
(e)  explanatory memorandum relating to the bill; 
(f)  the second reading speech of the bill; 
(g)  any document declared by the act to be a relevant document; 
(h)  any relevant material in the Hansards (s15AB(2)). 
 
However, the Court must have regard to the desirability of relying on the ordinary 
meaning, read in its context and with a view to the act’s purpose, and of avoiding 
prolonged proceedings (s15AB(3). 
 
Has s15AB had the effect of doing away with the consequences of the mischief 
rule? In other words does s15AB do away with the common law on the question of 
when a court might look to extrinsic material? 
 
CIC Insurance Ltd was decided after the introduction of s15AB. The Court explicitly 
states that it can refer to extrinsic material as part of the context of the provision. 
The context to which the court refers is not the context formed by the statute as a 
whole but the broader context of the legislative purpose. In Newcastle City Council, 
a matter of interpretation to which the Acts Interpretation Act would apply, four of 
the Justices permitted extrinsic material as evidence by reference to the common 
law position. Justice McHugh specifically accepted the evidence despite its 
introduction being contrary to s15AB, citing CIC Insurance as authority. Hence, the 
position is that, notwithstanding s15AB, the common law position on statutory 
interpretation remains. 
 
The contentious issue is the point at which a court should go beyond the statute to 
determine intent. This is a matter of some significance in that a requirement for the 
court to refer to extrinsic material in the first instance has resource, and therefore 
efficiency, implications. The range and type of extrinsic material to which the court 
should or might refer has similar implications. Chapter 4 | 68 
In Telstra Corporation Ltd, the Federal Court was faced with the question of whether 
it could consider the explanatory memorandum of a piece of legislation to assist it 
in attributing meaning to the provision. In making the decision, the Court appears 
to maintain the continued relevance of the common law, to apply it as an 
alternative to the Acts Interpretation Act in much the same way as had occurred in 
relation to the mischief rule. In the case of s15AB, the court may only refer to the 
material listed under ss(3) after it has attributed meaning to the legislation. The 
Court’s reasoning is that s15AB(2)(a) allows reference to extrinsic material, 
including the explanatory memorandum, for “specific purposes, not generally” 
(¶142). McHugh J held a similar position in the earlier High Court case of Newcastle 
City Council that recourse to extrinsic material should only be made if the provision 
is ambiguous or obscure, or if the ordinary meaning of the text, in context, leads to 
an absurd or unreasonable result, not in the preliminary ascertainment of the 
ordinary meaning. 
 
The Court, in Telstra, then considers whether or not the material can be used to aid 
interpretation, by reference to the common law. This is the more interesting point, 
for the legal history suggests that while Law Reform Commission reports may be 
relied upon, other categories of material, such as the explanatory memorandum 
may not (CIC Insurance, Newcastle City Council). The Court concludes that a 
reference to the explanatory memorandum in the first instance would constitute a 
“supplanting” of the statute, and would “not merely [be] to provide a confirmation 
of its meaning or to resolve an ambiguity, obscurity or apparent absurdity” (¶142). 
Hence, whilst under the common law there might be some types of material which 
might be relied upon to assist interpretation, by and large, extrinsic material 
should be referred to only after some meaning has been attributed. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Contemporary legal interpretation rests on a history of belief that law is something 
to be discovered and declared. According to Davies, there is a residue of this 
thinking in contemporary law, leading to a criticism that it suggests that the law is 
“somehow exterior to, and separate from, social and political contingencies” 
(1994:51). 
 
This separation is reflected in the rules of interpretation which, when understood 
as part of positivist legal discourse, suggest that interpretation is an internal legal 
process – the courts simply look ‘before’ to declare the meaning of the legal text. 
Meanings which may be assigned to the law, whether statute or caselaw, are, 
theoretically, limited. Legal interpretation is a strictly legal phenomenon, permitted Chapter 4 | 69 
only through a logical application of rules, the general, to the specific (Hart, 
Kelsen).3 These rules fit tightly into a particular order. The meaning of statutes is in 
the first instance set by Parliament – it makes law. The court then interprets the 
statute, by reference to the meta-law of interpretation, giving rise to the definitive 
view of the law. In the case of the common law, a hierarchy of authority coupled 
with the principle that only the ratio is binding, ostensibly establishes meaning. 
These meanings circulate as the law in the non-legal community, that community 
which the institution of law seeks to regulate. This process exists as if they are three 
separate fields, over which the law lauds. 
 
By correlation, according to the institution of law, law as it is lived in the non-legal 
world is not law. Similarly, until an act is passed by the Parliament it is not law. 
The law as it is lived in the courts determines the law for itself as well as for these 
alternative fields. However, given that statutory rules require a reflection on 
parliamentary intent, the meanings constructed in that sphere are important to the 
law. Further, the fact that law lives outside of the legal domain suggests that the 
institution of law does not have a monopoly on legal meaning. 
 
In subsequent chapters, I will provide an analysis of the actions of these three 
spheres, the legal, the political and the social. This analysis will illustrate the 
fluidity of meaning, the mobility of legal concepts and the inadequacy of theories 
that prioritise the court’s meanings alone. This will lead to thinking of legal 
meaning beyond the boundaries of the legal discipline. For, as Davies so 
eloquently puts it: 
 
law is everywhere – in our metaphysics, our social environment, our ways of 
perceiving the world, the structure of our psyche, language, the ‘descriptive’ 
regularities of science (for instance) and so on. Thus the attempt to articulate a law 
of the law must be either a highly selective and artificially closed endeavour, like 
that of the positivists, or will become sensitive to the [sic] some of the ways in 
which our environment is structured by unceasing repetitions (1996:7). 
 
In the next chapter I illustrate the arbitrariness of, and flaws, in the “law of law”, 
before proceeding to outline the various, interconnecting spheres of meaning. 
                                                 
3 Kant distinguishes between determinate and reflective judgements, of which this is a determinative 
one (Lyotard 1987). Chapter 5  Challenging the Myth of Legal Determinacy 
 
Introduction 
 
It should ... be borne in mind ... that a norm, or a law, is never something simply 
‘within’ a closed system: ... the refusal to accept the closed terrains of conventional 
legal thought is an anti-conservative step which hopefully, in the right contexts, 
can open the domain of law to presently unthinkable possibilities. One such 
possibility, for instance is the acceptance of multiplicity in social organisation 
rather than the simple division of social categories into the same and different 
(Davies 1996:17). 
 
As outlined in chapters 3 and 4, the rules of legal interpretation establish a 
particular logic for the way law can and should be interpreted. This logic is 
supposed to produce the ‘correct’ interpretation of the law. In other words, legal 
decision-making is determinate and gives rise to the meaning of the law, as 
established by the Parliament (in relation to statutes) or the jurist (in relation to 
caselaw). Only this meaning is recognised as valid within the institution of law. 
However, I would ask, is it the case that the law is a set of propositions that can be 
applied systematically and objectively, or is the law and its application built on the 
foundations of the cultural? I wish, in this chapter, to question law’s claims to 
objectivity and determinacy. This is also a challenge to the delineation between 
what is law (the inside) and what is not law (the outside). These are problems for 
law generally, but I will explicate the issue by reference to the family and family 
law. 
 
I commence the chapter by referring to legal scholars who argue that, at least in 
some cases, the law is not determinate. I then move to the more general argument 
that meaning, in every case, is always indeterminate, because, firstly, it is 
impossible to find a source of meaning, secondly meaning cannot be categorically 
represented, and third, an original author cannot control the meaning of texts. I 
come to the position that law is constituted by the social, just as the social is, in 
part, constituted by the law, and that this affects law’s determinacy. 
 
 
Indeterminacy of Judgment 
 
Rules of interpretation suggest that the work of the judge is simply a matter of 
following rules or an application of established legal convention. Certainly, this is 
the position for positivists such as Bentham, Austin, Kelsen and Hart. Some 
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‘hard’ cases. For these thinkers, judges may apply rules in a logical and objective 
manner in easy cases, but in hard cases they act on non-legal criteria (as outlined 
by Davies 1996:120, Burton 1985:133, Fitzpatrick 1992:206-202 in relation to Hart). 
Other theorists argue that there is no pure distinction between hard cases and easy 
cases. Dworkin, for example, claims that hard cases and easy cases both involve the 
same method of interpretation. The difference between the two instances is that 
because the correct decision for an easy case is obvious, the matching of non-legal 
criteria to rules is seamless; whereas in hard cases, something else, namely theory, 
is at work to assist the determination (Dworkin 1986:353-354). Judges are involved 
in a constructive interpretation of the political and legal structures; that is, 
interpretation occurs with a view to the political and legal nature of a community 
(Dworkin 1986:413, 255). Hence, for Dworkin, judges are involved in a particular 
method of interpretation which, if followed correctly, gives rise to a correct 
outcome (Dworkin 1986:viii-ix). For Dworkin, notwithstanding the inclusion of 
political structure in legal determination, legal decision-making in both easy and 
hard cases is determinate.1 
 
Others argue that even if the distinction between hard cases and easy cases exists, 
there is limited consequence. For Davies, decision-making in either type of case 
cannot be reduced to a mathematical type of calculation (Davies 1996:121) and 
Fitzpatrick questions Hart’s distinction between those cases in which the rules 
have essential meaning and the “penumbra” of uncertainty in others (1992:206-
207). Goodrich argues that, even in easy cases, law’s determinacy is rhetorical 
rather than actual (1983:264-66). According to Douzinas et al., value choice is 
implicit in material, such as rules and standards, which is linguistic, and therefore 
open in nature (Douzinas et al. 1991:13). Critical Legal Studies, feminist, race and 
Marxist scholars similarly argue that the law is indeterminate and requires jurists 
to exercise discretion. They argue that this enables the court to privilege and 
protect certain power bases, whether these are related to race, gender, class or 
some other characteristic (for example, Delgado 1987, Gordon 1988, MacKinnon 
1989, Marx in McLellan 1977:20-22, Williams 1987). Although I do not adopt the 
macro concepts on which these analyses rest, I agree with the fundamental point 
that law is not simply calculation, and that legal decision-making can, therefore, be 
affected by any number of cultural concerns. 
 
Freeman says that there is flexibility in decision-making even within a formal 
conception of law. According to him, this is found in: 
 
                                                 
1 Although Dennis Patterson, in characterising Dworkin’s model of judicial decision-making as 
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the relative freedom with which courts may and often do determine the scope and 
limits of past precedents and whether to apply them to the fresh circumstance 
which have arisen, or to distinguish these from the facts and circumstances held to 
be material in previous cases … Only a totally static society could tolerate a 
completely rigid system of law (Freeman 1994:1263). 
 
This flexibility is noted in many theories of law. The question is, however, on what 
basis is it exercised? Again, there are divergent views. As discussed in chapter 3, 
Kelsen and Hart rely on conceptions of normativity within their models of law, 
namely the Grundnorm and the internal rule of recognition, respectively. For 
Dworkin, political theory informs the exercise of discretion. For critical theorists 
such as feminist, Marxist and race theorists, the discretion is exercised along certain 
lines of power. 
 
Common to both the critical schools of thought and positivists such as Kelsen, Hart 
and Dworkin, is the idea that interpretation is somehow linked to particular 
cultures of practice. For critical theorists, judicial decision-making is inherently 
cultural, imbued with non-legal as well as legal characteristics. There are non-legal 
cultures of practice through which decision-making is systematised and these are a 
significant part of law; the legal and non-legal spheres are not mutually exclusive. 
In the two preceding chapters, I referred to principles that underwrite judicial 
decision-making including: a deferral to the principles of democracy; individual 
rights; and, the pretext of a logical ordering of decision-making. There is an 
unspoken process of decision-making involving non-legal considerations that go 
beyond these stated elements, whether or not they are characterised as internal or 
external to the law. 
 
 
Indeterminacy of Meaning 
 
As we have seen, it is widely accepted that the common law is settled and therefore 
should be applied except where certain techniques can be appropriately adopted. 
While the distinction between law-making and law declaration may be blurred at 
times, the concepts of parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers 
suggest that the judiciary’s role is to simply apply the intention of the Parliament. 
In short, the judiciary’s role may be read as law-making only in so far as its 
determinations are binding as precedent upon inferior courts or, in the case of 
superior courts, upon subsequent matters of the same substance. The Parliament 
thus has the role of author while the court has that of interpreter. Even in the 
instance of caselaw the court’s work is seen to be one of discovery and declaration 
of the law as it already exists. Chapter 5 | 73 
 
According to such principles, the meaning of the text appears to lie with an 
original author. In the case of legislation, this is the Parliament, to whom the court 
must refer in order to clarify the statute. In respect of caselaw, the earlier jurist has 
authority over the text, to which the presiding judge must defer. Armed with the 
set of interpretative principles outlined above, the jurist must uncover the instances 
of original and ‘true’ meaning. The meaning of law is, theoretically, fixed in a 
particular moment in time, the point at which the Parliament’s intentions are 
assented to by the crown, or the point at which the court makes a declaration of the 
law (the ratio) in a determination. The exception is where the judiciary can deploy 
particular rules to permit variation, but even these, according to legal positivists 
such as Hart and Kelsen, are contained within the body of the law. 
 
A number of flaws arise with the presumption of, firstly, an ability to discover a 
source of meaning, secondly of being able to represent meaning authoritatively 
and finally, the idea of authorial control over the text. I deal with these in turn. 
 
 
The Search for Mythical Origins 
 
myth: 
A story about superhuman beings of an earlier age taken by preliterate society to 
be a true account, usually of how natural phenomena, social customs, etc. came 
into existence (Collins English Dictionary). 
 
Continental semiotician, Barthes expands on the ordinary explanation of myth. For 
Barthes, myth is a type of speech which, alongside language and discourse, is any 
verbal or visual unit of signification (1993:109-111). He explains that there may be 
ancient myths but there are no eternal ones because: 
 
Ancient or not, mythology can only have an historical foundation, for myth is a 
type of speech chosen by history: it cannot possibly evolve from the ‘nature’ of 
things (Barthes 1993:111). 
 
For Barthes, myth is the ideology of the time, but it transforms these ideological 
ideas into naturalised forms and, in so doing, depoliticises them. It has a double 
function; it explains something but it also imposes that something on us (1993:109-
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meanings which support class interests.2 Floch, however, adopts the term in a 
manner that applies specifically to semiotics. He says that on an axiology of 
meaning, certain values are actualised. ‘Ideology’ refers to this actualisation. It is 
the “syntagmatic articulation of values” or “the permanent quest for values” 
(2000:118-121). Hence, while ideology, in Barthesian terms, has a nominated source 
and object (the bourgeoisie and class interests), for Floch, ideology refers to virtual 
values, which find articulation when a subject, individual or collective engages 
with them (Floch 2000:188 fn 3). Therefore, the source may be any semiotic 
community and presumably, its object, if it is discoverable, is not predetermined. 
 
I argue here that law relies on both types of myth. It is a story of superhuman 
beings (the hypothetical jurists of the common law) who provide an account of 
truth (drawn from a golden age when the truth was first proclaimed; that is, the 
earlier judgment or Parliament’s passing of the statute) for the benefit of a legally 
illiterate general community. This story doubles as the everyday meaning of myth 
and the myth of the Barthesian kind, with its ideological implications (in the 
Flochian sense). The story of long-held truths and traditions that explain the 
legality or illegality of an action is an ideological position which transforms stories 
into truths and, in so doing, gives law its authority. As Fitzpatrick notes, myth is 
the “preserve of storytellers” (1992:22) and “is essential to [the] most influential 
assertion of law’s autonomy” (1992:183).3 Myth, in law, confers “force and 
meaning” on a law through its “correspondence to a transcendent model or origin” 
(Fitzpatrick 1992:20), a transcendence that Derrida draws to our attention in the 
title and substance of his paper “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of 
Authority’”(1992). However, the myth is logically disprovable. Even if the meaning 
of a text can be found in its origins, it is arguable that neither body of law (statute 
or common law) can be traced back to the words of an author; that is to an author’s 
intention represented in textual form. The notion that law is ascertainable through 
an investigation of its origins is based upon false premises: that one can find the 
original meaning in the texts of caselaw and statute. An investigation of the roots 
of both types of law illustrates the flaws in this mythology.4 
 
Legislation 
 
Statute is the product of one or more legal drafters attempting to represent the 
intention of the Parliament (the true author for the purposes of the law) as if it 
                                                 
2 For a discussion of the Marxist concept of ideology see McLelland (1997:ch 4) and O’Sullivan et al. 
(1994:139-143). 
3 Fitzpatrick draws particular attention to Hart’s rule of recognition and the idea that legal officials 
hold a privileged position as truth bearers in law (1992:ch. 6).  
4 Investigations of the consequence and contradictions of the truth claims of law are provided in part 
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could be somehow collectively known. The court may look to evidence of this 
intention, namely law reform reports, second reading speeches and parliamentary 
reports to determine this intention. Using the words of the common law, this is the 
mischief that the Parliament was addressing. But as Radin noted, early last century, 
any attempts to guess the intention of the legislature are futile: 
 
The least reflection makes clear that the lawmaker … does not exist … A legislator 
certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or 
three drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which the 
majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and 
beliefs (1931 in Freeman 1994:1292). 
 
Similarly, Jackson notes, in an article on legislation and the semiotics of law, that 
the passing of legislation involves not only the legislature, but civil servants 
(1999:12). In fact, only a small amount of legislation actually originates from our 
members of Parliament. He says, in relation to complicated statutes at least, that: 
 
it is a polite fiction to say that the legislators themselves understand it; indeed, in 
many cases they may not even have read it, word for word. That does not, however 
prevent them from talking about it. But the talk of the politicians about legislation 
… has a different pragmatic function from that of the talk of the parliamentary 
draftsmen themselves. Since the politicians seek to communicate with the public, 
they must construct the purpose and effect of the legislation in terms which the 
public can understand. Since the purpose of the legislative draftsman is to 
communicate to those who will handle the details of the legislation itself … their 
pragmatic function is technical: to satisfy as completely as possible the prevailing 
norms of what constitutes good legislative language – norms which differ, of 
course, from one jurisdiction to another, but which may generally be described in 
terms of accuracy and completeness (1999:13). 
 
Hence, the words of the statute do not necessarily represent the Parliament’s 
intention, since its members might not have even read the bill. Therefore, the 
political debates, and the parliamentary documents surrounding the bill, are not a 
guide to statutory meaning. As is illustrated in chapter 5, where I present the 
parliamentary debates on family, the Parliament’s function is not limited to law-
making and the debates reflect this. 
 
Jackson discusses, as a third “semiotic group”, the courts, occupying a different 
discursive space from that of the Parliament and the legislative draftsperson. The 
result of these differences is that “there can be no necessary coincidence in the 
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(1999:14-15). Jackson also discusses the role of lawyers as “translators” of the 
legislative text for clients (1999:15-16). Whilst commenting on the role of the 
legislator in communicating legislative reforms to the public, Jackson gives a 
privileged role to lawyers as the public translators of legislation. As an aside, he 
comments that these “of course” are not the only translators of legislation: there is 
also a “host of statutory, commercial, professional and trade union agencies … 
involved in translating regulator frameworks for the benefit of their members” 
(1999:16). 
 
Jackson’s comments relate to the interpretation of statutes. While Jackson notes 
that differences in the nature of legislation and caselaw impact upon how legal 
scholarship might focus on them, I think that it is still possible to transpose his 
comments on the role and function of semiotic groups regarding legislation to 
caselaw as well. In other words, his comments carry insights into the interpretation 
of judge-made law as well as statute. The interpretative work done by judges in 
relation to the common law is different, and effects a different end from the 
interpretive work of any other semiotic group. The pragmatics of an engagement 
with law (that is, statute and caselaw), cannot be extracted from the semantics. An 
issue central to law is the degree to which, and the means by which, the law 
operates as a gatekeeper in relation to meaning, and whether this gatekeeping 
function is always necessary. I consider this in chapter 11, where I discuss an 
alternative model of legislation. 
 
Common Law 
 
Efforts to establish the origins of the common law are as futile as for statutes. The 
common law, prior to the establishment of the doctrine of precedent was based 
upon custom and the learned judge’s ability to tap into this custom through proper 
legal reasoning (Davies 1994:29-39). Hale rejects, in the eighteenth century, the 
possibility of tracing law back to an individual source. Law is of its nature cultural. 
It was based, in the first instances, upon a combination of traditions and is marked 
by subsequent shifts as a result of its applications over time (Hale 1794:vol 1, 132-
133, see Davies on Hale and the common law, 1994:47-48). Nevertheless, Hale 
suggests that the leges non scriptae are resilient to changes in systems and structure. 
He explains that, although the common law cannot be traced to a single origin, and 
although the common law as it was in one era will be different from how it is in 
another, “they are the same English laws now, that they were six hundred years 
since, in the general” (Hale 1794:vol 1, 132-133). He provides the analogy of a ship 
that, despite numerous and almost total reconstructions remains the same ship, 
even if there is no original material in its make-up (Hale 1794:vol 1, 133). Some core 
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common law remains as a vessel, but its content has changed since its creation. 
There is, in short, no traceable original meaning. 
 
Despite the introduction of the doctrine of stare decisis and the attempts to fix the 
common law, it is still customary in nature. If there is a science of law, it is a set of 
procedures by which the court can come to a matching of traditions with the 
contingencies of the immediate situation. It continues to be customary if we take 
customs to be both established traditions as well as usual and habitual practices; a 
trace of the past that constitutes the common-sense in the activities of the everyday. 
However, the concept of custom frustrates any possibility for finding an origin to 
the texts of the common law. 
 
I return now to the concept of myth, discussed above. These are central to the 
nature of legal interpretation for, despite the claims of presenting a truth in law, 
legal interpretation is concerned with mythology, of both types. Firstly, there is an 
assumption of a true account of the law laid down by an earlier age. This is myth in 
the traditional sense. It is more than a pre-historic story. It is an historic story. 
 
The making of law at the parliamentary stage is the making of second myth. It is 
human action, coupled with the history and context of the activity, which turns its 
reality into speech. This is then further synthesised into legal text. Each of these 
stages is a reduction, as I argue below. The point is that the legal text is based upon 
an historical foundation that cannot be reconstituted by a subsequent forum of 
legal interpretation; especially one which sees the court’s role as one of releasing a 
pure, earlier meaning. This is indicated by the variations in readings of legal texts, 
as is illustrated in part 3. It is a particular and specific system of signification and 
its product can only be known (if at all) through an investigation of this system. 
The same can be said of legal interpretation by the courts albeit that its system is 
far different from the first. It seeks to ‘uncover’ meaning, failing to appreciate that 
the best it could hope to do is study, as the semiologist does, “ideas in form” 
(Barthes 1993:112). The institution of law searches for the stories of the 
“superhuman beings of [the] earlier age” (Collins), which constitute the true 
account of the law. In interpreting earlier texts that have taken on mythical 
proportions by virtue of their primary place in the legal system, a second instance 
of signification occurs. However, far from being a statement of the earlier text, as 
law would have us understand, the activity is another instance of meaning-
making, itself historically embedded, as was any preceding exercise of law-making. 
 
In other words, the law means, in both the semiotic and the dictionary sense, in 
mythical proportions. However, the ultimate myth is that the law can discover and 
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authority. This is the myth of legal interpretation, which denies ideological, 
cultural or historical dimensions of the ensuing text. 
 
Hale is right, at least in one aspect. Law is customary in nature, despite nineteenth 
century attempts to eliminate custom through the systematisation of rules and 
precedent. An interpretation of law should equally be an interpretation of the 
customs of creation and of usage, of the history of that law, of the motivations (or 
in Barthes’ terms, the ideology) that underpin it. As Foucault says, the 
“transmitting” author is not the same as the enunciating subject (1997:92-93). 
Rather, the identity of a statement resides in its material conditions (1997:102-103). 
 
 
The Lack of the Written Word 
 
We do not have access to a true legal history of doctrines and principles, and so we 
rely, instead, upon the subsequent retelling and reinterpretation of these. Even if 
we could get to the origins of a text, a direct line of communication with an 
originating author, we would not be any closer to understanding the author’s 
intention or meaning. Bentham suggests that the shift from an oral tradition (the 
common law) to a written tradition would assist this process. However, Derrida 
suggests that neither the written nor the spoken word is capable of transferring 
meaning. He argues that there is no distinction between writing and oral speech: 
both are examples of inscription in general (Derrida 1998:8-9). Speech is always 
metaphorical, writing more so (Derrida 1978:9): 
 
To write is not only to know that through writing … the best will not necessarily 
transpire … nor will the transition to what transpires always be willful, nor will that 
which is noted down always infinitely express the universe, resembling and 
reassembling it. It is also to be incapable of making meaning absolutely precede 
writing: it is thus to lower meaning while simultaneously elevating inscription 
(Derrida 1978:10, footnotes omitted, emphasis in original). 
 
The lack of distinction between an oral and a written tradition is further 
explanation of why an original legal text can not be found. Derrida argues that the 
representation (the writing) becomes intermingled with what it attempts to 
represent: 
 
In this play of representation, the point of origin becomes ungraspable. There are 
things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite reference from one to the other, 
but no longer a source, a spring. There is no longer a simple origin (1998:36). 
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The law’s authority is linked to the elevation of a holy trinity of writing. It is based 
upon the ultimate myth that meaning can first be represented in writing; that the 
court can come to an understanding of this original meaning of law by reference to 
supplementary texts if necessary; and that it can then restate this, in written form. 
This is the means by which law can establish truth, particularly according to early 
positivists such as Bentham. The internal can then be expunged of the traces of the 
external. 
 
A final gloss on the authority of law is the suggestion, by some, that the legal text is 
socially constitutive (MacKinnon, 1989; Cornell, 1991; Kahn, 1999:81; generally, see 
Coombe 2001, Calavita 2001, Ewick and Silbey 1998); that legal meaning permeates 
the social body in a determinative fashion. However, this authority sits on shaky 
foundations. For, as the need to resort to supplementary material suggests, writing 
reduces meaning: it creates meaning, but it does not purely represent a preceding 
meaning; certainly not one that is part of a collective voice.5 The word lives as law, 
as meaning, whenever it is used, not only when it is used in a legal sense. By 
placing the law in text, and limiting it through rules of interpretation, the law is 
removed from the moment of signification. It is “a sign without signification,” a 
transition from signifier to signified (Derrida 1978:12). It becomes significant again 
only at the moment of praxis (reading, application, guidance). There can be no 
capturing of the law of some magical origins, no restatement of the purity of these 
origins and no perpetuation of a singular signification, without loss or addition. In 
short, the legal word lacks a fixed content. 
 
The inability of the word to represent the intentions of law might be seen to be 
innocuous. Perhaps the inability of the Parliament and of judges to encapsulate the 
intended rule into a singularly signifying text has a zero effect. However, as 
Derrida indicates, writing is “inaugural”, “dangerous and anguishing” (Derrida 
1978:11) in that: 
 
It does not know where it is going, no knowledge can keep it from the essential 
precipitation toward the meaning that it constitutes and that is, primarily, its future 
(Derrida 1978:11). 
 
The writing of the law is an exercise in iteration rather than reiteration. Each 
performance of the word is a new performance, a rehearsal or recounting. There is 
a contradiction. This text, new in its physical creation as well as in its signification, 
is always open to subsequent readings, a Pandora’s Box waiting to be opened. 
                                                 
5 In fact, according to Derrida, for every iteration there is a supplement: “It [the supplement] adds 
only to replace. It intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of” (1998:145). Every time one repeats, 
something is added to the original, and something is taken away from it. Chapter 5 | 80 
However, it is also created as a text with its own history. This history is, in part, 
connected through its place in a particular discourse, but is equally removed from 
that which it is seeking to represent. Hence, the law is reconstituted by each legal, 
political and cultural usage. As Garfinkel, an ethnomethodologist, claims, each 
instantiation is “another first time” (1967). The lack of meaning in the written word 
is filled by each of these engagements with it; despite law’s attempts to fulfil the 
legal text (that is, to bring about its completion). 
 
 
The Necromancy of Interpretation 
 
The lack of tangible origins and an inability to represent these origins, is not the 
only flaw in law’s claim (or the myth of law’s claim) of resort to the original 
statements of the law. The exercise assumes a differentiation between author and 
interpreter. This distinction rests on a deproblematisation of language and 
authorship. It suggests that legislation and caselaw are capable of an ‘authentic’ 
reading, that an interpreter of the present is able to make sense of the intentions of 
an earlier author or interpreter and that, in the case of law, one interpretation has 
primacy over all others. 
 
The meaning of texts, including legal texts, is open to multiple readings even 
within what might be intended to be a relatively tight set of interpretative 
parameters. If this were not so, the reliance upon lawyers, even in Australia’s 
adversarial legal system, would not be so critical. It would be a matter of simply 
placing the facts before the court and applying a simple set of rules to them. 
Instead, the litigation is as much concerned with arguments about the meaning of 
these rules. That there is a huge body of theorising on the meaning of law and how 
meaning is made is further evidence of the open-textuality of law, even within the 
discipline (Douzinas et al. 1991:ix). For, despite the attempts by the institution of 
law to raise the application of legal texts to concrete problems above the 
circumstances of everyday life, law is neither predetermined nor a self-contained 
system of inquiry. It remains contingent, and its contingency is based upon the 
history, on the expediency, of discursive limits amongst other things. Law, in other 
words, may be many things, but it is not a static, determinate, or self-contained 
system for deriving predetermined, absolute, ‘correct’ answers to difficult 
questions (Malloy, 1990:215). 
 
This open-textuality is not only a product of the judicial process. It arises because 
every instance of reading a text is in itself a production of meaning, as I have 
already suggested above, citing Derrida. It might be said that both within and 
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that is, that meaning cannot necessarily be found by referring to the author’s 
intention. According to Eco, “the decoding of a message cannot be established by 
its author, but depends on the concrete circumstances of reception” (c1979:172). 
While the institution of law may attempt to fix law (for example through statutory 
and doctrinal rules of interpretation) law has a life of its own both inside the 
institutional constraints of legal discourse and outside them, in the world of legal 
influence. As Goodrich claims, in relation to law: 
 
any instance of interpretation always involves a choice and a motive, an element of 
the ‘play of meanings’ which denies that there can ever be a single ‘correct’ or valid 
interpretation (Goodrich 1986:138). 
 
 
But the Law Still Lives! Reflexivity Between Law and Culture 
 
Our lives are both texts that we create, and texts created by the laws of others. This 
interplay opens the space for new reading, writing and speaking, for becoming 
other than what we are (Douzinas et al. 1991:xiii). 
 
A final criticism of the law’s attempted closure on interpretation is that the legal 
and the cultural are always in some way, mutually constituted. On the one hand, 
social dimensions will influence the working of the law – the construction of legal 
arguments by lawyers as well as the interpretation of the law by the judiciary. On 
the other hand, the law will influence social and cultural dimensions. Ewick and 
Silbey, in a study of the presence of law in everyday life draw attention to the 
relationship between law and culture. 6 
 
Because law is both an embedded and an emergent feature of social life, it 
collaborates with other social structures (in this case religion, family and gender) to 
infuse meaning and constrain social action (1998:22). 
 
The law permeates cultural practice; that is, it builds understandings of the world 
and informs action. This is one reason for attempting to assert, theoretically, the 
cultural into legal interpretation. 
 
There is an expanding body of work referring to the constitutive nature of law: 
constitutive in terms of an array of norms and subjectivities including those 
                                                 
6 The term ‘everyday’ denotes, for Ewick and Silbey, life outside the confines of legal discourse. I use 
the term in this thesis in a different sense, to indicate activities that are part of a normal way of ‘doing 
business’ whether that ‘business’ is conducting a legal trial, debating legislation, organising one’s 
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associated with, inter alia (the categories are not mutually exclusive), gender 
(Collier 1995; MacKinnon 1989), race (Williams 1987), operation of the market place 
(Malloy, 2001), and the legal(ised) subject per se (Kahn 1999:81) (generally, see 
Coombe 2001, Calavita 2001, Ewick and Silbey 1998). As Calavita describes it, a 
central concern of this literature (whether it is a direct or an indirect concern) is 
how “law contributes to the making of everyday consciousness and practice” 
(2001:90, citing Hirsch and Lazarus-Black). This is noted in the Parliament’s 
concern for the effect of law on social practice. Returning to family law, as 
Reynolds argued in House of Representative debates on Matrimonial Causes Bill 
1959 (Cth): 
 
I would suggest that part of the dilemma in which honourable members find 
themselves is … the broader question of the relaxation of the marriage laws and the 
community’s attitude to the permanence of marriage as an institution. I think that if 
we continue to extend the grounds for divorce, this must have an effect on the 
community … [I]t is psychologically operative, and it must affect the attitude of the 
whole community to marriage as a permanent institution … When the community 
subtly and, maybe, subconsciously, gets into that frame of mind, it is quite possible 
that the subtle effect could be to make us a little less conscious about the moral 
regard to have marriage as a lifelong, permanent institution. I think it must be a 
subtle effect (Reynolds 1959:2832). 
 
Reynolds notes this as a psychological explanation, but this terminology does 
similar linguist work as terms such as ‘general culture’ or ‘public opinion’. He is 
referring to the belief systems of the time. 
 
An alternative focus is what Kahn refers to as the “imaginative construction of the 
subject under law” in The Cultural Study of Law (1999:81). According to this body of 
literature, the law is not only influential in the construction of the subject of the 
everyday; it also constructs a notion of everyday legal subjectivity. There is a legal 
imagining of the subject and it is upon this imagining that law does its work. 
Further, as Kahn comments, this legal imagining plays equally upon the external 
and internal appearances of judges and courts (1998:81). 
 
The law’s role in the construction of subjectivities is reason to have a theory of 
interpretation which includes such an effect. However, it is necessary to 
problematise this aspect of law’s reach. For, as I have already argued (in chapter 1), 
the law is only one of the technologies of discipline, in the Foucauldian sense. 
 
The danger of a causal accounting for law’s effect is that it underestimates localised 
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social constructionist and identity-based scholarship rarely problematize the basic 
claim that law, as a social construct, permeates and is inseparable from everyday 
living and knowing but nonetheless is tempered by human agency which can 
avoid, resist, invoke, or reconstruct this structure (2001:43). 
 
She calls for an understanding of “legal consciousness” that can address how the 
law, as a form of “structural domination”, is challenged and transformed through 
the realm of the everyday (2001:43). Ewick and Silbey provide a case study of 
everyday experiences of law. They argue that we should “lay claim to the multiple 
and contradictory experiences of law” (Ewick and Silbey 1998:31). 
 
Society’s power to transform law was noted, as a caution to the Commonwealth 
Parliament, during the parliamentary debates on the Matrimonial Causes Bill 1959 
(Cth). The Government was seeking to expand the grounds of divorce. In making 
his case in the House of Representatives debates, Killen quotes Lord Denning: 
 
I have said enough to show that the divorce laws are of great importance. Those 
laws have been made in response to public opinion. Public opinion and law act and 
re-act on one another. The deserving cases became so pressing that the legislature 
widened the grounds of divorce to meet them. Once they were enacted, however, 
the laws in turn had their influence on public opinion. Undeserving cases have 
slipped through and people have come to regard divorce as a matter that can be 
arranged between the parties (Lord Denning, in Killen 1959:275). 
 
Here, Denning is illustrating how everyday reconstitutions of meaning affect the 
law. Whilst, for the law, divorce once represented a decree of last resort where 
there was some overbearing fault on the part of one of the parties (though the 
constitution of this is an anachronism) cultural usage was usurping legislative 
intention and judicial power. Killen warned that the same could happen in 
Australia, should similar legislation be introduced. Not only was this true, but as 
the ensuing chapters explain, these cultural uses arguably impacted (and continue 
to impact) on judicial pronouncements of the law. In time, these cultural uses 
became the basis of legislative reform, giving rise to a fundamental overhaul of 
divorce laws in Australia with the introduction of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) 
and no-fault divorce. There is reflexivity between law and culture, and constant 
leakages occur between them. The law is clearly something more than the 
application of formal legal criteria to an unproblematically given set of facts. Any 
instance of the law is culturally saturated, not just at the point of its so-called 
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on this meaning, as it professes, but is subject to the push and pull of the cultural 
on its own processes of interpretation. 
 
A further challenge to the notion of authorial monopoly on law’s meaning arises 
from law’s operation as a text outside of the legal discipline, despite internal 
attempts to close signification. The role of law as a signal of obedience and 
disobedience requires its semiosic circulation outside of law. As Malloy explains, 
the law “gives meaning to, and establishes boundaries for, the values and norms of 
a community” (Malloy 1990:214-215). As such, law’s meaning is, by necessity, open 
to interpretation, and is acted upon, by those without access to legal discourse, 
who have neither the prescribed technical nor disciplinary restraints of meaning-
making. Within the cultural domain there is further contestation over meaning, as 
indicated by public debates over legal concepts. Hence, we have, in Fiske’s terms, a 
case of “semiotic democracy”, that is, the idea that “[t]he reading relations of a 
producerly text [the law] are essentially democratic, not autocratic” (Fiske 
1987:239). Yet this essence is rarely brought to the level of everyday action. As the 
overview of the rules of legal interpretation indicates, legal discourse rarely, if 
ever, acknowledges non-legal readings of the law - except perhaps as part of an 
investigation of how the social or cultural spheres (the outside of law) uses the law, 
with a view to law reform. 
 
There is a paradox in the law’s dismissal of alternative versions of legal meaning. 
Goodrich points to a contradiction in the relationship between the common law 
and its political setting (in Freeman 1994:1158). As discussed above, there is a 
correlation between common law legal discourse and the discourse of the modern 
democratic state with the former an element of the latter. The contradiction is that 
whilst a constitutional democracy relies, in principle, for its legitimacy on the 
consent and agreement of its constituency, the people are not present in the 
formation of this agreement. I wish to take this argument one step further. If legal 
interpretation, readings of law by those inside of the law, is informed by a political 
democracy, as I have argued, then it is logical that the members of that political 
community inform those readings. The law should live through its external 
manifestations. Yet, as the rules indicate, interpretation is a closed, uniquely legal 
enterprise, distinct and separate from the political. This is a fundamental 
contradiction which shores up law’s power: 
 
the [social] contract is that which excludes, it is that which immunizes us against 
other discourses and precludes that we even think of any other law (Goodrich 
1990:171, quoted in Freeman 1994:1158). 
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There is a discourse of law which tries to be insular, but it is predicated on its own 
outside, as alluded to by Hart, Kelsen and Dworkin. The law cannot do without the 
thing it denies – the outside, however that is named. This thesis is a quest to return 
dimensions of the populace to the site of law. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have challenged law’s myth of determinacy, by reference to legal 
scholars and general theories of meaning. Firstly, I claimed that it is not possible to 
find original sources of legal meaning: the origins of the common law do not exist 
and there is no singular author of a statute. Secondly, there is no way in which the 
intended meaning of these mythical sources could be represented. Finally, I 
claimed that an original author does not have control over meaning – a text is 
newly constructed each time that it is read. 
 
If we want law to be progressive, we need to understand law as shifting sand, at 
times sculpted into apparently fixed legal form, at others ostensibly free-moving. 
At the point of interface with legal institutions meanings may be relatively fixed, 
although as critical legal commentators have noted, the degree of fixity is mythical. 
However, meanings circulate in different ways in communities outside the law. 
This is not to say that within a given community a legal concept or sign (as we will 
come to know it) is free of significatory restraint. 
 
There are prescribed limits to legal interpretation; the discipline of law constructs 
its own versions of truth. However, as Ruthrof notes, truth claims remain 
problematic (2000:145). Truth, he argues, only works well in formal systems, 
mathematics being one such system. ‘Juridical discourse’ as he terms the domain of 
the jurist, is somewhere between formal systems (which have the greatest ‘truth’ 
return in relation to linguistic meanings) and “complex social situations” (which 
have the least return) (Ruthrof 2000:145-146). Law, however, posits itself as a 
formal system of meaning making, through the construction of formulae for 
interpretation coupled with an adherence to a positivist discourse. It uses this 
formalisation to remove itself from the other complex social situations that 
comprise the everyday. Yet the law and legal interpretation, as Goodrich has noted 
(above), cannot be reduced to this. It is always a choice, a play, and an exchange: it 
is always social and cultural. When the law ‘decides’ it carves a boundary line. A 
legal decision on family cuts out a certain family, leaving it as a remnant, outside of 
the law (cf. the discussion of ‘legal decision’ at the end of chapter 2). 
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Drawing partially on Peirce, Ruthrof argues that, in these complex social systems, 
meaning making derives from a negotiated settlement, rather than from “check 
mechanisms of truth” (2000:147). For Ruthrof, meaning making consists of 
“sufficient semiosis” (semiotics will be discussed in detail in part 4), which “rests 
on a community-based assumption that meanings have been produced for 
communication to continue, to conclude with agreement, or be determined as 
fruitless” (2000:146-147). In this model, meaning is negotiated, resting on local 
compromise rather than eternal criteria. 
 
We might similarly understand legal interpretation as “sufficient semiosis”, but 
within a formalised system which rests its authority on truth claims. The jurist is a 
technician who oversees the conditions for semiosis (the conditions for finding 
truth) and is therefore an arbitrator of meaning. However, part of her or his role 
could be to acknowledge that her or his interpretation is not the only possible 
truth, and that she or he does not have the only right to decide (to ‘cut’ a line 
between the inside and the outside). Instead, she or he should reach outside of the 
law to mediate a compromise position. This places a burden on the officers of the 
inside to reach to the outside in mediating between law and society. 
 
In the next part, I show how meaning varies between different, but related, 
spheres. I provide an outline of Australian family law, including the statutory, 
parliamentary, and judicial history of family law, focussing on the Commonwealth 
jurisdictions. In addition to providing an overview of the existing and past 
treatment of family in family law, this permits a number of observations, which 
draw into question the validity of the dominant, positivist, discourse of legal 
interpretation and illustrates the cross-overs between the outside (the social), the 
inside (the law) and the political (the point of interface). 
 Part 3:  An Anthropology of Family 
 
Preface 
 
The literary critic engaged with the law must read the literature of law through 
the evidence of its absence, through its repetitions and through the failures 
which indicate the return of that which is repressed by law (Goodrich in Pether 
1998:115).  
 
To couple the method of philosophical critique [genealogy] – i.e., exposing the 
conceptual conditions of the practice – to that of thick, anthropological 
description – i.e., investigating the instances of practice in their layered 
character of multiple, juxtaposed meanings – is both the end and technique of a 
cultural study of law’s rule … The latter is open to the possibility and indeed 
suspects, that the elements of such a “system” are not well-ordered, that they 
do not all point in a single direction, and that, indeed, there are tensions … 
within the beliefs that support the cultural practice of law’s rule (Kahn 1999:36). 
 
In part 2 of the thesis, I undertook what Kahn calls a “genealogy” (or, in the 
extract above, a “philosophical critique”) of law by discussing the conceptual 
conditions of legal interpretation. One of the core conceptual conditions of the 
law is that the truth of the meaning of law can be found by formulaic 
application of the rules of interpretation. This permits the law to subscribe to a 
view that the court is involved in an objective process; that its determinations 
are ‘rational’ and value free. 
 
I now take Kahn’s next step, which is to consider the meanings of family on a 
horizontal level; that is, across time and fields, across “structure[s] of belief” 
(Kahn 1999:41). I consider the meaning of family for the Parliament, the courts, 
and the social. I seek to undertake what Kahn calls an “anthropological” 
description of family.1  In doing so, I adopt the methods and idiom of the 
discourses of which the descriptions form a part. Most notably, I assume the 
stance of the legal formalist in undertaking a search for the intentions of the 
Parliament and of the meaning of family for the courts. In doing so, I illustrate, 
that the approach which, in positivist terms, is intended to find truth in law, 
merely enables the construction of a particular position. This shows that law’s 
authority does not rest on the truth of original texts, but in the myth that law 
                                       
1 Elsewhere, Kahn calls it an “architecture” (1999:41). Preface | 88 
 
has an originating source, as noted by Fitzpatrick (1992:20) and discussed 
above, in chapter 5. 
 
This anthropological description illustrates that there are contradictions at any 
moment in time in the construction of family: in the political debates, which 
underpin the legalisation of family; in the ways in which people live family; in 
the theorising of family by socio-critical and feminist scholars; and in the 
judicial determinations of family. Meaning is not contained within fields. There 
is an overlap in meaning construction. Hence, the meanings of family found in 
law have a debt to the meanings of family in the other spheres.  
 
The law requires an intersection of the social, the political and the legal planes. 
For example, legal interpretation requires not only a reflection on the genealogy 
of the law (its own conditions of existence) but also, at times, a reflection on the 
lived history of family. This is so even if legal formalism dominates legal 
decision-making, because finding the Parliament’s intention requires looking 
beyond the words of the statute. What the Parliament meant at a particular 
moment in time, requires an understanding of the members’ own codes for 
meaning construction, within the complex system and varied motivations of the 
parliamentary context. What ends up as family in the law is not inevitability 
derived from a linear, logical set of propositions but is a chance event – where 
these vertical and horizontal dimensions intersect. The ‘system’ of law is the 
ordering of these events, though this is an ordering which, itself, is an effect of 
chance and possibilities, presence and absence. I hope to show what is absent 
from the official position of law. These are: the families which are not given 
names (in law and official record-keeping) but which exist nevertheless; the 
intentions of the Parliament which are outside of the dominant categories for 
understanding family; and the jurist’s assumptions and values about family 
which the law, in its ideal of objectivity, represses. The investigation shows that 
judicial decision-making is as social as any other field of meaning making. Its 
determinations on what it means to be family are built on dominant 
conceptions of family, outside the court. Legal decision-making is not an 
objective process or capable of being contained within a distinct field of 
knowledge. 
 
In the following three chapters, I investigate the meanings of family within the 
fields of the social, the political and the legal (assuming there can be a 
distinction), during Australia’s colonial history. By looking at family as 
constructed in different fields at parallel times, I illustrate the law’s incapacity 
to keep up with social change under traditional models of legislation. Hence, as 
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normative concepts in a way which permits the jurist to investigate that 
normativity. My investigation will also illustrate that multiple meanings can be 
read into Parliamentary intention, drawing into question the positivist’s quest 
for truth. A single, original intention cannot be elicited from the Parliamentary 
debates, other than, perhaps, broad principles and overall legislative goals. 
Therefore, a method of legal interpretation which rests of the ability to find 
original meanings is problematic. 
 
Finally, by tracing the caselaw on the meaning of family, within and across 
particular statutes, I show that the task for judges, of applying the rules of old 
to new social practices and mores, in accordance with the rules of 
interpretation, requires creative decision-making. The myth of legal truth is 
disproved. The capacity for the judiciary to read the same law differently at 
different times suggests that interpretation is an active rather than a formulaic 
process. If we accept that legal interpretation is constructive we may then think 
of more suitable ways of understanding laws. In the final part of this thesis I 
attempt to do this by recommending a semiotic approach to interpretation in 
relation to family law, and possibly other areas of law. Chapter 6  Family: Outside the Law 
 
“Kel and I have decided to make our beautiful sensual relationship a mere 
formality” — Kath Day (Jane Turner), announcing her pending nuptials in: 
ABC TV’s Kath and Kim (2002). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
What is family outside the law? The outside of law does not have juridical 
limits to its construction of family, although, as I argued in chapter 1, the law 
may have some role in the constitution of the family and the construction of 
the obedient subject. The outside of law unashamedly draws on a range of 
aspects, such as history, function and sentiment, to construct family. Defining 
family is made difficult because conduct that is familial in nature might be 
designated by a variety of nomenclatures, if named at all. So how do we find 
the families of the outside? 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I provide an overview of the approaches to 
collecting data on Australia’s families, in particular the categories that have 
been at the centre of such data collection. This overview shows that there are 
historical variations in what can be counted as family in data collection. In 
other words, data collection creates categories in addition to counting families. 
I then draw on Williams’ etymology to show the various uses of the word 
‘family’. According to Williams, family has not always signified a nuclear 
model. 
 
I then move to an historical discussion of Australian families. I begin with 
colonial family formation leading up to Australian federation, moving to the 
century between federation and 2001 and finally speculating on the families of 
the future. I draw on statistical, sociological, anthropological and socio-legal 
sources to develop a wider picture of Australian families than would be 
provided by a statistical analysis alone. This includes material on British 
family practices because of the early immigration patterns. British migrants 
came to represent the power base of Australian governance and the practices 
common to this group came to represent the official discourse on family. To 
counter the obvious cultural bias, I seek to include domestic patterns not 
represented by the official data, such as those pertaining to Indigenous 
Nations and non-British immigrants. Finally, I focus on socio-legal material, 
which suggests that family is best known through the characteristics and 
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diversity of family patterning, including the institutional inclusion and 
exclusion of some practices as familial, draws into question the legal position 
that the heterosexual, nuclear family, sanctioned through marriage, is a natural 
form. Rather, that this model has had dominance in official histories (including 
legal history) rests on the repression of alternative histories and is merely 
evidence of the patterns of social power. The social and statistical history 
points to the need for a means to give expression to those families that are not 
named. Further, the history indicates that, for Australian law to be inclusive, it 
needs to be framed in a manner which permits the repressed versions of 
family (and there will always be some) to obtain legal sanction, without an 
overt statement (a centring), in law, of the particular family type. 
 
The Limits of Data: Australian Statistics and the Recording of Family 
 
There is a problem in trying to identify, historically, the social practices that 
might be deemed to constitute family given that the literature and data is 
generally limited to the dominant conceptions of family at the time. For 
example, in Australia the most comprehensive and geographically and 
historically consistent data are derived from the Population Census 
undertaken, currently, on a 4 year cycle. The availability of family data is 
dependent upon the types of questions asked by the Census and the types of 
categories established for collecting and analysing that information. Parker et 
al. note that the Census did not, until recently, ask about cohabitation (Parker 
et al. 1999:41). The writers ponder the questions that should be asked to 
determine de facto relationships, given that the concept is difficult to define 
(1999:41). Further, statistical profiling is limited by the analysis undertaken of 
that data. Primary statistical analysis is outside the scope of this thesis. The 
statistical information on family demographics that follows reflects the limits 
of the data and of the analysis undertaken of that data. Nevertheless, these tell 
a story of the history of family and of what has, and has not, been permitted to 
be known as family.  
 
A ‘household’ is the basic unit of measurement for the Australian Census 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS hereafter] 1978a:1). For the 1976 Census, 
household was defined as “a person or group of persons living as a domestic 
unit with common eating arrangements” (ABS 1978a:1). In 2001, the ABS 
household was defined as: 
 
A group of two or more related or unrelated people who usually reside in the 
same dwelling, who regard themselves as a household, and who make 
common provision for food or other essentials for living (ABS 2001:115). Chapter 6 | 92 
An individual in a dwelling who supplies her or his own food is considered a 
household. In the case of a share-house, the occupants will be considered to be 
a single household, except where a person provides her or his own food (ABS 
2001:115). 
 
The household unit is a cohabitation criterion only and does not capture the 
emotional connection that might be said to mark family. The marriage data 
complemented the household data in ascertaining family relationships until 
1966 when, for the first time, family coding was adopted. This permitted a 
broader analysis of family types. Family was determined by reference to the 
relationship to the household head (ABS 1978a:1). In 1976, the coding rules 
were changed so as to recognise that: 
 
legal marital status has no necessary bearing on family structure (i.e., a family 
based on a de facto relationship is, sociologically, as much a family as one 
based on a legal marriage) (ABS 1978a:2, emphasis in original). 
 
The 1976 Census also permitted the introduction of the ‘commune’ as a family 
unit, although it was only recorded as such if the household head identified 
the household as such (ABS 1978:2). A further significant change was that, for 
the first time, the Census recognised that a man need not be the household 
head (ABS 1978:2). While post-1976 data is available on some families not 
represented by a traditional nuclear construction, it is only possible to allude 
to such pre-1976 families through the data on marriages. 
 
In the 1990s, the ABS adopted two concepts of marital status: “registered 
marital status” and “social marital status”. While the former is a person’s 
status of relationship based on their holding a marriage certificate, the “social 
marital status” is: 
 
A couple relationship … based on a consensual union, and is defined as two 
people usually residing in the same household who share a social, economic 
and emotional bond usually associated with marriage, and who consider their 
relationship to be a marriage or marriage-like union (ABS 1997:90). 
 
This is a recognition of de facto marriages and, while falling short of noting a 
wider range of relationships, nevertheless indicates an institutional shift from 
marriage-centred definitions of family. The definition is similar to that 
adopted by some states and territories in their domestic relationship property 
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Census measured the incidence of same-sex familial relationships for the first 
time (McDonald 1995b:37, commenting on the Census to come). 
 
For the 2001 Census, family was defined as: 
 
Two or more persons, one of whom is at least 15 years of age, who are related 
by blood, marriage (registered or de facto), adoption, step or fostering, and 
who are usually resident in the same household (ABS 2001:114). 
 
As will become apparent, from the 1970s the ABS started to adopt a much 
broader conception of family than that which attracts the jurisdiction of the 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (FLA), even though this legislation was debated and 
passed in the 1970s. A likely explanation for the difference is that, although the 
government of the day may have held a liberal conception of family life, the 
legislation required the support of both the major political parties. It also 
reflects the constitutional limits of Commonwealth law, regarding matters of 
family, although there is, as is discussed below, some debate on the breadth of 
such limits. 
 
The changes in Census definitions and data collection possibilities are 
indicative of changing social attitudes to family life. Current ABS definitions 
move away from marriage-centred conceptions of family relations and are a 
further suggestion that the possibilities of family, in the broader society, are 
wider than the law has generally recognised. 
 
Just as the collection of data is limited by definitions of family associated with 
marriage, so the literature gives little aid to knowing the incidents of family 
practice; except through an investigation of marriage and divorce laws, with 
the starting point being the defining of the familial relationship through 
marriage. Elkin, for example, notes a lack of sociological inquiry on Australian 
family as at 1957 (1957:1). The literature confirms Parker’s claim that 
compiling a “social history of marriage ‘is a near impossible task, and no one 
book can do justice to the complexities of special variety and historical 
change’” (1990:15, quoting Outhwaite 1980:1). Parker’s work is unique in that 
he considers trends of informal marriage in his treatise on marriage, drawing 
into question the legitimacy of relying on marriage data to determine familial 
trends. His work supports the view of Bertrand Russell several decades earlier 
that marriage is most essentially a legal institution, although it may also be a 
religious institution: “The legal institution merely embodies a practice which 
exists not only among primitive men but among apes and various other 
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suggests a sophistication of human conduct, only that today, as then, the legal 
institution formalises and affirms social practice. It is a mere formality, as Kath 
Day, the iconic Australian modern woman, claims (in the opening extract). 
This formality may be imbued with deeply symbolic and/or religious 
meaning, but another ritual, if as widely accepted, could be equally as 
significative.  
 
It might be said that the centrality of marriage in statistical and sociological 
accounts of family, is indicative of a social fact; that marriage was the lynchpin 
of family for twentieth century Australia. Carmichael notes that although there 
have been periods in which “informal cohabitation” was commonplace, it is 
indisputable that marriage and family have had a close association since the 
beginning of European colonisation (Carmichael 1988:1). However, through 
sociological and anthropological information, we know that this is a reflection 
of the official data and literature, rather than a singular set of family practices. 
The first nations of Australia had and continue to have familial relationships 
that are not represented by an atomised, nuclear model defined through 
marriage. Similarly, Australia’s immigrant populations comprise groups for 
whom extended family relationships and responsibilities are important. And, 
finally, those in same-sex relationships or in relationships without children 
identify and live as family, even in marriage-like relationships, but these have 
not always counted as family. Some members of Parliament when discussing 
family-related legislation have alluded to such differences (see chapter 7). The 
centrality of the marriage-defined nuclear family is perhaps more an index of 
social authority than of actual practice. 
 
The nature and limits of statistical information is indicated by Hacking in his 
Foucauldian explanation of the history of data collection. According to 
Hacking, taxation was the earliest motive for collecting information about 
people but it was considered impossible to “number the people” so authorities 
collected information on “hearths and windows” instead (Hacking 1982:280). 
Around the early- to mid-nineteenth century there was a change in data 
collection practice from hearths to bodies. This, says Hacking, “represented an 
overt political response by the state” to the need to maintain the moral 
standards of the people (1982:281). But the effect was not a neutral one, a mere 
change in the way things were counted. Instead it established the categories 
through which people could be represented: 
 
The subversive effect of this transition was to create new categories into which 
people had to fall, and so to create and to render rigid new conceptualizations 
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Hacking shows that, rather than collecting what is, data collection creates the 
categories for what can be counted and therefore of what can be known. This 
resonates with the Foucauldian argument that law is merely one of the 
technologies for disciplining the subject (as discussed in chapter 1) and that 
therefore there are limits to the constitutive power of the law (as conceived of 
by a positivist discourse). Referring to the fictional statistics worked into The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman Hacking says: 
 
these very interminable countings and tabulations beautifully illustrate the 
manifold ways in which knowledge is, and is not, power. They neatly display 
the overt and the subversive ramifications of knowledge (1982:279, emphasis in 
original). 
 
As is discussed further below, knowledge of family life has been severely 
proscribed by the marriage-centred data collected; that is by the formal 
requirements of affirming relationship. This may be a reflection of the reasons, 
which no longer exist, for the categories. They may be a reliable source of 
knowledge of the categories that were established, but they give no 
information on the practices that fall outside them. In the discussion that 
follows, I have relied on statistical information as an indication of family 
structures in Australia, but I note that the data may say more about the 
available categories of recognition than they do about the nature of family 
practices. 
 
 
The Etymology of ‘Family’ 
 
A further indication of the diversity of family life, notwithstanding the limited 
statistical possibilities, is the etymology of the term ‘family’. The courts have 
referred to this etymology when called upon to define family (see chapter 9). 
Williams provides an outline of the history of family from the fourteenth 
century, in his Keywords. It did not always signify the nuclear form, as it 
generally does today. Its immediate forerunner at the time of its entry into 
English at the turn of the fifteenth century was the Latin familia, meaning 
household, derived from the rootword famulus, servant. He says: 
 
There is the direct sense of the Latin household, either in the sense of a group of 
servants or a group of blood-relations and servants living together in one 
house (Williams 1983:131, emphasis in original). 
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It was then extended in the fifteenth century to denote kinship lines of 
relationship such as a large kin-group or “tribe”, or the “kin-group of a 
common father”. These two senses are indicated in the 1611 Authorised 
Version of the Bible (1983:131-132). It is not until the seventeenth century that 
family comes to represent a small blood-related group. Williams notes that: 
 
between C17 and C19 the sense of the small kin-group, usually living in one 
house, came to be dominant; so dominant indeed that in C20 there has been an 
invention of terms to distinguish between this and the surviving subordinate 
sense of a large kin-group; the distinction between nuclear family and extended 
family (1983:132, emphasis in original). 
 
Struening’s historical references support the position that, before the 
eighteenth century, family denoted kin and non-kin drawn together under a 
household head; the family included blood relations as well as servants and 
apprentices (1999). However, according to Williams, the dominance of the 
small kin-group is not likely to have occurred until the mid-ninetheenth 
century (1983:133) with the growth of capitalism where “[f]amily or family and 
friends can represent the only immediately positive attachments in a large-scale 
and complex wage-earning society” (1983:133, emphasis in original). The 
association of the growth of the nuclear family with the growth of capitalism 
has been noted elsewhere (see for example: on the separation between home 
and work, Olsen and Levesque 1978:7 and Struening 1999, citing Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau). In Australia, in the mid 1800s the wage-earning and familial 
capacities of women were partially conflated. Single women were given 
assisted passage to Australia to work as indentured domestic servants. 
However, given the shortage of brides in the colony marriage became a greater 
attraction for women, as they replaced the role of paid housekeeper with that 
of wife (McDonald 1975:52). 
 
It is notable, given the use of marriage as the primary signifier of family in 
Australian law and society (as indicated by data collection), throughout the 
twentieth century, that the history of the word ‘family’ has not been linked nor 
tied to the formality of marriage. This, it seems, has been only a recent 
phenomenon. 
 
This varied etymology, coupled with the limits in available data, points to the 
difficulties of trying to capture the history of family. I will present data on 
family or other indices of family, such as the rates of marriage and the nuptial 
and ex-nuptial birth-rates around the years of major legislative reform on 
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family forms in Australia’s European history and to reflect upon the 
relationship between social, legislative and judicial trends. Relevant social 
trends are also recorded in parliamentary reports, where members have 
provided the results of polls conducted at the time of the introduction of 
family-related legislation. Socio-legal commentary will give indications of how 
family is lived today. I will present this information as it is both an indication 
of social trends and of the understandings of family life influencing political 
outcomes. 
 
The discussion that follows is centred on Anglo-Australian society, though I 
will refer to the family practices of Indigenous communities and non-British 
immigrant groups. The complexity of family relationships within the diverse 
matrix of Australian society cannot be sufficiently represented here. My brief 
and simplified references are intended to indicate the diversity of family form 
and the limits of a singular perception of family. I will discuss at some length 
the nature of familial and marital relationships at the turn of the century 
because the Commonwealth’s legislative power depends on the understanding 
of marriage prevalent at the time of federation. I then reflect on twentieth 
century family before concluding with indicators of the family of the future. 
 
 
Colonial Family Formation before Federation 
 
Given that the Commonwealth’s power to legislate on family-law-related 
matters requires a link to marriage, it is important to try to understand the 
family form and, in particular, what ‘marriage’ denoted, at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Is it possible that the constitutional framers contemplated 
common law marriages when they limited the Commonwealth’s powers to 
matters pertaining to marriage? The constitutional debates suggest a 
commitment to the institution of marriage on the part of some members 
particularly in their concern over rates of divorce. That the form of marriage is 
not fixed is indicated by the arguments of other members who suggested that 
the states should be free to make their own determinations on the issue. This 
discussion is presented more fully in the next chapter. There is, however, little 
specific explanation of the nature of family life or the types of union in place 
and/or recognised in the states at the turn of the century. 
 
Similarities in social trends can be found between British colonies. As 
McDonald and others have observed, the values held in Australia were largely 
attributable to those of Britain or Northern Europe, from where the settlers 
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settlers originated, in descending order, from England, Wales, Ireland and 
Scotland. The similarities lie not only in the social policies applied to the 
colonies with respect to the settlers, but also in the effect of colonisation on 
Indigenous communities. 
 
According to McDonald, a prominent family researcher in Australia, the 
nuclear family model in England became dominant with the advent of 
Christianity in the fourth century. The church introduced marriage-related 
proscriptions which undermined the broader “extended family kinship 
system” (McDonald 1995a:10). Social historians say that the baptismal and 
burial records of past populations of selected English villages show that the 
nuclear family was the dominant family form, with aged and widowed people 
living alone (McDonald 1995a:9). The exception has been when housing 
shortages have forced low-income families to live in extended family 
households. 
 
This does not mean that the nuclear family is and has always been the 
Australian norm. The nomenclature of nuclear family does not describe the 
family of Indigenous Australia, Australians of Southern European, Asian and 
African descent and the Australian in late modernity which is permissive of a 
variety of lifestyle choices. 
 
The effects of colonisation on the life of Australian Aboriginal people has been 
widely noted, from the dispossession of lands, to the imposition of a Christian 
way of life, the introduction of diseases and the removal of children (see for 
example, Australia 1997, Bourke and Bourke 1995). Nevertheless, Aboriginal 
family life in 1788 and today can be distinguished from Anglo-Australian 
family life. According to Bourke and Bourke, traditional Aboriginal life was 
based on the nuclear and extended family, tied to the “rich and symbolic 
spiritual world” provided through land (1995:58-61). Aboriginal societies were 
organised around kinship systems with all members being classified in 
relationship terms (Bourke and Bourke 1995:54-58). Such kinship networks 
managed social, economic and cultural life (McDonald 1995a:8). Although by 
the time of federation in 1901 most of Australia had been colonised and its 
original inhabitants dispossessed, Aboriginal family kinship structures 
continued to exist (Bourke and Bourke 1995:58, 63). Australian society at the 
time of federation included Indigenous society, with its distinct family values 
and structures. Yet, because Aboriginal people were not included in the 
Census count until 1971, their family life has not been historically represented 
in the Australian population statistics (ABS 2001:5). 
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There is some evidence that, for non-Indigenous Australia, the marriage-
centred nuclear family was not entrenched until the 1860s. Before the mid 
1800s informal cohabitation amongst the settlers was also widespread 
(Carmichael 1988:2-3, McDonald 1975:27-56). In 1806, only 28 per cent of adult 
women in the New South Wales Colony (presumably non-Aboriginal women) 
were married; the majority of the remainder were living in de facto marriages 
(Carmichael 1988:3). They did this for cultural as well as practical reasons, 
such as the shortage of Church of England ministers, the invalidity of Catholic 
rites, a lack of identification with the Marriage Acts by poorer classes (the 
convict classes), the prohibitive costs of marriage and an imbalance of the 
sexes (McDonald 1975:29-57). Government policy actively and successfully 
sought an alteration to this state of affairs (Carmichael 1988:2). As was 
reported in the Sydney Gazette in 1927, “[illegal marital unions are] a crime 
which the Government have repeatedly declared they will not overlook” 
(McDonald 1975:36). Carmichael reports that the required effect was achieved 
by the 1860s (Carmichael 1988:2). 
 
Parker’s work on Informal Marriage, Cohabitation and the Law, 1750-1989 
challenges the official British data, which indicated that common law unions 
had given way to marriage. He claims that common law marriages were 
commonplace in Britain until well into the nineteenth century. For, despite 
Lord Hardwicke’s Act 1753, entitled “An Act for the better preventing of 
clandestine marriages” (Parker 1990:29), informal marriages continued in large 
numbers in regional pockets throughout Britain, perhaps until the mid-
nineteenth century (Parker 1990:77-79). Civil (registery office) marriages began 
to stand in for the local traditional practices (Parker 1990:78) despite the 1753 
act which, according to Parker, was designed around the concerns of the 
propertied classes and required, generally, that only marriages solemnised in 
the Anglican church were legal (1990:29-31). Parker finds socio-historical 
research which challenges the official data. Amongst the emerging working 
classes in new towns, “free unions” increased after 1750, between 1753 and 
1836 up to one third of all marriages were void and illegal, and common law 
marriage was such a deep-rooted practice amongst some communities that up 
to 15 per cent of marriages were non-church (and therefore non-legal) 
marriages (Parker 1990:62-63). 
 
Other evidence suggests that, even after the passing of the Marriage Act 1836, 
which broadened the possibilities for legal marriage beyond marriage by 
banns and by license, in some areas only 10 per cent of couples were legally 
married (1990:78-79). Parker claims that the proportion of common law 
partnerships may have increased in the nineteenth century, even after the 1836 Chapter 6 | 100 
act. In rural areas of southern Wales “bastardy was common and unchastity 
the rule,” according to the archdeacon of one parish (Parker 1990:79). Parker’s 
findings are supported by Stone who concludes that, in 1868, the laws 
governing marriage were not being strictly obeyed, any more than before the 
1753 act (Stone 1990:135). He attributes the trend mostly to a desire for privacy 
which was “a product of the traditional freedom of pre-marital social relations 
and sexual experimentation among the English poor” but also to the lack of 
consensus as to how a legal marriage should be carried out, given the tensions 
between church, state and popular custom (1990:135-136). 
 
The continued existence of informal marriage is further evidenced in the 
vernacular of the time. For example, the phrase “to dab it up” was an accepted 
cockney expression for informal unions (Parker 1990:78-79). Given that 
Australia’s migrant population was derived, predominantly, from working or 
rural class Britain, it is feasible that the sense of legitimacy of common law 
marriage, was carried to Australia, given that, as I have already noted, many 
of the conditions which undermined the 1753 act (lack of access to church 
officials, poverty, non-allegiance to the Anglican church) applied also to 
Australia. Golder and Kirkby say there was a religious tolerance of marriage 
customs, partly out of a desire to keep the colony ‘respectable’ by getting the 
population married. The House of Lords passed legislation in 1844 which 
decreed that marriages must be ordained according to proper religious rituals. 
However, the New South Wales Legislative Council subsequently passed the 
Marriage Act 1855, which legitimised all marriages performed in the colony to 
this time. Further, the act: 
 
laid down principles for all future marriages that made no distinctions 
between religious affiliations, and allowed for civil marriages with no clergy 
at all (Golder and Kirkby 1995:153). 
 
Like Britain, the Australian colony was clearly having to contend with non-
legal marital unions. Assuming a delayed reaction in the colonies to British 
legislative change, it is possible that the tradition of common law marriage 
existed well into the nineteenth century despite the official data. This is, 
however, highly speculative, as it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
undertake the primary research necessary to establish this hypothesis, given 
that the secondary material relies heavily on the official data. It is notable, 
however, that a number of submissions to the 1992 Joint Select Parliamentary 
Committee on Certain Aspects of the Operation and Interpretation of the Family 
Law Act argued that, at the time of the acceptance of the Commonwealth 
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marriages (National Women’s Consultative Council and Finlay in Australia 
1992:269). 
 
A degree of commitment to extended family was perhaps indicated by a 
common practice of men marrying their deceased wife’s younger sister which 
became illegal in 1835 with the passing of what was known as Lord Lyndhurst’s 
Act (Parker 1990:79-87). The practice was common in bourgeoise and working 
class families, where the wife’s younger sister often lived as housekeeper and 
nurse (Parker 1990:83). Despite the proscription, the practice continued, being 
made legal again in 1907. This is an exceptional instance of the role of 
extended family in a culture which otherwise had the nuclear model as its 
norm. 
 
McDonald provides a detailed statistical analysis of marriage in Australia 
between 1860 and 1971. Before 1966, much of the Australian official data-
collection did not include “full-blood” Aboriginal people. Therefore, the data 
should not be seen as fully representative of Australian society. Further, as 
Golder and Kirkby note, at no time have Aboriginal marriages been 
considered valid and, in fact, legislation passed from the turn of twentieth 
century expressly prohibited marriages between Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people (1995:154). The law similarly excluded other cultural groups 
at different times. McDonald notes that the mid- to late- nineteenth century 
was marked by low marriage rates. This was partly because of the low number 
of single males in the colonies as a result of a cessation in immigration 
(1975:112, 125). McDonald also credits the typically late age of marriage in the 
case of the middle class, but possibly also amongst the working class, as a 
reason for the low marriage rates. The trend to marry late was attributed to a 
desire to secure and maintain one’s material status, the decision to marry 
being associated, at the time, with a decline in socio-economic status 
(McDonald 1975:113, 126-131, 1995b:29, Carmichael 1988:3-4). 
 
Finlay and the National Women’s Consultative Council may have drawn their 
conclusion from this fall in the marriage rates around the turn of the twentieth 
century. In all states other than WA (where there were already low marriage 
rates for women because of the excess of adult males, Carmichael 1988:4) there 
was a drop in the rate of marriage. Victoria, most notably, recorded that 51 per 
cent of females aged 25-29 had never been married at the time of the 1901 
Census. This rate was exceeded only by Ireland, Iceland and Sweden 
(McDonald 1975:145). McDonald speculates that the depression of the 1890s 
was the reason for the postponement of marriage and the reduction in the 
rates of marriage (McDonald 1975:147-9). With the low marriage rates there Chapter 6 | 102 
may have been a loss of the existing facilities for marriage, such as the “district 
registrar’s office”, and a growth in “matrimonial agencies”, which adopted an 
informal marriage ceremony (McDonald 1975:149). 
 
The proportion of one-parent families in the late nineteenth century is also 
notable, and is an antidote to the common belief, today, that single-parenthood 
is associated with the breakdown of the institution of marriage. In 1891, 16.7 
per cent of all Victorian families with dependant children were sole-parent 
families (McDonald 1995a:22), compared to 15.4 per cent of all Australian 
families in 2001 (ABS 2015.0:2). Of the 1891 figure, 38 per cent were men. 
MacDonald says that this reflected high levels of maternal mortality 
(MacDonald 1995a:22). It should be noted that this period correlates to the 
time in which it was common social practice for a widower’s sister-in-law to 
undertake the role of carer and housekeeper. 
 
There was also a consistent reduction in the number of ex-nuptial children 
born from the late-nineteenth century to the early-mid twentieth century. The 
number of births per 1 000 unmarried women aged 15 to 45 years peaked in 
1890-92 at 15.93 with a reduction at the turn of the century to 13.30 (ABS 
1963:370, 1974:184). These figures are high when compared to 6.91 in 1932-34 
but only around half the figure of 28.59 in 1970-72 (ABS 1963:370, 1974:184, see 
Figure 1). Nevertheless, the figures suggest that, except where marriage 
followed the birth, children were either being raised in sole-parent families or 
in legally or socially adoptive families, indicating a certain fluidity in family 
modelling. 
 
 
From Federation to the New Millennium 
 
Despite a common misconception that the twentieth century was a period of 
challenge to the institution of marriage, from the 1940s, there was a dramatic 
increase in marriage rates. In 1900-02 there were 42.14 persons married per 
1000 persons aged 15 and over (see Figure 1, below). This figure remained 
relatively stable until after World War II (1946-48) when it rose dramatically to 
71.24. In 1957, Brown writes that: 
 
the Australian family system has undergone something of a renaissance since 
the last war. In particular the trends towards a lower birth-rate and to a higher 
divorce incidence which were apparent during the first four decades of this 
century have been to a large extent reversed, and pessimistic predictions that Chapter 6 | 103 
were so freely made of a gradual withering away of marriage and family life 
show no signs of being realized (1957:110). 
 
  Births per 1000 unmarried 
women 15-45 years*(ABS 
1963:370,1974:184) 
Marriage per 1000 single, 
widowed and divorced, aged 
15+* (ABS 1977/78:117) 
1880-82 14.49  48.63 
1890-92 15.93  44.04 
1900-02 13.30  42.14 
1910-12 12.53  50.12 
1920-22 10.50  50.97 
1932-34 6.91  42.88 
1946-48 11.45  71.24 
1953-55 14.45  65.32 
1960-62 18.49  62.27 
1965-67 20.96  68.05 
1970-72 28.59  68.69 
* Figures exclude “full-blood” Aborigines before 1966 
Figure 1: Births and Marriages 1880-1972 
 
 
By 1959, when the Commonwealth Parliament first proposed introducing 
universal comprehensive divorce laws, divorce was already available under 
the various state jurisdictions. However, the number of divorces in each of the 
states did not correlate with the ease of dissolving marriage. The 
parliamentary record of debates on the Matrimonial Causes Bill 1959 shows that, 
in Western Australia, there was a lower rate of divorce than in other states. 
This was despite divorce being available without the need to prove 
“matrimonial offence” if the parties had separated for a term of 5 years or 
more. In other jurisdictions, it was necessary that a party establish that a 
“matrimonial offence”, such as adultery or cruelty had been committed. In 
other words, it was easier to obtain divorce in Western Australia than in other 
states. Halbert reports that in 1947 there was one divorce for every 625 
Western Australians, compared to a ratio of 1:1 316 in 1958; and from 1950 to 
1959 there was an 8 per cent drop in the number of divorces, a greater rate of 
reduction than for any other state in Australia.1 Finally, fewer than 5 per cent 
of applications for a decree of dissolution on the five-year separation ground 
were defended (Halbert 1959:2712). The national data were as follow. 
 
                                                 
1 Throughout the thesis I will refer to members of Parliament by their surname alone, as I would any 
author. This is because in the Author-Date system the use of titles for Parliamentarians, interferes 
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In 1957, there were 6 983 divorces. Forty two per cent of women who divorced 
were aged between 25 and 34 years whereas, for men, the majority (42 per 
cent) were in the 30 to 39 year age group. Most dissolved marriages were of 
less than fifteen years duration, with 40 per cent being of less than ten years 
duration. One third of the dissolved marriages were childless (Stewart 
1959:2711). Finally, a Gallup poll in July 1959 indicated that 83 per cent of 
people favoured federal divorce laws over state laws (Calwell 1959:2711). 
Brown, in a text written at the time, explains that the divorce rate was 
flattening out by the mid 1950s, “although the general tendency over the past 
eighty years has been for rates to rise” (1957:111). Australia, it seemed, need 
not be alarmed despite the growing availability of divorce. Marriage and the 
family were each surviving its ‘assault’. Nevertheless, it may have been a 
disheartening fact for those committed to a family-marriage nexus that the 
number of ‘illegitimate’ births began to increase, from the slump in the 1930s 
of 6.91 per 1 000 unmarried women aged 15 to 45 years, to 11.45 in 1946-48 and 
to 14.45 in 1953-55 (see Figure 1). This increase preceded the Commonwealth’s 
increase in the number of grounds for divorce. 
 
By 1974, when the Parliament was considering no-fault divorce provisions, the 
Australian public was ready for such a proposition. A 1973 Morgan poll 
(incorporated into the parliamentary debates by Missen 1974a:2034-2035) 
indicates 69.7 per cent of those polled favoured laws permitting divorce 
immediately or after a 12 month separation, on the ground of marital 
breakdown. If we extract the proportion of those who were undecided (8.8 per 
cent), 76.43 per cent of those expressing a preference were in support of such a 
proposition. 
 
In the early 1970s when Australians were being faced with radical family law 
reform, the rates of marriage were consistent with the post-war figures (68.69 
persons per 1000 persons in 1970-1972) (See Figure 1). Members of Parliament 
relied on figures such as these during family law reform debates in 1959 and 
the 1970s to counter arguments that the proposed legislation would erode the 
sanctity of marriage and undermine the family unit. For example, in the 
debates on the Family Law Bill 1974, Missen reported on the increasing trend of 
marriage from the turn of the century. He said that, in 1960, six per cent of 
women and seven per cent of men in Australia were unmarried, compared to 
twice this rate in the 1930s and four times as many in the nineteenth century 
(Missen 1974a:2031-2032). Reports of the marriage trends were an antidote to 
the claims that proposed new divorce laws would erode the sanctity of 
marriage and undermine the family unit. 
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Between the 1950s and the 1970s, there was an increase in the number of 
children born to parents not married to each other. In 1951-55, 3.9 per cent of 
births were ex-nuptial, compared to 10.1 per cent in 1975. However, between 
1972 and 1978, there was a reduction in the rate of ex-nuptial births (ABS 
1978b:107), despite (or perhaps because of) the apparent liberalism of domestic 
relations. 
 
As noted above, after 1966, the Census included questions relating to family 
structures. Alternative categories of family were at last capable of being 
recognised. Once the fluidity of family structures and household types was 
noted, the data collection was capable of being designed to capture broader 
categories of family. The possible “conceptualizations of the human being” 
and the categories into which people could be placed (to return to Hacking), 
were being expanded. 
 
McDonald characterises the changes that have occurred in family behaviour in 
the latter part of the twentieth century as “explorations”, as the society 
attempted to reconcile liberal and conservative moralities (1995b:31). This was 
a tension between the: 
 
conflicting needs of individuals for personal autonomy, intimacy, aspiration 
and acceptance … [and] the prevailing social and economic structure or the 
prevailing idealised family morality (1995:31). 
 
Between the 1940s and 1970s, there were higher rates of marriage and a 
decrease in the age of marriage compared to the earlier part of the century; it 
was a period of “familism” (McDonald 1995b:32). The immigration of people 
from non-English-speaking European countries following World War II also 
brought new family practices, which differed from the structures and values of 
the earlier British immigrants (1995b:31-33) and, I would add, of the pre-
existing Indigenous Nations.2 However, the influence of cultural diversity was 
neither understood nor tolerated (McDonald 1995b:34). As will be seen in 
subsequent chapters, these differences in family structures were by no means 
reflected in family law. 
 
Following the debates that occurred in the 1960s, the 1970s, by contrast, saw 
the implementation of changes associated with the rights and needs of the 
individual (McDonald 1995b:34). The growth of feminism – associated with an 
                                                 
2 See the essays in Hartley (1995) on the trends in non-British migration from the time of 
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increase in the age of marriage, an increase in divorce rates, control by women 
over fertility, increased education and labour force participation for women 
and a restructuring of gender roles in the home – accompanied the shift 
(McDonald 1995b:36-37). The period saw a growing awareness and 
recognition of same-sex relationships and an expanded capacity for 
individuals to make choices about relationships, a change from the structural 
demands of the earlier period (McDonald 1995b:38-40). Struening, writing on 
American family life, similarly notes the effects in the 1970s of feminism and 
gay liberation on the prevailing attitudes to sexuality and, in turn, on family 
life at the time (1999). Ironically, given the arguments in the 1950s and 1970s, 
the Australian trend of early marriage in the post-war years was accompanied 
by a subsequent high rate of marital break-up for these marriages (McDonald 
1995b:38). 
 
These changes are reflected in the Census data and analysis, which show 
increases in lone parent families, single households and couple families 
without children, as well as higher rates of divorce. However, the experiment 
with open marriages, as indicated, perhaps, by the change in Census coding in 
the 1970s, was “largely dismissed as an affront to the ideal of intimacy in 
committed relationships” (1995b:39). 
 
Between 1971 and 2001, there was a significant increase in the number of lone 
parent families, from 5.7 per cent to 15.4 per cent of families. This correlates to 
an increase in the rate of divorce after the 1975 FLA, which stabilised after the 
mid-1970s. Less than 2 per cent of people were divorced in 1971 compared to 
6.4 per cent in 1996 and 7.4 per cent in 2001 (ABS 2001:2). The trend to not 
marry increased between 1976 and 2000 from 25 per cent to 32 per cent of the 
proportion of the population aged 15 years and over (ABS 2000:75). 
 
There was a decrease in the number of couple families without children 
between 1971 (37.9 per cent of all couple families) and 2001 (35.7 per cent), 
although an increase between 1996 (34.1 per cent) and 2001 (ABS 2001:2). The 
ABS attributes the recent increase to an aging population and a trend for 
people to have children later in life or to remain childless (ABS 2001:2). 
Between 1996 and 2001, there was also a decrease in the number of family 
households, from 70.6 per cent to 68.8 per cent of all households (ABS 2001:2). 
Yet there is also a reported increase in the number of lesbian-headed families 
in Australia (McNair et al. 2002:1) and, according to research undertaken by 
same-sex lobby groups, around 20 per cent of Australian lesbians, gay men 
and bisexuals have children (McNair et al. 2002:1). As of the 1996 Census, there Chapter 6 | 107 
were 11 288 same-sex male couples, 275 of them living with children, and 8296 
same-sex female couples, 1 483 living with children (McNair et al. 2002:1). 
 
Between 1971 and 2000, there was a reduction in the number of other family 
types, such as co-resident siblings, from 6.2 per cent of all families in 1971 to 
1.8 per cent in 2001 (ABS 2001:2). The figure, however, remained stable 
between 1996 and 2001 (ABS 2001:2). Given the Bureau’s definition of family, 
family types indicated by non-biological cohabitation (such as friends who live 
as family) or non-cohabitation families (such as couples who do not co-reside) 
are not captured by the category. 
 
A reduction in the average household size between 1971 and 2001 is attributed 
to an increase in the number of single person households (ABS 2001:2), from 
18.1 per cent of households in 1971 to 22.1 per cent in 2001 (ABS 2001:3). 
Perhaps more relevant to my argument is the large increase in the number of 
people aged 20-29 years living alone, from 4.7 per cent of the age group in 1971 
to 7.1 per cent in 2001 indicating that the is a result of a change in lifestyle 
choices for this group (ABS 2001:3) rather than an aging population. 
 
What is not indicated statistically is the role of the extended family. Because 
the household is the basic ABS unit, non-residential extended family 
relationships are not represented in the data. McDonald provides sociological 
evidence for the significance of extended family, even for mainstream 
Australians. He says that: 
 
While it is true that Australians rarely live in extended family households, over 
the past ten year or so [1980s to 1990s] research … has shown … that the 
extended family is a very active and important force in the lives of most 
Australians (1995b:45, emphasis in original). 
 
Extended family networks provide financial support, assistance in the 
maintenance of housing and carer support, and are an important source of 
childcare (McDonald 1995b:44-46). Australian families may not live with 
extended family members but they reside in close proximity to them and the 
extended family is involved in the day-to-day lives of family members. 
 
Even with their limits, the ABS publications show an increase in the range of 
possible household and family types. In fact, although the data provide a 
conservative picture of alternative familiar relationships, recent research 
estimates that, at the current rate of decline, the nuclear family will “become 
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household types increased in number, except the traditional nuclear family. 
From 1976 to the late 1990s, the nuclear family shrank from 27 to 19 per cent of 
all households (Salt 2003:109). 
The change in Australian family life has occurred not only because of changes 
within particular social or ethnic groupings but also through their unions. 
Nguyen and Ho, for example, report that: 
 
on the whole [Australian-Vietnamese] families move in varying degrees 
towards becoming ‘bicultural’, adapting to the economic, social and cultural 
conditions of life in Australia while maintaining to some extent their own 
culture (1995:240). 
 
Bourke and Bourke similarly point to the incorporation of non-Indigenous 
spouses into Indigenous families and on the effect on Indigenous family 
values (1995:49). 
 
Trends, of course, are generalisations and belie the particular experiences of 
specific Australian communities. Just as the post-war period brought 
European immigrants with their own set of family practices and structures, so 
we have more recently seen an increase in the rates of Asian, Middle Eastern 
and African immigration, each with their own values associated with familial 
obligation and responsibility. Aboriginal Australia is another distinct variety 
of community with its own experience of family. A broad definition of family 
is called for, to protect these differences from what I have called the violence of 
exclusion. 
 
 
Aboriginal Family: A Reminder of the Pluralism of Australian Society 
 
Urban, rural and traditional Aboriginal communities maintain the existence of 
distinct conceptions of family, from the mainstream. As Bourke and Bourke 
explain: 
 
When discussing Aboriginality, family relationships are invariably raised. Kin 
includes a wide network of people, many of whom are only distant relatives in 
non-Aboriginal terms … The Aboriginal family is central to the survival of 
Aboriginal culture. The values, structures and practices can be based on 
traditional kinship systems or the extended family, kin ties and locality 
allegiances of rural and urban Aboriginal people (1995:64-65). 
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Despite the ravages of colonialism, distinct Aboriginal cultures, centred on 
locality and family rather than marriage, persist (Bourke and Bourke 1995:63, 
Dewar 1997:221). This distinction is indicated in the 2001 Census data. 
Ironically, at a time when conservative Australia laments the breakdown of 
family relations but refuses to recognise and celebrate Aboriginal culture, it is 
Aboriginal society that is most committed to the ideal of the family unit. 
Households with Indigenous persons are more likely than other households to 
be family households (in the traditional sense, 82 per cent compared to 70 per 
cent) and less likely to be lone-person households (13 per cent compared with 
24 per cent) (ABS 2003:np). This is in opposition to the overall trend of an 
increasing number of lone-person households (ABS 2001a:1). 
 
Households with Indigenous persons had an average of 3.5 persons per 
household, compared to 2.6 persons in other households (ABS 2003:np). The 
ABS attributes this to the higher number of dependent children in households 
with Indigenous persons. The largest households were those with two or more 
families (multi-family households). Multi-family households with Indigenous 
persons had an average of 7.7 persons, compared to 5.4 persons in other such 
households. Among households with Indigenous persons, the average number 
of residents ranged from 3.2 in major cities to 5.3 in very remote areas (ABS 
2003:np). 
 
These figures are accompanied by an increase in the number of people 
identifying as Indigenous Australian. The resident Indigenous population of 
Australia was 2.4 per cent of the total population in June 2001, with an increase 
of 16 per cent between the 1996 and 2001 Censuses (from 2 per cent to 2.2 per 
cent of the population) (ABS 2003:np, ABS 2001a:1). In short, while 
colonisation has affected Indigenous family structures, Indigenous 
communities maintain distinct familial practices coupled with an increase in 
the number of people practising them. Bourke and Bourke stress that although 
some demographic differences may be attributed to poverty, these familial 
practices are also a result of positive cultural foundations (1995:51) including 
an accommodation of new social requirements. For example, Bourke and 
Bourke note that, not only do Indigenous people have their own familial 
codes, as something distinct from other Australian families, it is common for 
cross-cultural relationships to form, requiring an accommodation of varying 
family practices (1995:49). The divergence between the family forms and 
practices of Indigenous and mainstream Australia (from which family 
definitions normally derive) indicates a need for a new approach for 
describing family. 
 Chapter 6 | 110 
 
 
 
 
Family: From Form to Function 
 
McDonald identifies a problem in trying to define family, for the concept is 
constantly changing. He says that: 
 
there is no single, universal definition of a family but … each of us defines our 
own family and, as we move through life, we change our definition as 
different people take a more or less important role in our lives (1995:5). 
 
The ideas of contemporary socio-legal scholars, on what it is to be family 
outside the law, hint at an alternative to attempting to ‘define’ family. Eekelaar 
finds that the social obligation in family relationships is developed rather than 
biologically inherent (2000:19). In short, social obligation is not a product of 
biology or family form, but is tied to the nature of relating. According to Finch, 
in an analysis of morality as part of an understanding of family relationships, 
people choose their social obligations and moral responsibilities for a number 
of reasons (1994:63). While a biological or close familial relationship might 
produce the circumstances under which people are likely to develop the sense 
of duty central to mutual support, “in family life there appear to be very few 
issues upon which there is a clear consensus at a general level about the right 
thing to do” (1994:75). 
 
Silva and Smart distinguish between the “ought” or “should” and the 
“actualities” of family life (1999:1). The “ought” or “should” is articulated by 
the rhetoric of the nuclear family. The “actualities” are how families actually 
operate, rather than how they should (1999:2). Focussing on actualities, Silva 
and Smart suggest that family signifies “the subjective meaning of intimate 
connections rather than formal, objective blood or marriage ties”. At the core 
of this connection is “the sharing of resources, caring, responsibilities and 
obligations” (Silva and Smart 1999:7), a connection which can be shared 
irrespective of blood relations or patterns of cohabitation. Finally, Worth et al. 
give an outline of Giddens’ account of relationship trends in late modernity. 
According to Giddens, these relationships combine “sexuality, love, equality 
and autonomy … formed on the basis of attributes intrinsic to the bond itself” 
(in Worth et al. 2002:1). The relationship is not subject to an “overarching 
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Intimacy is a “transactional negotiation between equals” (Worth et al. 2002:1, 
citing Giddens). 
 
These views indicate a shift in thinking about the formation of family, from a 
focus on associations founded on reproduction and child rearing to one 
concerned with the nature of relating. With such a focus, the possibilities of 
function expand. As Streuning argues, families are multipurpose, so why 
should a single purpose be elevated (1999:1)? According to Bolte, a move from 
a traditional Western concept of marriage and family “could be positive and 
stabilizing for the community because all citizens would be accepted (1998:3). 
 
While individual autonomy may mean greater personal choice, as was 
indicated by McDonald in relation to the latter part of the twentieth century 
and Giddens regarding late modernity, it does not mean that these choices are 
devoid of social imperatives. For, as Silva and Smart argue, such choices “are 
in fact closely connected to social conditions that continue to produce tensions 
and anomalies” (1999:2). 
 
The approaches to understanding family outlined above are very much like 
Lyotard’s linking of the différend to “feeling” (1984:7, discussed above). He 
notes that one can know the différend by what one feels, when one “cannot find 
the words”. Rather than explain family through words, with the risk that 
certain families are denied a name and a naming, perhaps we should 
understand family as what one feels to be family. For it is this feeling, the 
feeling of social responsibility to a particular person or set of persons, that 
comes from the nature of relating, which determines family and the manner of 
conduct that is required. 
 
An appropriate approach to legislating on the family may be to focus on the 
conduct and practices of individuals, a subjective test, rather than on the form 
of the unit, an objective criterion. Kirby J, of the Australian High Court, has 
commented on the problems of trying to define the duties associated with 
family through the creation of categories to which duties would attach.3 The 
use of categories, he argues, does not “allow for the variety of personal 
relationships that sometimes constitute the ‘family’ of particular persons in 
Australian society today.” He preferred the use of a category “intimate 
personal relationship” claiming that such an approach was non-
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discriminatory, especially in relation to “traditional Aboriginal marriage 
relationships and homosexual relationships.” A “genus” approach, that is, a 
focus on the common characteristics, would be preferable to a category 
approach because the latter is subject to the need for constant addition and 
subtraction of categories as the society changes (New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission 2001:¶2.38-2.40). In addition, the participants in family 
life may not identify as members of a particular category of family, even 
though their practices may indicate familial relations of a certain type. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is little doubt that British legal and social policy in the nineteenth 
century attempted to secure marriage as the basis of official family formation. 
Prior to this, informal unions were commonplace, particularly amongst the 
convict and working class settlers and especially in relation to Irish-Catholic 
immigrants. Yet even though pro-marriage and pro-nuclear family policies 
were adopted and effected, there is still overwhelming evidence of informal 
partnerships, and of a role for extended family in the support of the nuclear 
family. Similarly, just as the denial of divorce did not keep the nuclear family 
intact, the simplification of divorce law did not necessarily lead to an increase 
in the rate of divorce (see Western Australian pre-1959). Despite the policy and 
legal drives to construct family, Australians continue to form families 
according to a wide range of personal and social contingencies, from the 
delaying of marriage in the late nineteenth century to the delaying of 
parenting in late twentieth century. Yet, although there have been variations in 
family life, the statistical representation of family has generally permitted only 
the story of matrimonially-formed families which, in turn, affects legislation 
and legal outcomes, by constituting an official ‘commonsense’ benchmark. 
 
In fact, the social and statistical history challenges this commonsense 
benchmark of family. Families function in the shadow of the law, informed by 
history, by individual concerns, by cultural imperatives as well as by the law, 
as such. This social history also shows what and who is excluded from the 
official record of Australian family. The story of Anglo-Australia is only one 
part of the story of Australian family. The customary unions of Indigenous 
communities and the familial practices of immigrant families are not clearly 
part of the history of Australia. Instead, they are represented as peripheral 
stories and, as a result, become the exceptions to the rule of Australian family. 
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A violence of exclusion occurs by the official recognition of only some forms of 
family, a violence that will continue unless there is a reconsideration of the 
categories under which family can be known. One way of circumventing this 
problem is to understand family as something other than a ‘thing’, as I have 
argued already. This would permit law to be framed in a manner which 
recognises the repressed versions of family life as family.  
 
In the following chapter, I discuss the main parliamentary acts and debates on 
family. Just as the social history (the outside) of Australian family has been 
linked to marriage trends, so the political history (in between law and society) 
has marriage as its starting point and this impacts on the legal definitions of 
family (the inside). Chapter 7  Family: Before the Law 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I have called this chapter “Family: Before the Law” because, for positivists, the 
legislature and the political dimensions of legislation are not, in fact, part of the 
law. They come ‘before’ the law. The legislation that ensues is law, and is one of 
the law’s sources. The parliamentary debates can also become relevant to the law, 
pursuant to the rules of interpretation. As we have seen in chapter 4, the court may 
refer to the Parliament, to determine the purpose of legislation, and to this end it 
may refer to extrinsic material such as the parliamentary debates. 
 
I argued in chapter 5 that a single meaning of legislation cannot be found in 
parliamentary debates. It may seem somewhat contradictory, then, that I now trace 
these in order to find intention. However, the law argues the importance of legal 
formalism and, as part of this, the need to refer to the Parliament’s intentions to 
assist interpretation. I refer to the debates here to substantiate my earlier claims on 
this point; that is, that a single intention cannot be elicited from the debates. I show 
that multiple readings can be made of the parliamentary texts, as evidence of the 
futility of a commitment to formalism. Further, the chapter illustrates that the 
Parliament has numerous functions, only one of which is the passing of law, and 
that these impact on the nature and content of the debates, obfuscating the 
Parliament’s intent in relation to a particular statute. The chapter finally points to 
legal decision-making as being an active process: the jurist makes choices about the 
intention that is to be accepted, rather than passively applying easily discernible 
rules. 
 
The parliamentary debates are not the only extrinsic materials available to assist 
interpretation of a statute, but they are part of the broad context to which the court 
can refer. Given that part of law’s method is to effect the Parliament’s wishes as 
expressed in the statute, a close examination of the parliamentary debates, will 
show us how this intention is represented. As noted already, the extrinsic material 
is only a point of reference if the provision of the statute is ambiguous or if the 
ordinary meaning of the provision, within context, is an absurdity or is 
unreasonable. 
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In this chapter, I provide an outline of the Commonwealth Constitution as well as 
the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 and the Family Law Act 1975, two key family-
related enactments of the federal Parliament. For each Commonwealth bill, I 
provide a commentary on the parliamentary debates as an indication of the 
Parliament’s intention in passing the legislation. I pay greatest attention to the 
debates in the House of Parliament in which the relevant bill was first introduced. 
In discussing the acts, I refer to the legislation that was in place at the time of its 
repeal, or in the case of the Family Law Act 1975 at the time of writing. 
 
 
The History of Family Law in Australia 
 
Family law in Australia, as opposed to the laws of the states and territories, is 
premised upon constitutional powers regarding ‘marriage’ and ‘matrimonial 
causes’. In fact, the term ‘family’ has only been used to define the subject area since 
1975 with the passing of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). Before 1975, legislation 
pertaining to family existed, at a federal level, under the nomenclatures of the 
Commonwealth heads of power. The Commonwealth did not comprehensively 
legislate until 1959, when it passed its first generic divorce laws. The states 
maintained similar titles for legislation. Hence, at a state and federal level, 
legislation pertaining to families was, until 1975, signified by the terms ‘marriage’ 
or its derivative, ‘matrimonial causes’. 
 
Today, ‘marriage’ law remains; that is, the statute that embodies the rules 
governing the official passing from single status to marital status, but the 
nomenclature of ‘matrimonial causes’ has been replaced by that of ‘family’ at a 
federal level with the passing of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 
 
Following observations of the jurisdictional limits of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), 
the states and territories passed their own legislation on the property rights of 
parties to alternative (to the FLA model) families, as discussed in chapter 2. There 
was, generally, a chronology of coverage: from heterosexual de facto couples, to 
same-sex de facto couples, to other, non-couple-centred familial relationships, such 
as cohabiting friends or caring relationships. 
 
The Commonwealth is now being faced with the proposition of legislating on de 
facto relationships, with the state Attorneys-General agreeing to transfer their 
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limits. However, the Commonwealth has only agreed to accept the states’ transfer 
in relation to heterosexual de facto relationships; not the other types of 
relationships represented by the state acts. 
 
 
Australian Constitution 
 
The Law 
 
The Commonwealth Parliament’s power to legislate on matters relating to family 
derive from placita (xxi) and (xxii) of s51 of the Australian Constitution. These are: 
 
51(xxi): Marriage; and 
51(xxii): Divorce and matrimonial causes powers; and in relation thereto, parental 
rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.1 
 
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the English case of Hyde v Hyde and 
Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P&D 130 provides the authoritative definition of the legal 
institution of marriage in Australia (as referred to by Mason and Brennan JJ in 
Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242, 259-60 and Brennan J in The Queen v L (1991) 
174 CLR 379, 392). Hyde defines marriage as “the voluntary union for life of one 
man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others” (per James Wilde, 133). From 
this definition of marriage, the meaning and scope of the ‘marriage’ and 
‘matrimonial causes’ powers is derived, the ‘matrimonial causes’ power flowing 
from the concept of marriage (Attorney-General (Victoria) v Commonwealth (Marriage 
Act Case) (1962) 107 CLR 529, 560 per Taylor J, 572 per Menzies J, and 582 per 
Windeyer J). 
 
I return to the judicial discussions of the marriage power in chapter 8. For now, I 
note the history as an indication of the source and scope of the power of the 
Commonwealth Parliament to make laws associated with family. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 I will cease use shudder marks when I refer to the constitutional heads of power, unless it is necessary 
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The Constitutional Debates 
 
Between 1891 and the acceptance of the Constitution in 1901, there were a number 
of proposals regarding the nature and content of the Commonwealth legislative 
powers in relation to family.2 The proposal for the provision to be called “Marriage 
and divorce” did not attract discussion in Committee debates in Sydney, 1891,3 and 
was included in the 1891 draft bill as Clause 52 (20). In Committee in Adelaide, 
1897 the power was divided into Clause 50 (xxiii) and Clause 50 (xxiv) as 
“Marriage and divorce” and “Parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of 
infants”, respectively. Again, this was accepted without discussion to form 
subclauses 52 (xxiii) & (xxiv) respectively of the 1897 draft bill.4 The main 
discussion occurred in Committee in Sydney in 1897. Subclauses 52(23) and (24) of 
the 1897 draft bill were endorsed, following debate of a proposed amendment of 
(23), which was not eventually put (see discussion below). The two, however, were 
combined, with a conjunction of “and in relation thereto”, upon a motion by 
Barton. His intention was to ensure that the power of the Commonwealth in 
relation to the custody and guardianship of children be limited to a power arising 
from marriage and divorce, not a power that existed on its own terms. The clausal 
separation between ‘marriage’ and ‘divorce’ and the inclusion of ‘matrimonial 
causes’ giving rise to the two subclauses as they exist today, occurred before the 
Committee discussion in Melbourne 1898 and was not the subject of discussion. 
 
My discussion of the constitutional debates are therefore limited to the 1897 
Sydney meeting, which provided the only recording of debate and constitutes the 
record of the framers’ intentions. The constitutional debates included some 
members guarding against a perceived increase in the numbers of divorces (eg. 
Glynn in Quick and Garran 1901:1077-78), and others arguing for the need to 
permit divorce because of the inevitably of some marital breakdown (eg. Downer 
in Quick and Garran 1901:1081). Of most interest here, are those comments and 
arguments, which suggest that the concept of marriage (and therefore of 
matrimonial causes) is not necessarily as unproblematic as we assume. I alert to 
three issues: the idea of a marriage as a purely legal construct; the suggestion that 
there is not a natural form of marriage; and the cultural nature of marital 
                                                 
2 The variations in numerical conventions in relation to the clauses of the draft Constitution reflect those 
of the various drafts. 
3 The constitutional debates were held in a number of states. 
4 This is noted as subclause 52(xxvi) in the Guide to Provisions, but subsequent comment suggests that 
this is a typographical error and not the subclause number of the provision. Chapter 7 | 118 
affiliation. I will permit the speakers to speak for themselves. It should be noted 
that although I use the comments as part of a progressive argument, this was not 
necessarily (though may have been) the spirit in which they were spoken. 
 
Interestingly, despite the placita permitting uniform Commonwealth legislation, 
the pre-federation debates suggest a concern, by some representatives, for 
protecting the capacity for recognising differing values on the subject of family, 
namely on the issue of divorce. For example, both Houses of the Tasmanian 
Parliament passed an amendment that the (then combined) provision read: “The 
status in other states of the commonwealth of persons married or divorced in any 
state” (in Quick and Garran 1901:1077-1079). The effect of this would be that the 
Commonwealth could not prescribe legislation on marriage or divorce. Instead it 
could only endorse the legislation of the states, ensuring the uniform acceptance of 
the marital status of persons. The amendment was not passed but it did meet the 
approval of a number of Convention participants. 
 
In supporting the amendment, Wise argued that the amendment would permit the 
intercolonial recognition of any laws on marriage and divorce. He provides an 
illustration: 
 
Suppose we were to have a settlement composed largely of Germans or Italians, or 
a settlement composed largely of Anglicans, or of Catholics, or, at any rate, in 
which either of these denominations largely preponderated. In New Zealand one of 
the provinces for many years was composed almost exclusively of Anglicans, and 
another of Scotch Presbyterians, and we know that the ideas of those communities 
on the subject of divorce would be as wide apart as the poles (in Quick and Garran 
1901:1079). 
 
He is essentially arguing for the protection of states’ rights, but the form of the 
amendment and the nature of his argument also acknowledges, firstly, the range of 
values associated with family, or marriage more specifically, and secondly the 
importance of a fit between the law and localised social and religious practice. He 
is suggesting that the law be able to respond to a variety of communities, an 
argument which, of course, is at the core of federalist debates. The comment should 
be considered in the context of the difficulties, in the previous century, of 
controlling the forms of domestic union, and the degree to which common law 
marriages were socially accepted (see chapter 6). 
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A number of the Convention participants argued the need for uniformity, 
notwithstanding concerns for the protection of states’ powers in relation to 
marriage and divorce. Wise, despite favouring that “each community might be 
allowed to legislate according to its own ideas of right and wrong”, also argued 
that it was proper that there “be such supreme control on behalf of the 
commonwealth as is necessary to prevent scandals from people having one status 
in one state and another status in another state” (in Quick and Garran 1901:1079). 
Similar statements of support were provided by Grant, O’Connor and Downer (in 
Quick and Garran 1901:1080, 1084). It is interesting that Downer appears to place a 
reserve on the power of the Commonwealth on matters of marriage and divorce 
when he says that “it becomes very important that, in all English-speaking 
communities, we should have the law uniform, as far as we can” (Quick and 
Garran 1901:1081, emphasis added). The framers of the Constitution therefore had 
in mind the possibility for a diversity of values on the topic, notwithstanding the 
desire to maintain some uniformity of recognition of those varying standards. 
 
The marriage power, as it was subsequently adopted, has been read in narrow and 
prescribed terms. However, it is significant that not all those involved in the 
framing of the Constitution understood marriage to be a natural state. To the 
contrary, Grant suggests that marriage is a legal fiction and that those who have 
entered into the legal arrangement of marriage should not be subsequently bound 
by the law at the end of cordial relations: 
 
Since the law only recognises marriages as civil contracts or partnerships, it would 
seem intolerable that when the partners can prove the impossibility of their 
maintaining friendly relations, they should be compelled by law to make a 
semblance of doing so, and both lives be in effect wasted (in Quick and Garran 
1901:1080). 
 
If marriage is a legal fiction, a legal construct, then there is no reason for assuming 
a primacy of form x (of relationship) over form y. It may be that, on the basis of 
legal reasoning, it was proper for the Court to find that Hyde was the appropriate 
definition of marriage but this should not lead us into thinking that this is the 
definitive version of marriage. It is a legal construction, not a natural state. 
O’Connor said as much in arguing that the amendment was necessary: 
 
It simply means, as far as marriage is concerned, that the form of marriage adopted 
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Considering what the form of marriage is in all the states, that would be recognised 
at present (in Quick and Garran 1901:1080). 
 
For O’Connor, it is not a preposterous proposition that each of the states or 
colonies should have a different version of marriage; that families could be 
differently formed. While he is committed to the prospect of uniformity of law, he 
sees this in terms of uniformity in the acceptance of difference, rather than 
uniformity in form. I am not suggesting that he had in mind the range of 
relationships that is current today, but it does suggest a possibility that there is 
more than one form of marriage, more than one form of domestic union, than is 
recognised under the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). He supports the proposal because of 
a desire for national recognition of the marriage and divorce laws of the states, and 
for the reciprocal recognition of the marital status (including the divorced status) of 
Australian citizens, irrespective of their state of domicile. The amendment was not 
accepted and the rationale for this is not recorded. However, this does not mean 
that these concerns were not reflected in the final placita. 
 
These debates are significant because the nature of family law legislation at a 
federal level is dependent upon the reading of the marriage power. If the framers’ 
intention is a source of constitutional meaning, then what the framers understood 
as marriage stands as the interpretation of marriage today. What we can glean is 
that marriage was, at the turn of the last century, understood as a legal construct 
and, further, that marriage could be (and was) constructed in different ways in 
different states. An intention to permit fluidity in arrangements was also reflected 
in some of the Convention participants’ statements, in somewhat more problematic 
terms than we assume today. Marriage was not limited to its legal form, but was 
something more than legal formalism. There were some arguments presented to 
Joint Select Parliamentary Committees inquiring into the Family Law Act 1975(Cth) 
that, at the time of the acceptance of the Commonwealth Constitution the meaning 
of marriage would have included common law marriages (National Women’s 
Consultative Council and Finlay in Australia 1992:269). These comments defy the 
unproblematic characterisation of marriage that predominates in Australian law 
and culture, and which flows on to ideas of the ‘proper’ family. 
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Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 
 
The Act 
 
The act, which has been repealed, provided that it was “An Act relating to 
Marriage and to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes and, in relation thereto, Parental 
Rights and the Custody and Guardianship of Infants”, replicating the wording of 
the constitutional powers. It was the first body of law, resting on the vision of an 
earlier 1957 bill, to provide a comprehensive and uniform federal system for the 
dissolution of marriages and associated ancillary matters (matrimonial causes). 
 
Barwick, Commonwealth Attorney-General, introduced the object of the bill as 
part of his second reading speech: 
 
The object of this bill is to give to the people of Australia, for the first time in our 
history, one law with respect to divorce and matrimonial causes and such 
important ancillary matters as maintenance of divorced wives and the custody and 
maintenance of children of divorced persons (1959: 2222). 
 
He noted that, should the bill become law, Australia would be one of the first 
constitutional federations to deal uniformly with the subject matter, thanks to the 
prescience of the constitutional framers (1959:2222). 
 
The act defines “matrimonial causes” (s5) to include inter alia: 
•  proceedings for a decree of: 
Dissolution of marriage; 
Nullity of marriage; 
Judicial separation; 
Restitution of conjugal rights or 
Jactitation of marriage (prohibiting a party from holding themselves out 
as being married). 
•  proceedings in relation to spousal maintenance, child maintenance, custody 
and guardianship of children, and “damages in respect to adultery”. 
 
The act provided for these matters accordingly. Preceding the parts of the act 
dealing with the decrees, in lexical order, are those providing for marriage 
guidance (Part II) and measures to assist reconciliation (Part III). The provisions 
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Arguably the most controversial part of the bill, attracting the suggestion by 
Luchetti that it be retitled “The Increase in Divorce Bill 1959” (1959b:2778) were the 
national grounds of divorce. Until then, each state had its own statutes. The 
grounds provided by the act included adultery, desertion, non-consummation of 
marriage, cruelty, rape, sodomy and bestiality, failure to comply with an order for 
restitution of conjugal rights and unsoundness of mind of one of the parties (s28). 
Sections 39 and 40 specifically prevented the court from granting a decree of 
dissolution if the petitioner had condoned the breach or “connived at the ground”, 
or if there has been collusion “to cause a perversion of justice”. In other words, the 
parties could not agree to default in the eyes of the law and the court to obtain a 
divorce. In addition, s43 provided that proceedings for dissolution could not be 
brought within three years, without the court’s special leave. 
 
Because the act rested on the marriage and matrimonial causes power, the 
constitution of family relied upon the determination of who might be parties to a 
marriage, a matter outside the ambit of the act. The jurisdictional test was whether 
the parties’ relationship had been validated under the state legislations. But the 
nature or form of family in the sight of the legislators was indicated in part by the 
proceedings available by virtue of the definition of matrimonial causes under s5 
and the relevant parts of the act, and by the act’s provisions in relation to the 
children of the marriage. 
 
The available proceedings included decrees for dissolution and applications for 
spousal and child maintenance. Also available were: decrees ordering the 
restitution of conjugal rights (s60) which were available on the condition that the 
petitioner provide a “home” (s63); decrees for “jactitation of marriage … based on 
the ground that the respondent has falsely boasted and persistently asserted that a 
marriage has taken place between the respondent and the petitioner” (s65); and the 
availability of damages from the partner of a so-called “adulterer” (s44). These 
suggest that, firstly, marriage was seen as a contract between two persons 
(although not a contract of the commercial type: see Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 
571), for exclusivity in relation to sexual conduct and that this contract had 
economic consequences for any third party who has sexual contact with either of 
the parties. In other words, there was an assumption of sexual exclusivity. 
Secondly, the parties had certain “rights” and correlative obligations pertaining to 
the marriage, though these were not clarified except that they includes cohabitation 
(s62(b)) and were referred to as something derived from a “desire” and required to 
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certain unspecified duties associated with marriage.5 Finally, it was an ‘offence’ 
under the act for a party to pass themselves off as married. Presumably there were 
some prevalent reasons for such conduct given that there were sufficient 
incidences of the action for the Parliament to expressly limit its potential. 
 
The act took a broad approach to the determination of who might be children of 
the marriage. Section 6 deemed that a child of the marriage included a child 
adopted during the marriage, a child born of the parties before the marriage and: 
 
a child of either the husband or wife (including an illegitimate child of either of 
them and a child adopted by either of them) if … the child was ordinarily a 
member of the household of the husband and wife (s6(1)(c)). 
 
Section 5 clarified that adoption referred to legal, as opposed to social, adoption. 
Hence a legally adopted or biological child of either of parties, if accepted as a 
member of the family, was a child of the marriage (though the Federal Court 
subsequently found that there are limits to such acceptance: see chapter 8). 
 
That the second reading speech makes no special note of these statutory 
presumptions, and there was little emphasis on the relevant clauses of the bill 
except when the clause was voted upon, suggests that the matters were not 
controversial. The provisions suggest that there was a degree of recognition of the 
social (as opposed to the purely legal or biological) construction of family life 
which should, then, be given legal validity. 
 
 
The Debates 
 
The tenor of debates on the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) was preceded by the 
1945 discussions leading to the Matrimonial Causes Act 1945 (Cth) and the 
Matrimonial Bill 1957 (Cth). Although, as noted by Barwick, the intention of the bill 
was to create national uniformity in the law pertaining to divorce, matrimonial 
                                                 
5 Perhaps the duties are unspecified because, at the time, they were unspeakable duties. See, for example, 
Van de Velde’s sex education manual, Ideal Marriage: Its Physiology and Technique, which in 1959 had 
had its 35th impression. Van de Velde notes that his book “state[s] many things which would otherwise 
remain unsaid” (1962:xxi). It seems that sex could only be discussed under the guise of “marriage” which 
in turn was a pseudonym for sex. Although the publisher of the 1962 impression notes that “what was 
whispered is now discussed openly” the fact of the book’s continued publication suggests that the 
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causes and ancillary matters, the emphasis of the Parliament was on the grounds of 
divorce and the mechanisms for avoiding divorce proceedings. In promoting the 
bill, Barwick says that “the paramount endeavour of this bill, as contrasted with 
the existing laws of the states, is that it seeks to maintain marriage and to protect 
the family” (1959a:2225). He is at once countering arguments that the regulation of 
family should remain with the states and that the bill encourages divorce. The 
statement also indicates that family is constituted, and is best served, by the 
protection of marriage. The family is safest in the hands of the Commonwealth. To 
gain support for the bill and its comprehensive range of divorce provisions, the 
bill’s supporters needed to assure the Parliament that a commitment to family 
underwrote the bill. They achieved this by suggesting that family is poorly served 
by its parties being tied to an unhappy marriage and restrained from forming or 
recognising their commitment to new families. To this end, Barwick quoted 
evidence presented in the lead-up to the drafting of the bill: 
 
We see no benefit to society, to the individual or to the State in maintaining 
marriages in name which are no longer, and on all foreseeable estimates will never 
be, marriages in fact and which secure few or none of the purposes for which 
marriage was designed. There are many persons living together in illicit unions, 
which have all the potentialities of happy, permanent marriage, who are unable to 
marry because of a pre-existing marriage which has completely broken down, and 
because the “innocent” spouse from spite, religious scruple or some other reason, is 
not prepared to take proceedings for divorce. We see in many of these illicit unions, 
which may have endured for years, all those elements of love, comradeship and 
happiness in children that make the cohesive qualities of a happy marriage (quoted 
by Barwick 1959b:2772-3). 
 
Permitting divorce, the argument goes, puts an end to the suffering of the parties 
in marriages already irretrievably broken down, and permits them to enter into 
and legitimate new, positive relationships. 
 
The emphasis on the divorce provisions and on the reconciliation measures as the 
counter to suggestions that the bill assists in the break up of marriages (that is, 
families), is clear from the second reading speech in the Senate, by Gorton, Minister 
for the Navy. The “four main features of the bill from the point of view of its  
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impact on Australian family life”, in the order presented by the Senator, are: 
 
• “to promote stability of marriage by making divorces difficult during the early 
years when a husband and wife are learning … to make a marriage endure”; 
• “to lay stress on reconciliation, … attempt[ing] to save marriages even after 
proceedings for divorce have begun”; 
• to ensure that “if in spite of all endeavours a divorce is granted” there are proper 
arrangements made for child and spousal maintenance and support; 
• “to specify the grounds of divorce” (1959:1695). 
 
As a strategy for steering debate, the supporting members emphasise the 
reconciliation measures and de-emphasise the divorce grounds except to show 
their value to society. Despite these attempts, discussion on the divorce measures 
dominated the debates. 
 
The divorce provisions, coupled with ss39, 40 and 43, the ability to obtain damages 
for adultery from the third party (s44), and the power to obtain an order requiring 
restoration of “conjugal rights”, indicate that the marriage and the family unit (as 
narrowly constructed by the marriage and matrimonial causes power) was 
considered higher in value than the right of the individual to self determine family 
life and lifestyle, once married. The family was a matter of public interest. Of 
greatest concern to some members was the ground that the parties had been 
separated for more than five years, modelled on the Western Australian divorce 
laws and representing a no-fault provision. In introducing the ground, Barwick 
indicates an appreciation of this discourse on family by framing the justification for 
the provision in terms of social good. He emphasises that permitting dissolution in 
circumstances where the parties have been separated for years, without 
“matrimonial offence” on the side of either party, is in keeping with the “public 
interest in family life”: 
 
the public interest in family life comes down on the side of allowing each of these 
separated parties to regularize their relationships or to assume regular 
relationships in the future. On this view, no sense is seen, in the public interest, in 
denying the possibility of family life to each when all is irretrievably lost between 
them. No sense is seen in possibly condemning either or both of them to irregular 
relationships which, in honour, cannot result in families. Nor is the existing 
capacity of an innocent party to withhold dissolution indefinitely seen as 
necessarily just or conformable to the public interest (1959a: 2231). Chapter 7 | 126 
A dominant feature of the debates was an association between the public interest 
and the ‘protection’ of the family unit, but the discourse was also one of 
nationalism and Christian values. The second reading speech includes a comment 
that the bill deals with relationships which affect “the fabric and the future of this 
nation” (1959a 2238). Anderson identifies the following paragraph as the most 
important part of Barwick’s speech: 
 
One of the great foundations of our national life is the family, and in turn the 
family is founded on marriage. National interest is best served and family life is 
best nurtured when marriage is truly life-long. The prevalence of broken marriages 
does threaten our strength and imperil our future (1959:2740). 
 
Luchetti, as one of the strongest parliamentary adversaries of the bill, particularly 
the grounds for divorce, says that the “[t]he basic strength of the nation is the 
family, and every action that is taken to preserve the family should find favour 
among responsible people everywhere … Much of Australia’s strength and 
greatness in the past has flowed from the springs of wholesome family life” (1959a: 
279). In a similar vein, Killen identifies family as the basis of civilisation (1959:275). 
 
References to Christian values as a justification for protecting marriage (including 
permitting divorce as a protection of marriage) were also common. Among those in 
the House of Representatives who raised concern that the divorce provisions in 
particular were a threat to the Christian standards of Australian society were 
Luchetti (1959a: 279-280), Costa (1959:2684-2685) and Calwell (Deputy Leader of 
the Opposition, 1959:2695-2697). Luchetti admonishes the Parliament which, he 
claims, is ostensibly Christian, when he says that, “we in this place want to throw 
away all reference to the Church and to Christianity, and to follow a secular line 
which may appeal to a few people, but which is, I believe, against the judgement 
and the wishes of the majority” (1959:279a). These are just some examples of those 
invoking Christianity as a challenge to the legislation. Hughes, though supporting 
the legislation in principle, appeals to the Parliament for a greater consideration of 
the issues in light of criticism from the churches: “Each one of us here has the 
responsibility … of handling a subject which goes to the very foundation of our 
Christian society” (1959:2752). Notwithstanding the commitment to a protection of 
a Christian way of life, some of these members of Parliament nonetheless 
supported the goal of uniformity of divorce and matrimonial causes law. 
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Others, including Barwick (above), Courtnay (1959:273-274) and Cleaver 
(1959:2744-2748), invoked Christian values in support of the bill. Duthie draws on 
his experience as a retired Methodist Minister and conductor of approximately 200 
marriages to speak as a person of some authority on religious matters and on 
marriage. He says that the majority of churches support uniform divorce laws, but 
he ultimately draws a distinction between the role of the Parliament, to make good 
laws, and the church, whose job it is to produce Christians (1959:2737-2739). 
Anderson notes, “[w]e are guided quite clearly in Christian principles and, where 
there are transgressions that offend social life, by clearly defined commandments”. 
He links the low incidence of divorce to a high standard of Australian morality and 
argues that the greatest period of immorality was at a time when divorce was not 
available. In doing so, he not only invokes Christianity to support divorce 
legislation but merges what might be separate discourses on nation, Christianity 
and public interest, into one (1959:2740-2741). As with the public interest 
arguments, not all members agreed with these views. However, those who posed a 
challenge did so in the terms of the discourse, for example presenting commentary 
from Christian organisations which supported their position, or arguing that their 
position was in the national interest. 
 
While these debates hinted at the nature and significance of family in Australian 
society, they had little to say on the issue of form. This can, however, be contrasted 
with the debates over the Marriage Act 1961 (below) which, to a limited degree, 
contemplated the possibility of a range of family models, drawn from a range of 
marriage permutations. The historicity of this moment is significant. As already 
explained, the Commonwealth’s legislative potential rested on the constitutional 
powers pertaining to marriage and matrimonial causes. The Commonwealth had 
so far deferred its power to legislate on marriage to the states. Marriage, therefore, 
is what the states deemed it to be, and it was on this that the current exercise of 
legislative power rested. Hence, we can only glean ideas of what family life looks 
like from the values underpinning debates so far as they might indicate the 
dominant culture of family. The members were committed to a Christian family 
that was an autonomous self-functioning entity (the basis of civilisation) and that 
represented the nation, one built on a British heritage. Family is likely to look 
something like the Hyde formulation: heterosexual, monogamous and committed 
for life. It is from this marriage that children would spring forth building the 
Anglo-Christian-Australian family. The model ignores the complexity of 
Aboriginal family relations and fails to accept that the nation, built on a migrant 
population, had a pluralism of family form. The Parliament’s only concession to Chapter 7 | 128 
these is s6A of the act (pursuant to a 1965 amendment), which recognises 
polygamous marriages for the purposes of permitting dissolution. 
 
While the bill takes marriage for granted, as something from which matrimonial 
causes derive, it does clarify who might be deemed children of the marriage. 
However, the lack of debate of s6 of the final act suggests this was an 
uncontroversial aspect and tells something of the ease with which the Parliament 
saw it as proper that the children of either of the parties be considered part of the 
family constituted by the married couple. It is arguable that the members 
considered the family as having autonomy over events within the family, once that 
family was properly constituted through the legal ritual of marriage. The only 
relevant comment was from Fraser who sought to clarify the liability of a man who 
married a woman with custody of the children of a previous marriage (1959:2783). 
The Attorney-General, Barwick, confirmed that the second husband might have 
responsibility for the children, should he and the woman divorce, assuming that 
the children had been brought into the household (1959b, 2783). This was a matter 
that received some judicial comment (see chapter 8). There was no dissent over the 
scope of this clause. The Parliament and the bill were silent on which children of a 
household might be deemed to not be children of the marriage, for example 
socially adopted children or children born of a second relationship of one of the 
parties. This perhaps, again, reflects an Anglo-Christian view of Australian family, 
against the traditions of Aboriginal people. A notable exception was a side 
comment by the Attorney-General that artificial insemination by a donor other 
than a husband was not a ground for divorce recognised under the bill, although it 
might be a “grave offence against the marriage”. The Government’s view was that, 
having received no advice from the Law Council, the legislature should not 
pioneer such legislation without social and legal clarification (Barwick1959a: 2234). 
He makes the same point in relation to sex-reassignment of a spouse (1959a:2234). 
Because these issues were not present in the bill there was no debate generated. 
 
 
Marriage Act 1961 
 
The introduction of the Marriage Act followed what was perhaps the more difficult 
task of the Commonwealth Parliament – the passing of the 1959 Matrimonial Causes 
Act. In some ways, this act had already paved the way for uniform legislation 
pertaining to family matters, something which until then, had remained within the Chapter 7 | 129 
regulatory jurisdiction of the states, notwithstanding the constitutional grounds 
having existed for almost 60 years. 
 
 
The Act 
 
The Marriage Act 1961 (Cth), which remains in force, introduced a uniform national 
marriage law. It does not define marriage, nor does it specify who can be married 
under the Act. However, section 46 of the Marriage Act provides that a marriage 
ceremony must include a description of marriage as “the union of a man and a 
woman to the exclusion of all others voluntarily entered into for life.” This is a 
reflection of the classic formulation of marriage contained in Hyde, and as noted 
below, was not included in the bill because of a commonsense assumption that the 
Hyde formulation constitutes marriage. It clarifies that the parties of a marriage 
must be of different sexes, sets the minimum ages, and outlines the procedures for 
a valid marriage ceremony. 
 
 
The Debates 
 
In introducing the bill in the House of Representatives, Barwick, the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General, spoke to a number of issues. These were: a 
desirability for national uniformity in marriage laws, the minimum marriageable 
age, the procedures for celebrating marriage and the “legitimation” of children 
born outside of legally recognised marriage. He noted that, although he was not 
necessarily in favour of uniformity of law, the relationship of husband and wife 
and parent and child was “common to all of us” irrespective of state borders and 
should not, therefore, be subject to different laws (1960a:2000). 
 
The Parliament’s makeup was consistent with that of the 1959 debates and so the 
political persuasions which influenced the flow of debate were similar. However, 
whereas the subject matter, particularly the divorce provisions, of the Matrimonial 
Causes Bill 1959 attracted concerns of a moral nature, the debate here was more 
specifically focussed on jurisdictional and federal matters. Further, the Marriage Bill 
1961 invited questions of who should be permitted to marry and, as this is the 
enabling condition of family under Australian law, this goes more acutely to the 
question of what and who constitutes family than the debates of the Matrimonial 
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Hence, the debates of the Marriage Act 1961 are perhaps of greater and more direct 
relevance to the topic of this thesis than the parliamentary debates on the 
Matrimonial Causes Bill 1959 and the Family Law Act 1975. Nevertheless, the former 
two statutes were the first to tackle the issue of uniformity of family and marriage 
law in a reasonably comprehensive way. The debates include discussion of the role 
of the Commonwealth to determine family matters and of the differences between 
family formations across state borders. By the time of the 1975 act this issue was a 
given and so the debates focus on the content of legislation rather than on the form 
of the families to which the legislation would apply. 
 
A number of speakers on the 1961 bill make indirect comments in relation to those 
who are outside of the norm of marriage. Barwick explains that the law would 
apply to the Commonwealth, including the Northern Territory and the Australian 
Capital Territories, and to Norfolk Island. He notes, however, that “a law which is 
suitable for the mainland and the Territory of Norfolk Island, would probably 
prove inapt in the other external territories” (1960a:2001). 
 
There was, it seems, a tension between the desire to regulate in a way that permits 
national uniformity and the reality that family, as a social rather than a legal 
category, is changeable and has a social and religious specificity. Although clearly 
favouring a Christian view of marriage, Beazley refers to the customary nature of 
marriage, in the most part framed around religion rather than law (1960:229). 
Haylen insists that uniformity of the law “is only a figment” and that you cannot 
dictate practice through law. To the contrary we should, he argues, value 
individuality: 
 
I do not think that you create a marriage law by saying what you cannot do, 
because, straight away, the people will do what they think right or they will do 
what they do, whether it is right or wrong in relation to marriage or divorce … If 
we need some individuality of mind we leave it to the average normal Australian – 
or sometimes to the abnormal Australian – to work something out roughly which 
we can adjust afterwards (1960: 223-225). 
 
Barwick similarly notes the need for the act to deal with the specific ceremonies of 
alternative cultures or religions, including the polygamy of those in the community 
who “by their beliefs may not be bound to monogamous marriage”. He specifically 
mentions Buddhists and Muslims and, when prompted, Mormons (1960b:233). The Chapter 7 | 131 
solution was not to accommodate these other ceremonies but merely to clarify 
which ceremony and/or marriage would be legitimate. 
 
The debates indicate that the Parliament contemplates marriage and family 
primarily as social rather than legal constructs, concluding that how family is 
constituted varies, specifically noting non-Christian communities. In fact, Bandidt 
comments that: 
 
The form of marriage was not strict hundreds of years ago. In fact, the common law 
marriage was regarded as an ordinary everyday affair. No specific form was 
required other than that people would live together and recognize each other as 
mates (1960:133). 
 
Such comments indicate that the marital relationship was defined through the 
lived experience of the parties, in relation to each other, not by a formal, legal, 
action. Marriage was formed by relationship, not by formality. 
 
Yet the response of the Parliament is an act which affirms and formalises the 
requirement for a ceremony based upon a narrow Christian definition of marriage. 
This, it would seem, is a given for some, such that there is no need for a specific 
statement in the act confirming Christian values. Barwick says of the lack of 
definition of marriage in the bill or in the Constitution that: 
 
This is because we in this community recognize a marriage as monogamous and a 
voluntary union for life of two people to the exclusion of all others (a definition 
which reflects Hyde, 1960b:2321). 
 
Killen specifically invokes Hyde as the definition of marriage in English law, and 
calls for it to be included in the act (1960:121). His recommendation was taken up 
and translated into the Act. Section 46 of the Marriage Act provides that a marriage 
ceremony must include a description of marriage as “the union of a man and a 
woman to the exclusion of all others voluntarily entered into for life”. 
 
The effect of law on public perception of family was noted by Harrison: 
 
This bill, which deals with marriage – something that is the basis of family life and 
the home – will have a tremendous effect on the public mind in the long run. After 
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Queensland and in Victoria, and husbands and wives will not feel that if their 
marriage partners skip over a State border they will be virtually in another country 
with respect to marriage laws (1960:122). 
 
The cultural and social effect of law was also pointed out in the debates. For Drury, 
this was in terms of the bill’s ability to “strengthen the institution of marriage” but 
also in relation to the “anomalies and injustices that arise … through our having six 
separate sets of State laws” (1960:126). Harrison makes the connection between 
uniform laws and equal opportunity in Australia (1960:123). 
 
There is, according to Drury, an injustice in having separate state regimes of law; 
that is, law which applies to differently constituted families on a geographical 
basis. Duthie makes a similar assertion: 
 
Geography should not be a vital factor in such an important human matter as 
marriage, yet, up to date, geography has decided the form of marriage in Australia 
(1960:129). 
 
There is an injustice in having an inconsistency in the way family is defined and 
accordingly the access to law that is permitted. But, if we return to the earlier 
arguments, there is also an injustice in forcing difference to become sameness. 
 
Paradoxically, the geographical distinction on the recognition of domestic unions 
remains today, notwithstanding the federal legislation. This is because of the 
variety of legislation on domestic relationships, passed by the states to cover those 
unions not covered by the Family Law Act 1975 in combination with the Marriage 
Act 1961. 
 
 
Family Law Act 1975 
 
The 1975 Family Law Act was preceded by three Family Law Bills – one in 1973 and 
two in 1974. They were introduced into the Senate by the Attorney-General, 
Murphy (later a Justice of the High Court), and into the House of Representatives 
by the Prime Minister, Whitlam. The 1973 bill lapsed when the Parliament was 
prorogued. It was again presented to the Senate in 1974 and referred to the Senate 
Standing Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs before its reintroduction 
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incorporated the proposals of the Senate Committee for the establishment of a 
specialised Family Court, along with measures to assist with the non-legal aspects 
of marriage break-up such as conciliation and mediation services. There are traces 
of the second reading speeches of the earlier bills in the second reading speech of 
the Family Law Bill 1974 (2) because it refers back to the justifications of the earlier 
bills. 
 
 
The Act 
 
The purpose of the bill was “to replace the existing divorce law contained in the 
Matrimonial Causes Act with up-to-date provisions, to make uniform provision in 
areas of family law outside divorce that are at present the subject of state and 
territory law, and to provide for the establishment of family courts to administer 
this jurisdiction” (Whitlam 1974:4320). Whitlam explains that the bill’s primary 
purpose was to reform the divorce laws (1974:4320) replacing the fault 
requirements of the earlier legislation with a no-fault ground based upon 
“irretrievable breakdown” provable by separation and a cessation of cohabitation 
for a minimum 12 month period (1974:4321). 
 
The long title of the act is similar to that of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959. It is 
“An Act relating to Marriage and to Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, and in 
relation thereto and otherwise, Parental Responsibility for Children, and certain 
other Matters”. There are, however, vast differences between this and the 
preceding Act. 
 
For the first time in Australian history, the Parliament eradicated all grounds for 
dissolution other than irretrievable breakdown of the marriage (s48(1)) indicated 
by a period of 12 months separation (s48(2)). The act contains provisions for 
property division and spousal maintenance. The court is permitted to adjust 
property interests in recognition of direct and indirect financial contributions to 
property acquisition, such as child rearing and homekeeping (s79) and the spousal 
maintenance provisions permit an acknowledgement of the vocational costs of 
being the primary carer of children and housekeeper in the career-building period 
of one’s life (s75). 
 
The act comprehensively deals with children’s matters, including child 
maintenance (Part VII, Division 7) and the determination of Parenting Orders Chapter 7 | 134 
(residence, contact and specific issues orders).6 The paramount consideration for 
the court, when making a determination, is the “best interests of the child” rather 
than any perceived ‘right’ of the applicant (s65E). Following the transfer of powers 
by the states (except WA which has maintained its own parallel system) the FLA is 
comprehensive in its dealing with children’s matters (Part VII), dealing nationally 
and uniformly with all matters pertaining to the welfare of the child, not 
withstanding the constitutional requirement that the Commonwealth’s powers be 
limited to matters pertaining to marriage. Because of the state transfer, the FLA 
addresses matters concerning ex-nuptial children as well as the children of 
marriage, and can receive applications from the parents, the child or “any other 
person concerned with the care, welfare or development of the child” (s65C). 
 
A separate “Family Court of Australia” is established under the Act, which 
operates as federal jurisdiction (Part IV) (except in WA which has established its 
own Family Court) with specially appointed Judges (s22). In addition to the legal 
framework, a social infrastructure is established permitting access by parties to 
mediation and counselling services on their own behalf or at the instruction of the 
court (Part II). A research and advisory body, the Australian Institute of Family 
Studies, is established (Part XIVA) with the primary goal of developing an 
understanding of the factors “affecting marital and family stability in Australia 
with the object of promoting the protection of the family as the natural and 
fundamental group unit in society” (s114B(2)(a)). In addition to the Institute, the 
act establishes the Family Law Council (Part XV) with the role of advising the 
Commonwealth Attorney-General on matters relating to family law, including the 
working of family law legislation and of related legal aid (s115(3)). 
 
As with the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, the order of the act is telling. The 
counselling and mediation provisions precede all other substantive sections, 
including those establishing the Family Court and those setting out the grounds for 
dissolution and the Act’s responses to matrimonial causes. 
 
It is interesting that the act does not define ‘family’. McDonald comments that the 
Family Law Act “apparently presumes that what is meant by family is so well 
known that there is no need for a definition” (McDonald 1995a:3). As becomes 
                                                 
6 The child maintenance provisions have been largely superseded by the Child Support (Assessment) Act 
1989, which establishes an administrative arrangement, linked to taxation, for the calculation and payment 
of child support: s66E. The terminology has also changed. Originally the Act referred to custody and 
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apparent in my discussion of the Family Court’s interpretation of family, 
McDonald is correct in his idea that ‘commonsense’ ideas of family may prevail in 
legal interpretation; however, in the positivist discourse that is legal interpretation, 
these should take a back-seat. The need to refer to the parliamentary intent is 
arguably greater because of the lack of definition. We need, therefore, in coming to 
a legal understanding of family law as it exists today, to understand parliamentary 
intentions, as they can be gleaned from the second reading speech and the debates. 
Nevertheless, the correlations and contradictions between the debates on the 1959, 
1961 and 1975 acts are interesting. It is particularly noteworthy that the tensions 
between law and social practice indicated in the debates preceding the passing of 
the Marriage Act 1961 are repeated here. 
 
 
The Debates 
 
In introducing the first 1974 bill the Attorney-General clarified his intention to 
ratify, through the provisions of the bill, the provisions relating to family contained 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in particular the 
principle that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State”. He also sought to ratify the 
requirement of state parties to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of the 
parties to a marriage (Murphy 1974:640-641). These measures, however, 
supplemented the earlier Human Rights Bill, which “explicitly recognised the right 
to marry and to found a family” (1974:640). The Senator notes that the bill does not 
reform the law to the degree that he might have wished but, he says, “I believe it 
goes as far as the Parliament and the majority of the people would find acceptable 
at the present time” (1974:641). In the second reading speech to the 1973 bill, 
Murphy indicates his intention to have it cover as much of the field of marriage 
and matrimonial causes “as is constitutionally possible”. This was confirmed by 
the Senate as a whole when it voted against Greenwood’s amendment to limit the 
scope of the definition of ‘matrimonial cause’ (43 votes against, 12 votes for, 
1974b:2648-2655). Murphy, in speaking against the amendment, argues that the 
broad provisions are constitutionally valid and “eminently in the public interest” 
(1974:2651). Further, quoting a published text, Family Law in Australia by Finley et 
al., Murphy says that: “It has been strongly urged that the Commonwealth should 
boldly step into this field on the grounds that [such] laws are of national … 
importance” (1974:2654, emphasis added). Further, he says the argument that “the 
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support from the High Court” (1974:2654). The Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, it was 
argued, had not legislated to the limits of its powers (Missen 1974b:2650). 
 
Arguably, it was the intention of the Parliament to permit family law to be as 
broadly applicable as legally and socially possible. Considered alongside the 
commitment to equal opportunity pursuant to the Human Rights Bill it is 
conceivable that the intention was to recognise alternative models of family, the 
Constitution permitting. This is confirmed in the later judgements of Murphy, as 
Justice of the High Court (see below), where he undertakes a broad reading of the 
constitutional powers, to recognise children socially adopted by a family, as the 
children of the parties to a marriage. In other words, if we take parliamentary 
intention as the starting point of interpretation, and if the FLA was built upon three 
separate bills and the second reading speeches of those bills (as indicated by the 
second reading speech of the Family Law Bill 1974), family was to be characterised 
as wide as was socially and legally permissible. It was not to be limited to a narrow 
category, the effect of which would be to contradict the intentions to ensure equal 
recognition of family as contained in the Human Rights Bill. 
 
Many of the members note family as an historical and social category. Button, in 
painting a picture of family life from pre-industrialisation to the 1970s, points to 
the impact of “social welfare legislation” on the institution of marriage and on the 
family (1974a:2061-2062). Marriage, “[p]rior to the Industrial Revolution … was 
part of a much wider network of social relationships … what might properly be 
called an extended family” (1974a:2061). In contrast: 
 
the current urban society is anonymous. Its people are alienated from each other, 
and its family units are no longer of an extended nature in that they are alienated 
by distance and by the complexities of travel in large cities and so on. The romantic 
view of even the 19th century of the marriage which came about through a 
relationship with the girl next door progressing through school, and so on, to 
ultimate marriage and the establishment of a stable peer group, is no longer 
possible (1974a:2062). 
 
Button is asserting that family is historically formed and subject to change, 
irrespective of the legislation (1974a:2062). Divorce law does not create divorce but 
responds to a society that has a need for divorce laws. McClelland similarly argues 
that divorce is a result of social factors rather than divorce law (1974:2046-2047). 
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be responsive to the changes to family that occur (1974a:2063). Greenwood also 
notes that family has changed from a concept of extended networks to a nuclear 
model, comprised of “a mother and father and 2 children” (Greenwood 
1974a:2534). Webster has a similar view of marriage and family as mobile concepts 
when he speaks of the changing expectations of marriage and of the roles of the 
partners of a marriage, over time (Webster 1974:2136, see also Baume 1974:2048-
2049), with many of the functions of family having been devolved to other social 
institutions (Baume 1974:2048-2049). Whereas once a woman’s role was as servant 
to the family (Webster 1974:2136) her role was changing as women obtained social 
equality and had increased access to education and employment (Webster 
1974:2136, Baume 1974:2049; Martin 1974b:2499-2502). Nevertheless, many of the 
women in the families of the 1970s were a product of an era in which marriage 
spelled an end to such opportunities and so she should be catered for, as such, in 
the spousal maintenance provisions (Martin 1974b:2499-2502). 
 
This is a conception of family as a category which changes in composition over 
time. Some members of Parliament, however, saw the possibility that there can be 
variations of family within a moment. Martin, for example, refers to the differences 
that constitute the category of family at any particular time (see also Button 
1974a:2063 and Baume 1974:2047-2049). She says that: 
 
We must recognise that we are dealing in a complex area of human relations, that 
every case which comes before a court for a dissolution of marriage will be 
different, and the court must be given the means to deal with those problems fairly 
(1974b:2499-2502). 
 
A number of Senators repeated Murphy’s reference to the terms of Article 23(1) of 
the United Nations’ ICCPR that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental group 
unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State” (Laucke 
1974:2065, Carrick 1974: 2503; indirectly by Scott 1974:2510; Greenwood 
1974a:2534). Protecting this unit demanded that the parties be locked into it and so, 
for all but Murphy and Greenwood, the legislation, because of the liberal ground of 
divorce, was considered a threat to family. As with the 1959 bill, there was the 
suggestion that the bill be renamed the Marriage Dissolution Act (Anderson 
1974b:2635). For some of these Senators, and others, this “group unit of society” 
was marked in the secular terms of Hyde and the Marriage Act 1961 (for example, 
Davidson 1974:2637, Carrick 1974:2503, Laucke 1974:2065, Baume 1974:2048, Scott Chapter 7 | 138 
1974:2510-2511, Durack 1974a:2142, Anderson 1974a:2158) though, for some, this 
was incidental and not essential to the construction of family (note Baume, below). 
 
Faith in the Christian model was indicated most fervently by Scott when he spoke, 
with some incredulity, of statements by Margaret Whitlam, wife of the then Prime 
Minister, on her vision of society in the year 2001, reported in the Sydney Daily 
Telegraph earlier that year. Her vision, presented by Scott, was that children would 
be the responsibility of the community rather than of a family (‘devolved’ was 
Baume’s word), that marriage would be less common but more secure and 
confined more to women in their thirties (1974:2511-2512). He warns that the 
proposed legislation might give reality to these “sorts of revolutionary changes in 
attitude to society” (1974:2512). The report and Scott’s response to it indicate a 
changing view of family from the Christian-centred Hyde formulation to a more 
secular, multifarious version, and this is reflected in the ways in which the 
Parliament refers to Christianity in these debates (below). Anderson’s proposal for 
the inclusion of a definition of marriage in Hyde terms, (1974b:2642) or what Button 
calls an “ecclesiastical definition of marriage” (1974b:2643) was rejected by the 
Parliament (31:23 votes). This indicates that the Parliament held a secular view of 
marriage and family. Durack rejects Hyde as the definition of marriage, 
distinguishing it as concerned with “whether a divorce court or an ecclesiastic 
court had jurisdiction at all” and claiming that this definition “has come in by a 
back door method” (1974b:2645). He rejects the inclusion of Hyde as the definition 
of marriage because it would not “reflect the realities of our society in any way” 
(1974b:2645). 
 
For some, it is not so much the form of the family unit as its nature that needs to be 
protected. The Attorney-General’s second reading speech (above) suggests this, but 
Baume’s comments are most illuminating. He speaks of a society that constantly 
changes and of the need to continually shift our view of marriage and family. He 
argues that there are two aspects to marriage: the social or, as he explains, the 
relationship aspect and the legal aspect. This is a point that was raised in debates 
surrounding the Marriage Act 1961. What matters most to society (drawing on the 
ICCPR principle) is not the legality of the relationship per se, but the benefits of a 
committed, supportive relationship and its ability to provide a supportive 
environment for the raising of children. He says: 
 
relationships will exist no matter what the law is or in spite of any law. In the end it 
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view. If we approve of marriage it is not necessarily because we approve of the 
legal state of marriage. We approve of the situation which marriage creates for the 
protection of society … These relationships are very difficult. They depend upon 
the mores of society as they exist at any moment. Various groups in society may 
not believe in marriage (1974:2048). 
 
He is arguing that relationships are important, not withstanding their legality. 
Marriage, as a legal institution, may be culturally unique, but it exists to support 
the relationship (1974:2049). Baume suggests that family law should similarly 
support this changing structure. Baume has a Hyde-like formulation of family in 
mind, but depicts the true value of family not in terms of what it looks like, but in 
terms of how it functions (2048-2049). 
 
What does this mean for family law? Durack says that: 
 
the intervention of the law into … a relationship … requires the application of basic 
legal principles of justice, certainty and practicability … [T]hese rules must be 
flexible, they must be kept under constant examination and they must be changed 
and be changeable according to movements in social ideas and habits (1974a: 2142). 
 
This is a hard call given the constitutional limits. They indicate a desire to not fix 
family to the social mores of the day, a warning first given by the constitutional 
framers. A similar distinction between the legal recognition of family and the social 
practice of family is noted by Carrick, in his arguments against no-fault divorce, 
when he argues that the problems of family are social and economic problems not 
legal problems, and their solutions should be social and not legal (1974:2504). 
 
The debates indicate a conflation between marriage and family, although with 
efforts by some to distinguish between the legal institution of marriage and the 
social relationships that comprise family. Although the direct references to family 
and marriage are telling, family for these members can more completely be 
understood within the space of the broader social and cultural commentary. In the 
case of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 family can be understood through the 
Parliament’s references to public good, Christianity and nation. This was similar to 
the debates on the 1945 Act. The discourse on family, by 1973-75, had changed 
significantly. 
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Although the 1945, 1959 and 1973-1974 legislatures shared concerns, the debates 
surrounding the passing of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1945, the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1959 and the Family Law Act 1975 occurred within two vastly differing 
discourses. Discussion on the importance of family and fear that a no-fault ground 
for divorce would weaken the institution of marriage (and family) dominated the 
debates. However, although the members of the earlier legislatures justified their 
positions in terms of nation and Christianity, the later legislature more frequently 
referred to these only as a socio-spatial grounding of the family. 
 
Most members of the Senate drew on Christian organisations and their ideas. 
However, the references were used in two ways. Firstly, references to a Christian 
viewpoint were more often than not used as evidence of support for the 
simplification of dissolution proceedings (see, for example, McClelland 1974:2040, 
Baume 1974:2050, 2052, Melzer 1974: 2138); and sometimes as argument for 
extending the separation period (Missen 1974a:2036, Durack 1974a:2142, 2154). The 
minority used Christian values as an aid to the description of Australian families 
(Anderson 1974a:2158-2161). Martin puts the debate in its place when she says that 
drawing on the views of the churches is futile given that they do not have a 
unanimous position on the bill (1974b:2168). 
 
The second set of references pertained to a statement of the dominant religious 
culture of Australia, at least historically. Carrick refers to the dominant values of 
Australian society as being “Roman law, the Judeo-Christian ethic” (Carrick 
1974:2508). Some members were clear that this was a culture of a bygone era. For 
example, Everett notes that the “shadow of the ecclesiastical courts of England still 
hangs heavily over our divorce law, practice and procedure [the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1959]” (1974:2054). 
 
By 1974, the churches’ views were presented more for rhetorical value than as a 
statement of social propriety or as evidence of Australian values, and references to 
a Christian society were as likely as not to be statements of historical and 
descriptive fact. This differed from the ‘commonsense’ tenor of Christian beliefs in 
the 1959 debates. Here a Christian viewpoint was something for the members to 
contend with, perhaps in deference to the power of a Christian viewpoint in days 
gone by, but it was as an element of an otherwise secular society. Those invoking 
Christianity could no longer be seen to be representing the morality of a Christian 
society. The same could be said of the use of nationalistic sentiment. 
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The references to nation were an indication of a geographical, jurisdictional 
and/or, occasionally, cultural domain, distinguished from other cultural, 
geographical and jurisdictional sites. It was a purely descriptive invocation – 
Australian society, the Australian people, a national approach, Australian law 
(Missen 1974a:2032; Anderson 1974a: 2158, Scott 1974:2510). Nation was not 
invoked as a justification for the protection of family as it was in the 1959 debates. 
This change in tenor is perhaps best illustrated by Everett’s contention that: 
 
I see this Bill, if it is passed…, as introducing for the first time a benign, 
nationalistic approach to a matter which either affects or potentially can affect any 
family in the community … [T]his bill is a nationalistic approach to a national 
problem (1974: 2060). 
 
The family might have had an Australian flavour but its value was not as an 
instrument of the Australian nation. The Australian family was to be protected 
because of its social function, one which was under constant review, not because 
that social function served a national goal. The nation had a responsibility to the 
family, but the family did not have a responsibility to the nation. Family no longer 
lived within the discourses of Christianity and nationalism. 
 
The possibilities for family construction were freed from the restraints imposed by 
a Christian belief or an idea that an idealised family form was in the national 
interest (notwithstanding the continuing restraint of the Constitution). What was 
the common sense of family in the 1970s? Margaret Whitlam’s vision gives a clue. 
A focus on women’s liberation replaced the 1950s discourses of nation and religion. 
There were consistent references in the debate to the changing role of women in 
society, coupled with an increase in the educational and employment opportunities 
for women. The assumed position was that this was an advance in society. 
However, for some, this was directly or indirectly the cause of marital breakdown; 
because women had choices and were not tied to an unhappy marriage or a 
subservient position or because women’s new found freedom enabled them to 
make comparisons and form judgements about their situation (Webster 1974:2136). 
 
Feminism, it seems, was the new prism through which Australian families were 
viewed. The parliamentary members accepted without question that women had 
been denied choices and that women’s liberation was a social advance. This was 
the common sense of the 1970s. It was a different woman-focused concern from 
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gendered structure of society.7 The weight of feminist thinking on the members of 
the 1974 Senate meant that at least one member had to apologise to the so-called 
“militant feminists” for his concern for those women who had not been part of the 
workforce because of their role as mother and housewife (McClelland 1974:2045). 
Some others had a paternalistic attitude to such women (such as Greenwood 
1974:2534), but most spoke of the specific provisions of the bill in terms of the 
practical effects of women’s traditional lack of vocational choices and the potential 
for gender reform, albeit a slow process (for example, Baume 1974:2051, Melzer 
1974:2140, Martin 1974b:2499-2502 and Carrick 1974:2506). 
 
The parliamentary references to submissions from women’s organisations, 
especially the Women’s Electoral Lobby (Martin 1974b:2502, Scott 1974:2512) are 
further evidence that feminism was beginning to rival the church as a source of 
wisdom for understanding family. Perhaps more indicative of the power of a 
feminist presence was the fact that the majority of Senators had no need to 
evidence or source their position on the disadvantaged, but improving, status of 
women. One of the effects was a change of focus from ideal notions of family to a 
pragmatic concern of matters within family. This is not so much a concern with the 
family as a social ideal but with the interests of the individuals within the family. 
 
 
Continuing Reform: And So the Circle Begins 
 
The Commonwealth Parliament has amended the Family Law Act 1975 but there 
have been no reforms that challenge its conception of family. The most pressing 
change to the Commonwealth family law system comes from the 2002 agreement 
of state and territory Attorneys-General to refer their legislative powers on 
alternative families to the Commonwealth Parliament. 
 
The states’ incremental approach to legislating (from heterosexual de facto 
relationship, to same-sex de facto relationship, and so on) has come full circle, with 
the Commonwealth’s acceptance of legislative powers from the states and 
territories. The acceptance of powers starts with heterosexual de facto couples; that 
is, relationships that replicate the Hyde formulation of familial relationship. Only 
                                                 
7 In addition to the parliamentary debates to the Matrimonial Causes Bill 1959, see those of the 
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time will tell if state and territory recognition trends will repeat themself in the 
case of the Commonwealth Parliament. 
 
 
More than a Statute: Some Observations 
 
There is a pragmatic and an interpretative lesson to be gleaned from the 
Commonwealth legislative history, particularly the parliamentary debates. I will 
deal, firstly, with the pragmatic. 
 
Midway through the twentieth century, the Australian Parliament initiated 
measures to create uniformity between states. Notwithstanding the broad-reaching 
provisions of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959, the focus for the Commonwealth 
Parliament was the grounds for dissolution of marriage. Despite the reservations 
by some members of the Parliament, its approach was to capture all of the state 
grounds, rather than to limit the act to the more narrow common grounds. The 
1959 act was expansive in its divorce grounds, although it was said, during the 
Family Law Bill debates, that the act did not push the limits of the matrimonial 
causes power. Sixteen years later, the federal Parliament again led the way with the 
passing of the Family Law Act 1975. Of particular note was its doing away with the 
concept of marital offence and fault-based awards of maintenance and damages. 
Now, 29 years later, the Family Law Act 1975 is dated, so much so that the states 
have again taken responsibility for legislating for domestic relationships not 
covered by the Commonwealth. In the twenty-first century, the states are 
reconceptualising their notions of family and framing legislation accordingly. It is 
true that the Commonwealth has constitutional restraints, but the interpretation of 
these constraints is, it seems, shaky and open to debate. It is time for the 
Commonwealth to test the constitutional limits as they might sit in a new era. The 
current legislation is, the states would agree, dated and treats marriage and 
matrimonial causes in a narrow fashion, whether or not this is because of any 
overriding constitutional restraint. 
 
We might continue to legislate in terms of categories or form. However, the 
approach is problematic in that its potential is limited by the ability of the 
legislature to picture alternatives to family modelling. The Commonwealth 
Parliament cannot, it seems, conceive of the sorts of family relationships that might 
be typical of, for example, Aboriginal families or same-sex couples or even 
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people might have familial commitments to people outside of the nuclear family 
model. The potential for recognising alternative families is limited by the public 
imagination, notwithstanding actual practice. Further, such a formulation does not 
provide for changes in community attitudes. The law, as we have seen, struggles to 
keep up with the changing nature of family. This is evident from the NSW 
legislative history. Although there were amendments to expand the 1984 category 
of domestic relationship (family) as recently as 1999, by 2001 the NSW Law Reform 
Commission was already investigating further changes in keeping with a changing 
community. 
 
A second issue relates to the rules of legal interpretation. Though the political 
speeches, at large, may be part of the “contextual field” for interpretation, the 
second reading speech is considered particularly relevant to an understanding of 
the Parliament’s intention. Yet, it is artificial and arbitrary to interpret a legal 
concept by reference to the second reading speech. The legal outcome is the 
product of a democratic process, requiring a majority vote of the Parliament. The 
resulting act is the product of a consensus of meaning on the part of the 
Parliament, which rests on cultural information. If law’s task is to get to an original 
meaning it can only do so by reference to the broader context of the parliamentary 
debates, not the recorded words of a single speech. The law would find, were it 
required to consider the meaning of family (or marriage, domestic relationship, de 
facto or the nomenclature de jure), that these would depend upon the broader 
questions before the framer. 
 
For the constitutional framers, the meaning of marriage was embedded in issues of 
federal power and the degree to which a singular version of marriage, and 
therefore family, would be proper. These concerns were repeated in the 1961 
Marriage Act debates. In the case of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 debates on 
marriage and family were implicated in nationalistic and Christian sentiment. The 
Family Law Act 1975 was derived from debates which emphasised pragmatics, 
women’s liberation and the changing nature of family life. 
 
A close reading of the legislative debates indicates that meanings associated with 
family are not only driven by questions of sentiment pertaining to relationship. The 
politics of family is not simply a question of ‘proper’ domestic relationships, 
invoking questions of morality, though this may also be the case. In 
Commonwealth law it is determined by constitutional debates, by state and federal 
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rather than as representative of the law. Legal meanings are inevitably driven by 
the discourse/s of which a particular debate forms a part. Hence legal meaning is 
tied to political action as much as parliamentary intent. Jackson questions the idea 
of “legislative intent” as a route to determining the meaning of statute. He argues: 
 
one may wonder whether the speeches made in Parliament are good evidence of 
the reasons for the legislation, as opposed to the reasons for the act of legislation. In 
political terms, the latter is often more important that [sic] the former. This 
transmits a devoir faire to the legislators: They must be seen to be doing something 
… The speeches which are made, often reported in the press and transmitted on 
television, address a political agenda: we, the legislators, are responding to public 
concern; we are doing something; we are passionate in the cause. 
 
The parliamentary debates presented above, whilst indicating some of the concerns 
of legislators, some of which may have impacted upon the statute, do not 
necessarily refer us to the meaning of the legal text. Rather, they report the 
meaning of the debates (Jackson 1999:25) which are politically and discursively 
restricted and enabled. 
 
It is clear that the legislature does not represent a singular edifice of meaning, and that 
its parameters for meaning construction are different than those of the courts. 
According to Jackson, this is not a problem unless one is committed to the idea that 
there is an “equivalence of sense” of the legislation before and after it is invoked in 
litigation (1999:17). To the contrary, legislation has “semantic” and “pragmatic” 
dimensions (1999:8). Notably, the framers of legislation, the Parliament (at least 
according to legal doctrine), does not have a semantic ‘edge’ on the meaning of 
legislation. There is no true or even truer meaning available to us from searching the 
legislators’ commentary on legislation, for their purpose in commenting is of a 
political, not a legal nature. The lack of certainty in legislative intention has further 
implications for a positivist account of the relationship between law and society. For 
the Austinian view, of law as the commands of the sovereign, is flawed if the 
Parliament is not making a clear statement of intention and if this cannot be 
categorically communicated. 
 
Family, in political discourse, is a slippery concept. The creation of the legal family, 
in legislation, is not done simply with a view to social or legal effect. Rather, legal 
concepts may reflect social understandings and a deferral to diplomatic and 
political concerns, rather than literalness. If we are committed to a search for an Chapter 7 | 146 
original meaning, that original meaning can only be gleaned from an investigation 
of the political and cultural embeddedness of the law at its inception. However, 
relying on these origins would condemn law to anachronism. It could never come 
to mean anything beyond the culture of its inception. The population of 1974, 
whose version of family would in the next year be reflected in the Family Law Act 
1975, would be bound to the Christian and nationalistic conception on which the 
1959 act was built. And the 2003 Family Court would be bound to an 
understanding of marriage and family as conceived in 1974. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have provided an overview of the key Commonwealth acts on 
family, and have also presented the related parliamentary debates. The chapter 
illustrates that the Parliament follows social trends. Because the Parliament has 
been reactive, and because it has traditionally legislated in terms of family form, it 
has had to continually amend the law as it becomes aware of family alternatives. 
As described in chapter 2, the states have only recently adopted a more fluid 
definition of domestic relationships, extending their courts’ jurisdiction to any 
familial form satisfying certain criteria (in the nature of characteristics). Rather than 
learn from this experience, the Commonwealth government is likely to repeat the 
incremental approach to recognising alternative familial forms, in its acceptance of 
state powers. 
 
This chapter also calls into question the strength of the law’s claim that it merely 
interprets the relevant statute. As I argued in chapter 5, the author is dead; that is 
that her or his intentions have limited relevance to meaning, because interpretation 
is a constructive process. Further, even if it were possible to discern an original 
author’s meaning, the words of a statute do not necessarily represent the 
Parliament’s intention, because the legislation is usually drafted by a public 
servant and the members of the Parliament may not have even read the bill. 
Further, the Parliament’s function is not limited to law making and so the 
proceedings and debates must be read with a view to the competing demands of 
the environment. A close reading of the debates confirms this. The Parliament has 
are a variety of political functions, only one of which is to create legislative 
terminology. A ‘legal’ meaning cannot be extricated from this multiplicity of 
meanings. 
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My selection of parliamentary comments is evidence of the capacity for alternative 
readings of the same material, indicating that statutory construction is selective in 
its approach. The selectiveness is manifested in the court’s decision to go to the 
debates as opposed to remaining bound to earlier caselaw, the discussion it 
chooses as a reflection of the purpose and, perhaps, how it reads the parliamentary 
debates. For example, by making an alternative selection, and reading from a 
particular view point, I am able to argue for a broader construction of the 
Constitution, than the courts have tended to appreciate. 
 
These observations alert to the need for an alternative approach to framing law on 
matters such as family, to the need to reconceptualise the concept of truth in law, 
and to the idea that meaning can be found by reference to the legislative author. I 
elaborate on these issues in the final part of the thesis, in coming to an alternative 
method for writing and reading law.  
 
In the next chapter, I present the judiciary’s interpretation of family, in relation to 
these Commonwealth statutes. This overview confirms that the interpretation of 
legal texts follows social trends, but also that legal interpretation is not purely 
legal. 
 
 Chapter 8  Family: Inside the Law 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In chapter 7, I reported some of the parliamentary debates on family in order to 
illustrate the futility of searching for truth in the legislative text. In this chapter, I 
present and discuss the caselaw, providing an overview of Commonwealth judicial 
interpretations of family. As I have noted already, the Commonwealth’s power to 
legislate is limited to matters relating to marriage and matrimonial causes. The 
legal decisions are concerned with what it means to be family in light of these 
constitutional limits. 
 
My coverage includes the dissenting judgments as well as the lead judgments, 
because the differing positions give insights to the range of thinking at any one 
time. Further, the dissenting judgments have, at times, given rise to legislative 
reform; perhaps indicating what the Parliament thought it was doing in passing 
the original legislation, notwithstanding the lead judgments to the contrary. 
 
In addition to the issue of how the courts have defined family, I also show how 
legal judgments on a particular provision of a statute have varied over time. This 
draws into question the proposition that judicial decision-making is a formulaic, 
rule driven practice alone, a point argued in the abstract in chapter 5. The 
judgments on family illustrate my earlier claims that judicial decision-making is 
part of the social milieu and that there will be different readings of the same 
provision over time, as a result. Finding the meaning of a statute is not a semantic 
quest, nor a search for authorial (that is, parliamentary or juridical) intention. 
Rather, legal interpretation is a transactional, constructive process (as argued in 
part 4, to come), notwithstanding the very real limits placed on interpretation by 
law’s positivist foundations. Before discussing the law’s treatment of family I wish 
to return to the law’s defining of the marriage power as a particular indication of 
the embeddedness of social meaning in legal interpretation. 
 
 
Marriage and the Australian Constitution 
 
As discussed already, it is widely regarded that the English case of Hyde v Hyde and 
Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P&D 130 provides the authoritative definition of the legal 
institution of marriage in Australia, settling the scope of the Commonwealth’s 
power to legislate on marriage and matrimonial causes (see chapters 2 and 7). 
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and leading up to the passing of the Australian Constitution, to denote common 
law as well as legal marriage (see chapter 6). It is arguable that, in accepting the 
Hyde definition for the purposes of determining the scope of the Commonwealth’s 
powers, the Justices in Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 379 and The Queen v L 
(1991) 174 CLR 379, relied on their own commonsense view of marriage, as 
determined by the practices of their own era. A number of other Justices, have, 
however entertained the proposition that the marriage power be broadly 
interpreted. 
 
In an earlier High Court case than Calverley and The Queen v L, three of the seven 
judgments provide the basis for a wider interpretation than Hyde. Taylor J, in the 
case of Attorney General (Victoria) v The Commonwealth (1961-2) 106 CLR 529 states 
that the Commonwealth power “is entitled to as wide an interpretation as it can 
reasonably bear” and that within the realm of Commonwealth power is the ability 
to make “laws prescribing the form and requisites of a valid marriage”(560). Deane 
J (dissenting) in the case of Re Cook and Maxwell JJ; Ex parte C and Anor. (1985) FLC 
¶91-619 says that: 
 
it is now settled that, [on the basis of Attorney General, and in the context of 
s51(xxi)] “Marriage” is not to be understood in the narrow sense of connoting 
merely the ceremony or procedure by which two persons become husband and 
wife under the law … The reference to “Marriage” in para. (xxi) is to the institution 
of or relationship of marriage and what is involved in it (at 80 009). 
 
His Honour refers to the leading judgment of Gibbs CJ (obiter only, but a judgment 
with whom the majority concur) that “[i]t is now well settled that ‘marriage’ in sec. 
51(xxi) includes the relationship or institution of marriage” (Re Cook, 80 009; 
referring to Cormick and Cormick v Salmon (1984) FLC ¶91-554, 79472). 
 
Cases interpreting the marriage power have been concerned largely with the 
secondary question of what laws the marriage power might permit (ancillary 
matters), such as the legitimacy of deeming certain children to be children of the 
marriage (for example, Cormick and Re Cook) and the relationship of legislation, 
such as child welfare acts, to the Family Law Act 1975 (FLA) (for example, R v 
Lambert; Ex parte Plummer (1980) 146 CLR 447). The question “what is marriage?” 
has been a given, except as obiter in the above situations. Few cases have 
challenged the common wisdom of Hyde on what it is that constitutes marriage for 
constitutional purposes. Griffith, a commentator on constitutional issues and 
family law, notes that there appears to have been a departure from the normal 
rules of constitutional interpretation with the High Court proceeding “on the basis 
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to Murphy J in R v Lambert). This indicates a difference in the process of 
interpretation of the marriage power. The concept is taken for granted, the legal 
questions being answered by a commonsense of meaning rather than the law’s 
own processes for interpretation (Griffith 1990:5). Nevertheless, there has been 
division between cases such as Calverley and The Queen v L, which define marriage 
directly and narrowly, and the obiter of other cases, which suggest that marriage is 
what the Parliament deems marriage to be. 
 
The question of what are matrimonial causes necessarily flows from the concept of 
marriage. The interrelationship is suggested by the case of Attorney General 
(Victoria) v Commonwealth (Marriage Act Case) (1962) 107 CLR 529, 360 per Taylor J, 
572 per Menzies J and 582 per Windeyer J, in which it was found that there is 
substantial overlap between the marriage and matrimonial causes power so that 
support for aspects of the Commonwealth family laws could be derived from 
either or both placita. This is consistent with the constitutional conventions (see for 
example debates held in Sydney, 22 September 1897, outlined in chapter 7). 
 
 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 
 
As noted in the previous chapter, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 does not draw on 
‘family’ as the jurisdictional subject because it rests on the marriage and 
matrimonial causes power bestowed by the Commonwealth Constitution. Nor 
does it define who can be parties of a marriage, a matter which at that time had 
been the prerogative of the states. The best hints on the nature of family, in the eyes 
of the judiciary, are from the judgments on the issue of the ‘children of the 
marriage’ pursuant to s6 of the act. Section 6 provides that a child of either the 
husband or the wife can be a child of the marriage if it was “ordinarily a member 
of the household”. 
 
Zanon v Zanon and Metcalf [1961] VR 325 posed the question of whether the 
children of a previous marriage of one of the parties, although not residing with 
the parties at the relevant time, were members of the household and therefore 
children of the marriage. The children’s biological father had custody of the 
children and had entrusted them to his mother who “brought them up”. The 
children had lived with the mother and her new husband for 10 days but, the 
Court found, they “never were members of the household of the husband and 
wife” (326, per Barry J). 
 
The case of May v May and Thomas (1961) 2 FLR 383 clarifies that whether a child 
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upon whether the child was physically in residence with the parties, but upon 
whether the relationship of the child as a ‘member of the household’ existed at that 
time” (headnote, 383, emphasis added). Again, the case concerned a child of an 
earlier marriage of one of the parties. The child had stayed infrequently with the 
parties to the marriage and had resided with them for 11 days in the month prior 
to their separation. The Court determined that this should not be resolved on the 
basis of residence alone but also by reference to whether the child “became a 
member of their household in any real sense” (385, per Barry J). The corollary is 
that a child who did not reside in a household immediately preceding the relevant 
time might still be a child of the household if for all purposes the child was 
ordinarily considered a member of that household (386 per Barry J). Although the 
statute limits who might be deemed a child of the marriage, there is scope for 
discretion, which rests, according to this judge, on a factual assessment of the 
nature of relationship rather than a technical interpretation. 
 
The terminology of ‘family’ is used in the later case of Viney v Viney (1964) 6 FLR 
417. The Court notes that: 
 
the policy of the legislature is manifestly to include in the family unit … any child 
of either spouse … who was ordinarily a member of the household during the 
subsistence of the marriage (per Burbury CJ, 418). 
 
The composition of household, it would seem, corresponds with the composition 
of family (this correspondence has further relevance in the judgments under the 
Family Law Act 1975, as will be indicated below). Burbury CJ further suggests that, 
as per the earlier judgments on household, the issue of whether a child is a member 
of the family unit is one of fact (418). Once it is established that a stepchild is a 
child of a marriage a duty falls upon the stepfather (the husband of the marriage) 
to support that child notwithstanding the conduct of the mother. The case may be 
understood as establishing that once a familiar relationship is found to exist 
between a stepchild and a stepfather, that relationship has an autonomous 
existence in terms of the duties of the act. 
 
Despite the potential scope of the decision in Viney, the case of Cunningham v 
Cunningham (1966) 11 FLR 399 establishes some limits to the life of that 
relationship. In this instance, the wife had children to a previous marriage that 
lived as a member of the new household from the time of marriage in April 1963 
until the end of 1964 when, because of the conflict within the family, they went to 
reside with their maternal grandparents and at a boarding school. The wife 
submitted that the time of separation was September 1963 when the husband 
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that is, the time of separation for the purposes of s6(2), was in 1965 when the 
husband observed his wife in an “adulterous situation” with another man. Because 
the children were not members of the household in 1965 they were not ordinary 
members of the household “at the relevant time” and therefore the husband (their 
stepfather) had no duty to them. The case draws limits on the social relationship, 
which would not apply to a biological relationship. Having established the 
relationship there is no capacity to suspend the fact of that relationship 
notwithstanding the circumstances. The case can also be distinguished from the 
principle established by Viney. 
 
The caselaw on Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 does not give great insights into the 
nature of family because of the jurisdictional reasons outlined above. Nevertheless, 
they do indicate a correspondence between household and family, suggesting that 
family need not be of a determined form but derives from the nature of 
relationship. Further, the cases indicate that the relationship is a factual not a legal 
category and that this relationship should be inferred from the conduct of parties 
rather than the formality of arrangements. 
 
 
Family Law Act 1975 
 
The question of “what is family?” was answered directly by a number of 
judgments. In fact, using the search term ‘meaning of family’ gave rise to five 
relevant cases. This is surprising given that it is not a definition of family that sets 
the jurisdictional limits of the FLA. However, there are references to ‘family’ in the 
act. Those giving rise to caselaw have been the (now amended) s5(1)(f) (“a child … 
treated by the husband and wife as a child of their family … [who is] ordinarily a 
member of the household”: Cormick), and s79(4)(c) (“the welfare of the family”: 
Mehmet v Mehmet (1 & 2)1). In addition, the meaning of ‘family’ was discussed in 
relation to s60H, which pertains to children born of artificial conception and Part 
VII in respect to matters pertaining to children (Re Patrick and An Application 
Concerning Contact (2002) FLC ¶93-096). These have given the most interesting 
discussion on the nature of family relationships, because they permit an expansion 
of discussion from the more limiting ‘marriage’ and ‘matrimonial causes’ and the 
courts’ views about how broadly (or narrowly) the notion of family can be 
constructed without offending the constitutional limits. This is where the social 
and cultural dimensions of legal interpretation come to the fore. It is interesting 
that the judgments, in particular those around the difference between ‘household’ 
and ‘family’, but also the issues of consanguinity and affiliation, suggest that socio-
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historical traces of the word family, as indicated by its etymology, retain a 
currency. Many of the histories of family are imbedded in the legal language of 
family. 
 
Cormick considered the constitution of ‘household’ for the purposes of the now 
repealed s5(1)(f) of the FLA. This deemed that a child who was treated as a child of 
the family and who was an ordinary member of the household, was a child of the 
marriage for the purposes of the FLA. Proceedings for custody and guardianship 
were brought in the Family Court by the grandparents of a child who had lived 
with them for four of his five years. The matter was defended by the child’s 
mother. The issue for the Court, then, was whether the child was a child of the 
marriage by virtue of being part of the household, giving the Court jurisdiction 
under the matrimonial causes power (Gibbs CJ at 79 471). 
 
The Court clarifies that an adopted child, a child of the wife and husband born 
before the marriage, and an ex-nuptial or adopted child of either of the parties to 
the marriage is deemed a child of the FLA by virtue of the then s5(1). Section 5(1)(f) 
referred to a child that is not a biological or adopted child of either of the parties 
(79 473 per Gibbs CJ). It includes, as a child of the marriage: 
 
(f) a child … who has been, and was at the relevant time, treated by the husband 
and wife as a child of their family, if, at the relevant time, the child was ordinarily a 
member of the household of the husband and wife (79 473 per Gibbs CJ emphasis 
added). 
 
Gibbs CJ (with whom the majority concurred) finds that the “Parliament cannot 
bring a case within sec.51(xxi) by deeming a child to be a child of a marriage if the 
necessary connection between the child and the marriage does not in truth exist” 
(79 473). Hence, the Court presumes that ‘family’ was used in a narrow sense in the 
provision, flowing from marriage rather than from affiliation (as Gibbs CJ notes in 
Re Cook, 80 005). This was the ratio of the case. There was not sufficient connection 
between the child and the parties to the marriage (the grandparents) to deem that 
the child was a child of the marriage. Therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to 
determine the matter. The Court read the connection between marriage and child 
as being a narrow one. Whereas the provision arguably permitted the recognition 
of a social connection, the sharing of a household being the enabling condition, the 
Court restricted the connection to a legal (legal adoption) or a biological (ex-
nuptial) one by virtue of their narrow construction of ‘family’. The mere fact that 
the child was treated as a child of the family or, ordinarily, as a member of the 
household, was not a sufficient connection to the marriage (79 472-3). The 
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Murphy J, however, has a different point of view. Referring to the 1897 Sydney 
session of the constitutional debates he argues the value of uniformity in legislation 
relating to marriage and divorce (79 474) and decries the failure of the 
Commonwealth to so legislate until 1959. He reframes the issue for the Court as 
being “whether the Parliament is empowered to legislate for such a child [an ex-
nuptial child]”, rather than “whether the Parliament can define such a child to be a 
child of the marriage” (79 474). 
 
Having presented the argument that the constitutional powers are to be read 
broadly (Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty Ltd (1955) 93 CLR 55) Murphy J 
considers marriage in wide terms. He says that: 
 
Marriage is a social and economic institution which takes many forms, and so 
affects human society that law-makers have always devoted much attention to it. 
The institution of marriage is closely connected with the concept of family, in 
ancient and modern thinking (79 475). 
 
He concludes that the validity of the provision stems from the connection between 
family and marriage, with Parliament correctly considering its legislative power to 
protect “all children who become part of the family which arose from the 
marriage” (79 475). 
 
For Murphy J, marriage should not be understood as a legal category only, but as a 
social institution connected with family, however one defines one’s family. It is 
arguable that he sees marriage flowing from family, rather than the position of the 
majority which has family flowing from marriage, so that a child is essentially only 
a child of the marriage if there is biological or legal connection to the marriage. 
Murphy J’s view is consistent with the view of some of the framers, as noted above. 
The children to be protected under family law, therefore, are those who the parties 
to a marriage deem to be part of their family. It is a social connection. That the 
Parliament legislated in such a way was a valid exercise of its constitutional power. 
Murphy’s judgment, however, was a dissenting judgment and his reasoning does 
not form part of the law in Australia. It is, however, notable that Murphy J was the 
Attorney-General who presented the Family Law Bill second reading speech to the 
Parliament. According to positivist assumptions about meaning and authority, he 
would be in the strongest position to know the Parliament’s intention, a point of 
clarification according to the rules of interpretation. 
 
The relationship between ‘household’ and ‘family’ was subsequently considered in 
Re Cook. In Re Cook grandparents sought the custody of their daughter’s ex-nuptial 
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mother and stepfather. The question for the High Court was whether the Family 
Court had jurisdiction, pursuant to the then s5(1)(e) which was concerned with an 
ex-nuptial or adopted child of either of the parties of a marriage who was 
‘ordinarily a member of the household’. It provided that: 
 
5(1)(e) For the purposes of each application of this Act in relation to a 
marriage … 
(e) a child of either the husband or the wife, including … 
(i) an ex-nuptial child of either of them; and 
(ii) a child adopted by either of them (whether alone or together with 
another person or other persons); 
if, at the relevant time, the child was ordinarily a member of the household of the 
husband and wife; … shall be deemed to be a child of the marriage … A child of the 
husband and wife (including a child born before the marriage) who has been 
adopted by another person or other persons shall be deemed not to be a child of the 
marriage (emphasis added). 
 
Counsel for the applicants argued that ‘household’ for the purposes of s5(1)(e) 
meant ‘family’ and therefore was within the marriage power (presumably taking 
the lead from Murphy J and not from the leading judgment of Gibbs CJ given that 
the majority found that family was not a sufficient connection). According to the 
argument before the Court, the connection to household gave rise to a connection 
to family and therefore to marriage. The Court concludes that the two are not 
synonyms and that even if they were, given Cormick, being an ordinary meaning of 
a household (or part of a family) is not equivalent to being a child of the marriage, 
the requisite for jurisdiction (Gibbs CJ, 80 005-80 006, Mason J concurring, 80 006). 
Gibbs CJ notes that: 
 
A law regulating the rights and duties of the parties to a marriage (at least vis-á-vis 
strangers to the marriage) with respect to the guardianship, custody and 
maintenance of children is a law with respect to marriage only if the children have 
the status of children of the marriage, through birth, legitimation or adoption (80 
006). 
 
This, he claims, does not include “de facto adoption” (80 006), presumably the type 
of relationship before the Court. Hence, for Gibbs CJ, the connection to family 
requires legal or biological categories and excludes social categories, without 
providing an explanation of why this distinction should be drawn. This is notable 
given that some of the framers indicated that they acknowledged social categories 
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marriage” of the grandparents and determines, on the matter of the constitutional 
validity of the provision, that: 
 
the provisions of the Family Law Act which attempt to create, define or declare the 
rights of the parties to the marriage as against strangers to the marriage, or the 
rights of strangers to the marriage as against the parties to the marriage, to the 
custody of an ex-nuptial child deal with rights which do not arise out of the 
marriage relationship and have no sufficient connexion with it (Gibbs CJ 80 006). 
 
Section 5(1)(e)(i) is, therefore, an invalid provision except, perhaps, in relation to a 
matter between the parties of the marriage, a matter which is not clearly 
determined. The concentration of the majority of the Court is on the validity of the 
provision as against strangers. 
 
Deane J, in the only dissenting judgment, finds that the provision is valid, even as 
against strangers of the marriage. In fact, Deane J does not discuss the latter point, 
suggesting that if a child is a child of the marriage, the provision is valid against 
strangers. Deane J looks to language, Biblical texts and practice as indications of the 
connection. He notes that the relationship between an ex-nuptial child of one of the 
parties to a marriage and the other party of the marriage is acknowledged as a 
“special relationship … as a matter of ordinary language, by the terms ‘stepfather’ 
or ‘stepmother’ and ‘stepson’ or ‘stepdaughter’” (80 010). Biblical texts and a 
consideration of actual practices (only ascertainable on a case by case basis) 
confirm that the relationship between step-parent and stepchild is one of “affinity 
as distinct from consanguinity” (80 010-11). The only situation in which s5(1)(e)(i) 
would, according to Deane J, be an invalid exercise of the marriage power would 
be where the child was a child born after the relevant marriage “as a result of the 
adultery of one party” and this is indicated by ordinary language, which does not 
bestow the term ‘step-child’ on that child (80 012). 
 
Hence, for Deane J, the issue of whether an ex-nuptial child is a child of the 
marriage rests upon the acceptance of that child as an “ordinary member of the 
household”, to cite the provision, determined by practice rather than formal blood 
or legal ties. The argument, however, fails to be applied broadly to an ex-nuptial 
child borne to a party not of the marriage, marking a flaw in the logic of the 
argument. On the other hand, such a position is consistent with his reasoning if 
that child is not brought into the family. 
 
The ratios of these cases establish family as being constituted by the parties of a 
marriage, defined narrowly, and their children; those children being the legal or 
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a family member or ordinarily being part of a household is not sufficient without a 
relevant degree of “connection” to the marriage. The dissenting judgments, on the 
other hand, open the possibility of affinity or social practice as being determinative 
of family, at least once the legal requirements of marriage are satisfied, though as 
the discussion of marriage during the constitutional debates indicate, marriage 
might be designated by social category rather than a legal confirmation. 
These judgments are yet further instances of the limits of legal reasoning and the 
role of individual values in the determination of matters. Even where the logic of 
the decision is expansive, such as Deane J’s dissenting judgment, the full extent of 
its application is halted by a decision based on an assumption that the ex-nuptial 
child borne of an outside relationship during the term of the marriage would not 
be accepted by the parties to the marriage, as part of their ‘family’ or ‘household’. 
 
Mehmet v Mehmet (No 1) (1986) FLC ¶91-730 directly addressed the meaning of 
family. The Court was asked to decide ‘family’ for the purposes of calculating the 
division of marital property pursuant to s79(4)(c), which was inserted into the FLA 
in 1983. Section 79 provides that the court may order an alteration of proprietary 
interests of the parties to a marriage. In making such an order the court shall take 
into account a number of factors including: 
 
79(4)(c): the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family 
constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, 
including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent 
(emphasis added). 
 
Rourke J considers the meaning of ‘family’ for the purposes of determining what 
contributions might be recognised in relation to s79(4)(c). He refers to the 
nineteenth century wills cases of Re Terry’s Will (1854) 19 Beav. 580 and Bigg v 
Clarke (1876) 3 Ch. D. 672, which find that family means ‘children’. An Australian 
authority, Re McGrath’s Will (1899) 20 NSWLR 55, confirms this meaning. Rourke J 
eventually settles on the broader definitions of family appearing in the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary: 
 
i)  “Members of a household, parents, children, servants, etc”; 
ii)  “Set of parents and children, or of relations, living together or not” (75 301-
302, punctuation as in the judgment). 
 
The result was that the contributions made by the husband to his son-in-law, to the 
fiancé of one of his children and to an ex-nuptial child of the wife (who resided 
with the husband as part of the family from the age of 5 years) constituted a 
contribution to the ‘family’. Chapter 8 | 158 
 
The decision was appealed to the Full Court of the Family Court (Mehmet and 
Mehmet (No 2)(1987) FLC ¶91-801. The majority narrowed the meaning of family, 
for the purposes of the provision, to “the nuclear family”, thereby denying that 
contributions by the husband to his son-in-law, to his daughter’s fiancé and to the 
ex-nuptial child, are contributions to the family as provided under s79(4)(c) (76 
063-064, per Nygh J, with whom Strauss J concurs). Nygh J notes, however, that 
such contributions could be a relevant consideration for other provisions not 
alluding to the meaning of family. The decision was made with a view to the act as 
a whole, namely s43(b) of the FLA, which notes as a fundamental principle of the 
act the: 
 
need to give the widest possible protection and assistance to the family as the 
natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly while it is responsible 
for the care and education of dependent children (quoted at 76 064). 
 
Strauss J concludes that s79(4)(c) should be read such that “the words which 
commence with the word ‘constituted’ are both descriptive and definitive of the 
meaning of the word ‘family’” (76 064). Similarly, Kay J finds that the words 
“’constituted by the parties to the marriage’ … are not words that are intended to 
widen the meaning of ‘family’ but are words read together with ‘the children of the 
marriage’ to narrow the meaning of the word ‘family’”. 
 
In summary, Mehmet finds that family for the purposes of s79(4)(c) is a nuclear 
family, constituted by the parties to a marriage and the children of that marriage 
and excludes family by marriage and the ex-nuptial child of one of the parties. 
Interestingly, the Court embarks on a grammatical analysis, without reference to 
expert evidence, and with respect, I consider that it misreads the reasoning of the 
earlier judgment by finding that Rourke J’s conclusion was based upon the earlier 
English cases. He in fact distinguishes these cases. Further, it is notable that despite 
the obvious difficulty of ascertaining the ordinary meaning of the word ‘family’ 
from the words of the statute as a whole, there is no reference to extrinsic material 
such as that giving insights to the mischief intended to be addressed by the 
Parliament, or sociological insights on what configuration of people constitutes 
family. 
 
The reasoning of Mehmet (No 2) was subsequently followed in the case of Robb and 
Robb (1995) FLC ¶92-555 where Lindenmayer, Finn and Joske JJ confirmed the trial 
judge’s finding that, for the purposes of s79(4)(c) the two children of a wife, borne 
of an earlier marriage, were not part of the family as they were not “children of the Chapter 8 | 159 
marriage” (81 546-81 547). It was also cited as authority for the interpretation of 
‘family’ in Shaw and Shaw (1989) FLC ¶92-010 at 77 297. 
 
The meaning of family was again considered in 1996 by the Full Court in the case 
of W v W (1997) FLC ¶92-723. Here, one of the questions for the Court to determine 
was whether the mother’s care of a child born to the parties seven years prior to 
their cohabitation and eight years prior to their marriage constituted a contribution 
to the family pursuant to s79(4)(c). Complicating the matter was a payment of 
$2000 by the father to the mother, purportedly in full settlement of the father’s 
child maintenance liability. The Trial Judge considered that “the marriage of 
parents provides legitimacy to a child born prior to wedlock” (quoted at 83 772) 
but that the parties and the child in question could not be considered family once 
the maintenance responsibility had been discharged (as presented at 83 773). On 
appeal, Nicholson CJ, Finn and Maxwell JJ quoted Nygh J in Gill (1984) 9 Fam LR 
969: 
 
[t]he reference to a ‘family’ in para (c) is not a term of art referring only to a marital 
cohabitation, but can include any unit of persons who are cohabiting whether in or 
out of marriage. Nor can I read any policy to the contrary in s43(b) of the Act 
[extracted above], since under the law of this country … the obligation to give care 
and education to dependent children rests upon, and State support is given to, both 
the marital and extra-marital unit (quoted at 83 770-771). 
 
This approach was adopted by the Full Court in Nemeth and Nemeth (1987) FLC ¶91 
844 which found that Nygh’s approach was consistent with a “notion of justice … 
since entry into marriage is in a sense an affirmation of the previous relationship” 
(quoted at 83 771). The Court in W v W found that the contributions to the care of 
the child constituted a contribution to the family as per s79(4)(c), suggesting that it 
considered the child to be a child of the marriage. Further, Gill suggests a 
broadening of the idea of family than those noted above. Nevertheless, nothing in 
the judgments suggests a move from the idea of family as nuclear family, except if 
one considers that children of the parties born out of wedlock do not normally 
constitute part of the nuclear model. 
 
The last case to deal directly with ‘the meaning of family’ is Re Patrick. This case 
concerned an application for contact by a father-sperm donor in relation to the 
child (‘Patrick’) of a lesbian couple. It is a complex case challenging conceptions of 
family and crossing issues of sexuality, nuclear family modelling, biological versus Chapter 8 | 160 
social parenting, the role of biological third parties (the donor parent) and same-
sex co-parenting.2 
 
By 2002, the time of Re Patrick, the Family Court had a wide degree of discretion in 
the constitution of family for the purposes of determining matters relating to 
children. This is because of the state transfer of the powers to the Commonwealth 
to legislate in this respect.3 As a result, the courts have a freedom to accommodate 
alternative family models because the determining factor is the best interests of the 
child, pursuant to s65E, not a particular family model derived from marriage and 
matrimonial causes, as per other provisions. However, the FLA shows a bias 
towards the nuclear model (nuclear referring to heterosexual, dual-headed family) 
of family indicated by, for example, ss43(a), 64C and 65C. Section 43(a) provides 
that the court should, in making a determination under the FLA, have regard to: 
 
the need to preserve and protect the institution of marriage as the union of a man 
and a woman to the exclusion of all others voluntarily entered into for life. 
 
Section 64C provides that: 
 
A parenting order in relation to a child may be made in favour of a parent of the 
child or some other person (emphasis added). 
 
Finally, s65C provides that: 
 
A parenting order … may be applied for by; 
(a) either or both of the child’s parents; or 
(b) the child; or 
(c) any other person concerned with the care, welfare or development of the child. 
 
Whilst the child’s best interests are paramount, irrespective of the relationship to 
that child of the person applying for an order, this principle resides within the 
context of indications that marriage, and biological4 or legally adoptive5 parenting 
is prioritised over other persons in a hierarchy of relationships. These provisions 
                                                 
2 I do not believe it is appropriate to present this case without noting the tragedy surrounding it. Four 
months after the judgment the biological mother took her own life and that of her child ‘Patrick’ 
(Legge 2002). It feels improper to extract aspects of the decision as if it is merely legal discourse, yet 
that, of course, is what I am about to do. I wish it to be noted that my analysis has the benefit of 
hindsight, something which of course was denied Guest J in his determination of the matter. 
3 Except Western Australia which retained jurisdiction, but which replicates the federal statute. 
4 Rebuttable presumptions of parentage reflecting biological connection are provided under Part VII, 
Div. 12.  
5 Section 60D provides that parenting includes adoptive parents and that adoption refers to adoption 
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are not, however, prescriptive. The presiding judge has discretion over the 
determination of what is in the child’s best interest and this could include making a 
parenting order favouring a person who was neither biologically nor legally 
connected to the child. 
 
Re Patrick is one of many cases which gives an insight into the courts’ priorities in 
making determinations pursuant to Part VII matters (pertaining to children). These 
priorities indicate preferred models of family. I deal with this case specifically, 
because unlike others regarding parenting orders, it directs itself to the question of 
the meaning of family and of parent. The questions before the Court were whether 
a sperm donor, known or anonymous, is a ‘parent’ within the scope of the FLA, 
pursuant to s60H (88 870), and whether contact on the part of the Applicant, the 
father-donor, was in the best interests of the child. 
 
In deciding these matters Guest J reflects on the constitution of family for the child, 
‘Patrick’. Referring to Millbank who researches in the area of same-sex 
relationships, his Honour says that “the traditional hetero-nuclear family does not 
now reflect the reality of the various family forms within modern society,” noting 
that ‘family’ includes “homo-nuclear families” (88 927). He discusses the concept 
broadly: 
 
The term ‘family’ has a flexible and wide meaning. It is not one fixed in time and is 
not a term of art. It necessarily and broadly encompasses a description of a unit 
which has “familiar characteristics”. Not all families function in the same way. 
Never the less, they enjoy common characteristics such as those demonstrated by 
the applicants. Theirs is not of a casual or transitory nature but one that has 
embraced exclusivity and permanency. They are emotionally and financially inter-
dependant and I have no doubt, share common interests, activities and 
companionship. Their biological and psychological relationship to and mutual care 
of Patrick makes it so much more obvious. In my view it would stultify the 
necessary progress of family law in this country if society were not to recognise the 
applicants as a ‘family’ when they offer that which is consistent and parallel with 
heterosexual families, save for the obviousness of being a same-sex couple (88 927). 
 
Guest J stresses that gay and lesbian families can take many forms and should not 
be understood as an homogenous group. The family may be comprised of two 
mothers or two fathers, two mothers and one father (as in the case of Patrick) or 
two fathers and two mothers. The diversity of form is reflected also in the role of 
the father in relation to children conceived via artificial insemination. The father 
role need not be a “traditional ‘fatherly’ role” (88 927-8). 
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Patrick’s family, his Honour concludes, is a homo-nuclear family, comprised of the 
mother and the co-parent (the mother’s partner) (88 926). He notes that the matter 
before the Court is ultimately not dissimilar to matters that arise from heterosexual 
nuclear families and are decided by the Court on a daily basis (88 927). The 
question here is, what is the role of the biological father and, consequently, what is 
the appropriate degree of contact? 
 
A critical issue for the Court in determining this matter is whether the agreement 
between the parents (particularly the mother, as the biological mother is known in 
the judgment) and the donor was that the donor would be an anonymous donor or 
a known donor. Further, if the donor was to be a known donor, what would be the 
capacity of this acknowledgement – as father or some other relationship? Guest J, 
preferring the evidence of the father (as the donor was known in the judgment) to 
that of the mother and co-parent (as the judgment refers to the mother’s partner), 
decides that the agreement between the parties was that the father would have a 
role in the child’s life (88 895, 88 918). In other words, he was to be a ‘known’ 
donor. 
 
What was this role to be? This seems to be the real crux of the case, 
notwithstanding the primary issue of the terms of the arrangement. With respect to 
Guest J, who must be credited with becoming informed about alternative family 
modelling, particularly in gay and lesbian communities, it is arguable that the 
ultimate decision rested, in part, on hereonormative conceptions of family. For 
having determined that there was an intention for the donor to be a known donor, 
Guest J searches for the opportunity to deem him ‘parent’ rather than a less 
significant ‘other person’ under the provisions of the FLA. This suggests that Guest 
J was operating from the position of well-known binaries (this is discussed further 
in chapter 12; see also, table below) and that this ultimately led to contact 
arrangements which equated with those the Court would normally order, in 
relation to the non-residential partner of a nuclear family. 
 
 
Known biological or legal   Non-biological, non-legal or not known biologi
Parent Non-Parent 
Parental relationship  ‘Other person’ relationship 
Significant amounts of contact  Limited amounts of contact 
Binaries on Family Relationship 
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It seems that, for Guest J, having established that it was intended that Patrick’s 
father be a known donor, the latter also becomes a parent, notwithstanding the 
failure of the FLA to acknowledge this. Consequently, Patrick has a right to 
maintain a parent-child relationship with his father. This justified contact 
arrangements normally ordered in applications on the part of a parent, pursuant to 
s60B, which establishes the principles that: 
 
 
(2)(a) children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents 
regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or 
have never lived together; and 
(b) children have a right of contact, on a regular basis, with both their parents and 
with other people significant to their care.6 
 
The contact arrangements were despite the Court having noted that the mother 
and co-parent, along with Patrick, formed a homo-nuclear family. In effect, 
however, the Court construes Patrick’s family as comprised of mother, co-parent, 
father (as opposed to ‘other person’) and child, with the father-role surpassing the 
co-parent role. In other words, the hetero-nuclear family was reinstated, with the 
co-parent becoming a significant ‘other’. This is further indicated by a telling 
language slip where his honour mistakenly refers to the biological father as the 
‘husband’ (88 903). 
 
Hereonormative trends in contact were consequently applied in the Patrick case: a 
progressive expansion of contact time over a period of four years, culminating by 
2004 with Friday to Monday contact on alternate weekends and an assurance that 
Patrick have contact with the ‘father’ on Father’s Day. The Court ordered the 
norms of contact adopted for hereonormative family relationships. If however, we 
view the known donor as an ‘other person’, notwithstanding the biological 
relationship, then we open the door to more creative contact arrangements as say, 
we might if the applicant was a member of the extended family or a close family 
friend; that is some ‘other’ person with a significant relationship to the child. The 
judgment indicates that this scenario is exactly what the homo-nuclear family was 
concerned about – that the relationship between the donor and Patrick would be 
equated with a father-son relationship at the expense of the homo-nuclear family 
constituted by Patrick, his biological mother and the social mother (or co-parent). 
As the judgment reports: 
 
                                                 
6 The order in this hierarchy is significant, that is that the relationship with a parent is more important 
than the relationship with significant others, as indicated by the lexical ordering of the clauses of the 
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In the course of her evidence, the mother said that there was no need for a … 
‘parental’ father in Patrick’s life. When asked why Patrick should be different from 
any other child and not have a right to know his father, the mother jauntily 
responded “… because he’s got leso’s [sic] for parents” … She said that if a parental 
relationship developed between the father and Patrick, it would conflict with the 
parenting offered by the co-parent and herself … The mother agreed, when cross 
examined … that her objection to contact was based upon a fundamental belief that 
children can be raised with a homo-nuclear family, but the difference here is that 
the father desires and has always desired to play an active and fatherly role in the 
life of his son (88 884). 
 
When it was put to the mother that Patrick had two families she responded: “No, 
he has one family and he has a donor” (88 885). 
 
While Guest J accepts the legitimacy of the homo-nuclear family form, he suggests 
that the mother had a “hardened” position and characterised the view of the 
mother and co-parent as predicated on “philosophical and ideological bases” (88 
886). The mothers desire to maintain a homo-nuclear family model was, in effect, 
dismissed as a philosophical and ideological position, getting in the way of a 
resolution, which could include the father as family. What Guest J fails to 
appreciate is that the desire to involve the father was in itself a ‘position,’ in fact a 
dominant social position, which Patrick’s family was trying to counter. The 
involvement of the donor, as father, was, perhaps, as alien to the conception of 
family held by the mother and co-parent, as the conception of a two-parent, 
fatherless family to the Court and, perhaps, the broader, hereonormative 
community. 
 
I believe that there could not have been a win-win outcome for this case given the 
complexity of issues and the base position of the FLA. Guest J notes the difficulties 
of the case given the heterosexist basis of the FLA. He says that: 
 
It is clear that gay and lesbian families were not considered by the legislature when 
s60H of the Act was being drafted. These families differ in significant ways from 
heterosexual families who access artificial insemination services (88 929) … [I]t is 
time that the legislature considered some of the matters raised, including the 
nature of parenthood, the meaning of ‘family’ and the role of the law in regulating 
arrangements within the gay and lesbian community. The child at the centre of this 
dispute is part of a new and rapidly increasing generation of children being 
conceived and raised by gay and lesbian parents. However, under the current 
legislative regime, Patrick’s biological and social reality remains unrecognised (88 
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Nevertheless, whilst the judgment indicated research into alternative parenting 
arrangements and the issues of same-sex families, a real desire on the part of Guest 
J to adopt an alternative framework, he was limited in his vision of possibilities. 
 
What does this case stand for? What is its ratio? An interpretation of family was not 
a key issue for the Court, except as an addendum to the issue of whether a sperm 
donor could constitute a parent. On this latter point Guest J answers the question 
“is a known sperm donor, a ‘parent’?” in the negative, finding that a sperm donor 
merely has jurisdiction in the Family Court as ‘any other person’. Despite this 
finding, his Honour uses the nomenclature of ‘father’ and attaches rights and 
duties to the donor accordingly, an approach open to him under the discretionary 
powers granted pursuant to s65E, but nevertheless indicating the social and 
cultural power of dominant values in the constitution of the family. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The cases on ‘the meaning of family’ suggest that family is to be defined according 
to a connection with marriage rather than a connection with the household of the 
parties to a marriage. It is constituted by marriage, not by the parties to the 
marriage. This reading may be because of the limits imposed by the s51(xxvi) of the 
Australian Constitution but, notwithstanding this restraint, some judges have 
interpreted the constitutional power broadly, permitting the parties of a marriage 
to self-determine their form of family through practice. The differences in 
judgments indicate that the courts’ readings of family, whilst having some 
restraints by virtue of a discourse on interpretation, are fundamentally social. 
There is a potential for selection even within the rules of interpretation and in 
making the selection, the judiciary relies upon its ‘beliefs’ as well as the rules of 
interpretation. 
 
Re Patrick stands out because the construction of family, in matters relating to 
children, is not limited by the marriage power, thereby more explicitly inviting 
judgement, in the non-legal sense, on what constitutes family and the best interests 
of the child. Therefore, one of the gatekeeping mechanisms is eradicated and there 
is greater discretionary power for the Court in acknowledging non-conventional 
family forms. Nevertheless, we can see, in the decision, the traces of the many 
families that have come before – the nuclear family which is the central model with 
which all other models compared. The neutrality of this model is indicated by the 
comments in Re Patrick regarding the philosophical and ideological positioning the 
Court attributed to those who stood outside of the centre. 
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In an interview for the The Weekend Australian Magazine Guest J makes a comment, 
as the presiding Judge in Re Patrick, that I think is at the core of an alternative 
approach to judicial decision-making. This is an approach that acknowledges its 
social and cultural dimensions and eschews the notion of a science of 
interpretation. He says that, “Every case has a new database … Like fingerprints, 
no two marriages or relationships are the same. Relationships are secrets shared 
only by the principals, and that is what they bring to the court”. He continues, “If I 
let it [the devastating consequences of this case] overwhelm me, I don’t think I 
could approach a case again in a manner which requires me to make a decision” (in 
Legge 2002:37). There are two points that I wish to make here. The first is that 
Guest J’s comments appear to represent a confirmation of the incalculable 
calculation of which Derrida and Cornell speak and which every act of judgment 
requires – the requirement to make a decision on the undecidable. To requote 
Cornell, the aporia can never be overcome, “it must be lived and lived as a 
response to justice” (1991:113). 
 
The second point is that the available constructions of family permissible under 
Part VII are only possible because Part VII shies away from a formal description of 
family, except as implicit in the broader premises of the FLA. Hence, while, as I 
have argued, the judgment reflects a limited imagination of the possibilities for 
family formation, the Judge was not limited to this imagining by virtue of the 
terms of the act. ‘Family’, for the purposes of determining children’s matters, is an 
open signifier, permitting wider possibilities of interpretation than its significatory 
potential in other parts of the FLA, and to which other judgments refer. The 
problem for the court is how to determine family, if not by reference to the 
provisions of the FLA. In the context of a positivist discourse on interpretation this 
determination was deemed as a non-social activity – a journey which lead to a 
neutral, objective position. It is to the possibility of an interpretation which 
accommodates the subjective position of the interpreter (as both subject and a non-
objective constructor of meaning), that my proposal for legal semiotics speaks. 
With these comments in mind I return to a discussion of the case in the latter parts 
of the thesis. 
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Summation of Part 3 
 
My overview of the family in the three spheres illustrates that there is a broad 
range of factors at play in the construction of family. In the social sphere, data 
collection and reporting practices, as well as social and legal policy, lead to the 
recognition of some families and the denial of others. Despite the official position 
on family, alternative familial practices continued and adapted, in relation to 
cultural, social and economic contingencies. It comes to light in the socio-legal 
commentary and in the statements by members of Parliament and judges, that 
family flows from affinity rather than, necessarily, marriage; it is better understood 
as a practice than a thing. 
 
The political debates since federation represent some of the contradictions between 
the official statements of family and actual family practice. Nevertheless, these 
debates were limited and permitted by the discourses of the time, which directed 
the ways that members of Parliament could speak about family. Further, the 
discussion of family was affected by political concerns, as well as social practice. 
 
My overview of the law’s treatment of family illustrates that legal decision-making 
is not strictly legal. The law’s meaning of family changed over time, even where 
there was no change to the legislative provision. The jurist exercises discretion in 
determining how a provision should be read. She or he brings her own 
commonsense to the decision. 
 
These three spheres of meaning making are related. Social practice informs the 
need for legislative reform. The legislatures pass legislation, arguably in response 
to social need. The courts interpret this legislation, by reference to the problem that 
the Parliament was responding to. The juxtaposition of spheres gives some specific 
insights to this relation. 
 
Firstly, the Parliament is slow to react to social need. The parliamentary debates 
show that particular practices (such as separation) were in place long before 
legislation was changed. The effect is that alternative practices are excluded from 
legal recognition until such practices become more central. In the language of 
Lyotard, a différend is established. Those living outside of the centre are silenced. 
They are not part of legal reality and, as I have illustrated, they are excluded from 
historical accounts. There is however, often a disjunction between practice and 
political and formal acceptance. For example, at the turn of the century it is 
possible that common law unions were commonplace, and the constitutional 
framers may have contemplated a variety of unions when they discussed marriage. 
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meaning of family, they decided to refer to a pre-Constitution case which 
confirmed their idea of marriage. The law, through the court, constitutes the family 
at the turn of the twentieth century in its own eyes. Similarly, in the 1970s, family 
practice was changing, reflecting the rise of public awareness of homosexuality and 
feminist concerns, and McDonald reports that the social sphere is moving beyond a 
time of “familism”, where relationships were based on structure (as discussed in 
chapter 6). Yet, this movement from structure to transaction and negotiation has 
only recently started to impact on state and territory legislation, and is still to be 
accepted by the Commonwealth Parliament. 
 
Secondly, the juxtaposition shows that the Parliament is not a source of legislative 
meaning for the court. The Parliament has a range of functions, in addition to the 
legislative one. The debates reflect political and diplomatic concerns and are 
discursively contained. They depict the debate, not the legal meaning of a statute. 
This undermines the idea that the law can find the truth of the statute by reference 
to the parliamentary texts and debates. Hence, the legal meaning of family cannot, 
in fact, be drawn from a singular parliamentary intent, because the Parliament has 
multiple functions, giving rise to a diversity of meanings. The court determines the 
truth of the law by reference to its own mechanisms for truth construction, one of 
which is the rhetorical devise of referring to the legislature. 
 
Finally, the judicial determinations on the same provisions conflict. For example 
dissenting judgments on the reading of a statute are common and there is change 
over time in the interpretation of the same provision. Guest J’s order for normal 
parental contact, in Re Patrick, despite the implications of the statute, is a clear case 
in point. Overall, part 3 of this thesis illustrates that legal determinacy is a myth, 
and is not aided by the idea of an original source of meaning. Non-legal factors 
impact on legal interpretation. This being the case, law and society would be better 
served by a theory of interpretation that acknowledges the social and cultural 
nature of interpretation and allows alternative truths into law’s realm. 
 
Dewar, a family law scholar, argues that “the rigidity of this [Anglo-European] 
nuclear model for support purposes can have serious consequences for those ethnic 
groups, including those from Indigenous communities, for whom social 
obligations of support are in practice more fluid than the legal-nuclear model 
suggests (1997:220). The Australian Law Reform Commission argued, in its report 
Multiculturalism and the Law, that multiculturalism could be implemented by “a 
general amendment to Australian law to make it less narrowly monocultural and 
more flexible to accommodate individual differences” (Australian Law Reform 
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and interpreting family law that would permit the law to be more capable of 
accommodating the families of difference. Part 4:  Legal Interpretation as a Semiotic Endeavour 
 
 
Preface 
 
In part 1, I outlined the need for a bridge between the inside and the outside 
of law and of the ethical demand for such a linkage. In part 2, I described 
and questioned the legal approaches to interpretation in general terms. 
Having illustrated the disparities and overlaps between the social, legal and 
political conceptions of family in part 3, as evidence of my earlier arguments, 
I turn now to an alternative means of coming to know a ‘legal/non-legal’ 
(inside/outside) family. This is family, understood through the law and in 
law, by reference to family practice rather than by reference to a legally pre-
designated family. I believe that a semiotic approach to framing legislation 
and to constructing meaning may permit this. 
 
In the following chapters, I develop this approach. The first step, in chapter 
9, is to question the positivist view that law is the communication of 
commands from a sovereign state. This view relies upon an idea of 
communication as a transmission of meanings from author to receiver. It 
assumes that there is a single, passive author. An alternative is to view 
communication, including legal communication, as transactional. A 
transactional model of communication assumes that interpretation is a 
constructive process, and that the audience is actively involved in the 
construction of meaning. If the court and legislature are divested of their 
authorial power the court can be open to the possibility that law can mean 
different things to different audiences. 
 
In the early twentieth century, Saussure, the continental father of semiotics, 
shifted the focus of meaning from one of a word’s semantic history, to its 
structure and context. Peirce, a North American scholar, also argued that 
meaning was socially constructed. In chapter 10, I provide an outline of the 
ideas of Saussure and Peirce, and then draw on contemporary writers, such 
as Silverman, Hodge and Kress, McHoul and Malloy, to develop a theory of 
meaning construction as an alternative to the positivist discourse on legal 
interpretation. This alternative model requires that the jurist accept her or his 
incapacity to find a singular truth to legal meaning, and engage with 
alternative constructions of legal concepts. 
 
In the case of legal decision-making, a legal semiotics of meaning 
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without a different approach to legislating socially normative concepts. In 
chapter 11, I explain the current Commonwealth/state systems of family law 
in semiotic terms. I then set out an approach to framing law, which would 
permit an endorsement of the lived experience of families. 
 
In the final chapter of part 4, chapter 12, I analyse the law using my method 
of legal semiotics. Firstly, I illustrate how a semiotic approach to 
interpretation, coupled with a statute that is indexically open, might assist in 
capturing the experiences of the family (the “feeling” of family, to return to 
Lyotard) as the legitimate outcome of legal interpretation. I then indicate 
how semiotics can be useful as a tool of evaluation and as a guide to law 
reform. Finally, I undertake a semiotic analysis of the Family Court case of 
Re Patrick to show the social limits of meaning construction generally, and of 
legal interpretation specifically. 
 
What is the value of my endeavour? I seek to incorporate a process of 
semiotics into the method of legal interpretation. Law is ultimately about 
interpretation – interpreting the law to apply it to a set of facts, and 
interpreting the facts to know whether the law applies to them. We have a 
system of governance premised upon the principle of the rule of law. Each 
rule is predicated upon another, as per Hartian or Kelsian notions of a 
hierarchy of legal norms. To have law operating in accountable and 
predictable ways we need to have rules of interpretation which guide the 
exercise of interpretation, notwithstanding the actual contingencies of 
interpretation. However, these rules close off, firstly, the potential for an 
appreciation of the processes and outcomes of non-legal interpretations, and 
secondly, disguise the degree to which the outcome of the application of 
these rules is still simply an interpretation, one amongst a range of possible 
interpretations. Critical legal scholars, who have done important work in 
disclosing the indeterminacy of the law, and subsequently the ideological 
(for some) and cultural (for others) content of the law, have objected to this. 
Nevertheless, there needs to be some method of understanding the concepts 
over which the law is required to preside, because law is ultimately a 
practical discipline. Its goal is to resolve social conflict. In the following 
sections, I describe my attempts to create a method of interpretation, 
drawing on semiotics, which would form a bridge between the inside and 
the outside of law. Chapter 9  Law as Communication: A Different View of Law 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I have spoken above of a positivist position, which sees law as a command of 
the sovereign directed at its subjects, and legal interpretation as a formulaic 
activity. I have presented a number of challenges to these positions. The 
difference between these views on the nature of legal interpretation and the 
relationship between law and society might be explained in terms of 
communication models. The different models permit the outside into the 
inside of law, to varying degrees. 
 
In this chapter, I provide an outline of alternative communication models. 
Witteveen’s discussion of models in relation to legislation types leads me to 
the conclusion that the transactional model is a better characterisation of law 
than the transmission model, especially in relation to social categories such 
as family. I turn, finally, to a discussion of the instrumental ideal of law; that 
is, that law can effectively be used to obtain policy outcomes. I discuss 
Teubner’s “autopoiesis” as an alternative view of the relationship between 
law and society. This theory posits law as a domain in which its meanings 
are self-generated in light of external (such as social) factors. It suggests that 
there is not a direct relationship between the legislator and the subject of the 
law. This has implications for legislating and legal interpretation as well as 
for legal reform strategies. 
 
 
Law as Communication 
 
A positivist explanation of legal interpretation might be said to reflect a 
transmission model of communication. Communication is conceived as 
operating in a linear fashion, ‘transmitted’ from sender to its destination 
(Hodge and Kress 1988:3-4, Mohan et al.1992:27-41, Fiske 1982:7, Williams 
1983:721). This may be likened to the “Simple Message Model” outlined and 
applied to legislation by Witteveen. His model comprises three elements, a 
sender, a receiver and a message, within a system of code shared by the 
sender and receiver (Witteveen 1999:30, 35). It includes a feedback 
mechanism, which provides an indication of whether the message has been 
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received as intended. Under this model, the law is a system of commands on 
the part of the legislature, transmitted to a judge (Witteveen 1999:31, Cao 
2002:12), who merely verifies and institutes that command according to a set 
of rules of interpretation. Witteveen gives criminal, administrative and tax 
laws as examples of laws operating under the simple message model 
(1999:31-32). Additional examples might be speeding regulations, or laws 
which create legal fictions, such as corporations. He explains these areas of 
law, which he coins “significant” (1999:35) as “obvious areas where 
legislators express their intentions in precisely worded statements, thereby 
prescribing conditions upon people comprising a category of intended 
receivers” (Witteveen 1999:31-32). This model excludes a role for the 
audience or for non-legal culture in the construction of the message; the so-
called outside of law. 
 
The transmission model assumes that meaning inheres in the text or message 
itself. It posits the sender as deciding the message (Fiske 1982:8), meaning 
being contained within that message. The model obfuscates the role of the 
source (as sender) or receiver of the message in the construction of meaning 
(Mohen et al. 1992:41). In relation to legislation, the sender is construed as the 
Parliament, with the lawyer or judiciary merely translating it. In respect to 
caselaw, it might be thought that the judiciary is the sender. Alternatively, 
Greimas and Landowski (as outlined in Frow 1995:185) construe the 
judiciary’s role as completing the legislature´s process of meaning 
production, by verifying that which, until the juridical moment, is only 
virtual meaning. If a shared code is necessary, as Witteveen claims, then the 
model excludes anyone not skilled in legal interpretation from semiotic 
engagement with the law. It is not possible for such people to find, nor 
contribute to, the (legal) construction of, the meaning of law. By this I mean 
that the non-legally-trained ‘consumer’ of the law can only be dictated to by 
the law. There is no requirement on the jurist’s part to refer to a non-legal 
viewpoint (except in limited circumstances), and so there is no way (on a 
strictly positivist view) that everyday engagement with the law, or with 
concepts contained in the law, can inform new meanings; that is, can be part 
of the construction of the law. Family means what the Parliament intended 
family to mean. The lived-in experiences of family are not the concern of the 
law unless the family in question satisfies what it means to be family 
according to the statute. The role of the lawyer is to translate this meaning to 
the public and the role of the judiciary is to bring this meaning to life. 
 
Those adhering to a transactional characterisation, on the other hand, insist 
that communication is constructive in nature. Mohen et al. argue that: Chapter 9 | 174 
words, gestures, actions and objects do not have meanings; they have 
meanings thrust upon them. In this sense it is the production of meaning, 
rather than the production of messages, that constitutes communication 
(Mohen et al. 1988:43). 
 
Communication is about meaning, not information (Kress 1988:4) and is 
much more than mere transmission. As Lyotard explains: 
 
addresser and addressee are instances, either marked or unmarked, 
presented by a phrase. The latter is not a message passing from an addresser 
to an addressee both of whom are independent of it. They are situated in the 
universe the phrase presents, as are its referent and its meaning (1984:6). 
 
Texts do not transport a meaning intended by an earlier author. Rather, 
meaning is a combination of author, reader, text and context. As I argued in 
chapter 5, a true meaning is not uncovered in the legal texts by the jurist, 
despite the persistence of a positivist discourse on legal interpretation. 
 
As an alternative to the “Simple Message Model”, Witteveen presents his 
“Simple Text Model”. This is indicative of a transactional approach, which 
he applies to “symbolic laws” (1999:35-41). These are expressions of norms, 
rather than mere inventions of the Parliament or the judiciary. Witteveen 
gives the example of constitutional law in so far as it contains open terms 
such as “reasonableness” and “good faith”, which require a reflection on 
social norms for its interpretation; that is, the legislation requires a reflection 
on the outside of the law to determine content. Family might similarly be 
considered under this category as it pre-exists legal statement and is derived 
from social norms rather than legal rules, existing independently of the law. 
Like Lyotard, Witteveen claims that the audience (the citizens of a 
community) are the authors of a text, that is, of such legislation. Witteveen 
says: 
 
Though it is likely the [communication] process starts at some moment in 
time on the side of an author, this model [the simple text model] does not 
stress the flow of information, but rather brings out recurring activities, 
provisional interpretation, adjustments in light of what has gone on before 
(1999:37). 
 
Hence, for Witteveen, like others who question textualism, communication is 
a process (Witteveen 1999:37). He notes that the text model permits 
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(1999:38). It incorporates judicial meaning into legislative meaning, 
constructed by reference to normative values; that is, standards ostensibly 
set outside of the law. However, unlike Lyotard and Derrida who challenge 
textualism, Witteveen adheres to the view that meaning can be found by 
reference to the author’s intention for some types of legislation, namely 
significant laws. He suggests that only symbolic legislation, or the symbolic 
dimensions of that legislation, is open to the interpretations of the non-legal 
community, although this appears to be limited to an objective standard, or 
the reasonable person test, of community norms as determined by a judge 
(Witteveen 1999:36). 
 
Witteveen’s idea of symbolic laws is an interesting approach to 
understanding the place of non-legal norms within laws, and fits 
comfortably with the Australian rules of interpretation as outlined above. 
However, these rules of interpretation, as with Witteveen’s explanation of 
symbolic law, fail to sufficiently account for interpretation as a productive 
enterprise. This is, in short, a problem with positivist accounts of law and 
with the transmission model of communication. Rather than simply relaying 
a message or changing a message from the virtual to the concrete the jurist 
constructs meanings by reference to the universe that she or he occupies. 
This is indicated by Cao, when she says that: 
 
a legal rule is a construction that is built twice, first constructed by the 
legislator, as the positer of legitimate law and subsequently (re)constructed 
in interpretations of the users (2002:12 by reference to van Schooten 
1999:210). 
 
We have then, on this accounting of the transaction model, two moments of 
meaning construction (legal interpretation) – that of the legislature and that 
of the jurist, a person trained in legal interpretation. There is, however, a 
third moment (at least) – that of the everyday. Cao’s “user” of the law is not 
only the jurist but also the subject or object of that law – she or he who or for 
whom the law seeks to regulate. But the construction of law by this third 
party is not, by and large, recognised as law and is seen to sit outside of 
law’s domain. Witteveen draws attention to the outside of law as it is 
incorporated into his idea of symbolic law, but this is a semiotics from the 
point of view of the judiciary, whose task is to represent the ‘ordinary’ 
person, through an objective assessment of norms. This is necessary, 
Witteveen implies, because these non-legal communities do not share the 
code necessary for making sense of law (1999:32). Incorporating this third 
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discourse of legal interpretation is, however, important; for reasons both 
ethical and pragmatic, as I have already argued. This is not a case of sharing 
the knowledge of the law by those in the law or, as Witteveen explains of his 
simple message model, of “tak[ing] an interest in selectively schooling the 
receiver in legal knowledge” and of “translat[ing] the contents of the legal 
message in everyday terms” (Witteveen 1999:33). This would merely be an 
instance of forcing an interpretation based upon one set of practices and the 
contingencies of one semiotic group, onto the other. I advocate for an inverse 
of Witteveen’s translating hierarchy; that is, education of the legal, by the 
non-legal, of these other knowledges of law (in this instance, of family), 
permitting an incorporation of these into the law. In this respect, Witteveen’s 
third communication model (of legislation) in some ways permits this 
(1999:47-49), by opening a space for considering interpretations of those 
outside of the law. 
 
Witteveen’s third model is based on an analogy with the performance of a 
symphony. A symphony can be characterised as “performance” and 
“practice” (1999:50). “Performance” involves a “well-organised” group of 
people providing an interpretation of a score for an audience. On the other 
hand, the “practice” of a symphony, of which each performance is an 
instance, is an experience shared by the performers and the audience and 
ruled by conventions (1999:50). The audience has a role in the interpretation 
of the music: “[t]he listener might regard himself as a legitimate extension of 
the performer; and in this way abolish the gap which separates him from the 
sender of the music” (1999:48). The model, when applied to law, combines 
the special knowledge and expertise of the jurist with the involvement of the 
legal subject, to whom the performance of law is directed. It reflects a 
transaction model of communication in that it is concerned with a 
construction of meaning rather than the transmission of information. I like 
this explanation for some forms of legal communication in that it at once 
acknowledges the fluidity of meaning whilst balancing this realisation with 
the pragmatic need for gatekeeping mechanisms on the part of the law (see 
below). In addition, it permits an engagement, in legal terms, with the 
constructions of meaning outside of the law. 
 
Let me explain this further, using the family as example. Family law is 
significant, in Witteveen’s terms, in that it does not rely on motherhood 
statements as a link to the social and cultural; that is, upon normative ideals. 
Instead, in most jurisdictions the relevant statutes indicate how family, or 
any other nomenclature, in law, is to signify. We could, as a means of 
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symbolic law; that is, something that is seen as normatively derived rather 
than legally constructed. According to Witteveen, this would open the law to 
a textual model of communication. This would permit the judiciary to look 
outside of the law to determine the norm, on the basis of the objective test. 
Doing so takes the court beyond the temporal and spatial limits of the 
legislature, permitting it to determine family according to external norms. 
But this still privileges the interpretation of the judge – what counts as family 
as a normative formation is what the judge, as the arbiter of the reasonable 
person, counts as family. As an outline of judicial determinations has shown, 
even within the confines of a narrowly constructed Family Law Act 1975, 
judges’ subjectivity (masquerading as the objective arbitrator) has given rise 
to a range of assessments of the value of certain family models. This is very 
much an internal (to the law) assessment of norms. 
 
A third approach, that which I favour and upon which I elaborate below, is 
to defer the assessment of family, of the norm, to those interpretative 
communities within which the family resides. In some ways this is a dual 
interpretation, though I use the word interpretation with some hesitation – 
an interpretation of family by those living as family, then the interpretation 
of this by the jurist. This is more in keeping with the transactional model of 
communication, recognising the meanings that non-legal communities give 
to concepts and giving them legal status. The jurist’s role is not to attempt an 
objective assessment of an homogenised social norm – the family according 
to an idealised interpretative community2 - but to defer to a more empirically 
derived interpretative community and its family norm, on what constitutes 
family within this interpretative community. This permits deference to the 
family norms of non-normative (in the homogenous sense) communities. 
 
The third approach permits the acknowledgment of the interpretative 
practices of the outside of law, albeit mediated by an officer of the law. The 
difference from Witteveen’s second option is that it places an onus upon a 
judge to reflect on the outside in its complexity and multiplicity, rather than 
assuming a singular norm. 
 
If legal interpretation is not concerned with a transmission of commands of a 
Parliament, or of the judge’s declaration of the law, but involves a 
production of meaning on the part of the legislature, the jurist and the user 
of the law, how might this be transformed into interpretative method? If 
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meaning is not located within the text, we have to find some way of coming 
to know how texts work, for each of these users of the law. 
 
 
An Alternative to an Instrumental Approach to Law 
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I noted that in the twentieth century, 
presumably extending into the twenty-first century, an instrumental ideal of 
law dominates (van Schooten in van Schooten 1999:185,186). The ideal 
assumes that law can be used to effect policy goals, suggesting a causal 
relationship between legislation and social outcomes (see also Ewick and 
Silbey 1998). The same could be said of caselaw. The pronouncements of 
judges, particularly in so far as they note the policy implications of a 
judgment, are also assumed to affect social practice. 
 
This relationship between law and society is predicated upon the 
transmission or simple message communication model. The model assumes 
that a single meaning flows accurately and directly from the legal 
pronouncement, denying the interpretative work of legal subjects. A 
transactional model, on the other hand, explains why social engineering 
through law does not bring about the patterns of conduct intended, although 
it might, as I have argued earlier, be constitutive of social practice in some 
indirect and unpredictable ways. In presenting a number of theories that are 
directed at the “problems associated with the legislation in the modern 
welfare state” van Schooten questions: 
 
the idea that goal-oriented legislation determines society from the moment it 
comes into force, as if there existed a direct causal connection between law 
and social behaviour (van Schooten 1999:186). 
 
One of these theories is Teubner’s “autopoiesis” or its earlier nomenclature 
“reflexive law” (van Schooten 1999:188-197 and Teubner 1988). Luhmann 
was a central proponent of “social autopoiesis” and he contemplated the 
theory’s use in law. 3 Van Schooten says that reflexive law is a reaction to the 
problems of goal-oriented legislation (1999:187). 
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According to Teubner, an “autopoietic system produces and reproduces its 
own elements by the interaction of its elements … on the basis of meaning” 
(Teubner 1988:3). Luhmann notes that society is an autopoietic system but 
Teubner asks if law is also such a system in its own right (Teubner 1988:3); 
that is, is law, like society generally, a structure which self replicates through 
self-referential communication? Teubner concludes in the affirmative, but 
develops the theory further. He claims that society is comprised of sub-
systems which are each closed to the other (van Schooten 1999:187). This 
does not mean that the social environment does not influence law. For: 
 
Legal structures … reinterpret themselves, but in the light of external needs 
and demands. This means that external changes are neither ignored nor 
directly reflected according to a “stimulus-response scheme”. Rather, they 
are selectively filtered into legal structures and adapted in accordance with a 
logic of normative development (Teubner in van Schooten 1999:189). 
 
In other words, law is “an autopoietic social system of a secondary order”, 
society being the first order system (van Schooten 1999:192). The law is 
impacted upon by the social environment but it then gives that input its own 
meaning. Social meaning is, it seems, mediated through the self-referential 
codes of the legal system. 
 
Reflexive law substitutes instrumental law in so far as its relationship to the 
social is only indirect, establishing procedures and guides for self-regulation 
(van Schooten 1999:190). As van Schooten explains this: 
 
’regulation of autonomy’ does not take full responsibility for the outcome, 
like purposive and goal-oriented legislation does, but leaves the ‘substantive 
rationality’ to the self regulating social system (1999:190). 
 
Rather than being directive reflexive law is framed in open ended terms. 
 
We might also see the law through the metaphor of the game. Ewick and 
Silbey in their study The Commonplace of Law: Stories from Everyday Life 
suggest that law is a game rather than an instrument (1998:135-136). In 
American culture, and arguably so in Australia: 
 
games are clearly demarcated encounters, bounded in space and time, with 
formal beginnings, turn taking , and endings. As a set of constraints 
specifying permissible roles, transactions, and purposes, a game contains 
within its rules all that is necessary to realize its aim. Within the gaming Chapter 9 | 180 
encounter, the rules provide the only legitimate normative framework. It is, 
in other words, only within the rules of the game that action makes sense … 
The rules of any game specify what does and does not matter in the game. 
These rules of irrelevancy may cover material, social or psychological 
phenomena (1998:136). 
 
What is particularly important to this thesis is Ewick and Silbey’s reporting 
on how the game of law is played outside of the law. For, they note, “the fact 
that legality is a game represents an invitation to play or to enjoy the sport” 
(1998:132). One does not need to be an officer of the court to play the game, 
despite its so-called rules, although as Ewick and Silbey note, non-lawyers 
are certainly seen as amateur competitors (1998:152). I wonder, however, 
whether there is an inconsistency between law (at least its official discourse) 
and not-law in the rules of the game – whether they are, in fact different 
games, at least from the point of view of the rule makers. The former retains 
the instrumentalist attachment, such that law means in prescribed ways, 
whereas the latter sees the law in terms of a broader schema of signalization, 
positive obedience and private/public interests (to refer back to Foucault, 
Parkinson and Weber, in chapter 1). 
 
McHoul, in presenting his own version of semiotics, draws a distinction 
between the game and the ceremony. The game is the rules of the game, 
where as ceremonies are the rules surrounding the game itself. He gives the 
example of the game of tennis: “the warm-up, the toss, and, at the end, the 
declaration of the winner and the closing-down rituals – showers, 
presentations, or the drink at the bar” are ceremonies which themselves 
constitute the game of tennis. As he says, “[t]ennis could barely even be 
tennis without them” (1996:72, emphasis in original). If we translate this to 
law we can see the law as a combination of the rules and the ceremonies. 
While the rules may be set according to a positivist model (like say, the rules 
set by the arbitrator of international tennis), the ceremonies which are 
equally part of the law are subject to a spatio-temporal evolution. The 
ceremonial aspect of the law might be something akin to the secondary rules 
of Hart, specifically the rule of recognition or perhaps, even, the efficacy 
which gives the Grundnorm its legitimacy in the Kelsen schema; as discussed 
earlier. The lawyer might be the skilled player in the legal court in the way 
that Venus Williams is the skilled player on the tennis court (no pun 
intended), but in backyards all over Australia people are playing their own 
games of tennis. They are also playing their own game of bush law. The 
ceremonies in each space dictate or, rather, are fully implicated in the rules 
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“this is a friendly game, not a competition” has implications for the way the 
game will be played, whether that game is tennis or the rearrangement of 
family property regimes upon separation. 
 
What does this say about law as communication? For McHoul, there are 
implications for reading practice (here he is actually analysing reading 
practice – what students in a classroom are doing when they have a reading 
lesson). The text is always framed and it is in this space between text and 
context (eradicating the distinction) that meaning exists – “these ceremonial 
places are readings” (1996:73). The metaphor of the game suggests a 
transactional model of communication, where the reader-player is involved 
in the construction of meaning. I will revisit the idea of reflexive law and the 
metaphor of the game in framing an approach for legislating for the family, 
an approach which is notable for its inclusion of the game playing of the 
outside-law. Its relevance here is in terms of communication models. 
 
Teubner’s autopoiesis leads van Schooten to a reconsideration of Witteveen’s 
construction model of legal communication. If there is not a direct 
relationship between the legislator and subject of that law and if the content 
of law is open to multiple constructions, then how might that law be 
properly framed? She argues, by reference to Witteveen, that “[i]n order to 
obtain symbolic value, legislation must be formulated in such a general way 
that it is fit to elicit discussion in an interpretation community” requiring the 
employment of “open legislative norms” (1999:210). For our legal ‘family’, 
family would not be defined by the statute but by reference to broader 
community norms, that of the first level autopoietic structure. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have given an overview of communication models and the 
implications of these for law and legislation types. I have then suggested the 
possibility of conceiving of law in reflexive terms as a response to the goal-
oriented approach to legislating. 
 
If we move from an instrumentalist view of law and the presupposition of a 
simple message or transmission model to a transactional or constructive 
model there are implications for legislative framing and legal interpretation. 
Legislation needs to be framed so that it is open-ended, and legal 
interpretation needs to be reconceived as the reading of alternative 
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reflexivity between the law and the social. I propose, in the next chapter, that 
legal interpretation be replaced with a legal semiotics. In the subsequent 
chapter, I consider the framing of legislation. Chapter 10   Semiotics 
 
Introduction 
 
Both the outside world and the utterer’s intentions form part of the semiotic 
function, which is conceptually distinct from the sense of that which is uttered 
(Jackson 1985:16, emphasis in original). 
 
Semiotics, also known as semiology, is the study of signs, things that refer, signify 
or point to something other than themselves. Despite the many threads of 
semiotics, there is a shared concern with three elements: the sign, the referent or 
object (that to which the sign refers) and the sign-user (Fiske 1982:44). There are 
three main themes, though semiotic analyses may place varying emphasis upon 
the categories. These are (Honderich 1995:821, Jackson 1985:4-12, Fiske 1982:43): 
 
•  semantics or the study of meaning. It is a concern with the sign and its 
relationship to the thing it represents. 
•  syntactics or the study of structure. Structuralists seek to explain the 
relationship of the sign to other signs, through the study of underlying patterns 
or structures of sense-making within a particular system, for example, within a 
sentence. 
•  pragmatics or the study of the setting within which sense making occurs. This 
includes the extra-linguistic effects and purposes of communication, matters 
neglected by formal semiotics. Pragmatics seeks to explain the sign’s 
relationship to users and the social sphere, and may include references to, for 
example, environmental, psychological and cultural factors and influences. It is 
an exclusively American movement although its proponents were educated in 
European philosophy and literature, thereby owing much to a European 
intellectual tradition (Sedgwick in Edgar and Sedgwick 1999:305-306). 
 
Most semiotic analyses, including those derived from legal traditions, can be 
distinguished from my own. These are generally involved in a reflection on the 
semiosis that has occurred, in terms of the processes for making meaning or in an 
investigation of meaning itself; in law, these are commonly semiotics of law 
analyses. I have developed a semiotics in law, as an alternative means of judicial 
interpretation, although my approach may also be used for analysis. In 
investigating a method of semiotics I am mindful not only of the interest in how 
meaning-making occurs in various communities, but also, and more importantly Chapter 10 | 184 
for this thesis, how we, in the law, can develop meaning-making processes within 
the law (legal discourse would refer to interpretative processes), which may confer 
a greater integrity on law’s engagement with the non-legal. The reader should 
consider this chapter in such a light. The chapter is concerned with semiosis itself, 
as well as how the semiosis of various interpretive communities can be built into 
the law. This has implications for legislative framing as well as for judicial 
interpretation. 
 
 
A Warning on Legal Semiotics: Looking Beyond ‘the’ Law 
 
In venturing into semiotic theory, I bear in mind the critique of legal semiotics 
provided by Frow, a cultural theorist. He argues that legal semiotics, as an 
approach for thinking of law as a “textual practice,” has been limited by its 
tendency to focus on the structure of legal rules as a means of reading the 
institution of law (1995:183). Though not specifically making the claim, he appears 
to be speaking of a particular type of legal semiotics, that of the Paris school of 
Greimas and Landowski. His comments apply more readily to structural, linguistic 
analyses. Nevertheless, his comments regarding these latter forms provide a useful 
reminder of the tendency, at least for legal scholars, to become stuck in the 
discursive quagmire of the law and its meanings. He notes that: 
 
a legal proposition does not control the historical changes in its social force: the 
meanings it will carry, the functions it will fulfil, both within the formal system of 
the law and in everyday understandings and applications (1995:184, emphasis added). 
 
The law, he continues, is constituted by heterogeneous discourses, including “the 
everyday gossip through which the categories of the law are translated into 
experience” (in addition to those things that are ordinarily considered as within or 
on the margins of the discourse of law, such as statute, doctrine and legal 
commentary) (1995:187). Moreover, Frow insists that the concept of the law “must 
be studied as a system of interdiscursive relations” (1995:187). His comments spur 
on my endeavours to think of the various ways in which law comes to mean, as 
well as providing a reminder of the limits of understanding presented by one’s 
own discourse. Further, he challenges the idea of law as a closed semiotic system, 
as a structure which can distinguish itself from the outside of this structure. 
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Overview of Semiotics 
 
Contemporary semiotics, including those varieties developed around the theme of 
law, is largely derived from two models; the structuralist syntactics of Ferdinand 
de Saussure, known as the founding father of continental semiotics (Hodge and 
Kress 1988:14), and the pragmatism (or what he subsequently termed 
pragmaticism – Cahoone 1996:145) of North American Charles Sanders Peirce.1 In 
introducing the basic elements of each model, I address the critiques that are 
particularly relevant to my project of seeking a process of legal interpretation, 
which can engage with the multiplicities of semiosis of the law. 
 
 
A Brief History 
 
Whilst Peirce and Saussure provide the modern roots of semiotics, it is often 
difficult to trace their influence on individual semiotic accounts, except in so far as 
individual analysts claim an influence.2 Instead, what binds semiotics is a broad 
concern with text and meaning. Versions differ in terms of, inter alia, the degree to 
which they might be called structuralist and in the relationship between, and the 
emphasis on, internality and externality, text and context. Further, despite shifts in 
emphasis throughout the history of semiotics, semiotic analysis is no longer 
subservient to a linguistic model. For the linguist, Saussure, ‘semiology’, to use his 
terminology, constitutes a science of signs of which linguistics is a sub-category, 
with language being an ideal model for analysis (Blonsky 1985:xv, Strinati 1995:94, 
Champagne 1990:39-40). Others who were influenced by Saussure’s hierarchy of 
semiotics and language included Hjelmslev, a linguist, and Greimas, a semiotician, 
of the Copenhagen School (Champagne 1990:14-15). However, Barthes and others 
working in the area in the 1950s and onwards, inverted this hierarchy (Strinati 
1995:ch 3). Everything non-linguistic was to be treated as if it were language 
                                                 
1 On the other hand, Jackson in his outline of the application of Greimasian semiotics to law, says 
Saussure is part of a semantic, structuralist tradition (Jackson 1995:141). He may be suggesting that 
Saussurian linguistics constitutes a combination of the two categories, syntactics (structure) and semantics 
(meaning), indicating, in any case, the fluidity of the categories. For me, Saussure reflects a syntactic 
tradition because his study of meaning is through a consideration of the structure of a semiotic system, 
namely language. He focuses on the relationship within that structure of signs and is not deeply concerned 
with the sign’s relationship to the referent (see below). 
2 Semiotics has a history reaching back to the ancient Greeks. ‘Semeiosis’ was an expression in the Greek 
at Cicero’s time and Locke makes reference to the ‘Semeiotike’ in the seventeenth century (Greenlee 
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because, it was argued, “natural language mediated the process of decoding the 
world” (Blonsky 1985:xviii). Only through language could signs carry meaning. 
The question of hierarchy between semiotics and language, and which of the two 
constitutes the encompassing category, is a debate that continued in the history of 
French structuralism (Champagne 1990:9). In 1985, Blonsky wrote that semiotics 
was “at the Crossroads”: “we must stop using only the linguistic sign as our 
glasses to see the world” (1985:xviii). He suggests that the future of semiotics 
involves looking at the sign other than as language; in effect, that one of the 
signposts at the “crossroads” is a reinstitution of the Saussurian relegation of 
language to simply one of the categories of possible semiotic systems (1985:xviii). 
Champagne claims that it was Barthes’ use of the semiology tag, as a name for a 
study of signs, which gave priority to language and gave the term currency 
(1990:40). Hence, it might be argued that ‘semiotics’ is the study of signs as a broad 
non-linguistic category as Saussure envisaged, whilst ‘semiology’ is the study of 
signs based upon the prioritisation of language, as established by Barthes. 
Irrespective of the history of the terminology, the use of the sign 
semiotics/semiology suggests that semiotics constitutes ‘the field’ of sign analysis, 
of which language forms a subdiscipline, although the terms are also used 
interchangeably to denote the same field. Edgar and Sedgwick, for example, claim 
that “[th]e terms ‘semiotics’ and ‘semiology’ alike refer to the theory of signs” 
(1999:350, emphasis omitted).3 
 
 
Saussure 
 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s major body of work is in the area of linguistics, but it has 
been his vision for an alternative, broader field of study that has captured the 
imagination of subsequent analysts:4 
 
A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable; it would be part 
of social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it 
semiology … Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern 
                                                 
3 See also: Silverman (1983) and Hodge and Kress (1988) who use ‘semiotics’ as the generic, despite 
references to ‘semiology’. Strinati’s emphasis on semiology suggests a concern primarily with that field 
enunciated by Barthes, and his contemporaries, Eco and Lévi-Strauss, who each modelled the science of 
signs on language (1995). 
4 In this chapter I refer to Hjelmslev, Barthes, Greimas, Voloshinov, Hodge and Kress, and McHoul, who 
come from a Saussurian tradition. Chapter 10 | 187 
them … Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology; the laws 
discovered by semiology will be applicable to linguistics, and the latter will 
circumscribe a well-defined area within the mass of anthropological facts (Saussure 
1974:16, references omitted). 
 
As I have already noted, for Saussure, semiotics is the metacategory of which 
language is a part (Silverman 1983:8, Champagne 1990). However he argues that 
language “can become the master-pattern for all branches of semiology” because as 
“the most complex and universal of all systems of expression” it is also “the most 
characteristic” of the “semiological process” (1974:68). Language therefore holds a 
privileged position. 
 
Despite the promise offered of a study of sign systems generally, Saussure’s own 
investigations are, in fact, of a narrowly prescribed kind, limited to linguistics. His 
investigations are defined by a set of binaries which limit his field of analysis 
ultimately to formal language systems studied at a moment in time (synchronic) 
and upon a syntagmatic axis (or plane of combination) only (Hodge and Kress 
1988:15-17). Saussure omitted those aspects of linguistic analysis which could not, 
in his view, easily be subjected to a systematic study: speech, the diachronic (over 
time) and the paradigmatic axis (or plane of selection).5 
 
Saussure’s vision was influential in the development of Continental semiotics. 
Champagne suggests that his greatest contribution was “to point out the 
importance of the systemic map of structure…[beginning] with the psychological 
observation that language structure is manifested in the consciousness of the 
speech community” (1990:9, citing Piaget). Meaning is derived from individual 
use, but only as part of a system of language (Champagne 1990:9), that is, it is 
inherently cultural. The structuralism that constituted many of the subsequent 
semiotic approaches has been under review since the late 1960s when the claim 
was made that it, as part of structuralism, amounted to “scientific and positivistic 
claims on truth and method” (Champagne 1990:2). Ironically, many semioticians, 
structuralists and non-structuralists alike, have taken inspiration from what 
Saussure omitted from his analysis; that is, those excluded from the schema of 
binaries (for example Hodge and Kress 1988). Although many of the components 
                                                 
5 Hodge and Kress place the syntagmatic analysis, rather than the paradigmatic analysis, in Saussure’s 
waste-basket. Saussure, however, focuses upon the syntagmatic relations of the sign because it reflects a 
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of Saussurian semiotics have provided the basis for further theorising and analysis, 
it is possibly Saussure’s theorisation of the sign that carries the greatest continuing 
influence in semiotics, consistently providing the starting point for subsequent, 
Continent derived, approaches. 
 
For Saussure, the sign consists of two parts: the signifier, or physical manifestation; 
and the signified, the mental concept, that to which the sign refers. This is 
juxtaposed with the external reality or referent, the object of signification. Although 
naming this external reality, Saussure is not greatly concerned with the 
relationship between sign and referent preferring, instead, to focus on signifier and 
signified. Saussure’s first principle is that signs operate on the basis of “collective 
behaviour” or “conventions” rather than anything necessarily inherent or intrinsic 
(c1986:647; see also Silverman 1983:6-8, Hodge and Kress 1988:21). He says 
“language never exists apart from the social fact, for it is a semiological 
phenomenon (1974:77). 
 
The relationship between the signifier and signified, in the case of the linguistic 
sign at least, is arbitrary and unmotivated, that is, not rational or natural 
(Silverman 1983:68, Hodge and Kress 1988:21). Saussure notes, as exceptions, 
onomatopoeic words and symbols, which derive meaning from some “natural 
bond” so that the association is at least partly motivated (1974:68-69). Saussure 
focuses his analysis on the linguistic sign, as the “ideal of the semiological process” 
(Saussure c1986:647-8). What characterises the ideal are signs that are “wholly 
arbitrary” (Saussure c1986:647). In claiming that linguistic signs are the preferred 
focus of analysis because they are wholly arbitrary, Saussure suggests that there 
are other signs that are not arbitrary. For example he differentiates language from 
other human institutions, such as law, which are based “on the natural relation of 
things; all have of necessity adapted the means employed to the ends pursued” 
(1974:75). 
 
Hodge and Kress question Saussure’s first principle even in relation to the 
linguistic sign. They point out that even in the sound of words the relationship 
might be rational or natural and that syntactic patterns may be motivated; for 
example the subject in a sentence in English comes first, a motivated indication of 
its importance (1988:21-22). Hodge and Kress argue that Saussure’s claim of 
arbitrariness was purposeful. Given that his studies were constructed on the basis 
of binaries, he was faced with only two possibilities: a natural connection or no 
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and, therefore, that there is no natural connection between words and social and 
historical forces. It was therefore incumbent upon him to claim that the sign, for 
example, the word in relation to the concept it represents, was arbitrary. The effect, 
they claim, has been the stifling of the development of a semiotics which permits a 
factoring in of the social: 
 
This is because Saussure saw the social determination of language as not simply 
unlimited but also inherently incomprehensible. That is why he used the term 
‘arbitrary’, as though the bonds between signifier and signified were subject to the 
whims of an inscrutably powerful collective being, Society. To call these signs 
‘conventional’ … is not much better, since it still attributes the source of 
determination to society without encouraging a study of how that determination 
works in practice (1988:22). 
 
It should be clear that the idea of the arbitrariness of the sign means that it is not 
‘natural’ – there is no inherent relation, in linguistics, between the signifier and the 
signified. But Saussure stresses that this does not mean that an individual has the 
power to determine or change the sign, once it has become recognised as such in 
the linguistic community (1974:69). Semiosis is a social process – “every means of 
expression used in society is based, in principle, on collective behaviour” (Saussure 
1974:68). The social processes by which the sign carries meaning, however, is 
outside Saussure’s project. Similarly, any concern with the material form of the 
sign (a sound, the visual presence) is external to Saussure’s linguistic semiotics 
(Hodge and Kress 1988:17). 
 
Saussure’s semiotics is therefore a closed system looking to the internal 
mechanisms of language to find a universal structure of meaning making. It is a 
mapping out of language “by sketching the interdependence of meaning and 
system” (Champagne 1990:9). His project influenced generations of intellectuals in 
the development of structuralism (Champagne 1990:8). However, with a critique of 
structuralism, and of French structuralism in particular in the late 1960s 
(Champagne 1990:2), came a concern with factoring into analysis that which, 
according to Saussure, was external to language. Perhaps this is a return to the 
spirit of Saussure. Hodge and Kress claim that despite his emphasis on the 
internality of the language system, Saussure was not “opposed to a social basis for 
semiotics” and nor was he averse to a consideration of “external linguistics”, as he 
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consideration of socio-historical matters was necessary to understand “the internal 
linguistic organism” (Saussure 1974:22). 
 
There have been numerous attempts to incorporate the external. For example, in 
the 1950s, Barthes attempted to do so, within a structuralist framework, through 
the incorporation of a method for understanding the play of ideology and “myth” 
(as discussed in chapter 5) on the working of the sign. McHoul, however, argues 
that such attempts miss the point that semiosis is social from the ground up, not 
something that can be attached, after the fact of semiosis, on to a Saussurian 
foundation (McHoul xviii).6 In other words, the social is not found outside of the 
sign but is always part of the sign. The same is true of the legal sign. 
 
As already stated, Saussure rejects the diachronic, or the study of language as it 
operates over time, in favour of the synchronic, language as it exists in any one 
system at a given moment. The reasons for his rejection of the diachronic are (at 
least) twofold. The first of these is an attempt to create a science. Although 
Saussure spent a lifetime studying diachronic change, he concludes that a rational 
and cohesive approach is not possible (Hodge and Kress 1988:16) and that the 
diachronic is therefore not capable of systematisation (Hodge and Kress 1988:16, 
Silverman 1983:12). Synchronic linguistics, could, however, be “concerned with the 
logical and psychological relations that bind together coexisting terms … [to] form 
a system in the collective mind of speakers” (Saussure 1974:99-100). Synchronic 
linguistics is capable of systematisation. Saussure’s turn to the synchronic was also 
a reaction to the intellectual status quo of the day. He was attempting to 
distinguish his form of linguistics from the comparative studies of words over time 
(Silverman 1983:12) or comparative philology, which omitted considerations of 
system, relations and use. This rejection of the diachronic, as discussed below, has 
been the subject of most contemporary criticism. It should, however, be noted that 
for Saussure: 
 
language … appears as a heritage of the preceding period … A particular 
language-state is always the product of historical forces, and these forces explain 
why the sign is unchangeable, i.e. why it resists any arbitrary substitution 
(Saussure 1974:71-72). 
 
                                                 
6 McHoul specifically cites post-Hallidayan social semiotics such as that of Hodge and Kress (footnote 7 
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Hence, although Saussure’s own analysis was a focus on the synchronic, he did not 
disregard the significance of the historical. For Saussure, however, a diachronic 
linguistics would focus on “successive terms that are substituted for each other in 
time” rather than the relation between “co-existing terms of a language-state” 
(Saussure 1974:140). 
 
Finally, Saussure elaborates on two axes of analysis: the paradigmatic and the 
syntagmatic, his focus of analysis.7 The syntagm is an axis of structure, whereas the 
paradigmatic is an axis of selection, the linguistic choices available to a speaker 
(1974:122-23). He provides the analogy of a fixed part of a building, a column: 
 
On the one hand, the column has a certain relation to the architrave that it 
supports; the arrangement of the two units in space suggests the syntagmatic 
relation. On the other hand, if the column is Doric, it suggests a mental comparison 
of this style with others (Ionic, Corinthian, etc.) although none of these elements is 
present in space: the relation is associative (1974:124). 
 
His interest is in the study of the relation between the different parts, or units as he 
would call them, of the syntagm; not only the words but also groupings of words 
(1974:124-5). This is because the syntagmatic relation is the structural aspect of 
language (langue), produced from collective use, unlike speech (paroles, the 
individual manifestation of language), which is based upon a degree of individual 
freedom (1974:125). He clarifies this as follows: 
 
Language is not a function of the speaker; it is a product that is passively 
assimilated by the individual. It never requires premeditation, and reflection enters 
in only for the purpose of classification (1974:14). 
 
This idea of a non-premeditated functioning is significant to a rethinking of legal 
interpretation, as we will see later. 
 
Syntagms are “combinations supported by linearity” (1974:123), such as the 
relation between a pronoun and a verb or an adjective and a noun. The value of 
language, is found in oppositions within the syntagmatic relation: “[i]n the 
                                                 
7 Saussure refers to the plane of ‘association’. Hjelmslev renamed this the ‘paradigmatic’ plane, the term 
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syntagm a term acquires its value only because it stands in opposition to 
everything that precedes or follows it, or to both” (Saussure 1974:123). He says: 
 
It is not enough to say, looking at the matter positively, that the speaker chooses 
marchons! [‘(let’s) walk!’ as opposed to, say marche! ‘(thou) walk!’] because it 
signifies what he wishes to express. In reality the idea evokes not a form but a 
whole latent system that makes possible the oppositions necessary for the 
formation of the sign. By itself the sign would have no signification (1974:130). 
 
In other words, signification occurs through difference, built into the structure of 
the semiotic system. 
 
The paradigmatic or associative relations, on the other hand, are concerned with 
mental associations of like words, which are drawn upon as a matter of choice 
(1974:123). Saussure gives the example of the words ‘painful’, ‘delightful’ and 
‘frightful’, which are a mere selection of an unlimited number of options that could 
be drawn upon by a speaker to do the work of an adjective or adverb (1974:126). 
They are therefore individualistic rather than structural in nature as well as 
indefinite and unverifiable, unlike the syntagm, and for this reason cannot be the 
object of Saussure’s project (1974:126). Nevertheless, Saussure concedes that, even 
in the case of the syntagm, which is a product of “collective usage”, both 
individual and social forces can work in indeterminable combinations such that a 
combination is “hard to class” (1974:125). Bearing in mind that Saussure is 
concerned with analysable structure (according to his criteria), he has no interest in 
the individual manifestations of language, including paradigmatic relations. 
 
Saussure’s schema is an internalisation of the sign. Although he notes that 
signification is always social, the cultural dimensions of a society remain beyond 
his analysis. In some way, this is akin to the law’s treatment of the legal sign. For 
positivists such as Kelsen and Austin, there may be an outside, but it should not, as 
a disciplinary predicate, be part of the search for legal meaning which, they argue, 
is to be confined to the structures internal to the law. Notwithstanding Saussure’s 
structuralism and the limits of Saussurian semiotics, it should be remembered that 
his model was specifically designed around language as an ideal model of a 
semiotic system. An oblique reference to the law suggests that were law his model 
of analysis his schema may have been different for he notes its difference as a 
semiological system from language, in so far as the law, he argues, has a motivated 
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This is the starting point for further developments of a semiotic model tailored to 
the law as a specific system. At the very least, Saussure’s legacy is the conception of 
an analysable relationship between sign and meaning, lifted from the 
epistemological constraints of its time. Its limits, though alluded to here, will be 
discussed further, below. 
 
 
Peirce 
 
Charles Sanders Peirce is attributed with providing the basis for American 
semiotics, a type which is more behavioural than Saussure’s rationalist, 
structuralist approach (Hodge and Kress 1988:14). Unlike Saussure, Peirce 
addresses the place of law in his theory of signs (Kevelson 1990:2) arguing that 
“law and legal argument is prototypical of semiotic processes in general” 
(Kevelson 1992:2). Peirce thus provides the impetus for an ongoing movement 
addressing the relationship.8 Whereas Saussure seeks to understand the social only 
through an analysis of the internal structure of his sign, Peirce is concerned with 
the social, as an entry point of analysis. 
 
Peirce’s background as a philosopher is reflected in his concern with the way in 
which the sign operated in the world, through human experience (Fiske 1982:47). 
As a pragmatist, it was his view that: 
 
A conception, that is, the rational purport of a word or other expression, lies 
exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life … if one can define 
accurately all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or 
denial of a concept could imply, one will have therein a complete definition of the 
concept, and there is absolutely nothing more in it (Peirce in Edgar and Sedgwick 
1999:306, emphasis in original). 
 
Peirce claims that the means to understanding the value attached to signs is by 
emphasising the concrete outcomes of the concept (Edgar and Sedgwick 1999:306). 
In other words, Peirce differs from Saussure in that he has an interest in the 
materiality of the sign, at least in terms of effect. Unlike Saussure who sought to 
                                                 
8 There has been a series of Round Table discussions in the US, with collections of papers on the topic; 
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understand the social through structure, Peirce’s understanding of structure comes 
through a consideration of the social. 
 
The Peircean semiotic structure differs from Saussure’s in a number of ways; 
ostensibly reflecting the play of the social on meaning.9 It is triadic, it pays 
attention to the referent, or object, as Peirce calls it, and is both two-tiered and 
interlocking. 
 
Peirce’s theorising of the sign consists of two triads. He says, of the sign: 
 
I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its 
Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its 
Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former (quoted 
in Greenlee 1973:26). 
 
The first triad, then, consists of the sign, the interpretant and the object; 
approximating, respectively, Saussure’s signifier, signified and referent.10 He 
defines the triadic model in his explanation of semiosis: 
 
By semiosis I mean an action, an influence, which is, or involves, a co-operation of 
three subjects, such as a sign, its object and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence 
not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs (Peirce in Hodge and 
Kress 1988:21). 
 
While Saussure prioritised the relationship of signifier/signified, Peirce eschewed 
binaries. 
 
Peirce’s interpretant is, perhaps, of most promise for a semiotics with a social and 
cultural imperative, one which seeks to challenge the binary between the internal 
and external aspects of a sign. As becomes apparent later in the thesis, these are 
important themes for a semiotic model of interpretation of law. The interpretant 
does not simply mean the ‘interpreter’. Greenlee suggests that: 
                                                 
9 I say ostensibly because of suggestions by Hodge and Kress (some already outlined) that Saussure was 
not averse to a consideration of the social, of history and of that which is external to linguistics; only that 
his schema was an attempt to create an internal linguistics and his positions spoke to this goal (1988:20-
21, 30-31).  
10 In this part, Peirce’s terminology will be relied upon. Hence a reference to the sign is a reference to the 
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it is best to think of Peirce’s ‘interpretant’ as any sign which interprets another sign, 
whether that interpreting sign be a thought in somebody’s mind, a written 
translation, a sentence spoken, or anything else that is interpretative (1973:26). 
 
The interpretant is the mental effect (though note the qualification below) derived 
from and comprised of a combination of the sign and individual experience. 
 
The replication and interlocking of first level triads occurs at the point of the 
interpretant, forming an endless circulation of semiosis (Silverman 1983:15). Peirce 
argues that each semiosic event merely gives rise to a new sign, a new 
representation under a different guise, that which arises as an effect of individual 
use. This sets off a new chain of signification, and so on (Silverman 1983:15). The 
interpretant is the sign combined with use to form the mental concept (see my 
discussion below on the mental concept). The creation of a new sign, interlocking 
to a new triad, can be likened to the second order signification of Hjelmslev and 
Barthes. However, Barthes and Hjelmslev suggest that there can be a purely 
denotative level of signification. Peirce, on the other hand, does not entertain such 
a purity of signification. For Peirce, every act of semiosis is loaded, not only with 
ideology, as per Barthes’ second level signification, and the social semiotics of 
Hodge and Kress, but with a multiplicity of external factors. 
 
In either event, meaning should not be considered as “psychologism”, or as a 
mental process whereby meaning can be found through an investigation of mental 
events (Greenlee 1973:30-31). If this were the case, there would be no possibility for 
a community of interpreters – no two readers could make the same sense of a 
sentence (Greenlee 1973:31). Peirce’s theorising of the sign may be better 
understood if we note that he is anti-Cartesian and eschews mental-material 
dualism (Greenlee 173:61). Thought, for Peirce, is not always a mental 
phenomenon which is distinct from “objective, external things and events” 
(Greenlee 1973:62). He says: 
 
When a thing is in such relation to the individual in that the mind cognizes it, it is 
in the mind; and its being so in the mind will not in the least diminish its external 
existence … [T]o say that an object is in the mind is only a metaphorical way of 
saying that it stands to the intellect in the relation of known to knower (in Greenlee 
1973:62). 
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In short, we should not try to separate the thought processes from the physical 
effects of a sign. Nor should we try to understand thought as something 
psychological. Instead, it is something more akin to being of mind which, Greenlee 
reminds, can be cognition or the capacity to cognise (Greenlee 1993:62-63) in 
relation to its external existence. Peirce’s comments on the realist’s conception of 
thought generally are pertinent to an understanding of the interpretant:11 
 
They [the realists] showed that the general is not capable of full actualization in the 
world of action and reaction but is of the nature of what is thought, but that our 
thinking only apprehends and does not create thought, and that that thought may 
and does as much govern outward things as it does our thinking (1:26).12 
 
The last element of the preliminary triad is the object which is roughly equivalent 
to the Saussurian referent. At its simplest, this is the ‘real’, something other than 
the mental conception. However, Peirce argues that a reality can have no relation 
or quality if it has no representation (Silverman 1983:16). This suggests that while 
an object may exist materially it has no value outside its semiosic play. In other 
words, a thing cannot form part of human cognition except as a sign. Further, if 
“anything should be a Sign, it must ‘represent’, as we say, something else, called its 
Object …” (Peirce 2.230, emphasis in original). As Greenlee adds, the “first 
principle of Peirce’s sign theory asserts that the sign relation requires an object 
functioning significatively” (1973:30). Hence ‘reality’ and the sign mutually rest on 
signification. The functionality of which Peirce speaks should be clarified. Greenlee 
says that it raises two possibilities. One is that an object is actually in place and 
functioning as a sign at a given point. The other is that the object routinely 
functions as a sign (Greenlee 1973:30). 
 
According to Silverman, while Peirce may comment on the object and even include 
it in his triadic structure, it might be understood as something similar to the 
Saussurian referent, both having little relevance (remaining external) to semiosis 
(Silverman 1983:17). It might be ‘out there’ as something real, but there is no scope 
for a referentialist take on the object. This does not mean, however, that for Peirce, 
every object is a sign. He says “[of] course, nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted 
as a sign” (2.308). A sign is not a sign “unless it is interpreted through and 
                                                 
11 Peirce is referring to philosophical realism, which should be distinguished from legal realism. 
12 As is the convention, when referring to the collection of Peircian papers I will refer to Peirce by volume 
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addresses itself to some mind” (7.356). McHoul has a similar view, arguing that the 
existence of a sign depends upon the conventions surrounding it. This “not-sign” 
could be the equivalent of Saussure’s referent or Peirce’s object (which McHoul 
sees as representing either a thing or teleology) or something else (1996:viii). 
 
In so far as the interpretant appears to be independent of the object, and that object 
is excluded from Peirce’s semiotic structure except, effectively, as sign, it might be 
argued, as does Silverman, that at least in this respect, Peirce’s semiotic system is 
closed. Like law then, the sign’s object is largely irrelevant, its representation being 
determined through the internal structure of semiosis. The same conclusion could 
be formed from the “endless commutability” of the first level triad which closes off 
reference to the object (Silverman 1983:15). However, Peirce’s triad is explicitly 
inclusive of the object, perhaps as something external and real but, nevertheless, to 
be viewed as part of semiosis (Silverman 1983:15). And this is, perhaps, what I 
wish for law – to factor in the object, albeit operating always as a sign, into the first 
triad. In short, this is a double semiosis – a referential semiosis on the part of the 
law of an outside community’s semiosis. 
 
That the interpretant involves the individual reader’s social experience also takes 
semiotic analysis beyond internal structure. This contradicts Silverman’s argument 
of a Peircean closed system, despite its provision for unlimited semiosis, because 
each of the elements of the triad is somehow linked to the external. For example, 
for Peirce, semiosis is both diachrony and social practice, unfolding over time in 
and through its community of sign users (Silverman 1983:17). Further, the sign sets 
the limit of users: “… the word or sign which man uses is the man himself” (Peirce 
in Silverman 1983:18). This is a significant difference from the Saussurian schema 
and one which is enticing to contemporary semioticians who seek to investigate the 
sign alongside, and in a reflexive relationship to, the social. As Hodge and Kress 
conclude: 
 
Unlike Saussure, Peirce sees meaning as intrinsically a process, not a quality of 
signs or texts, and he sees a place for both the material determinations of meaning, 
and general social cultural constraints on individual thought (Hodge and Kress 
1988:20). 
 
The second triad is a subclassification of the sign as icon, index or symbol, 
suggesting the possibility that the relationship between sign and interpretant (or 
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‘natural’ connection, differing from the arbitrariness of the Saussurian sign (Hodge 
and Kress 1988:21). 
 
An icon resembles what it signifies by either sharing some of its properties or by 
duplicating its organising principles (Hodge and Kress 1988:27, Silverman 1983:19, 
Greenlee 1973:78). This is similar to Saussure’s symbol, one of the exceptions to his 
principle of the arbitrariness of the signifier, but nevertheless it may rely upon 
convention for interpretation (Greenlee 1973:78). According to Hodge and Kress, 
icons are the most persuasive, their truth value or modality being that of direct 
perception (Hodge and Kress 1988:26). Peirce explains the icon’s value as being of 
‘Firstness’. This is “the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and 
without reference to anything else” (Peirce in Greenlee 1973:34) and is anything 
“capable of being described without contradiction” (Greenlee 1973:36). Firstness is 
immediately realisable, the vaguest of ideas (Peirce 1.537). Greenlee draws 
attention to Peirce’s inconsistencies in relation to these modes of being (1973:81). 
For example, Peirce notes that all signs are also in a mode of Thirdness. He 
explains: “so far as the idea of any law or reason comes in, Thirdness comes in … 
[A]ny mentality involves thirdness” (c1986:640,643, emphasis in original). The sign 
“brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body” 
(Peirce 1.537). Similarly if all signs signify by virtue of a rule of interpretation or 
convention (Greenlee 1973:78) then each of the signs must simultaneously have a 
mode of thirdness as well as its own mode of being. 
 
The index, Peirce’s second type of sign, operates by association, forming some 
connection to the thing it represents so that the thing becomes conceptually present 
(Silverman 1983:19-20). It might be said that the index ‘points to’ something else. 
This connection can be a cause-effect relationship (for example, smoke representing 
fire) or “contiguity linkages” (for example, an arm representing the person) (Hodge 
and Kress 1988:27). The relationship between thing and sign is natural, but less so 
than for icons for which a lesser degree of inference on the part of the reader is 
necessary (Hodge and Kress 1988:27). This is because the index is in a mode of 
secondness. Secondness is experience or event (Peirce, c1986:640, 1.537), more than 
the mere idea of firstness. Peirce explains that, in comparison to thirdness, 
secondness is brute action (c1986:642). 
 
The third type of sign is the symbol, which most closely resembles Saussure’s 
concept of the sign especially in its arbitrariness, but should not be likened to 
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it represents and so relies entirely upon convention or cultural association to 
signify (Greenlee 1973:79, Hodge and Kress 1988:27, Silverman 1983:20). Language, 
by and large, falls into the category of Thirdness, involving a mental aspect. Law, 
in so far as it depends upon language for its representation, is also symbolic and 
relies upon legal conventions for its representational quality, whether or not the 
conventions are those of the legal fraternity. Further, the language of the law can 
defy the ordinary conventions. For example, in law, family relies upon different 
conventions from the non-legal family, particularly inside of legal discourse, but 
also outside of it. 
 
In many ways, Peirce counters the limits of Saussurian semiotics. Where Saussure’s 
binarism forecloses considerations of the social, Peirce centralises the social in his 
triadic, self-perpetuating schema. Peirce’s idea of the object as something tangible, 
but also mediated by the interpretant, limits referential analysis, and demands that 
the semiotician engage with the interpreted manifestations of any object, rather 
than an object itself. Finally, the non-specific nature of the interpretant, as 
something mentalistic but also social, and not a “psychologism” highlights the 
cultural dimensions of interpretation. 
 
 
Beyond the Roots of Semiotics: Rethinking the Limits of Semiotics as a Means of 
Reading the Socio-Legal Sign 
 
In the following sections, I will attempt to develop a specifically legal semiotics, for 
the purposes of reading law. Jackson, an eminent scholar of legal semiotics, has 
written on the development of a “semiotic model of law”, based upon Greimasian 
structuralism (1985). Jackson seeks to describe legal discourse, examining “the 
semiotic characteristics of different aspects of the legal system” (1985:284), and in 
so doing constructing a “theory of sense construction” (as he describes semiotics, 
1995:140), which can be applied to the law. I am concerned with an approach to 
legal interpretation rather than analysing legal discourse per se.13 As already noted, 
my model strives to develop a method of interpretation, to use the terminology of 
law, which is concerned with the meanings of the everyday, mediated through 
law’s discursive constraints. In other words, I seek an approach which permits a 
jurist to reflect on the outside of law when making a determination on a normative 
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legal concept. This means, firstly, an acknowledgment by law that legal 
interpretation is never strictly legal but is always also social and should, therefore, 
incorporate these social aspects into its method. Secondly, it means that the process 
of interpretation look outside of the law to gauge the meanings of legal concepts 
held outside it. This is a focus on the formulation of semiosic communities or the 
various ways in which family means for various communities. It includes a shift 
from meaning being a “psychologism” or linguistic use to community practice. We 
find the meaning of family in the lived-in relationships of people. Thirdly, it means 
recognising that the legal text has multiple histories. Each engagement with the 
sign ‘family’ occurs as part of a discourse which has a history. This history is 
formative in the constitution of a relationship as a familial one, and must be 
incorporated into the semiosis. Fourth, these meanings are not simply ethereal, but 
have a materiality; not only does the law have material consequences, but it is in 
material manifestations that legal concepts can be found. Family can be found in 
ways in which people live, not simply in a statutory definition. Further, these ways 
of living, the meaning of family for these groupings, is a solution to specific socio-
cultural problems. And finally, it requires questioning of whether the object or 
referent is distinct from semiosis, let alone something that is tangible and ‘real’ and 
therefore anything other than a representation. For law, there is a blurring between 
the sign as constructed by legislators and jurists and what might be considered the 
referent or object in Saussurian or Peircean terms. For family, as defined by the 
law, is only ever a signifier of family, but is misunderstood as representing family 
in referential terms. The legal family is construed as a thing called family. My focus 
on these particular aspects will draw out an approach appropriate to legal practice. 
 
In the following discussion, I question the separability of aspects of the sign in 
traditional semiotics, particularly the binaries posited in the Saussurian schema. I 
also discuss the limits of the Peircean model. It should be noted that my 
conceptualisation of a model for legal semiosis should not be construed as a 
replacement of one positivist model by another. There is no question that legal 
interpretation can never be certain. No matter how methodical the approach, 
interpretation remains complex and therefore erratic. My proposal however, 
challenges the law’s officers to note the potential fallibility of their truth claims and 
to defer to alternative truths, as flawed as these may be. It is a request for humility 
in decision making, perhaps, or a call for law to look outwards for meaning rather 
than inwards. 
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In short, I seek to incorporate the social and cultural into legal semiotics. One of the 
criticisms of early versions of semiotics, particularly the Saussurian trajectories, is 
the degree to which the social is rendered secondary in an analysis of meaning and 
meaning making. Strinati comments, on semiotics generally, “[s]emiology does not 
recognise that meaning is not a quality of the sign itself but of the social 
relationships in which it can be located” (1995:126). The same criticism can be 
aimed at law which, built around issues of meaning, purports to find that meaning 
through a structural analysis, assumed to be objective and scientific, when this 
analysis is always a cultural process. If a semiotic method is to apply to law for the 
purposes I have outlined, it must be one which challenges, rather than supports, 
the myth of objective interpretation. 
 
Strinati’s claim is probably unfairly directed to Peirce, and possibly indicates the 
myopia of semiotics associated with one or the other of the forefathers. There have 
been developments which attempt to address Strinati’s criticism. For example, 
drawing upon both Peircean and Saussurian semiotics, Hodge and Kress develop 
an approach for understanding the processes and structures of meaning systems, 
identifying the social, rather than the text, as the starting point for analysis (Hodge 
and Kress 1988:vii). 
 
Having identified the problem, it becomes a question of where to locate the social 
in an analysis, the tendency being to work with the social by locating and 
analysing a text within a context or, as McHoul describes, by attaching a “social 
geometry” to a pre-existing one (1996:xviii). A flaw of this approach is that it omits 
an appreciation of the reflexivity between text and context. They are mutually 
productive: the text is as constitutive of the context as the context is of text. 
 
 
Communities of Semiosic Activity 
 
Reality is not what is ‘given’ to this or that ‘subject’; it is a state of the referent (that 
about which one speaks) which results from the effectuation of establishment 
procedures defined by a unanimously agreed-upon protocol, and from the 
possibility offered to anyone to recommence this effectuation as often as he wants 
(Lyotard 1984:4). 
 
Positivist accounts of law insist that there is only one meaning of a legal concept. 
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reference to the doctrine of stare decisis and the rules of statutory construction. Yet, 
this is but one interpretative community. In fact, the legal fraternity consists of a 
number of interpretative communities, as indicated, for example, public debates 
over the ‘proper’ approach to legal decision-making on the part of the High Court 
of Australia. In addition to those within the law there are those interpretative 
communities working with the law yet outside it. As I have argued, the work of 
law depends upon the engagement with law by alternative interpretative 
communities. 
 
What are these interpretative communities of which I speak? What is their 
relevance to semiotics, and where do we find them? As already outlined, for 
Saussure and for Peirce, meaning is dependent upon the sharing of conventions by 
semiosic communities. Saussure makes numerous references to the collectivity of 
language (for example, 1974:5,9,11,13,39,68 etc.). Further, “every means of 
expression used in society is based, in principle, on collective behaviour or … on 
convention” (1974:68) although semiotic systems in which the sign is fully arbitrary 
are the optimum types for study. Hence, although Saussure does not define his 
idea of the collective, it is clear that it is the means by which the non-natural sign is 
imbued with meaning. It might also provide the motivation for natural signs, as is 
indicated by his statements on the law. Peirce’s collectivity is most strongly linked 
to the idea of the interpretant, which links social convention to all parts of the triad. 
Hence, for both Peirce and Saussure, the collective is the grouping that gives signs 
their conventionality. 
 
What do I mean by interpretative (or semiosic) communities? The idea at times is 
mistaken for a singular entity, through which the meaning of a sign can be known. 
For example, Dworkin’s “interpretative community” is a single community bound 
by a single political morality of a single democratic community to which the 
perfect judge (his Herculean judge) would concede in the determination of so-
called “hard cases” (those cases which require judgment, as opposed to “easy 
cases” which, according to Dworkin, can be determined through a simple 
application of rules) (Dworkin 1986). To the contrary, and as I have already 
indicated, a single sign could give rise to multiple readings, depending upon the 
conventions of the communities. In other words, there is more than one 
interpretative community. 
 
Jackson uses the terminology of Greimas to describe such communities as 
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communication. Jackson is quick to distinguish his conception of the semiotic 
group from that which might inhere in a philosophy such as Hart’s, where 
authorial intent is at the fore of meaning. Jackson’s semiotic communities, on the 
other hand, are those: 
 
within which messages are sent, received and understood, without necessarily 
employing any authorial intention on the part of the ‘sender’ as to the identity of 
the particular ‘receiver’ (Jackson 1990:85-86). 
 
Jackson’s semiotic group belongs in a transactional model of communication as I 
have described it, above. Communication relies upon a shared set of conventions 
regarding the transmission and coding of messages. For Jackson, one of the 
criterion, at the “surface level” for a system of communication is that its members 
share a socio-linguistic register (1990:87). This means, for instance, that only those 
who understand the register of the language of the law can understand the legal 
message. There is also a semiotic criterion, at the “deep structure” level, which 
involves the “closure rules” of a discourse. These restrict sense construction, even 
to those who understand the language at the first level (1990:87). Jackson’s idea of 
the semiotic group recognises that there may be different semiotic groups even 
within the law. But it retains a clear binary between the inside and the outside of 
law, so that only meaning construction within law is ‘legal’. This may be true, but if 
we are to overcome the injustice that occurs through law’s violent imposition of 
terms and its closure to alternative idioms, we need to find a way around this 
distinction, at least in regards to normative concerns such as family. 
 
For McHoul, the interpretative community is more multifarious. He defines 
community “as any collectivities that assemble (physically or by other means) for 
relatively common (including dissensual) semiosic activities” (1996:49). It may be a 
traditional grouping, such as a church group, or a looser group bound, over space 
and time and across media, through a shared interest such as Star Trek fans 
(1996:49). They might come together on the basis of consensus but can also be 
linked despite dissention (178-79). McHoul, through a “Heideggerian-Nietzschean 
version of history” places history at the heart of community, and vice versa. He 
quotes Nancy, a philosopher who has considered the notion of community: 
 
Community itself is something historical. Which means that it is not a substance, 
nor a subject; it is not a common being, which could be the goal or culmination of a 
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happening, an event, more than a being’ (Nancy in McHoul 1996:50, emphasis in 
original). 
 
Communities, then, are “collections of what happens” (1996:50-51) and these 
collections and the communities which they constitute are empirically knowable. If 
we link this to the discussion so far, we can say that, in semiotic terms, 
interpretative communities are those that “use” the sign in a certain way. This is 
discussed in greater detail, below. The point, for now, is that the various uses of the 
signifier of family indicates that there is not only a legal community, but 
communities of those who come together in agreement over the law, in dissension 
over the law or through the practices of the law irrespective of a consensus or 
otherwise. Similarly there is the non-legal; communities who are not made of a 
singular ‘non-legal’ category but who use the sign in various ways. Hence we can 
think of family not only in the terms defined by the law but also according to how 
family is practised, ‘lived’ if you will, according to different cultural and historical 
dimensions, marking out what it means to be gay, Aboriginal, mainstream, 
alternative or whatever else is constitutive of social practice. Jackson might agree 
that these are semiotic groups, but they would be different semiotic groups, with 
different communicative systems. My point is that there is not a single binary – the 
legal (inside) and the non-legal (outside) – which distinguishes between 
interpretative communities. Rather, semiotic groups can cross this divide. In fact, 
the constitutive and ordering requirements of law anticipate that there is some 
overlap, such that ‘non-legal’ semiotic communities are able to read/construct law. 
This is assumed by the entire practice of legal advice. Further, there is a 
requirement that ‘legal’ semiotic communities be a conduit to meaning 
construction outside the law. This is clearly the case in an area such as family law. 
 
The task then, is to frame the law such that it is, in Fiske’s terms, “semiotically 
democratic”, as I discussed earlier. In relation to television culture he recommends 
”the opening up of its discursive practices to the viewer” so that “[t]he reading 
relations of a producerly text are essentially democratic, not autocratic”(Fiske 
1987:239). The same call can be made to law, conferring a power on the jurist to 
defer to the semiosic practices of the various communities and their engagement 
with family. 
 
The significance of community is not a new theme in legal theory. In 1859, John 
Stuart Mill spoke of the force of custom in the activities of individuals. He says: 
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In our times, from the highest class of society down to the lowest, every one lives as 
under the eye of a hostile and dreaded censorship. Not only in what concerns 
others, but in what concerns only themselves, the individual or the family do not 
ask themselves – what do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and 
disposition? or, what would allow the best and highest in me to have fair play, and 
enable it to grow and thrive? They ask themselves, what is suitable to my position? 
what is usually done by persons of my station and pecuniary circumstances? or 
(worse still) what is usually done by persons of a station and circumstances 
superior to mine? I do not mean that they choose what is customary in preference 
to what suits their own inclination. It does not occur to them to have any 
inclination, except for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is bowed to the 
yoke: even in what people do for pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought of; 
they like in crowds; they exercise choice only among things commonly done: 
peculiarity of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned equally with crimes 
(1962:190). 
 
Mill is writing of actions rather than language. But are these distinct? On matters of 
signification I argue that they can be one and the same. 
 
 
The Empiricality of Interpretative Communities: A Move from Meaning to Use 
 
If it is the case, as I have argued, that a community is a “collection of what 
happens” as opposed to a thing or an event (McHoul 1996:49), then what is it that 
brings these collections together? How do we know these collections and how do 
we explain their semiosic activities? 
 
Semiotic analyses associated with an incorporation of the social have been 
criticised for their lack of empiricism. According to Strinati, “semiologists are fond 
of referring to the codes which lie behind, or are embodied in, a particular sign or 
myth, but rarely if ever produce evidence of this code independently of the sign or 
myth under consideration” (Strinati 1995:123). The analysis is ineffective if it is 
confined to the (asocial) sign (Strinati 1995:124). This is a criticism levelled 
particularly at Barthes who overlays his semiotic investigation with ‘ideology’. The 
point is that if the analyst attaches theory, ideology or some other meta-narrative to 
their semiotic analysis when it is not apparent within the text or in the reading 
practices of the user of that text, all that is being illustrated is that scholar’s own 
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which she or he is a part. In law, interpretation is a process that resides on the side 
of the jurist rather than on the side of the ‘user’ of the text. In the 1980s, Blonsky 
saw the development of strategies for incorporating the empirical as one of the 
possibilities for semiotics (1985:xix). The challenge is to refrain from searching for 
the social within the text, to looking at the social in its relation to, and as part of, 
the text, by reference to what exists empirically. 
 
One empirical locus might be that suggested by Peirce’s claim that meaning inures 
in its “bearing upon the conduct of life” (Peirce in Edgar and Sedgwick 1999:306), 
in the relation between sign and use, and in the reciprocity between the semiotic 
subject and the sign (Peirce, cited in Silverman 1983:18). This suggests that there 
are both material effects of semiosis as well as a set of pre-existing conditions 
which might act as a catalyst for that usage. It might even hint at the possibility 
that sign use is semiosis. For as Peirce says, what the sign signifies, the 
“interpretant,” may be a concept, an action or experience, or a quality or feeling 
(c1986:642). Hence, the empirical evidence which one might seek might not be 
evidence of ‘meaning’ but of the practical applications of signs. Peirce’s functional 
approach might be a case in point. Through this, the semiotician might be able to 
identify the processes and the reasons for meaning making. This is similar to 
McHoul’s semiotic model, an approach he calls “effective semiotics”, the 
investigation of “the ways signs have meaning by virtue of their actual uses” 
(1996:vii). He clarifies, by reference to Garfinkel, that use does not refer to the 
meaning of a (linguistic) sign, but to the process by which something comes to 
mean (1996:91-92). In fact, for Garfinkel, utterances and practical actions, etc. are 
never signs. They don’t stand for something else, but are simply what they are in 
the event (McHoul:91-92). 
 
Let me give an example of the mutual constitutiveness of meaning and practice, 
from a conversation I witnessed some time ago. This example just happens to relate 
to alternative models, but I reproduce it here to illustrate the meaning-practice 
connection. It should be noted that I am not a conversation analyst and that the 
following does not follow the conventions of that discipline. The conversation is 
between two women. The relationship pattern for P, a lesbian, is long-term 
cohabitation with her partner, R, organising arrangements on a shared basis. For C, 
the pattern has been long-term heterosexual relationships, with a commitment to 
non-cohabitation and, generally, independent arrangements. 
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P: Is G (C’s partner) coming along (to the party)? 
C: Oh I forgot to ask. 
P: I’m glad I’m not the only one who does that. I’m always doing that to poor R (P’s 
partner). 
Pause in conversation. 
 
What the two participants know at this point is that they are effectively speaking at 
cross purposes. P is saying that she has forgotten to mention to R that they are both 
attending an event. The result is that it will come as a surprise to R that she is 
expected out that night. C is saying that in not being asked, G has not yet been 
invited to the event and therefore will probably not be attending. For P, the 
assumption of relationship is inclusion, for C the assumption is exclusion unless 
otherwise specified. Relationship for P is, by and large, a conducting of affairs in 
tandem, whilst for C it is a conducting of affairs singularly. The conversation 
suggests different understandings of relationship and the practices of performing 
relationship; a different semiosis. Outside of practice these differences are largely 
irrelevant. Their understandings of relationship are only made explicit, and only 
really matter, in actual practice. 
 
Patterson, in his critique of Fish’s and Dworkin’s works on interpretation, says 
“[m]eanings do not spring from interpretations but from action − ways of using 
signs (linguistic and otherwise)” (1993:49-50). He criticises their explanation of 
semiosis as being individual in nature, instead arguing that practice reflects the 
intersubjectivity of semiosis. Patterson argues that: 
 
[the] only way for any semiotic activity to get off the ground is for people to use 
words in the same way; that is, to have a practice. Once a practice is established, 
meaning is something one finds in the practice − the intersubjective coordination of 
verbal use (1993:29). 
 
Patterson is speaking of linguistic signs. I think, however, the same conditions 
might apply for semiosis of non-linguistic signs. Peirce’s idea of ‘function’ can be 
treated as something similar to Patterson’s community practice; as Greenlee notes, 
to say that the sign “functions” is to say that it signifies, and that it does not pertain 
to individual psychology or linguistically limited “use”. 
 
The anti-psychology stance of Peirce also indicates a need to go beyond what 
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can be extracted from Saussure’s position on the “passive assimilation” of the sign 
(of language) on the part of the speaker (1974:14). Saussure also makes a mention 
of sign use, albeit an indirect one. He speaks of the value of the sign as a product of 
social conventions and usage: 
 
The community is necessary if values that owe their existence solely to usage and 
general acceptance are to be set up; by himself the individual is incapable of fixing 
a single value (1974:113, emphasis added). 
 
This value is not arbitrary but is relative, unlike the signifier/signified relationship 
which, for Saussure, is unmotivated in language (1974:110-115). 
 
Saussure is not suggesting that sign use constitutes part of the method of semiotic 
analysis. He clearly distinguishes value-creation, where use is important, from 
signification, where usage is not (1974:114-115). This is consistent with the 
Saussurian approach, which assumes a complete separation between that which is 
internal and that which is external to the sign. Social use is outside the sign and is 
relevant only in terms of the value that it gives a sign rather than in terms of 
signification. But we can extract from this that sign use is a dimension of the social 
conventions necessary for determining the terms in which a sign is to operate as a 
sign. It is therefore relevant to a semiotic method which sees the effects of 
signification (the values associated with meaning) as being part and parcel of 
signification. 
 
McHoul takes the idea of meaning being found in use further in articulating a 
methodology for “effective” semiotic investigations. In so doing, he draws upon 
ethnomethodological insights, namely those of Garfinkel, in arguing that ‘use’ “be 
explained in terms of community members’ knowledge(s) of how signs are used” 
(McHoul 1996:91-92). This is not a concern with what signs mean but how, a 
question of procedure rather than substance. For McHoul, any part of the sign 
which is not relevant to its use is trivial, or at least irrelevant to an “effective 
semiotics”. These practices are purposive both in terms of their relationship to the 
wider community as well as to the community of which they form a part and of 
which they are in part constitutive. Firstly, activities “display their intelligibility as 
part of a specific form of life” and therefore are “methodic” in nature (McHoul 
1996:93, emphasis in original). In performing the activities in the appropriate 
manner, members express their relationship to the community of which they form 
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Society is irremediably practical; it is constructed from (and as) practical activity, 
and practical activity is irremediably reflexive. In acting in particular ways, that is, 
members not only rely on their community’s methods for doing so, they also 
display that it is these methods (and not others) that they are acting upon. Social 
practices are meaningful not because of their ‘contents’ but because they display 
the grounds of their methodic production and understanding. To ‘understand’ a 
sign, then, is to be able to see in it (as an activity) what its productional methods 
must be (1996:92-93). 
 
These “productional methods” bind individual communities. This is patently clear 
for the law and its agents, as has been noted by many legal theorists, and is 
imbricated in the methods of legal training. Jackson, for example, states that the 
pragmatic dimensions of the construction of the meaning of legislation for lawyers 
is a matter of education: 
 
The law student hears legislation spoken of in terms, and tones, of reverence. The 
values communicated by the speech behaviour of law teachers is yet a further 
example of the transference of authority from the enunciator to the text (Jackson 
1999:22). 
 
This is not only a matter of training in the tone and content of the legal text (both 
are important), but also a community membership strategy. Legislation is 
“binding” in character, a matter of “guild membership” (Jackson 1999:22). In a 
similar vein, the Critical Legal Studies movement is infamous for its attacks on the 
role of legal training in the perpetuation of the myths of legal determinacy and the 
social and cultural implications of this for the privileging of legal knowledge.14 
 
Legal education establishes the grounds of meaning production in law. One of 
these grounds is that only internal meanings are legal meanings. This is evidence of 
law’s autopoiesis as described in chapter 9: the law “produces and reproduces its 
own elements by the interaction of its elements … on the basis of meaning” 
(Teubner 1988:3). Those outside the law do not have the benefit of 
this training, as Jackson has explained (1999:22), and therefore do not have access 
to the essential techniques for meaning production. They come to the law with 
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different processes for understanding, a different pragmatics for interpretation, a 
training that has different discursive origins. 
 
The language of the law is a boundary marker between those inside the law and 
those outside of it. Understanding the particular procedural grounds of production 
is, on the one hand, an important solidarity marker for a community. These 
grounds provide membership categories for individuals within those communities 
and, on the other, are indicative of non-membership for those outside of it. 
According to Jackson, in relation to legislation specifically “[t]he Senders of 
legislative messages may readily be distinguished in terms of the sense we [and 
others] make of their respective acts of enunciation” (Jackson 1999:24). This is also 
true of the sense made of the objects of that legislation; in this instance, family or 
family type. 
 
To return to McHoul, who draws on Sacks, these ‘activities’ are “solution[s] … to a 
socio-logical problem that a community has … faced continually, day in, day out” 
(McHoul 1996:93). Patton, a philosopher, makes the connection between problem-
solutions and law when he conceives of societies as “systems of ideal events or 
differences that constitute the problem field of a given form of society” (1995:163). 
The legal, political and economic arrangements of that particular form of society 
are determined as “solutions” in response to specific “problems” (1995:163). 
Patton's “society” might also be understood as something else, as a community, 
however large or small its definition and scope. For McHoul, it is the intersection 
between the two, the methodical production and the socio-logical problem-
solution, that constitutes “meaning” (McHoul 1996:93-94). Though more detailed in 
its formulation, this is a similar position to that of Patterson who argues that 
meaning lies in the practices of communities (see above). 
 
Translating this to the topic of this thesis, the relationship to the law may be 
predicated upon community practices. The effect of these community practices is 
best left to empirical investigations. Nevertheless we can assume that these 
activities, which are problem-solutions, create membership and mark one 
community from another. We can view ‘family’ as a sign, analysing the content of 
that sign by virtue of what a community of users does, as opposed to what they 
think, ‘thinking’ being a problematic explanation of how signs work on the 
individual, as I have already noted. The move to a consideration of what one 
thinks of a sign is, as Saussure says, something one does “only for the purpose of 
classification” (1974:14). Yet is this how the law comes to know meaning? The Chapter 10 | 211 
legislator starts to think about family for the purpose of classification, so as to 
present it in a legal format and, in doing so, fails to represent the lived-in sign of 
family in her or his legally constructed sign of family. The jurist similarly focuses 
upon the classification in interpreting the legal concept. Further, some non-legal 
communities may reflect upon the classification as part of a politics of inclusion. 
But this emphasis on thought, on classification, may be devoid of the passively 
assimilated experience of which Saussure speaks (above). This need not be the 
case, were the law to classify in terms that permit a commitment to the lived 
experiences – the use of family as a solution to socio-logical problems. 
 
 
Con/text: The Material Sign Across Space and Time 
 
It is often assumed that the struggle over the sign, family, in law is one which 
occurs in Parliament, where definitions are created. However, if law is a normative 
sign, rather than a substantive one, (i.e., the referent is a value as opposed to a thing: 
see the discussion on Witteveen’s normative law, in chapter 9), then the struggles 
continue in the court room, between lawyers, between judges. Further, the struggle 
continues outside legal realms. Each of these spaces has its own processes for 
determining meaning, its own context, as it were, but also, its own history, its own 
discursive parameters, its own reasons. These are all one and the same, located 
within the frame as part of the “not-sign”, as discussed below. They exist by virtue 
of what has gone before. Legal investigations into the meaning of family, therefore, 
need to include the histories of the family, not just inside the law (the caselaw) but 
also outside it. This is an issue of text and context; family as a text which is 
culturally, socially, politically and historically located. 
 
The issue of text and context needs to be clarified. A call to the social is not just a 
call to ‘context’ (the outside-text). The relationship between text and referent or 
object is always historically situated, always culturally mediated. The issue of how 
the historical (as opposed to the social) can be incorporated into semiotic analysis 
has also challenged semioticians. According to Silverman, the centrality of the 
synchronic has been the most controversial aspect of Saussurian semiotics, leaving 
little scope for accounting for historical change, unless the analyst ventures into the 
half of the binaries created but then omitted by Saussure, namely speech and 
diachrony (Silverman 1983:13). Silverman argues that the problem of Saussurian 
linguistics is its inability to account for change (Silverman 1983:12). The same may Chapter 10 | 212 
be said of law, unless we find a way of knowing the context of the text, not just at 
the text’s ‘inception’ but as it is read, at any point or place in time. 
 
There is a greater problem arising from the Saussurian emphasis on synchrony 
than its inability to account for change. An omission of the diachronic leaves no 
scope for considering the effects of history on semiosis in the present. Peirce makes 
such a point, referring to the influence of history on science, the relation between 
an historical mode of thinking and the successes of science (2.213). Similarly, 
Saussure comments that “the thing which keeps language from being a simple 
convention that can be modified at the whim of interested parties is not its social 
nature; it is rather the action of time combined with social force” (1974:78). Both 
Saussure and Peirce, therefore, acknowledge the effects of history on the sign, 
though they may not include an investigation of this as part of their method. 
 
The interest of contemporary semioticians in factoring the historical into analysis is 
not surprising, given the influence of Marxism in cultural studies and the Marxist 
emphasis on the play of history in the present:15 
 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please, they do 
not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances 
directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past (Marx 1977:300). 
 
Transposed into semiotics, meaning making is subject to and mediated by 
conditions that are formed through history. There is a need to understand semiosis 
as being contingent upon that which has gone before. Attempts to understand the 
processes for making meaning need to factor in this history. Hence, it is not only 
that a consideration of the diachronic allows for an accounting for change, as 
Silverman has suggested: it also permits an insight into the very processes and 
outcomes of meaning making. What one brings to semiosis is mediated by her or 
his own histories as well as by broader social and semiotic histories. In reflecting 
on history, I do not mean that the semiotician should reflect upon the past in search 
of a true meaning, an exercise in traditional hermeneutics. This is my criticism of 
law. It is about maintaining a vigilance to the material effects of the past on the 
present; both the hows and the whys of bringing up the past for the purposes of a 
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community’s semiosis. If this is the case, law’s methods of interpretation need to 
acknowledge history, including its own. The history embedded in the reading 
techniques of the law (rules of interpretation) assume a pure logic, stripped of 
social imperatives, and fail to acknowledge the multiple social histories within 
which the legal sign sits – of the jurists, of the broader community and so on. 
 
A reflection on history is not simply a reference to events, but also to knowledge 
and power, and to discourse in the Foucauldian sense: 
 
Discursive practices are characterized by the delimitation of a field of objects, the 
definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of 
norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice 
implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices (Foucault 
1970/1971:199). 
 
The idea of a designation of choices points to Foucault’s conception of power 
(discussed in chapter 1). Semiosis, in such terms, involves a history which is both 
limiting and productive. It limits the possible meanings but also produces 
meaning. 
 
An incorporation of the social into semiotic inquiry demands a method which 
recognises the discursive nature of meaning-making; by reference to that which is 
given within the text, as well as that which is excluded, to relations between 
knowledge, power and subjectivity. For an approach to be reflective of the society-
sign interplay, it is necessary to understand the constraints of that interplay. 
However, my project requires an accounting of the effects of history in particular 
semiosic instances. I propose that, in some instances, the jurist needs to be able to 
investigate the practices of signification in different social situations, the same legal 
concept in its play in and of different settings. In short, it is a case of watching for 
the historical in the play of the moment of specific communities; the tug-of-war 
between, on the one hand, the need by particular communities to undertake 
semiosis for particular purposes at a particular time and, on the other, the 
imperative by those same communities to undertake semiosis in particular socially 
(and so, historically) prescribed ways. In addition, there is a need to maintain an 
awareness of the law as discourse and the jurist’s place in that discourse. It is, in 
effect, a reading of the synchronic with the diachronic embedded; an engagement 
with the historical in event-specific ways, but according to the practices of separate 
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Legal interpretation, as part of a positivist discourse, is devoid of any of the 
manifestations of the sign. But, as I have argued, the reality of family is what one 
lives, the sign use, rather than something interpretable. Understanding the sign in 
terms of its materiality is the key to an historicised reading of family in the 
everyday. 
 
For Saussure, meaning is strictly a quality of signs or texts (Hodge and Kress 
1988:20-24). He says that the combination of sound and thought (signifier and 
signified) “produces a form, not a substance” (1974:113). Saussure’s point is that 
signification is not limited by the material dimensions of a sign. He gives the 
example of a street: 
 
if a street is demolished, then rebuilt, we say that it is the same street even though 
in a material sense, perhaps nothing of the old one remains. Why can a street be 
completely rebuilt and still be the same? Because it does not constitute a purely 
material entity; it is based on certain conditions that are distinct from the materials 
that fit the conditions, e.g. its location with respect to other streets (1974:108-109).16 
 
He continues: 
 
The entities are not abstract since we cannot conceive of a street or train outside its 
material realization (1974:109). 
 
This is true, but need it mean that the materiality is irrelevant? For while the street 
may signify street, its referential dimension may signify a set of alternative values – 
an upmarket street, a dangerous street and so on. This is a question of identity and 
values. As I have discussed above, for Saussure ‘value’ and ‘signification’ are not 
synonymous (1974:114-115). But, as I have also argued above, the distinction is 
arbitrary since value and signification may be mutually constituted. 
 
The legal tradition, like Saussure, tries to remove value from signification. This 
might be valid for non-normative law (intellectual property, as a purely legal 
fiction, is simply intellectual property as the law reads it, until such a time as it 
develops broader social connotations) but not for normative law (family is never 
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simply family, but carries many connotations and values as part of this 
connotation). In family, this value may be found in its materiality. 
 
Peirce’s denial of a clear separation between object and interpretant and of the 
conception of the interpretant as an individual reading practice or psychology can 
lead to the possibility of recognising a material dimension to the sign. If, for Peirce, 
the sign is not simply a thought process, does this mean that there are material 
manifestations, other than, perhaps, the object itself, or at least not distinct from the 
object? This is an issue that can be linked to the sign’s historical dimensions, if we 
take the Marxist position of the link between history and material effects. For if 
history is linked to material effect, is it not possible that one of these material 
effects involves the sign? Hodge and Kress refer to Voloshinov’s “theory of the 
fissive force on the sign coming from social conflict and class struggle” (1988:32). 
They outline, by reference to Volishinov, three propositions “asserting the material 
and social dimensions as essential to semiotic analysis”: 
 
1.  Ideology may not be divorced from the material reality of the sign. 
2.  Signs may not be divorced from the concrete forms of social intercourse 
(seeing that the sign is part of organized social intercourse, and cannot exist 
as such, outside it). 
3.  Communication and the forms of communication may not be divorced from 
the material basis (Hodge and Kress 1988:18, by reference to Voloshinov 
1973:21). 
 
McHoul makes a similar point about semiosis as a material practice. He says that: 
“because expressions are acts (of expressing), they too are material practices” 
(1996:xvii, emphasis in original). He continues, “[t]he whole of semiosis is material, 
not a separation of thing and mind, self and world, subject and object … 
Expression-effect is one material thing” (1996:xvii). If semiosis can be understood 
through usage, as I have described above, surely that usage has material 
dimensions. For me, the use of the sign can be found in the practices of everyday 
life. These are the expressions of the sign, not just their mobilisation in language. 
For example, if we come to know family through the practices of those living as 
family rather than through a distant reading of the word ‘family’ or through 
reference to a statutory definition of family, then the meaning of family has 
material form. We know this family through its bodily and relational 
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built into the sign or, as is more likely to be the case, it is both. What we look for is 
largely dependent upon the reason for our analysis. 
 
A semiotics of law, as I have formulated it, would understand the legal family 
through its physical manifestations – how the concept is used, as social practice, in 
the space of the everyday. Meaning is located in these physical manifestations 
rather than in a syntactic or hermeneutic analysis of the legal language of family. 
 
 
The Signifier/Signified (Sign/Interpretant) Relation 
 
Another way of factoring in the social is by asking “ why this signifier with this 
signified?” Saussure argues that this is arbitrary in the linguistic sign, but that there 
may be a motivated relationship in other semiotic systems, such as law. Whether or 
not we agree with Saussure on the issue of the linguistic sign, his qualification that 
other social laws might involve the sign being a means to an end has relevance to 
law. For the setting of legal signs is for a purpose – to regulate, and to assist the 
determination of disputes. Family is defined in a certain way for a reason, or a set 
of reasons, as we saw in chapter 7. This reason may be different from that 
suggested by an instrumentalist goal. The motivation of the relation between the 
legal signifier and the legal signified is a social issue. But what does this say of the 
non-legal sign of family? Arguably, this too is motivated, and it is a social issue. 
For the living of family, the calling oneself family, is designated. It serves a 
purpose. The signifier ‘family’ is chosen, whether by virtue of people living in such 
a way, or by virtue of groups of people calling themselves ‘family’ for practical 
purposes. Hence, the answer to the question of whether the sign, in the semiotic 
systems with which I am involved, has a social dimension within its structure, is 
becoming increasingly self-evident. 
 
If the motivations for the relation between this signifier and this signified are 
important considerations for a semiotics of law, we should think about the 
community’s reasons for the choice of the signifier ‘family’ to designate this 
particular set of ‘feelings’ (to re-cite Lyotard and Peirce) that constitute being 
family. We would find that there is no single ‘reality’ which can be known as 
family, in the way that, say, we might point to a tree and say “that is the referent or 
object, to which the word ‘tree’ points”. Instead we would find that there are many 
different social arrangements (families) that stand as the referent or object, because 
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Bringing the Referent/Object into Focus 
 
In defining terms the law, in a sense, creates a second level of signification. The 
legal signifier, though drawn from social constructions of family, is then fixed 
within the law. This (legal) family then comes to stand in as the referent or object. 
This is family. The signifier replaces the object/referent as that which is ‘real’; or, at 
least that which is ‘real’ family is partially known as such by virtue of its being 
formally consistent with the legal definition. In other words, the referent is 
constructed as part of social and cultural practice. The referent is, at once, both a 
part of signification and that which is ‘real’ and tangible outside of signification. 
Do dominant semiotic models permit such an equivocal position? 
 
Peirce and Saussure only permit two possibilities: that the object or referent is 
treated as sign, on one reading of Peirce; or that it is out there as an ‘objective’ 
reality but external to meaning making, according to Saussure, and an alternative 
reading of Peirce. As McHoul explains: 
 
[a]lmost by definition , every type of semiotic investigation has begun with the 
following idea: For a sign to mean, it must bear a relation to something else (1996:55, 
emphasis in original). 
 
This “thing-outside-the-sign”, framed in terms of a referent or object but which 
McHoul terms the “not-sign”, has, he argues, given rise to a neglect of the 
historical or diachronic (1996:55). If, however, this not-sign could be reframed as 
something like a context, it could incorporate the historical, the socio-political, local 
specificity (McHoul 1996:56). Lucy, a literary theorist, confirms that: 
 
All theories of the sign … have tended to begin from an assumption of the sign’s 
difference from something outside it. The candidate ‘outsides’ have included 
ideology, human nature, factical life, socio-political history, sensorial experience, 
psychic interiority and so (1997:177). 
 
This suggests that a sign has both internal and external relations (McHoul 1996:59). 
I have already argued the importance of accepting the social dimensions of the 
internal relations, that is the relation between signifier and signified (in Saussurian 
terms) or sign and interpretant (in Peircean terms). McHoul, however, argues that 
there is a further relation that is significant, and this, I would argue is an additional 
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a sign resides in the relation between a sign’s internal and external dimensions 
(1996:61). For Saussure, this relation is not relevant to signification. For Peirce, 
however, the object is at once part of signification (it is only a sign, and therefore 
relevant to semiotics, if it represents) as well as outside of it (some thing which is 
only known significatively as a representation). Where McHoul differs from both 
Peirce and Saussure is in his claim that this relation could be the relation between 
the sign and its referent or object or it could be the relation between sign and its 
context, or its history and so on. This is the key, I think, to a socialised and 
culturalised relation between sign and object/referent/not-sign. For the 
determination of this relation would, in itself, be historically determined; that is, 
the use of a sign is a cultural practice rather than an individual choice, suggesting a 
continual recursive historical looping which could, ironically, take signification to a 
simple relation between referent and sign. 
 
Law is a useful example of this relation. The cultural practice of law is to name the 
referent of family through its defining capacities, by reference to wider ‘non-legal’ 
cultural practices. This establishes the relation as one between a designated 
referent and the sign. This is what family means. It is an instruction for the jurist to 
take a purely denotative approach to interpretation. This is an inversion of Barthes’ 
first and second level signification (2000:114-115), but with an additional layering. 
At the first level the law ‘captures’ the connotations of family. This connotation is 
the sign ‘family’, which is to become the signifier for the second level of 
signification. The cultural practice at the second level is that the signifier be read in 
a denotative fashion, as if such a possibility exists, giving rise to a further sign. Part 
of the semiotic practice is to elevate this sign into a referent – this is family, not a 
representation or signifier of family. The third level is that this so-called denotative 
interpretative practice gives rise to a new sign which acts as a signifier for 
subsequent determinations and, potentially, for ‘law-abiding’ citizens. Only a 
semiotic model which factors in the relationship between the not-sign and the sign, 
through a complete blurring of the so-called distinction, can sufficiently account 
for this process. It permits us to understand the existence of the referent or object as 
a cultural practice which is, in itself historical. History has led legal signification to 
this set of practices at this point of time. 
 
Whereas the cultural practice of the law is to create something like a referent or 
object, the life of family outside of law is much more implicated in questions of 
context, with an almost total absence of any referent. This is indicated by 
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effectively no referent, no object that one can point to as family. There is only what 
the socio-politico-historical has deemed to be family for this community. The 
meaning of family can only be known by reference to this context or, in McHoul’s 
terms, by reference to the relation between the sign and the not-sign. Clearly, the 
schema points to a blurring between the internal and external spaces of the sign. A 
clear distinction becomes hardly possible (1996:60) and within these blurred spaces 
the possibilities become endless. 
 
The question of whether a sign has a relation to something outside itself and what 
this something is, is dependent upon what a particular interpretative community 
does with that sign. As I have noted above, for Peirce this does not mean that every 
object is a sign – it is only a sign if it functions as such. The opposite is also patently 
true. Not every sign has an object or referent, although it will have a history and a 
context. The question of what the internal aspect of the sign has a relation to, and 
how this is played out, would, it appears, be a question of local community use. 
 
To summarise, we do not need to be restricted to a choice: to include the not-sign 
as part of the sign so that it can only be known as a sign; or to exclude it as outside 
of the sign and therefore outside of semiosis. Instead, the referent-object and any 
other not-signs might be viewed as part of semiosis. Interpretative communities 
will determine how they deal with the referent-object; whether to view it as a 
‘thing’ or as another sign. This is merely an extension of Peirce’s idea that an icon, 
whilst resembling its object, is only understood as an icon, as resembling that 
object, by virtue of a consensus amongst its interpretative community (Greenlee 
1973:78, Peirce 2.276, 2.279). 
 
The same solution can be applied to the Saussurian relation between signifier and 
signified. Peirce proposes that the relationship might be arbitrary but that, at other 
times, it can be motivated. Again, it might be argued that the relationship between 
signifier and signified, like sign and referent-object, is socially determined and 
determinative. However, it can’t be known outside of an actual empirical semiotic 
investigation. McHoul claims that meaning is neither its referent, nor the historical 
conditions in which it was created. Meaning always depends on the practices of the 
community taking up the sign. So the referent might be what gives a sign its 
meaning, but only if a community treats it like that (1996:xiii). It is a matter for 
empirical investigation (McHoul 1996:60). 
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McHoul sets up a “frame” or, in Derridean terms, a “parergon” which is the space 
of the relation between the sign and the not-sign, as well as signifier and signified 
(1996:19). Hence, it is a space which permits the possibility for one to creep into the 
next; to what ever degree is necessary by that community of sign-users. This frame 
could be the space between the inside and the outside of law, as I explain briefly 
below, and elaborate in the next chapter. 
 
 
Conclusion: A Set of “Cautionary Prescriptions”17 
 
I wish now to summarise an approach to legal semiotics which would bridge the 
divide between legal and non-legal discourse. Ultimately, this section has been set 
on a course bound for McHoul’s “effective semiotics” (1996). A particular feature 
of this approach is its methodological openness alongside its insistence on the 
complexity and unknowableness (at least outside of a given site) of semiosic 
practice. By and large his propositions are not framed in absolute terms but permit, 
perhaps even require, a deferral of semiotic knowledge (what one can know of 
semiosic practice) to the moment of investigation. He does not provide a semiotic 
structure, like the binaries of Saussure, the triads of Peirce, the second level 
signification of Barthes and Hjelmslev or the semiotic square of Griemas. Instead, 
he provides what he calls methods for semiotic investigation. I draw this 
distinction in so far as McHoul’s effective semiotics stands for something like 
Foucault’s “cautionary prescriptions” and so it amounts to a theorisation of 
possibilities rather than a methodology to which one should subscribe. In fact, if 
any prescription can be gleaned, it is to not adhere slavishly to a methodology; 
instead it is to understand a particular framework of possibilities, a set of ways of 
seeing, accompanied by an instruction to work both within and beyond the frame. 
And yet this is accompanied by a methodological rigour, for it is accompanied by a 
call to refrain “from generalist positions concerning such key concepts as ‘meaning’ 
and ‘community’” (amongst other things) and an accounting for the text and for 
the communities using that text. 
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The cautionary prescriptions, as I have developed them, are: 
 
•  Legal texts, like other texts, have polyvalency. However, though there is not a 
single intrinsic meaning within a text, meanings can’t arbitrarily be attached to 
texts by scholarly practice, through the overlay of theory, ideology or some 
other meta-narrative, except as a scholarly semiotic practice. An alternative, 
‘non-legal’ reading does not necessarily constitute a reading of the outside of 
law. Instead one needs to engage with the semiosic practices of individual 
communities. 
•  The ‘social’ is not a mass, but is comprised of multiplicities, what one might call 
communities. The problem becomes one of knowing how to know a community 
when one finds one, or alternatively, how to aggregate readers as members of a 
semiosic community. 
•  The sign and the social are not two sides of a binary but are reflexive. An 
interrogation of the sign requires an accounting for this reflexivity, not an 
analysis which purports to be devoid of the social. 
•  The meaning of the sign can be found in the material manifestations of the sign. 
This is the use that individual communities put the sign to, as a solution to 
socio-logical problems, rather than an emphasis on a psychologism or mental 
process. 
•  The sign’s materiality has an historical dimension. This can assist the reader to 
understand the ‘how’, ‘why’ and ‘what’ of sign use. 
•  The traditional theorisation of the internal relations of the sign and the sign’s 
relation to the referent/object are largely unsatisfactory in terms of any 
semiotics, which seeks to incorporate the social. 
 
Law is generally believed to have significatory closure. Some laws, however 
(particularly the symbolic and symphonic types, as described by Witteveen), have 
a semiotic openness in terms of the meanings they carry in their everyday uses. 
Armed with these guides these alternatives can be more competently (though 
clearly not flawlessly) incorporated into legal semiosis if the objective test of legal 
interpretation is replaced by a self-consciously subjective one. 
 
My proposal is that the law create such a ‘frame’ for a subjective method of legal 
interpretation, where the legal sign (the definition of family) can meet the not-
(legal)-sign. Ordinarily, the law designates a referent, by defining a concept. 
Traditionally, it has defined the family as a thing. However, as I have argued, 
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‘thing’. Legislation could be ‘framed’ in a way which creates a space for the inside 
and outside to come together, for the purposes of legal interpretation. 
In the next chapter, I will outline the implications of such an interpretative 
approach for legislative framing. And in the final chapter, I will elaborate on how 
this approach might affect legal meaning, by drawing upon the semiotic practices 
of a single community. Chapter 11    A New (Semiotic) Model of Legislation 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is one thing to challenge law’s stranglehold on meaning and on the truth-
claims on these interpretations, and then to create a semiotic approach to 
reading texts. However, will this get us to a point of the jurist being able to 
reach into the context of the sign, to view the sign as it lives in the spaces of 
the everyday, to know the sign so constituted? As indeterminate as legal 
interpretation may be, the jurist is, nevertheless, limited in her or his capacity 
to make meanings, by law’s rules of interpretation. The game plan (the rules 
and the ceremony) for jurists would restrict such alternatives. So, for 
example, as willing as the Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia, 
Nicholson CJ, and High Court Judge, Kirby J, might be to extend family law 
jurisdiction to non-heteronormative families if the matter calls for it (see 
Nicholson CJ’s comments in 1997:119 and Kirby J’s view on defining 
personal relationships in New South Wales Law Reform Commission 
2001:¶2.35-2.40), they are limited by the terms of the statute, the doctrines for 
interpreting that statute and the precedents with which it is associated; that 
is, the rules of the game. No amount of legal scholarship – the game as 
constituted by the rules and the ceremony – would permit such a 
transgression. There is simply not always enough room for play.1 
 
There is little scope for a reflection by jurists on alternative family forms and 
of possibilities for alternative engagements with family law under the Family 
Law Act 1975 (Cth) except in relation to matters concerning children. The 
courts’ capacity to affirm the outside is, I think, a matter of the indexicality of 
the sign as well as the actual process of interpretation, as central as this latter 
may be. The new approaches of the states have, to an increasing degree, 
opened up the potential for interpretation. However, few jurisdictions have a 
highly mobile signifier. The earliest example is the Domestic Relationships Act 
1994 (ACT) where the sign “domestic relationship” (in lieu of family) is open 
to a multiplicity of family forms, because it opens a frame between the inside 
and the outside of law. I wish here to explain the difference between the 
statutes in semiotic terms, explaining why the Australian Capital Territory’s 
approach has been noted as a “paradigm shift away from the ‘marriage-like 
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jurists (at least in the eyes of conservative legal commentators), but the legitimacy of these relies 
upon their having arisen via the use of the interpretative tools that the jurist has at her or his disposal. Chapter 11 | 224 
state’” (Millbank 2000a:164), which has been the norm for constructing the 
family or its equivalents in Commonwealth and state family law. 
 
 
From the Peircean Symbol to Index 
 
I outlined the Peircean semiotic model in chapter 10. Here, I will elaborate on 
the aspects of it most relevant to this chapter. Peirce’s triadic conception of 
the sign includes the idea of the index, characterised as secondness. The 
index, for Peirce, is a “sign determined by its Dynamic object by virtue of 
being in a real relation to it” such as a proper name or the symptom of a 
disease (c1986:643). It is represented as an action, experience or feeling rather 
than a thing (firstness) or a thought (thirdness) (c1986:642). He adds that 
“brute force is secondness, any mentality involves thirdness” (c1986:642). 
 
According to Malloy the index functions in the following way: 
 
[t]he index is … of comparative reference. It functions as an interpretive 
screen. It frames, filters and influences the encoding and decoding of socio-
legal meanings and values. It ‘maps’ the relationship between a particular 
quality or exchange and other such exchanges or qualities. Alternative 
mappings are possible with different cultural-interpretive references. This 
involves the process of understanding the relationship between particular 
information fragments or facts, and a varying set of comparative measures 
or referents (2002:10, emphasis in original). 
 
The index differs from Peirce’s other two sign types, the icon and the 
symbol, in that, inter alia, it is both linked to, and remote from, its object 
(Saussure’s referent). There is both a natural and an inherent connection that 
comes from the sign’s materiality (Hodge and Kress 1988:20) and a 
“consciousness” (c1986:640) or “sense or memory” on the part of the person 
for whom it serves as a sign (1960:2.305). Peirce notes that some indices may 
“stand for things … with which the interpreting mind is already acquainted 
… They act to force the attention to the thing intended” (1960:8.368). We 
might understand the legal language of family or domestic relationship (as 
they are coined by statutes) as coming to stand for the social thing known as 
family or domestic relationship, however that understanding comes about. I 
have indicated already that family be understood as a set of practices rather 
than a ‘thing’ per se. 
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For Malloy, the “mapping” work of the index is dependent upon the 
existence of particular “cultural-interpretive frames” (2002:10). There is a 
social power associated with one’s ability to control this index, a power that 
asserts itself in terms of the discourses of that particular semiotic community 
(2002:11).2 Implicit is a power associated with one’s knowledge of the index 
and ability to engage with it. 
 
Arguably, family, outside of the law, is action (practice), experience or 
feeling – an index. Yet, law redesignates the social family as a Peircean 
‘symbol’ – a sign that relies for its signification purely upon convention or 
cultural association. As part of the convention the signifer relates to a 
referent, marked as a ‘thing’, which is outside of the process of signification, 
in the Saussurian sense. This symbol is a mode of thirdness because it 
essentially involves a mentality, at least according to the law’s discourse on 
interpretation. 
 
Despite the sign-type that exists within positivist legal discourse, the fact 
remains, as indicated by the judgments on family, that there is recourse to 
the social (as opposed to the strictly legal) sign and that the law, at least in 
the area of family, is rarely symbolic. Instead, the legal family is doubly, 
perhaps even triply, indexical. The law’s representation of family (whether 
that object is conceived of as a thing or a goal) relies upon a legal frame for 
interpreting the sign. However, an understanding of family also draws on 
the interpretive screen of the jurist who is both a legal and a social subject, 
bound not only by the rules but also to the ceremony of the game. Moreover, 
this construction of family is supposed to correspond to the non-legal frame 
in which the ‘thing’ family resides. A preferred reading is one which has the 
jurist reflecting upon the user’s social and cultural screening, as I have 
argued above. This is the nature of legal interpretation – it is, on the one 
hand, legal but, on the other, always also social and cultural. A redesignation 
of the legal sign from one of symbol to one of index would permit a shift in 
approach from legal ‘reasoning’ to a semiosis of the type I have outlined – a 
reflection on the experience of family. Even so, there is still the matter of the 
indexicality of the sign – the sign’s capacity to point to something else. 
 
In a similar vein to Malloy, McHoul says that, in ethnomethodological 
(rather than strictly Peircean) terms, “indexicality” refers to the “context-
dependence or context sensitivity of any utterance”; the context of the “here 
and now” of that utterance (1996:137). He proposes, however, that the 
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context reference point be equally important to all dimensions of the sign – 
the here and now (the synchronic), as well as the historical framework (the 
diachronic). More importantly, for this thesis, is his idea of the indexicality 
representing a “gap” in semiosis, which may need to be filled, but which 
may be operated upon in any number of ways: 
 
one may attempt to widen it, alter its shape, leave it in place exactly as it is, 
create another gap of a different sort in its place or beside it, ignore it, take it 
for granted, and so forth (1996:141). 
 
Now, to return to Malloy, an important aspect of the law (and, for him, the 
market economy) is the “competition for influence over the cultural-
interpretive frames and references of exchange” (2002:11). This struggle is 
similarly reflected in the different accounting of the conception of family in 
law and in the everyday. This is not only a struggle for influence but also an 
issue of the degree to which jurists and lawyers can manipulate the “gap” in 
semiosis, the indexicality of the law. In Derridean terms, it is a question of 
the degree to which the “organizing principle of the structure [the statute 
coupled with the rules of interpretation] would limit what we might call the 
play of the structure” (1978:278, emphasis in original). 
 
The dynamism of the object, family, is limited, in legal terms, by its 
designation as a model of thirdness, as symbol; and the legislature has 
placed a very clear wall around what it conceives as family, limiting the 
frame for interpretation. The scope for play on the part of the jurist is 
narrowly confined to the space, or the “gap” within those walls – the ‘game’ 
of family law is narrowly prescribed within law by the rules of interpretation 
coupled with the approach to legislative framing. But this is not a necessary 
condition. McHoul notes that a sign’s indexical potential can be opened or 
closed, “practically ‘definite’” or “practically ‘indeterminate’”(1996:145). He 
explains that, in fact, the closing of indexicality may be a strategy, for some 
communities, of guarding against a particular sign’s misuse or 
misinterpretation (1996:145). This is the method of law – part of its game as 
well as its ceremony. According to Jackson, “legislative language is reducible 
to norms expressed in terms of three deontic modalities, that which is 
required, prohibited or permitted” and only these have meaning in a 
modern legal system (1999:17-18). This is, it would seem, one way in which 
the law controls indexicality. It is, some might argue, essential to the law that 
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law into domains that might otherwise be none of its business.3 Indexical 
control is, arguably, part of the law’s strategy for obtaining the “sufficient 
semiosis” noted by Ruthrof and described earlier (2001:146-147). 
 
In any case, the possible play of this sign, the sign of family, at least for the 
legal fraternity, is severely circumscribed in descending degrees from 
Commonwealth legislation to the state acts with greatest potential for 
significatory play in the case of the Australian Capital Territory and, more 
recently, Tasmania. But (and this is an important ‘but’, for the non-legal 
fraternity, which is not limited by the interpretive and discursive constraints 
of the law) all sorts of play with the sign of family continues. It is a different 
ball game, to return to the ludic metaphor. 
 
Jackson stresses that the grammar of the law does not limit the way in which 
action is “modalised” outside of the law, that is, in “the discourses of non-
professional users of legislation” (1999:18-19). Family is a completely 
malleable category, limited only by the communities in which that sign lives 
in any particular moment.4 As I have noted already, by reference to 
Witteveen’s work on “significant, symbolic and symphonic laws” (1999:34-
35), there are some rules, principles and (I would add) signs that are not the 
inventions of law, but are the product of normative concerns beyond the law 
(though not necessarily exclusive of the law). Family is one of these unlike, 
say, something like a patent or other intellectual property rights, which may 
be argued to be, in the first instance, a legal creation (although my 
reservations in the introduction to the thesis should be noted) . And it is for 
this reason that it is unethical and an injustice, as I have argued, for the law 
to create closure on the ways the signifier, family, works – as if it is a 
construct of the law alone, as if the Parliament or the judge were the author 
of the concept, as if the law had an actual monopoly over its meanings. 
 
Law may be framed with a broader cultural interpretive frame, with a much 
greater “indexical potential” (McHoul 1996:145) and a more critical sense of 
what the gap might constitute of what it might mean. Such a law would be 
more akin to what Patton demands of a deconstructive gesture. It would 
permit: 
 
                                                 
3 I am not speaking of traditional public/private binaries. I am suggesting that the law has socially 
prescribed (legislated) limits that must be recognised if it is not to be essentially a tool of the state.  
4 This is not to say that the here and now of the sign does not have a history that limits its play in the 
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a legally and politically open-ended space of possibilities for action, a space 
of becoming that allows for the non-self-identical character of individual 
and collective agents (1995:162). 
 
The signifier ‘family’ is a category, a gap. How that category is limited, 
stretched or filled is culturally determined. And yet the law, in its definition 
of family, has ultimate influence over the permissible codes of interpretation 
of that category. It has limited the indexicality of the sign, family, which, as a 
result, can point to a very limited number of things. 
 
‘Things’ is the operative term here because family, in the Commonwealth 
law and,historically, in the state acts, is a sign directed to a referent, a thing, 
a model of relationship, and this is narrowly defined. The law could, 
however, relinquish its attempts of authority over the social and cultural 
space by firstly opening the ways in which the gap can be filled (its approach 
to interpretation) and, secondly, by redesignating family as an activity rather 
than a thing (an index in a mode of secondness). This would be in keeping 
with the explanations of family provided by some members of Parliament, 
socio-legal commentators and judges, as discussed in part 3. 
 
 
Redefining the Indexicality of Family in Law: From ‘Thing’ to ‘Practice’ 
 
I have spoken of the idea of social practice being the key to semiotic activity. 
I now wish to further develop this idea. McHoul’s method for an effective 
semiotics proposes that meaning inheres in the relation between: 
 
•  a community’s methodic activities (the here and now of the sign); and 
•  the sign as a solution to socio-logical problems (the community/history 
framing of the sign) (1996:93-94). 
 
To return to the site of my own investigations, the meaning of the concept of 
family is to be found in the ways in which communities use the sign in an 
everyday sense as a solution to socio-logical problems. 
 
The law uses family to create a point of demarcation between family law and 
other law. It signifies a particular space in which the activities and 
relationships differ from those in other spaces and so should be privy to a 
specially designed dispute resolution mechanism. So, at a jurisdictional level, 
the problem for the law is how to constitute a specific legal field for the 
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the need to resolve disputes which occur within the family setting; as a 
setting which is different in nature from that which is non-family. The 
justification for such a distinction is made clear in any family law policy 
report. The solution for law has been to construct the family in terms of 
form. But is this what family is really about? 
 
As already discussed, the work of socio-legal scholars such as Silva and 
Smart, Eekelaar and Finch suggests that family is not something that ‘is’; 
rather it is something that is ‘done’. The socio-logical problem outside of the 
law is one of defining the space within which social obligation and mutual 
duty is developed and practised. The solution is to call that space ‘family’ as 
a reflexive statement of the duties and obligations that exist within that 
space. For the law, the problem is that there are certain forms of relationship 
that can be distinguished in their economic arrangements and types of 
negotiation from those in the commercial sphere and which therefore require 
alternative mechanisms for the resolution of economic conflict. The solution, 
traditionally, has been to name theses families as subject to an alternative 
regime of law: by legislating that certain relationships are distinct from the 
public sphere. 
 
If we frame the index in terms of practice, and if we see meaning as 
implicated in what communities ‘do’ as part of their problem-solution, then 
we might have the capacity to be responsive to the full potential of family 
models operating outside the law. The Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) 
and the Relationships Act 2003 (Tas) are indicative of this “paradigm shift.” 
 
It is with such a view that I wish to recap on the Australian legislative 
regimes on family/de facto/domestic relationships law with a focus on the 
indexical potential of their definitions of the family. Do they permit the 
“legally and politically open-ended space of possibilities for action” that 
Patton strives for as part of a deconstructive gesture (quoted above)? In the 
chart overleaf, I map out the legislation in terms of its paradigmatic-
syntagmatic axes. The possibilities for combination at the paradigmatic 
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As can be seen, the indexical potential of most of the statutes dealing with 
the property rights of families is limited, because the statute applies to a 
small range of relationships; those looking like marriage. An exponential 
increase in the indexical potential occurs only when the legislature avoids 
defining relationship in terms of a ‘thing’ in favour of characteristics or 
practices. In the case of the form approach, the paradigmatic plane is 
organised in such a manner that each time the legislature notes a change in 
the nature of family it varies the form (the trend has been to move from 
marriage, to heterosexual de facto, to same-sex/heterosexual de facto), 
increasing the selections available. The ACT and Tasmania statutes on the 
other hand, and that of NSW to a degree, open their syntagmatic framing to 
greater paradigmatic possibilities. 
 
Soon after its inception, Behrens, an Australian family law expert, said that 
the ACT legislation was a recognition of ‘family’ outside narrowly 
constructed criteria (Behrens 1996). The same can now be said of the 
Tasmanian provisions. They permit communities to conceive of themselves 
and their economic (that is, ‘public’) affairs other than through the narrowly 
constructed fields marked by family law. In so far as the legislation deals 
with criteria, based upon the nature of negotiations rather than with a 
narrowly constructed form, it opens up a multiplicity of possibilities. It is a 
far more open text, permitting far more semiotic play than other bodies of 
family law and, in this respect is arguably less violent than a body of 
legislation which stamps the limits of legally sanctioned family form. In this 
way, it differs from law which relies simply upon “the programmable 
application or unfolding of a calculable process”; the type of law which, 
Derrida argues, may lead to a legal, but never a just, outcome (1992:24). 
 
For those within law, the idea of bringing everyday and legal meanings 
together is syntagmatically flawed. The construction of family in each space 
has its own syntagm. The relationship in law has traditionally been defined 
in terms of form whilst, in the everyday, the relationship is defined in terms 
of practice. However, as we have seen, a slight syntagmatic variation on the 
matter of relationship by the law permits a greater recognition of the choices 
of family and of the possibilities for manipulating the sign-relation, beyond 
the law. 
 
The need to change the approach to legislating for family has been noted in a 
number of jurisdictions. The New South Wales Law Reform Commission notes 
that the cohabitation requirement of their comparatively expansive domestic 
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47). Similarly, the South Australian Parliament is considering amendments to its 
De facto Relationships Act 1996 to recognise same-sex relationships. In an article 
in The Australian, the government opposition was reported as calling for broad 
ranging domestic relations legislation, in light of government proposals for law 
reform in relation to same-sex couples: 
 
Opposition legal affairs spokesman Robert Lawson said same-sex law 
reform in South Australia had to recognise “domestic co-dependent 
relationships”. “We should not be limited to sexual relationships, but look 
more broadly to other relationship which are both economic and social … It 
is unfair now that two elderly same-sex people in a non-sexual relationship 
can not have access to concessions that presently apply to married and de 
facto couples” (Di Girolamo and Altmann, October 2001:7). 
 
How the South Australian opposition would frame this legislation remains 
to be seen. However, it seems inconceivable that the required goal could be 
achieved without a change in the way domestic law is framed. The demand 
indicates a changing view of alternative family models, and a problem for 
the law in keeping up with these changes under the traditional legislative 
paradigm. The Law Reform Commission of Canada made the following 
observation about the trend of using “marriage as a proxy for indicating the 
kinds of close personal relationships between adults to which it intends a 
particular policy to apply”. The: 
 
generalised use of concepts like marriage and spouse … directly raises 
problems of congruence: in some cases, the concepts are too narrow; in 
some, they are too broad; and in some, they are both too narrow and too 
broad at the same time (2000:29). 
 
 
A Model of Symphonic Law? 
 
It is appropriate to return here to Witteveen’s schema of legislation types 
and their correlation to models of communication. Of particular relevance is 
his metaphor of “symphonic laws” – a depiction of those laws which are able 
to signify by virtue of a collaboration between a so-called creator and an 
audience and which rely upon a text-model of communication (though I 
prefer the concept of the transactional model, as discussed earlier). I think 
that this idea of an open-indexicality is reflective of Witteveen’s metaphor of 
the symphony. 
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Linked to the metaphor is Witteveen’s idea of “self regulation”. Open-ended 
norms operate alongside sharp rules (symphonic laws) – “work[ing] with 
norm formulations that are sufficiently open to stimulate active 
interpretation” (1999:69). This, he says, “is no passive act, but an active 
involvement in the process of social construction that gives shape to 
practices motivated by the standard” (1999:69). Witteveen uses the example 
of immigration law but family law is equally pertinent. For the idea of 
economic and personal interdependence, as depicted by the definition of 
“domestic relationship” in the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), permits 
an active interpretation of domestic relationship and therefore, family, on the 
part of the constituency. The law merely confirms this relationship if the 
requisite indications of interdependency exists – a factual investigation. 
Witteveen recommends that symphonic laws combine a combination of 
“sharp and open norms predicated on both communication models [message 
and text models]” (1999:68-69). That is, the open norm of, say, ‘family’ or 
‘domestic relationship’ should be accompanied by a set of sharp norms 
manifesting as a set of criteria with a discretion of weighting on the part of 
the decision-maker (1999:69). This gets to the idea of adding a set of 
considerations, as exists for some jurisdictions in the determination of de 
facto or domestic relationship as well as for determining the “best interests” 
of the child under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). 
 
 
Open-Indexicality and a New Configuration of the Law-Society Relation 
 
The idea of a legislative open-indexicality and symphonic legal metaphor 
suggests a different conception of the relationship between law and society, 
from that of the command-transmission model. I will return to Teubner and 
van Shooten to explain this difference. 
 
Teubner, in his discussion of “autopoiesis” theory, argues for a substitution 
of what he calls “reflexive law” for the instrumental law of the welfare state. 
Whereas the latter directs social behaviour, reflexive law sets out guidelines 
and provides a legal structure within which social groups can self-regulate. 
According to van Schooten, reflexive law: 
 
does not take full responsibility for the outcome, like purposive and goal-
oriented legislation does, but leaves the “substantive rationality” to the self 
regulating social system … [It] does not aim at the direct collective 
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procedure and competence that provide a legal structure in which the social 
group can regulate itself (van Schooten 1999:190). 
 
This points to a different type of legal rationality than that normally 
associated with positivist accounts of law. Teubner outlines three types of 
legal rationality. These are: 
 
•  Formal rationality and formal law, which is justified through “its 
contributions to individualism and autonomy, and so rests on the 
continued validity of these values … [F]ormal law fulfils legitimizing 
functions: ‘a logically formal legal order appears to be a neutral and 
autonomous source of normative guidance, and this very neutrality and 
autonomy of law forms the basis … to legitimate authority’” (Teubner, 
quoted in van Schooten 1999:191). 
•  Substantive rationality, which is associated with state intervention in 
market processes and the expansion of the welfare state. It is justified 
through “the perceived need for the collective regulation of economic 
and social activities to compensate for inadequacies of the market” 
(Teubner, quoted in van Schooten, 1999:191). 
•  Reflexive rationality, which “is justified by the desirability of 
coordinating recursively determined forms of social cooperation” 
(Teubner, quoted in van Schooten, 1999:191). Van Schooten says that 
justification for reflexive rationality is not found in individual autonomy, 
or in the state regulation of collective behaviour. 
 
The first two suggest a command-transmission model of legal 
communication, though directed at different ends. The third, however, relies 
on a transactional conception of communication with audiences being 
involved in meaning construction. 
 
Is it possible to conceptualise the jurisdictional components of family law in 
reflexive terms? One of the difficulties is, how to move legal determination 
out of a mode of autopoiesis. As discussed in chapter 9, legal autopoiesis is, 
according to Teubner, the means by which law self-replicates as a self-
referential, self-organising system. The law is “an autopoietic social system 
of a secondary order”, society itself being the first order system (van 
Schooten 1999:192). 
 
The problem for the law is that, unless the legislature is directive in the ways 
in which socially normative concerns are to be understood (such as ‘family is 
a man and a woman cohabiting in a bona fide domestic relationship’), the Chapter 11 | 235 
law is bound to reflect back upon itself on the nature of family. Family will 
be what it has been understood to be at some earlier point, and if we trace 
this back we come to an indeterminate moment – something akin to 
Derrida’s mythical authority, when the decision was simply made without a 
legitimating logic. Hyde is arguably that moment for Australian family law. 
Even if the law is only a second order autopoietic system, as Teubner argues, 
it is, nevertheless, an autopoietic system, strengthened in this sense by a 
positivist discourse on decision-making, and so there is a continual recyling 
of legal meaning, touched only slightly by the society, the first order system. 
 
An open-indexicality of relevant statutes, coupled with a semiotic approach 
to meaning, can permit the law to look outside of itself, to make a 
determination which fully embraces the social. This already occurs in the law 
with normatively-derived and -driven tests such as ‘reasonableness’ and ‘fair 
and equitable’ conduct. But in so far as these rely upon objective tests, they 
give the authority to a judge to determine the natural and neutral position. 
My proposal is that we require the law to reflect beyond itself – something 
like the subjective test, but applied to a community rather to an individual. 
The law would ask, what does the community in which this individual 
resides understand as family? We could, then, provide a system that 
represents the common norms regarding family obligation, but in a manner 
that permits communities to self-determine, through practice, whether or not 
they are family. This is not a case of individuals ‘buying out’ of family duties 
when it suits them – it is not a model which favours individual autonomy, a 
subjective test of family responsibility. It is a model more forcefully rooted in 
the practices of local communities. This is different from an instrumental 
law, which spells out the definition of family a priori. It is also different from 
a law which gives discretion to a jurist to determine family. In either case, 
the likelihood is a definition of family based upon a homogenised norm – the 
family which dominates public discourse. Instead, the model requires that 
the jurist reflect on the norms of localised communities to determine whether 
those families are ‘doing’ family, in the ways indicated by socio-legal 
scholars, as discussed above. It is a reflexive law, but one which requires a 
reflexivity between law and society, rather than between law and itself. This 
is a refining, if you will, of Teubner’s idea of law as a secondary order 
autopoietic system: “secondary order, because it achieves an independent 
operative closedness in regard to society as an autopoietic system of the first 
order – as far as it constructs its own system elements in a self-referential 
process” (quoted in van Schooten 1999:192). 
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That law is self-referential is important for how it operates as a discourse. 
The danger of any discourse, however, is, as Foucault points out, that 
knowledge is contained within and through discourse, and discourse 
operates “in relation to power relations” (McHoul and Grace 1993:39, 
emphasis in original). If law is an autopoietic system, independent of any 
other, then its truths can be independent from any others outside of its own 
system. Yet if law is to rule over these others, it must operate as a second 
order autopoietic system – be ‘in relation’ to the other. How do we resolve 
the contradiction? Firstly, by developing systems within the law by which it 
is required to reflect outside itself, a semiotic approach to interpretation; and 
secondly, through a combination of the symbolic laws of which Witteveen 
speaks and the reflexive rationality of Teubner. This would establish a 
requirement for the law to frame itself in a way that permits reflexivity with 
communities outside of itself. To invoke Floch, a semiotician concerned with 
the use of bricolage in the construction of visual images: he claims that when 
a group resists a reliance on stereotypes or a given discourse: “[t]hey talk of 
a community of values, convergence, assimilation, diversity, hierarchy, a 
respect for particularity” (2000:7). This is a possible effect of a reflexive 
approach to framing legislation, if coupled with a semiotic method to legal 
interpretation. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is one thing to propose that the law adopt a semiotic approach to meaning 
construction. Yet, without an approach to legislation which permits an 
ownership of meaning by specific legal and non-legal interpretative 
communities, the judiciary would be limited to the understanding of family 
dictated by legal discourse and the narrow semiotic community formed by 
that discourse. The combination of legal rules for interpretation and the 
adoption of “significant” legislation (to use Witteveen’s terminology) limit 
the play of the legal sign. 
 
Reframing family law so that it is symphonic in nature, if coupled with a 
semiotic approach to interpretation, would permit the jurist to have a 
dialogue with the families in respect of whom she or he is making a 
determination. Such a symphony would be permitted if legislators opened 
the indexicality of the legal signifier, forming a bridge between the inside 
and the outside of law. This would lead the way for a reflective rationality 
on the part of the jurist whose role it would be to establish a dialogue 
between the law and society. Instead of knowing family by a reference Chapter 11 | 237 
inward to a symbolic referent, the jurist would know family through an 
outward reflection. Family would be determined by the conduct of diverse 
communities, rather than through a legal prescription. 
 
In the next chapter, I provide an example of how the law might, given the 
appropriate legislative framework, engage semiotically, reflexively and 
symphonically with a particular family arrangement, not traditionally 
recognised as family by the law. The family of focus is the same-sex centred 
family. Chapter 12  Legal Semiotics: An Example Reading of the Family 
of the Indexically-Open Statute 
 
 
Introduction 
 
No longer can language be identified with a contract pure and simple, and it is 
precisely from this viewpoint that the linguistic sign is a particularly interesting 
object of study; for language furnishes the best proof that a law accepted by a 
community is a thing that is tolerated and not a rule to which all freely consent 
(Saussure 1974:71). 
 
In this part of the thesis, I have argued that an alternative to the truth claims that 
arise from a positivist description of legal interpretation is possible if we approach 
law as a transactional model of communication, which accommodates non-legal 
communities’ constructions of their signs. I have proposed a semiotic method of 
meaning construction as an alternative to positivist doctrines of legal interpretation 
(hereafter I will refer to this approach as the ‘semiotic method’). This semiotic 
method focuses on the social practices of those communities which are the subject 
or object of legislation, to imbue the legal text with meaning. This, I suggest, 
requires that the legislature adopts an alternative approach to drafting statutes 
directed at normative concerns such as the family. This approach is reflected most 
aptly in the Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT) (the ACT Act), although, as 
discussed, above, there are more recent state acts in which the 
jurisdictional/definitional provisions have been relatively indexically open. 
 
In this, the final chapter, I attempt to illustrate the value of semiotic tools to 
understanding and interpreting law and to bridging the law-presumed gulf 
between law and society. I consider, firstly, what a semiotic approach to 
interpretation might look like in relation to the permissible ACT Act. I also indicate 
how the same approach can be useful in evaluating legislative effect, and as a 
guide to law reform. Finally, I provide a semiotic analysis of Re Patrick and An 
Application Concerning Contact (2002) FLC ¶93-096, a case referred to in chapter 8, 
using what is commonly known as a grid of consumption values (also known as a 
Greimasian grid or myth quadrant). The analysis shows the social limits of legal 
interpretation, even where the legislative provision is relatively indexically open. 
 
I focus upon the gay and lesbian community and its constructions of famil(y)/(ies) 
as the example, in part because of the focus already given through the earlier 
reading of Re Patrick, but also because it is a family which has historically been 
denied family status in law. As is clear from the discussion of Re Patrick, the Chapter 12 | 239 
   
children provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (FLA) have an open 
indexicality. Despite this, gay and lesbian parents have at times received poor 
treatment in child custody applications (as they were known at the time). For 
example, in Re L (1983) FLC ¶91-353, per Baker J, 78,363-4, the Court created a 
checklist of special factors to take into account when a parent was gay or lesbian 
and, in Re G (1992) FLC ¶92-286, 79,122, a condition of custody was that the 
mother’s female partner not come into contact with the children.1 The key issue in 
each of the cases was the sexuality of the parent. 
 
I have argued that, historically, even where the legislation has permitted 
jurisdiction to non-heteronormative families, such as those headed by same-sex 
partners, the traditional approach to legislative interpretation directs that a jurist 
read family through a particular prism of meaning, that of the legal community. 
But as I have also argued, the rules of interpretation cloud the effect of the jurist’s 
other subjectivities on meaning making. Legal interpretation is, generally, 
considered to be objective and formulaic. In this chapter, I give an example of how 
a semiotic approach to interpretation can assist the jurist to move out of the 
confines of his or her spheres of meaning making, into the realm of the other, if 
somewhat tentatively. I also suggest that such an approach enables us to consider 
law other than in instrumentalist terms so that we can appreciate the everyday 
manifestations of socio-legal concepts, such as family, and frame law in permissive 
rather than prescriptive terms. 
 
The analysis illustrates how a legal semiotics, as outlined above, can lead to 
different conceptions of the law and the relationship between the law and the 
everyday. It also indicates the inadequacy of instrumentalist theories of law in so 
far as one cannot predetermine or predict the social engagement with a law. To 
illustrate, I draw on Millbank’s findings in 2000 of alternative families’ low level of 
use of the ACT Act. In this instance, I argue that the success or otherwise of 
progressive law need not be founded on the degrees of use of that law by those 
otherwise disenfranchised legal subjects. Instead, the issue is one of the degree of 
justice, in the terms I outlined in part 1 of this thesis, that is permitted by the law. 
The justice of the legislation is found in its ability to be accessible and open to 
variation in keeping with changing community needs and practices. As Giddens 
argues, “social conduct depends upon … the frames of meaning which lay actors 
themselves draw upon in constituting and reconstituting the social world” 
(1993:163). Justice is found when the law validates these frames of meaning, rather 
than simply matching instrumental intentions and outcomes. 
                                                 
1 These types of decisions are not the norm, today. I present the cases as an example, only, of the 
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The Model Statute 
 
At its inception, the ACT Act was a unique piece of legislation because it created a 
statutory regime for determining the property rights of domestic relationships 
beyond the normal limiting criteria for family law. In this respect, the legislation is 
the first of its kind in the common law world (Millbank 2000a:163). It addresses the 
broad concerns expressed by gay and lesbian advocates, Law Reform Commissions 
and others about the lack of legal redress regarding the property arrangements of 
such domestic relationships (for example, Queensland Law Reform Commission 
1991, 1993; Malcolm 1994; Morgan 1993; Law Commission of Canada 2000; New 
South Wales Law Reform Commission 2001, Western Australian Government 
2001). Some other Australian legislatures have subsequently followed suit. 
 
As noted earlier, the ACT Act applies to parties of a “domestic relationship,” that 
is: 
 
a personal relationship (other than a legal marriage) between 2 adults in which one 
provides personal or financial commitment and support of a domestic nature for 
the material benefit of the other, and includes a de facto marriage (s3(1)). 
 
The defining terms of the act replace the historical form-based syntagm of the FLA, 
which determines relationships in terms of cohabitation, marriage-like relations 
and sexuality. Instead, it considers the nature and character of the relationship, 
whilst maintaining a distinction between the characteristics that distinguish 
domestic relationships from non-domestic (for example, commercial) relationships. 
 
The ACT Act’s scope in terms of form is unlimited, so long as the content of the 
relationship – that is, the degree of “personal or financial commitment and 
support” – is such to mark it as a “domestic relationship”. Millbank calls the 
legislation’s “shift away from the ‘marriage-like’ state … towards the more flexible 
and inclusive criteria of emotional and financial interdependence”, a paradigm 
shift (2000a:164). I would add that the legislation is premised on a deconstruction 
of the traditional parameters of family law, though its capacity is limited by its 
reference to two people only. 
 
The ACT Act provides the legislative parameters for a semiotic construction of the 
meaning of family. However, as with the indexically-open provisions of the FLA, 
that is, the sections relating to children, the method of interpretation limits the 
potential for determining what might be a legitimate domestic relationship and 
how it should be regulated. So how might a semiotic method of interpretation 
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Law as Signifier, Community as Interpretant 
 
My semiotic method, as outlined above, is generally applicable, whether our 
interest in meaning is from the position of jurist, law reformer or social researcher. 
I have noted, above, the significatory consequences of law. In suggesting that the 
law be understood as a sign, that is, something that refers to something other than 
itself, I might be stating the obvious, at least in relation to written texts. For words 
are, without question, referential; that is, they refer to something else, however that 
something might be theorised. But it is the law as a body, whether statute or 
precedent, which operates as a sign, for the law’s functionality as regulator of 
public (and private) affairs hinges on it coming to mean certain things to the 
broader community of which it forms a part, despite the official discourse on legal 
interpretation. Law is much more than a set of meanings as adduced by the legal 
fraternity. Its role in social ordering and regulation depends upon the wider 
community also engaging with it at some level, as discussed in chapter 1. 
 
The interpretative practices of the non-legal community, in particular of those 
marked as ‘other’ from family, may assist us in finding how to interpret the law in 
the space of the everyday. This analysis would seek to explain how non-legal 
communities themselves engage, in terms of an understanding and a materiality, 
with the law, as a means of finding meaning in law. The analysis suggests that law, 
like any other language, is, as Saussure argues in the opening extract, something 
that communities tolerate rather consent to. 
 
Intrinsic to my semiotic method are some claims about meaning construction. I 
have discussed these in detail in preceding chapters, but I will recap them here. 
What family means is not to be found in legislation or caselaw but is embedded in 
the practices of particular communities. This ‘meaning’ is effective, in terms of how 
those communities in turn relate to and operate under any piece of legislation, the 
ACT Act being a case in point. Further, this meaning is historically located – how 
families live is predicated on a history of practices and knowledges. A semiotic 
method of legal interpretation requires a recognition that there is not a single social 
mass through which an ‘objective’ interpretation can be obtained; instead the social 
is comprised of multiplicities, with semiotic communities formed through specific 
practice. Having identified the semiotic community or communities of which the 
parties before the court form a part, an empirical investigation of the uses of the 
concept is required. 
 
The material effects of social practice constitute use, and these activities are 
solutions to socio-logical problems, founded on particular histories. Meaning is 
found here, in the use of signs, rather than in thought or psychological effect. Nor Chapter 12 | 242 
   
is meaning found in a so-called ‘objective’ interpretation of the statute and of legal 
precedent. One’s relationship to the law is predicated upon one’s own community 
practices, not upon legal interpretative practices. We can assume that these 
activities, these problem-solutions, create membership and mark one community 
from another. In the following section, I investigate the meaning of family by 
reference to the community practices formed around the gay/lesbian community 
and its problems-solutions; its meanings of family. 
 
What does my semiotic method of legal interpretation mean for the jurist? It 
requires that, as a part of the process, the jurist considers the practices of the family 
before the court in order to define family for the purposes of the legislation. To 
ensure a semiotic interpretation, as I have outlined it, the jurist should firstly reject 
the possibility of an objective interpretation, especially for any legal definition that 
seeks to capture normative concepts. She or he must know her or his own subject 
position, a subject constructed through a legal discourse as well as other 
discourses. There is no neutral, third party position from which the jurist can make 
an arms-length decision. 
 
Once aware of her or his own subject position (to the degree that this is ever 
possible) the jurist must then try to understand the relevant community 
membership of the parties before her or him. It involves the question of “who are 
you and through what discourses are you constructed?” A determination of family 
construction would come from a reference to the practices of the community or 
communities of which the parties form a part. This is a purely subjective test in 
legal terms. It requires that the jurist look at what the parties understand the nature 
of their social obligation to be, whether they have the emotional and economic 
interdependence of which the legislation speaks. 
 
This goes beyond the positivist discourse on legal interpretation, which would 
usually only expect a reflection on community values when the statute or common 
law refers to the ‘reasonable person, or normative phrases such as ‘best interests’ or 
‘common good’. This is the so-called objective test in law – to find what the 
reasonable person would think, not what the individual before the court of the 
jurist would think. My proposal is a subjective-objective test in legal terms: 
subjective because it refers to the parties’ construction; objective because it 
understands that construction as one which is formed through community, albeit a 
specific community as opposed to a mythical singular community; and subjective-
objective because it recognises the mutual constitutiveness of 
individual/community constructions of meaning. 
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There are instances in which the Family Court of Australia has contemplated 
family practices as a means of understanding family, where the parties have been 
from non-mainstream communities. Re Patrick was such a case. However, as I 
elaborate below, the dictates of a positivist approach to interpretation gave little 
assistance to Guest J to deal with ‘other’ families. 
 
 
This Community’s Use of This Sign: The Practice of Family 
 
The families of gays and lesbians are rich and diverse in composition. The 
literature, to which I refer below, notes a pluralism in family form in such 
communities, including relationships which look like the traditional Western 
family, relationships incorporating principals of non-monogamy, and families 
which are formed through association rather than biology. As Senator Brian Greig, 
(then) leader of the Australian Democrats, explained on national radio, when 
speaking of his life as a gay man, “To us [the gay community] the family means 
close friends” (Greig 2002). He says that it is a common experience, for those in the 
gay community, to be disenfranchised from traditional family. As such, there is the 
need to establish new communities, not necessarily linked through biological ties. 
 
Of course, family in such communities also includes biological connection. As I 
have noted already, 20 per cent of Australian lesbians, gay men and bisexuals have 
children (McNair et al. 2002:1). While many of these children are the biological 
offspring of one of the parties, brought to the relationship, others are born of the 
relationship through a variety of methods of conception. The complexity of family 
formation in relation to children of the relationship was explored by the “Lesbian 
and Gay Families Project” in Victoria, Australia. As McNair et al. explain in relation 
to their discussion of lesbian families: 
 
The issues explored included family formation and methods of conception; reasons 
for choosing such methods; family structure including roles and responsibilities of 
the biological and non-biological mothers and the biological father; levels of social 
and professional support; and finally an exploration of the self-perceived strengths 
and challenges for lesbian-led families (McNair et al. 2002:2). 
 
For gay male families, there are alternative and additional issues, such as the roles 
and responsibilities of non-biological fathers, the means by which a child should be 
conceived, and the role of the biological mother. Whatever the gender, there is by 
necessity a set of issues not generally contemplated by heterosexual families, 
namely the social designation of parenting roles. 
 Chapter 12 | 244 
   
The literature on the recognition of same-sex relationships investigates a range of 
alternative regimes for legally recognising relationship and for bestowing rights 
and obligations on the parties. These include extending rights under existing 
marriage and family law regimes, systems of relationship registration and using 
non-specific mechanisms, such as the creation of living wills or obtaining parenting 
orders under the FLA to protect social parent/child relationships. 
 
The ‘problems’ for these non-heteronormative communities have been: firstly, a 
complexity in the formation of family; secondly, social and legal marginalisation 
(more for some than others); and thirdly, an exclusion from ‘easy’ law regimes for 
resolving problems. This includes the basic issue of who is a parent. Whether the 
community to which we refer is comprised of lesbians, gay men, non-cohabitating 
‘straights’ or friends coinvesting, the problem in at least one aspect has 
traditionally been the same. There has not been access to the law for resolving 
intra-relationship disputes, either because there is no simple forum, or because that 
forum has been known as a heterosexist one. What, then, are the solutions, for 
these communities? 
 
The literature suggests that the lesbian and gay community has its own family 
practices and that it resists adopting traditional ‘family’ practices. This was 
highlighted in the case of Re Patrick in which the biological mother described her 
vision of the role of the biological father. 
 
Heteronormative models of relationship do not necessarily match the experience of 
gays and lesbians. Scholars express concern with the values and characteristics of 
traditional forms of relationship, and subsequently with proposals for 
incorporating alternative family models. They describe a pressure for alternative 
models to conform to the dominant model, despite the value of self-identification, 
and a resistance to replicating traditional gender hierarchies (Colker 1993:321-322, 
Ettlebrick 1993:402, Eskridge 1993:1486-7, Card 1996 in Bolte 1998:10-11, Polikoff 
1993). For example, Millbank criticises options for relationship recognition which 
mimic marriage because such options are: 
 
arguably based upon a heterosexist model of relationships which may not be 
appropriate, as it may not reflect the lived experience of couples in same sex 
relationships (Millbank 2000a:163). 
 
Some writers argue for the autonomy of same-sex relationships because of their 
unique features. There are also lessons that can be gleaned from these, for the 
benefit of other families. Mohr refers to the capacity for long term gay male 
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potential for such alternative practices to enable a rethinking of traditional family 
models (in Bolte 1998:6-7). Card argues that gays and lesbians should create their 
own traditions rather than adopt “flawed traditions” (in Bolte 1998:11-12). 
 
The negotiation that occurs in many gay and lesbian relationships supports 
Giddens’ claim that at the end of modernity relationships, generally, are founded 
on “transactional negotiation” (in Worth et al. 2002:1). This trend was noted by 
McDonald, who has argued that since the 1970s Australians have had a greater 
capacity for choice in relationships (1995b:38-40). This has been discussed in 
greater detail in chapter 8. According to McDonald (1995b) and Struening (1999), 
gay liberation was instrumental in carving out a freedom in relationship and 
familial possibilities. 
 
This does not mean that traditional values are never embraced by gay and lesbian 
families. The demands for marital rights by the gay and lesbian lobby is testament 
to this. Worth et al. have found, through interviews with twenty New Zealand 
men, that “conventional notions of relationships, romantic love and monogamy” 
dominate. Further, they conclude that we should not assume that gay relationships 
are open and democratic, despite Giddens’ suggestion that relationships are now 
transactional (2002:1). Nevertheless, even this research, which shows the 
predominance of traditional relational values in so-called non-traditional 
relationships, indicates that alternative communities grapple with what it means to 
be alternative and that they negotiate, implicitly or explicitly, over what it means to 
be a family. 
 
In summary, the solutions for these communities have been decisions (whether 
‘decisive’ or not) to conduct affairs (social and economic) with a degree of self-
consciousness and an understanding that there is no legal safety net on which to 
rely, or to find alternative means for resolving disputes, perhaps through more 
preventative or conciliatory mechanisms. Non-heteronormative communities 
negotiate the complexity of parenting and economic roles: whether a biological 
parent, not part of a couple, will constitute part of that family; whether she or he 
will be known as parent, as family friend or whether she or he will be known at all; 
whether the parties should co-invest; how the parties’ interests in shared property 
will be protected; and so on. 
 
These practices indicate that these alternative communities focus on a range of 
mechanisms, not commonly considered in mainstream families, for problem 
solving. The cultural practices of this non-heteronormative family community are 
not built around the notion of law as the panacea for their social problems. They 
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heteronormative idea of family. If the parties to a relationship know that they do 
not have recourse to a simplified body of law or wish to position themselves 
outside a heteronormative model, they may have to find alternative arrangements 
to circumvent problems or fallout from disagreement. 
 
These solutions-problems suggest what it means to be a non-heteronormative 
family. They also assist in the constitution of these families as something other than 
a heteronormative family. They are markers of a particular semiotic community, 
and a means by which one becomes identified with that community. Within this 
broad grouping, non-heteronormativity, there can still be marked differences, 
communities within communities. For example, the different uses made of the ACT 
Act by lesbians and gay men (“the gender disparity”) suggests divergent cultural 
practices in response to ‘problems’ (for example the question of children and the 
degree of property investment) (Millbank 2000a:175-177) and therefore a different 
set of possibilities for what it means to be family. It should also be remembered 
that there are not only gender disparities but intercommunity differences based on 
other cultural and identity lines, such as ethnicity, age, class and so on. There is a 
danger in assuming a singular community with a singular set of family practices. 
 
For this loosely defined community, family is clearly different from the 
heteronormative model so often taken as the benchmark of family. Social and 
economic relations are often not taken for granted as is the case of many 
heteronormative families; family can and often does include non-biological 
members, and may self reflectively exclude biological members, such as the donor 
parent. Its formation can follow a series of intense negotiations of the specific roles 
and functions of parties. There may not be an assumption of shared ownership of 
property. This does not mean that there are not disputes which require the 
intervention of the court. It does, however, mean that the nature of same-sex 
families as a distinct category needs to be considered by the court, as the backdrop 
to the litigating parties. 
 
The ACT Act enables the court to endorse these social practices, these solutions to 
socio-legal problems, these meanings of family. But the capacity of this legislation 
(and others like it) to accommodate such differences is limited unless the courts can 
investigate non-legal semiosis. The legislation’s potential can be maximised if the 
role of the court changes from one of determining family from a legal view point to 
one of determining family from the view point of the party before it. 
 
Determining family in this way is true to a constructionist, transactional approach 
to meaning making, in law. In the next section, I show how a semiotic method may 
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and society. This can affect our evaluation of the effectiveness of law and in law 
reform considerations. 
 
 
A Semiotic Approach to the Evaluation of Law 
 
An instrumentalist analysis of legislation considers its effectiveness by reference to 
the substantive outcomes for those within its ambit. However, I have argued that 
the work of any legislation, family law simply being a case in point, relies on the 
signifying practices of the communities of which those subjects form a part and in 
the ways it recognises that communication in law, as elsewhere, is transactional. 
The power and effectiveness of legislation does not simply lie in its jurisdictional 
and substantive possibilities. Alternative meanings, at least for laws that capture 
social norms, should be validated. Further the law means something other than, 
simply, a (particular type of) mechanism, as characterised by the legal system, for 
resolving social problems. 
 
Despite the ACT Act’s potential, Millbank, in her study of cases over a five year 
period from the date of the act’s inception, has discovered that the legislation has 
failed to attract the full ambit of its possible subjects. Of 237 Magistrates’ and 
Supreme Court files studied, only five involved same-sex couples, representing 
only 2.1 per cent of the total, compared to an estimated 8-10 per cent of the 
population (2000a:166-167).2 All of these were lesbian couples. Only one matter 
involved a non-cohabiting couple – a heterosexual couple who had bought 
property, in which they did not live, whilst engaged (2000a:170). One matter 
involved a “non-couple” – a heterosexual couple and a friend who had bought 
property together (2000a:167). In total, 3 per cent of litigants (7 cases) were people 
who fell outside the traditional de facto relationships legislation. This was in a 
population in which 21 per cent of households were constituted by something 
‘other’ than married or de facto heterosexual partnerships and where heterosexual 
de facto relationships comprised only 7 per cent (2000a:167). It would, therefore, be 
reasonable to assume that a greater proportion of litigants who fell into the ‘other’ 
category would have commenced proceedings under the act. If the ACT Act is 
more inclusive and reduces some of the significatory violence of family law, 
generally, why have there been so few applications from these newly constituted 
families? The answer, I argue, may lie in those communities’ own semiosic 
practices, as much as in the very valid reasons outlined by Millbank. 
 
                                                 
2 Millbank had originally intended to study reported and unreported cases. There was only one case 
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Millbank’s central interest is the use of the act by gay men and lesbians. With this 
specific group in mind, she speculates upon the reasons for the lack of use of the 
act, in a formal sense. These are: a lack of knowledge of the act, a reluctance by 
lesbians and gay men to use the formal legal system, differences in property 
ownership trends and the possibility that gay men and lesbians are under-
represented in the ACT population (2000a:167). 
 
Is it possible that, in addition to Millbank’s list of possible reasons for non-use of 
the act, the community practices of non-heteronormative families, as outlined 
above, circumvent the need for reliance (in the intended fashion) on the act? 
Further, is it possible that not all family types have an equivalence in their (legal) 
sign relation so that reliance on traditional remedies for resolving problems (legal 
resolutions) is a practice associated with heteronormative families? 
 
Millbank’s speculative list addresses some of the practicalities of use. She has, 
however, neglected a topic to which she alluded when citing reluctance by lesbians 
and gay men to use the formal legal system as one reason for their non-use of the 
mechanisms of the ACT Act (2000a:170). This is ‘culture’ – the idea that 
communities have their own understandings and practices and that this will affect 
the uses made of law. The particularity of social practice or meaning construction 
may explain the reason for the limited (visible) uptake, of what is an expansive 
piece of legislation, by ‘alternative’ domestic models such as same-sex couples, 
non-cohabiting couples (same-sex or heterosexual) and non-couples such as share-
housing and carer relationships. 
 
We can never escape the mythic history of the originating centre, for semiosis is 
both synchronic and diachronic, concerned with the contingencies of the moment 
as well as with history. If the historical centre of family law has been a prescribed 
heteronormative family, the “repetitions, substitutions, transformations, and 
permutations [will always be] taken from [that] history of meaning” (Derrida 
1978:249). The ACT Act has a past, and communities will make meaning of it and 
form practices, with a view to that past as well as to the present. 
 
The lack of recourse to the ACT Act may be because it connotes certain things to 
this community, perhaps by virtue of its history, such that the community 
‘chooses’ not to rely upon it, or to rely upon it in a certain, unorthodox fashion. 
Non-reliance may well be an act of empowerment, an engagement with the 
critique of traditional family, rather than a mark of disempowerment. 
 
In short, being part of these alternative models of relationship may mean not 
relying upon family law. As the literature suggests, gay and lesbian communities Chapter 12 | 249 
   
have their own sets of values. Some people resist being drawn into 
heteronormativity, the ‘centre’, as the only means of validation. It is, at times, part 
of the culture of this ‘other’ community, to conduct their private economic affairs 
in a manner which is alternative to centre. This is because that centre, at least until 
1994 (and still, in other jurisdictions), was marked as heteronormative family, 
something which was perhaps anathema to the alternative community's practices, 
or simply outside the alternative community’s understanding of itself. So, not 
doing family law in a conventional sense may be part of a resistance to being 
drawn into the traditional paradigm. To rely upon the law in the manner intended 
by the legislation is deviation from that subversion, a challenge to the way in 
which the community has defined itself through its action and use of the law. 
 
I hasten to add that this does not mean that one can simply choose to be outside of 
law. Law omnipresent and the best one can do is remove some of the things that 
might operate as triggers to involvement. Nor does it mean that legal discourse is 
inclusive. The procedures, the processes, and the grammar of law effectively 
exclude certain communities of legal subjects (ironic though it might be), at least in 
terms of a positive and active position. This may be an example of Lyotard’s 
différend – “the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which 
must be able to be put into phrases cannot yet be” (Lyotard 1988:13). In law, these 
are the differences and incommensurabilities which cannot be spoken of or, if they 
are, cannot be heard (Lyotard 1988:10). 
 
In short, there is a way of seeing the non-use of the ACT Act as something other 
than a negative position. It is possible that the respective community’s non-use 
reflects an active, positive engagement with their own cultural practices, a decision 
by community members on how they organise their affairs. Further, the type of 
engagement with the law does important work in terms of the formation of 
community. Millbank may be right that the issue of non-use of the law is a lack of 
awareness, among any number of factors, which a conscientious legal system 
needs to address. But increasing awareness need not necessarily lead to use in the 
way the act’s framers envisaged. There is no simple causal relation between law 
and its goals for we cannot know the movements, the shoots (to return to the 
Deleuzian metaphor of the rhizome) of the sign. Further, the relation of law to 
culture is not binaristic; each is mutually constitutive. And so, it is not, as Millbank 
suggests, a question of matching the use of law of this ‘other’ community – made 
up of a complex set of arrangements and based upon practices of self construction 
– with the use that would be deemed normal by the more widely understood 
family. This would assume the centre and the other were the same in their 
practices and their engagement with the law. 
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Even if awareness is of issue, consent to law is not just a question of communities 
coming to know the law but also of the time it takes for the law to enculturate, to 
affect culture. I have presented some of the ways in which the law affects culture 
insofar as communities develop practices in relation to the availability or otherwise 
of legal remedies. It is likely that practices will continually adapt, in dialogue with 
the new legislation. That the law has changed may lead to a change in culture and 
the constitution new ways of managing economic arrangements. The ACT Act is 
enabling legislation – it permits a flexibility to organise relationships and 
associated economic arrangements. 
 
Yet, as has been the case in child residence cases under the children provisions of 
the FLA, which are relatively indexically-open, dominant constructions of family 
can influence the decision in respect to alternative family forms. A semiotic 
analysis of Re Patrick helps explain this. 
 
 
A Semiotic Analysis of Re Patrick 
 
In the previous chapter, I provided an analysis of family law legislation at a 
paradigmatic level, that is, on the plane of selection. This showed the range of 
family types that Commonwealth and state statutes could recognise. Here I wish to 
go a step further in considering family law on its syntagmatic level, the plane of 
structure. Chandler notes, in his useful guide to semiotics, that: 
 
The study of syntagmatic relations reveals the conventions or ‘rules of 
combination’ underlying the production and interpretation of texts (Chandler 
nd:np). 
 
One means of studying conceptual syntagms is through what is variously known 
as a “myth quadrant” (MacFarquhar 1994:63), a Greimasian grid or “grid of 
consumption values” (Floch 2000:118). The myth quadrant, as coined by 
MacFarquhar, helps to map out the connotations of a sign. The concept has been 
used in marketing to map out the social meaning of brands and to enable 
marketers to adjust advertising campaigns to suit particular markets. 
 
For Lévi-Strauss, myth functions by reconciling contradictions within a culture 
(MacFarquhar 1994:63). It is a type of language, broken into particular components, 
known as mythemes. Myth, like language, acquires meaning only through 
particular combinations of these components, so that studying myth is in fact a 
study of the “universal mental operations” which structure it (Eagleton 1983:104). 
One such mental operation is the making of binary oppositions, which is a device Chapter 12 | 251 
   
that assists one to classify and organise reality and meaning (Eagleton 1983:104). 
Lévi-Strauss’s myth charts map out the mythemes to reveal the oppositions that 
the myth attempts to reconcile (MacFarquhar 1994:63). I have already alluded to 
the violence of the opposition, and of justice that comes with the acceptance of the 
undecidable, the incalculable. Nevertheless, understanding the binaries that have 
assisted meaning construction can place us in a position to know better the space of 
the undecidable. 
 
According to MacFarquhar, the myth quadrant explains whether a semiotic move 
is socially-culturally permitted. A single quadrant move is permissible. A diagonal 
move is too culturally challenging to be accepted by a semiotic community 
(1994:64). In Lyotard’s terms, the diagonal quadrants represent contradictory 
idioms and the incommensurability between them. The diagonal space represents 
something which cannot be put into a phrase that is comprehensible to the starting 
position. 
 
Using the myth quadrant helps explain the outcome in Re Patrick. Before 
undertaking the discussion I should concede that my presentation of arguments is 
cumbersome given the sensitivity of the case, and it is important that my writing 
be considered an articulation of concepts in light of the case, not as a criticism of 
the case. As I noted earlier, the tragic outcome should not, in any way, be 
considered a consequence of the judgment. If anything, the analysis issues a 
warning of the difficulty, at times, impossibility, of moving beyond the 
significatory conventions of which we are a part. 
 
The arguments contained in, and the decision of, Re Patrick indicate a particular 
conceptual syntagm – the grammar of family. The tension arises over a difference 
in understanding, an ideological difference, if we return to the language of Guest J 
(quoted in chapter 8; see also Barthes and Floch in chapter 10), over the structure 
which imbues the signifier ‘family’ with meaning. 
 
As already noted, the basic elements of this structure are sexuality and family 
form; family has tended to be associated with heterosexuality and nuclear 
modelling. These can be mapped out in a quadrant with their opposites, 
homosexuality and non-nuclear (extended, single-parent, non-cohabiting, non-
sexual) (see Figure 1). The dominant connotation of family sits in the 
heterosexuality/nuclear quadrant, at position 1. 
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The dominant position, as indicated by those provisions of the FLA which place 
traditional parenting arrangements at the centre, is the space between 
heterosexuality and nuclear modelling. It was inherent in the institutional 
positioning of Guest J that he start his deliberations in this space (position 1). He 
accepted that there are “homo-nuclear families”, a move to the adjacent quadrant 
(position 2). Section 60H provides that a child conceived through artificial 
insemination is a child of the mother, not of the mother and biological father. This 
therefore left it open to Guest J to find that the homo-nuclear family of the FLA was 
the biological mother and the social mother or co-parent, leading to a decision 
based upon the concept of the homo-nuclear family. However, the result would 
have been that the biological father/donor would have a peripheral role in the 
child’s life, as would any “other person” (as opposed to the “parent”) to use the 
language of the FLA, and that contact arrangements would have reflected this 
relationship. His Honour’s comments suggests that this was an unacceptable 
position. 
 
If Guest J had moved into the non-nuclear/homosexuality quadrant (position 3), 
he may have satisfied his own concerns for the role of the father/donor in the 
child’s life. It would then have been possible for him to validate the same-sex Chapter 12 | 253 
   
parenting union of the biological mother and the co-parent, as well as provide a 
role for the donor that Guest J deemed to be “father”, a stretch of the legislative 
provision. However, these are the oppositions of the dominant elements. If 
MacFarquhar is right in her gauging of the acceptance of semiotic tensions, such a 
move would have been too remote from the original position to legitimately 
constitute family for those who accept the dominant position. The contradictions 
would have been incommensurable. 
Despite the attempts by Guest J to rethink the nature of family in a particularly 
difficult case, the dominant family values of ‘nuclear’ and’ heterosexual’ won out. 
His Honour reverted to a position which favoured nuclear, heterosexual parenting 
arrangements, ordering contact arrangements normally provided for the non-
residential parent of a child. Hence, his Honour returns to the dominant quadrant, 
to find that the father/donor was the second parent, in true hetero-nuclear form. 
However, in attempting to accommodate the place of the social mother, Guest J’s 
final move was arguably to a point that was close to the heterosexual/non-nuclear 
quadrant (position 4). Given the starting point, this was the space which could 
permit recognition of the biological father, as father, and the social parent. On 
MacFarquhar’s semiotic modelling, the decision, located so close to the diagonal 
quadrant opposite the mother’s starting position, was too great a contradiction to 
be reconciled by the mother. It was, however, commensurate with the dominant 
(FLA) position. 
 
If the starting point was the meaning of family from the position of the community 
before the court, a different outcome might have been acceptable to the parties. 
That is, if the court’s role was to ascertain meaning according to the same-sex 
community, the diagonal (to dominant meaning) might have been acceptable. 
Patrick’s mother, co-parent and father/donor each understood that Patrick’s family 
was homo-nuclearly constructed, with the mother and co-parent at the core, even 
though the father/donor sought contact times normally provided to a father figure. 
Nevetheless, the meaning of family for this community could sit quite comfortably 
(and meaningfully) in the nuclear/homosexual quadrant (see Figure 2). An 
adjacent shift to the homosexual/non-nuclear quadrant would have permitted a 
validation of the homo-nuclear family constituted by Patrick’s mother and co-
parent, while permitting a role for the father as another parent, as desired by Guest 
J. 
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The case is a clear example of the différend. Lyotard explains that: 
 
a case of the différend between two parties takes place when the “regulation” 
of the conflict which opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties 
while the injustice suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom 
(1984:5). 
 
Here, the mother suffered an injustice because the proceedings took place in the 
idiom of the court, rather than in the idiom of the parties. Because the court’s idiom 
included an inherent role for the father figure, it favoured the biological father 
even though he, also, might not have shared that idiom. However, the Court’s 
phrasing could not accommodate the language of ‘family’ as enunciated by the 
mother and co-parent. 
 
Before making a decision in the case of Re Patrick, Guest J undertook independent 
research and received expert evidence on the nature of the same-sex family. In this 
respect, his approach was consistent with the semiotic method outlined above. A 
process of interpretation which directed Guest J to move to a subjective standard 
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parties before him; to start in that community’s quadrant of meaning. In this space, 
the biological father is not automatically the social father, and something other 
than the norm is not only contemplatable, it is inherent in the arrangements for 
conception. A doctrinal requirement that a court defer to the semiotic practices of 
the community before it, may have assisted it to come to a position that was 
tolerable to all the parties before it. 
 
I noted that the FLA is positioned in the heterosexual/nuclear quadrant setting a 
statutory context for the judicial interpretation of family. The ACT Act, on the 
other hand, is positioned within the centre (see Figure 2), permitting a court to 
remain interpretatively open to the semiotic communities before it. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have illustrated the applications of my particular version of a 
semiotics of law. Firstly, I showed how a semiotic approach to interpretation might 
assist a court to find the meanings of the everyday, privileging these lived-in 
meanings of family over those determined through the law and legal discourse. 
Secondly, I indicated that such a method would also assist us to understand the 
transactional nature of law, by reference to the uses of the ACT Act by the gay and 
lesbian community. This indicated that that community has developed its own 
familial relationships and practices, including a set of mechanisms to resolve 
family disputes, as a response to the lack of simple redress. Finally, I illustrated 
how such a method permits us to understand meaning construction and its relative 
positioning in competing communities. I used semiotic method, a syntagmatic 
analysis, to attempt to understand the meanings of family prevalent in the 
judgment of Re Patrick. 
 
The concluding remarks of the last section may be cause for pessimism. Despite the 
sincere efforts of Guest J, the Court was unable to breach the différend. However, 
Lyotard gives us hope. He says: 
 
To give the différend its due is to institute new addressees, new addressers, new 
significations, and new referents in order that the injustice find an expression and 
that the plaintiff cease to be a victim. This requires new rules for the formation and 
linking of phrases … Every injustice must be able to be phrased. It is necessary to 
find a new competence (1984:7). 
 
Traditional approaches to framing legislation have closed off the possibility for a 
linking of the phrasing of the legal and the non-legal; the inside and the outside of Chapter 12 | 256 
   
law. However, by defining jurisdictional terms in a way which is indexically-open, 
the Australian Capital Territory, and other states which have followed suit, have 
created the possibility for courts to accommodate non-legal idioms and to permit 
injustices to be phrased. The next step is to adopt a different interpretative 
approach; one which directs that a court know its own limits and attempt to find 
ways of forming a bridge to the phrasing of the other. This is the goal of my 
semiotic method. 
 Conclusion 
 
Law conceives of itself as a distinct field of interpretation, where its methods 
of meaning construction can be contained, limited by rules to aid 
interpretation. The law marks out a clear domain between the inside and the 
outside of law, between legal meaning and non-legal meaning. However, 
law exists in dialogue with the social. It is created to determine matters in, 
and in response to, the social sphere. Further, social and cultural imperatives 
affect the practice (if not the process) of interpretation. Yet, in determining 
social matters, law’s truth reigns over other truths. 
 
In this thesis, I have attempted to form a bridge between the truths of the 
outside and law’s rendering of them. I have challenged the command model 
of law, which assumes a transmission model of communication. I prefer to 
view legal communication in transactional terms, with both the so-called 
author and audiences being involved in the construction of meaning. I have 
conceded that there may be some laws, Witteveen’s “significant” laws, 
where it is proper for the law to provide a definitive statement of their 
significatory content. However, other laws, Witteveen’s “symbolic” and 
“symphonic” laws, are concerned with matters that exist independently of 
the law, outside the law. They reflect social norms, rather than legal norms. 
It is therefore improper that the law fail to recognise those normatively 
formed concepts in their living state. I have used the example of the family in 
Australian law, to explicate the problem. 
 
By reference to social, political and legal fields, I describe the different 
meanings of family over time. I show that the official statements on family 
do not necessarily reflect the reality of family life. Similarly, legal reform 
does not always effect policy goals, as assumed by an instrumentalist view of 
law. However, the law may, as just one signal of appropriate behaviour, 
influence the constitution of family. The notion of a wall between the inside Chapter | 258 
and the outside of law is not sustainable. This is self evident from the 
continual migration between legal and social fields of knowledge. The 
courts’ involvement in cultural awareness exercises is recognition of this fact 
on the part of the discipline. The challenge, however, is for law to question 
its own foundational myths: the idea of a distinct, definable legal field, and 
of determinacy and objectivity in legal decision-making. 
 
In defining the family in narrow terms, the law has traditionally limited the 
play of the sign, closing off the possibilities for the court to recognise a wide 
range of familial relationships. This is particularly the case for the 
Commonwealth legislation, under which family is generally defined as a 
nuclear model by virtue of the constitutional limit on Commonwealth 
power. The Commonwealth Parliament can only legislate on marriage and 
matrimonial causes. Marriage is narrowly defined in monogamous, 
heterosexual terms by reference to the nineteenth century case of Hyde. 
 
Derrida argues that this type of significatory closure is a violence. Although 
some states and territories have mitigated the effect of the narrow definition 
of family, one of the effects is to create a hierarchy of legitimacy, affirming 
the centrality of the nuclear family model, and marginalising, in varying 
degrees, other family relationships. 
 
I have argued that, in addition to law’s violence in its denial of the other, 
there is a différend in the inability of the outside, to express their idea of 
family in the somewhat limited idiom of the court. For Lyotard, this is an 
injustice. The injustice could be reduced if new ways were created so that it 
could “be phrased”, for there to be a “new competence” (Lyotard 1984:7). 
 
A reoccurring theme of this thesis has been the idea that experience and 
action should replace reified conceptions of family. Judges, politicians and 
socio-legal scholars have each described family as something people do, Chapter | 259 
rather than, necessarily, a particular form or entity. I liken this idea of ‘doing’ 
to Lyotard’s notion of “feeling”; that is, that one’s sense of familial 
relationship is something one feels or experiences. This is not something that 
necessarily inheres in a particular family form. 
 
I have developed a legislative and interpretative model which would enable 
the court to defer to the outside in determining the law, using semiotic 
method. This requires that Parliaments frame legislation, for normative 
concepts like the family, in indexically open terms, with a concentration on 
the characteristics of a relationship (based on what people ‘do’ which is, in 
turn, based on ‘feeling’) rather than on a particular form. This has been the 
approach adopted by some of the states and I would hope that the 
Commonwealth would take the challenge to do the same, powers 
permitting. 
 
Further, my approach requires that the jurist self-consciously interpret; that 
is, be aware of her or his own subject position in making the decision. This 
provides the justification for the jurist to go outside of her belief system to 
determine the norms of the other, and decide accordingly. After all, if she or 
he realises that there is no determinacy in decision-making, then the outside 
truth is as legitimate as the inside truth, legal process permitting. The desire 
for gatekeeping mechanisms (the requirement for consistency and certainty, 
as well as limit on the jurist’s power) need not mean that the outside should 
be kept separate from the inside. Part of the interpretative method can 
include reference to the outside, an analysis of a variety of fields of meaning 
making. For Derrida, this type of decision-making would be a case of 
calculating the incalculable, permitting a greater justice than merely apply 
the rule or enforcing the law. 
 
My vision for the future is that law is more humble, generally, in its 
engagement with the so-called outside, and of it own truth-claims. Only then Chapter | 260 
could the open-indexicality of any statute be given its due; only then could 
the division between the outside and the inside begin to be breached.    Family Law on Syntagmatic and Paradigmatic Planes 
Syntagmatic 
Axis: 
plane of 
combination 
Statute(s)  Signifier  A: Party A  B: Relationship – a thing 
(The Original Paradigm) 
C: Party B – as a relation of B  Indexical Potential* 
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)  Family Adult  person 
+ jurisdictional 
issues. 
Hyde-like heteronormative: 
family through marriage. 
Opposite sex. 
Part of couple. 
Not necessarily cohabiting. 
1 – little indexical potential. 
De Facto Relationships Acts 
(1996 (SA), 1991 (NT), 1999 
(Tas)) 
De facto 
relationship/ 
partner 
As above  Looks like heteronormative 
family (requires cohabitation). 
Opposite sex cohabiting partner. 
Not married. 
0.5 – less indexical potential than Family 
Law Act 1975 because of cohabitation 
requirement. 
 
Property Law Acts (1958 
(Vic), 1974 (Qld)) 
De facto 
relationship/ 
partner 
As above  Looks like heteronormative 
family (requires cohabitation). 
Opposite or same-sex cohabiting 
partner. 
Not married. 
1 – recognition of same-sex partner offsets 
cohabitation closure. 
 
Family Court Act 1975 (WA) 
 
Family  As above  a) Looks like heteronormative 
family (requires cohabitation). 
b) Carer-parent of a child of the 
relationship +  just and 
equitable provision.**Close to 
new paradigm (below). 
a) Opposite or same-sex cohabiting 
partner. 
Not married. 
b) Parent of B’s child. 
1.5 – recognition of same-sex partner 
offsets cohabitation closure. Just and 
equitable principle re: co-parent increases 
indexical potential. 
Property (Relationships) Act 
1984 (NSW) 
Domestic 
relationship Æ 
(a) De facto 
(b) Close personal 
relationship (see 
below) 
As above  a) Looks like heteronormative 
family (requires cohabitation). 
b) See below (new paradigm). 
a) Opposite or same-sex cohabiting 
partner. 
Not married 
b) See below. 
a) 1 – recognition of same-sex partner 
offsets cohabitation closure. 
b) See below. 
 
     B: Relationship – a set of 
qualities 
(The New Paradigm) 
  
Property (Relationships) Act 
1984 (NSW) 
Domestic 
relationship Æ 
(a) De facto (above) 
(b) Close personal 
relationship 
As above  b) Characteristics (provides 
personal care and domestic 
support) + cohabitation. 
b) Cohabiting friend, partner, 
biological or social family member or 
some other ‘close personal 
relationship’. 
Gender not relevant. 
Not married. 
b) 3 – high indexicality compared to FLA. 
Limited by cohabitation requirement. 
Domestic Relationships Act 
1994 (ACT) 
Domestic 
relationship 
As above  Characteristics (provides 
personal and financial 
commitment and support). 
Cohabiting or non-cohabiting friend, 
partner, biological or social family 
member or some other ‘domestic 
relationship’. 
Gender not relevant. 
Not married. 
Almost infinite indexical potential - as 
long as characteristics satisfied. 
Not limited to particular forms of 
relationship. 
Main limit is that the relationship be 
between two, unmarried persons. 
Paradigmatic 
Axis: 
plane of 
substitution 
Relationships Act 2003 (Tas)  Personal 
relationship Æ  
a) Significant 
relationship 
 b) Caring 
relationship 
As above  a) Couple relationship 
b) Characteristics (provides 
domestic or personal care). 
Cohabiting or non-cohabiting friend, 
partner, biological or social family 
member or some other ‘domestic 
relationship’. 
Gender not relevant. 
Not married. 
Almost infinite indexical potential - as 
long as characteristics satisfied. 
Not limited to particular forms of 
relationship. 
Main limit is that the relationship be 
between two, unmarried persons. 
*The indexical potential figure is an arbitrary figure. I use ‘1’ as the base figure, for the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The index for other statutes is in relation to this. **Trends in relation to the just and equitable provision are yet to develop. References1 
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